UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ion Catalin VRANCEA, aka Raul Caba, aka Iulian Ichim, aka Imre Makara, Defendant-Appellant, 688 F. App'x 94

SUMMARY ORDER Ion Catalin Vrancea appeals from the amended judgment entered October 27, 2015 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Kuntz, /.), sentencing him principally to 180 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release after his conviction on one count each of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1); destruction of evidence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519; use of arson to commit obstruction of justice or destruction of evidence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1); use of fire to damage real or personal property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i); and use of a false passport, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1543.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review. On January 15, 2013, a jury found Vran-cea guilty of the charges listed above. The district court sentenced him principally to 360 months’ imprisonment. Vrancea appealed his conviction and that component of his sentence to this Court. We affirmed the conviction, but ruled that “the district court committed plain error by failing to adequately explain its sentence,” and remanded for resentencing. United States v. Vrancea, 606 Fed.Appx. 21,24 (2d Cir. 2015).

The district court re-sentenced Vrancea to 180 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. Vrancea again appealed, using the procedure set forth in United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994). We affirm for the reasons set forth in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See United States v. Vrancea, 136 F.Supp.3d 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). The record fully supports the district court’s finding that Vrancea committed perjury.

Additionally, the district court, in considering Vrancea’s double jeopardy argument, correctly concluded that Counts Three and Four were “separate offenses for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause as each requires proof of an element the other does not.” Id. 136 F.Supp.3d at 398-99.

We find no merit to Vrancea’s argument that the conduct underlying Count Three, using fire to commit a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), and Count Four, using fire to damage real or personal property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) — namely, setting things on fire — is factually the same, such that consecutive sentences for the two counts violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Such an approach is inconsistent with Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (“[Wjhere the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 702-03, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (applying the Blockburger test); Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985).

We have considered the remainder of Vrancea’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is- AFFIRMED.