McCarty CLARKE, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent, 697 F. App'x 61

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner McCarty Clarke, a native and citizen of Jamaica, seeks review of a June 29, 2016 decision of the BIA affirming a November 10, 2014 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering Clarke’s removal to Jamaica. In re McCarty Clarke, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 29, 2016), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. Hartford Nov. 10, 2014). We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Clarke obtained conditional residency based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, whom he later divorced. Following the divorce, he sought to remove the condition on his residency. To remove the condition without filing a petition jointly with a U.S. citizen spouse, Clarke requested a waiver of the joint petition requirement on the ground that “the qualifying marriage was entered into in good faith” but had since terminated. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B); see also id. § 1186a(c)(l)(A).

The IJ and BIA determined that Clarke failed to demonstrate that the marriage was entered into in good faith, and denied his waiver request. Because the waiver Clarke sought is granted on a discretionary basis, our review is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(c)(4), 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), 1252(a)(2)(D); Contreras-Salinas v. Holder, 585 F.3d 710, 713-15 (2d Cir. 2009). Clarke challenges the weight the agency afforded his evidence. This aspect of the agency’s decision is beyond our jurisdiction to review. Contreras-Salinas, 585 F.3d at 713-14; see also Boluk v.

Holder, 642 F.3d 297, 304 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The amount of weight to be accorded any particular fact raises no question of law and is accordingly not within this Court’s jurisdiction to review... .”). Clarke’s argument that the agency should not have denied the waiver based on his failure to provide his daughter’s birth certificate is misplaced. As the BIA explained in its decision, the IJ did not rely on Clarke’s initial failure to produce the requested documentation, and instead denied the waiver on the ground that Clarke failed to establish that he entered into his marriage in good faith.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED. . We note that Congress has amended 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) twice since our decision in Contreras-Salinas was issued. See Amendment—Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L, 112-58, § 1, 125 Stat, 747, 747 (2011); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, § 806, 127 Stat. 54, 112. When Contreras-Salinas was decided, § 1186a(c)(4) expressly gave the Attorney General discretion to grant waivers of the joint petition requirement. See 585 F.3d at 713.

The two recent amendments replaced "Attorney General” with "Secretary of Homeland Security” throughout § 1186a, including at § 1186a(c)(4). § 1, 125 Stat. at 747 (enacting "Conforming Amendments”); § 806, 127 Stat. at 112 (making "Technical Corrections”). Our Court has not yet determined the effect, if any, of these amendments on our jurisdiction over challenges to denials of joint petition waivers. We think it unnecessary in this case to take up that issue, which Clarke’s brief does not address.

Even if we had jurisdiction to review Clarke's challenge, we would conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the finding by the IJ and BIA that Clarke failed to establish that he entered into the marriage in good faith. See Nguyen v. Holder, 743 F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 2014).