Deborah HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner for Social Security, Defendant-Appellee, 697 F. App'x 101

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Deborah Hill appeals from a May 17, 2016, Order of the district court, denying her motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the factual and procedural history of the case, the district court’s rulings, as well as the arguments presented on appeal. “We review the district court’s [decision regarding] attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.” Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Auto. Club of N.Y., Inc. v.

Dykstra, 520 F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir. 2008)). “Inasmuch as the resolution of the district court’s [decision regarding] attorney’s fees implicates questions of law, our review is de novo.” Id. (citing Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 2008)).

Section 406(

b) provides that an attorney who represents Social Security disability claimants in federal court may petition for attorney’s fees “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant ... who was represented before the court by an attorney.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The statute authorizes the court to allow such a fee as part of the judgment, not exceeding 25 percent “of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” Id. Here, the district court did not render any judgment on Hill’s Social Security claim. Instead, Hill voluntarily dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(

a) and chose to seek relief available through the terms of a separate settlement agreement, the Padro Settlement, resulting in the readjudication of her claims at the administrative level. Although Hill ultimately achieved the relief she sought, the voluntary dismissal entered by the district court neither established her entitlement to past-due benefits nor created a fund from which a

Section 406(

b) fee award could be allowed. Hill’s motion for attorney’s fees, therefore, was properly denied by the district court. We have considered Hill’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. The order of the district court denying Hill’s motion for attorney’s fees is AFFIRMED.