IN RE: CONGREGATION BIRCHOS YOSEF Debtor, Bais Din of Mechon L'Hoyroa, Appellant, v. Congregation Birchos Yosef, Debtor-Appellee, 699 F. App'x 91

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Bais Din of Mechón L’Hoyroa (“the Bais Din”) appeals from a judgment of the Southern District of New York (Sei-bel, J.) entered October 20, 2016, dismissing the Bais Din’s appeal from a bankruptcy court order enforcing the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

The bankruptcy court’s order declared that certain defendants in adversary proceedings brought by Congregation Birchos Yosef had violated the automatic stay by initiating proceedings in the Bais Din, a rabbinical court, after the automatic stay went into effect, and it held those defendants in contempt. The bankruptcy court further ordered that decrees issued by the Bais Din in furtherance of those rabbinical proceedings, which violated the stay, were void ab initio and of no force or effect.

The Bais Din, which was not a party in the adversary proceeding, appealed the bankruptcy court’s order to the district court, arguing that the order violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Following supplemental briefing on the question of standing, thé district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Bais Din did not have standing to appeal the bankruptcy court’s order.

This appeal followed. “When reviewing [a] dismissal ... for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.... ” Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). The Bais Din, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Although “[t]he current Bankruptcy Code prescribes no limits on standing beyond those implicit in

Article III of the United States Constitution];,].... this Court and others have ‘adopted the general rule, loosely modeled on the former Bankruptcy Act, that in order to have standing to appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling, an appellant must be “a person aggrieved”—a person “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily” by the challenged order of the bankruptcy court.’” DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Int’l Trade Admin. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 936 F.2d 744, 747 (2d Cir. 1991)).

This standard “reflectfc] the understandable concern that if appellate standing is not limited, bankruptcy litigation will become mired in endless appeals brought by the myriad of parties who are indirectly affected by every bankruptcy court order.” Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 642 (2d Cir. 1988). As the district court correctly concluded, the Bais Din failed to demonstrate that it suffered a pecuniary harm.

Quite the opposite, the Bais Din did not even allege a pecuniary harm before the district court, claiming instead that the automatic stay inhibited the free exercise of religion by “preventing the Bais Din from issuing notices to or against” individuals who violate Jewish law’s prohibition on initiating proceedings in secular courts without prior permission from a rabbinical court. Whatever the merits of that claim, it does not reflect a pecuniary injury.

Moreover, to the extent that the Bais Din seeks to vindicate a non-pecuniary injury, nothing in this or the district court’s opinion prevents it from filing a civil action. The Bais Din’s alternative theories of standing were not raised before the district court, and so they have been forfeited. Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the Bais Din’s appeal for lack of standing without considering the merits of the Bais Din’s underlying claims.