Edwin J. JENSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Correctional Officer John MULLIN, Jr., Defendant-Appellee, 692 F. App'x 61

SUMMARY ORDER ’ Plaintiff-appellant Edwin J. Jenson brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against correction officer John Mullin, Jr., alleging a denial of his constitutional right to due process in the prison disciplinary proceedings against him. In a September 27, 2016 Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court granted

summary judgment to Mullin on the grounds that there was no violation of due process and, in the alternative, that Mullin was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to any such violation. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. Shortly after being conditionally released from the Chenango County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), Jenson tested positive for Suboxone and appeared at a hearing in Chenango County Court.

Several witnesses—including the Chenango County Drug Coordinator Jim Everard and Jenson’s probation officer Jonathan Dunckel—reported to Mullin’s fellow correction officers, including one Sergeant Hackett, that in that hearing Jenson admitted to having obtained and used drugs while incarcerated at CCCF, According to these witnesses, Jenson had also provided a plausible explanation for how he obtained Suboxone at CCCF (including naming the inmate, incarcerated on his cell block, who had supplied the drugs).

Upon Jenson’s return to CCCF, Mullin presided over a disciplinary hearing against Jenson pertaining to the conduct he had allegedly admitted. Prior to the hearing, Mullin personally spoke to Sergeant Hackett as well as Dunckel and Everard, but none of these individuals themselves provided evidence during the hearing. Among other things, Jenson argued at the hearing that he had said merely that he “could have” obtained and used Suboxone while incarcerated at CCCF in an attempt to avoid having his conditional release revoked.

Mullin found Jenson guilty and he was sentenced principally to 120 days of administrative segregation. On appeal, Jenson argues that he was denied due process because there was no “‘reliable evidence’” of his guilt in the record. Jenson Br. 16 (quoting Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order, and the fact that Mullin acknowledged at the hearing making an admission in the County Court that corroborated the hearsay statements, we conclude that there was no violation of Jen-son’s due process rights and Mullin was entitled to

summary judgment. Accordingly, the September 27, 2016 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.