P. Stephen LAMONT, individually and as Nominee of 100% of the Capital Shares of Arumai Holdings, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ann EDWARDS, in her individual and official capacity, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Frank R. Alvarez, in his individual and official capacity, et al., Defendants, 690 F. App'x 61

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant P. Stephen Lamont (“Lamont”), proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(

b) for failure to comply with multiple district court orders directing that he, inter alia, refrain from email communications with parties to the case, their counsel, or their affiliates without permission. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review a district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(

b) for abuse of discretion. See Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 2009). While our review is deferential, we are mindful that a Rule 41(

b) dismissal is “a harsh remedy to be utilized only in extreme situations,” Jackson v. City of New York, 22 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Alvarez v. Simmons Mkt. Research Bureau, Inc., 839 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1988)), particularly when the offending party is a pro se litigant, LeSane v. Hall’s Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(

b) provides for involuntary dismissal “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with the[] [federal] rules [of civil procedure] or a court order.” We consider five factors “in light of the record as a whole” when reviewing a Rule 41(

b) dismissal for failure to comply: “(1) the duration of the plaintiffs failure to comply with the court order; (2) whether the plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal; (3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings; (4) a balancing of the court’s interest in managing its docket with the plaintiffs interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard; and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal.” Spencer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1998). No single factor is dispositive.

See U.S. ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 2004). As a threshold matter, we do not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s contempt and show cause order, with which Lamont takes issue in his principal brief on appeal. That order is interlocutory because it did not “end[ ] the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)).

Although interlocutory orders typically “merge with the judgment for purposes of appellate review,” no such merger occurs when an action is dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b). Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 1999). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Lamont’s complaint for failure to comply with multiple district court orders pursuant to Rule 41(

b) because the first, second, and fifth Spencer factors strongly favor dismissal. Lamont engaged in a persistent, six-month email campaign following the district court’s first order on the matter despite repeated warnings; the district court warned Lamont on multiple occasions that ongoing non-compliance with its orders could result in dismissal; and lesser sanctions, namely monetary penalties, were imposed before the action was dismissed.

Although the third and fourth Spencer factors — prejudice to the defendants and docket management — do not favor dismissal as strongly as the other factors, we nonetheless conclude that, “in light of the record as a whole,” Spencer, 139 F.3d at 112, dismissal was not an abuse of discretion here. We have considered all of Lamont’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court. . While the district court never explicitly indicated it was dismissing the action pursuant to Rule 41(b), on appeal the parties agree that this was the basis for dismissal. .

In light of this determination, the motion of Defendants-Appellees Gregory A. Salent and Julie Y. Low for an extension of time to file their briefs is denied as moot.