Danica BULOVIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY, LLC, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Industry Pension Fund-Future Service Pension Plan, Defendants-Appellees, 698 F. App'x 21

SUMMARY ORDER UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff-Appellant Danica Bulovic (“Bu-lovic”), proceeding pro se, appeals from a September 7, 2016 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (McMahon, C.J.) that sua sponte dismissed her complaint as barred by issue preclusion and claim preclusion. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Bulovic is seeking pension benefits that she believes she earned while working for Edwards Super Food, a grocery store operated by First National Supermarkets (“First National”), which in turn was owned by The Stop and Shop Supermarket Company (“Stop & Shop”). Bulovic v. Both, 14 F.Supp.3d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Bulovic I”). Stop & Shop had contributed money to United Food & Commercial Workers (“UFCW”) pension funds on behalf of First National employees, including Bulovic. Id. at 367. In 2012, Bulovic sued the UFCW Local 1500 Fund (and its manager/trustee).

The district court in Bulovic I construed her complaint as asserting causes of action under Sections 104(

b) and 502(

c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), and as challenging the Fund’s decision to deny her application for pension benefits. Id. at 378. After an extensive review of both the applicable retirement plan and Bulovic’s work history, the district court concluded that Bulovic lacked standing to assert any of these claims because she was neither a “participant” nor a “beneficiary” under ERISA. Id. at 390. In so finding, the court concluded that Bulovic did not “have a colorable claim to vested benefits, nor did she have such a claim at any point before or after her termination.” Id. at 386. The court granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment in a March 31, 2014 order. Id. at 390-91. In June 2016, Bulovic filed a new complaint alleging the same series of facts. She now sued Stop & Shop and a national union pension fund of the UFCW (without specifying any local) for pension benefits owed to her based on her employment from 1989 to 1999 with Stop & Shop, Waldbaum’s, and A & P, just as in Bulovic I. The district court issued an order on August 11, 2016 granting her permission to proceed informa pawperis.

On September 7, 2016, the district court then dismissed her complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Even after construing her complaint as liberally as possible, the district court concluded that Bulovic was bringing the same claim she brought in Bulovic I and was precluded from doing so under both res judicata and collateral estoppel. * * * This Court reviews de novo the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004).

Relitigation of an issue of fact or law is precluded on the basis of collateral estoppel if “(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” Bank of New York v. First Millennium, Inc., 607 F.3d 905, 918 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ball v. A.O. Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2003).

We agree with the district court that Bulovie’s current complaint raises the exact same issue she lost on three years ago. The complaint makes clear she seeks “overdue pension benefits” she purportedly earned while employed at various grocery stores from 1989 to 2000. Bulovic can prevail only by demonstrating she met one of her pension plan’s criteria for vesting. In Bulovic I, (1) the district court held that she did not meet any of the criteria, (2) this issue was actually decided in Bulovic I,

(3) Bulovic had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue (she argued her own case before the district court in person, and the district court published a twenty-page opinion developing but ultimately rejecting the best arguments for her position), and (4) this issue was the basis for the district court’s decision in Bulovic I. Bulovic contends that the present case is distinct from her earlier action because in that case she was not actually attempting to claim her pension benefits. Instead, she says, she was only alleging breach of fiduciary duty for refusal to provide relevant pension plan documents under

Section 502. Assuming arguendo that this is the case, however, the Bulovic I court found that in order to address Bulovic’s

Section 502 claims, “the court must necessarily, if indirectly, also address Plaintiffs putative claim that the [UFCW Local 1500 Fund’s] Board erred in denying her pension benefits application.” Bulovic I, 14 F.Supp.3d at 379. Since the Bulovic I court concluded that the board did not err, Bulovic is es-topped from relitigating her entitlement to pension benefits, and thus the present complaint was properly dismissed on the basis of issue preclusion. See Purdy, 337 F.3d at 258. We have considered all of Bulovic’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. . The court subsequently denied Bulovic's motion for reconsideration on November 17, 2016. However, because Bulovic did not amend her notice of appeal or file a new notice of appeal to include the district court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration, that denial is not before us for review. See Sorensen v. City of New York, 413 F.3d 292, 295-96 (2d Cir. 2005) (a notice of appeal filed after entry of judgment but before an order disposing of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)(4) motion does not give the Court jurisdiction to review that order).