Jesus SANTIAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee. John Does 1-20, being the fictitious names of the New York City Police Officers whose names are not known to Plaintiff, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants, 697 F. App'x 36

SUMMARY ORDER Jesus Santiago filed this civil rights action seeking to recover under various federal and state statutes for alleged injuries arising from a claimed assault by members of the New York City Police Department. The District Court, in a September 26, 2016 Memorandum and Order adopting the September 6, 2016 Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Reyes, M.J.), granted the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(

c) and denied leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Santiago challenges these rulings on appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. Santiago first argues that the District Court erred in granting the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. On de novo review, Hayden v.

Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010), we agree with the District Court that Santiago’s advancement of only conclusory allegations about the alleged assault requires dismissal of his complaint for failure to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Indeed, Santiago “con-cedéis]”—as he did in the District Court— that his complaint contains only conclusory allegations, but contends that no more is needed. Appellant’s Br. 6. This argument misapprehends the law. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (noting that “con-clusory” allegations are “not entitled to be assumed true”). Santiago also challenges the District Court’s order denying his motion for leave to amend to substitute the names of specific police officers for the “John Does” pseudonym that he used in the complaint. Reviewing the order for abuse of discretion, Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars, LLC, 856 F.3d 216, 224 (2d Cir. 2017), we find no such abuse here.

We affirm that order substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its Memorandum and Order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. We note, in addition, that even had Santiago been permitted to substitute names of police officers for the pseudonym he initially used, his proposed amended complaint was insufficient in that it contained no additional factual allegations.

Like Santiago’s original complaint, as to which the District Court entered judgment on the pleadings, the proposed amended complaint contained solely conclusory allegations; denying leave to amend was proper for this reason as well. See F5 Capital v. Pappas, 856 F.3d 61, 90 (2d Cir. 2017) (upholding refusal to grant leave to amend where plaintiff “has not explained how it could amend the complaint to ... survive a motion to dismiss”).

Finally, to the extent Santiago argues that, because he filed suit in federal court, his state law claims are not subject to dismissal for failure to comply with New York State’s notice-of-claim requirement, N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e, he is mistaken. See Hardy v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 793 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We start with the general rule that in a federal court, state notice-of-claim statutes apply to state-law claims.” (emphasis omitted)). * * * We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit.

The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.