Gayle R. DIGIROLAMO, Plaintiff-Appellant, Yvonne R. Haskins, Plaintiff, v. Randy L. SARGENT, Dale Robbins, Defendants-Appellees, 699 F. App'x 84

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Gayle R. Digirolamo, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s judgment dismissing this action without prejudice. Digirolamo purportedly filed a complaint pro se in the District Court. She did not respond to a motion to dismiss and told the Court that she had not signed or filed the complaint; she said, however, that she wanted the action to. proceed. The Court granted her extensions of time to oppose the motion to dismiss and warned her that failure to comply with its orders could result in dismissal.

She did not file an opposition, and the court dismissed the action without prejudice. The Court reasoned that Digirolamo had not filed the complaint and had failed to comply with its orders to oppose the motion to dismiss. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. Digirolamo’s brief does not challenge any basis of the District Court’s dismissal order. She has therefore abandoned any challenge to the Court’s decision. See Lo-Sacco v.

City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (pro se litigant abandons issue by failing to raise it in brief). In any event, the District Court properly dismissed the complaint. Digirolamo did not sign or file the complaint; it appears instead to have been filed by a person who was not an attorney and who was therefore not permitted to represent her. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (complaint must be signed “by a party personally if the party is unrepresented”); Guest v.

Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A person who has not been admitted to the practice of law may not represent anybody other than himself.”). The Court also did not err in dismissing the complaint for Digirolamo’s failure to comply with the Court’s orders to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss. See Spencer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). We therefore AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment of September 1, 2016.