YING JIANG, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent, 701 F. App'x 52

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Ying Jiang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 21, 2016, decision of the BIA affirming a May 7, 2015, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jiang’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ying Jiang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 21, 2016) , aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 7, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v.

Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on ... the consistency between the applicant's or witness’s written and oral statements ..., the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record ... without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Jiang was not credible as to his claims that Chinese police detained and harmed him on account of his practice of Christianity and that he continues to practice his religion in the United States. The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Jiang’s testimony and his earlier sworn statements during a credible fear interview. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

As an initial matter, the agency did not err in finding the interview record reliable because the interview was conducted with an interpreter, the interview was memorialized in typewritten question and answer format, the questions posed were designed to elicit details of an asylum claim, and Jiang’s responses showed no reluctance to answer questions. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 724-25 (2d Cir. 2009). At his credible fear interview, Jiang stated that police did not question or hit him after the first day of his month-long detention.

By contrast, he testified at his hearing that police interrogated and beat him at least two more times after the first day. The IJ was not compelled to credit Jiang’s explanation that he had a fever at the interview because the record of the interview states that there was no indication that Jiang had a medical condition and it does not reflect that Jiang had difficulty answering any other questions regarding his claim. See Majidi v.

Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotations omitted)).

The agency also reasonably found Jiang’s testimony that he was beaten on more than one day of his detention inconsistent with his asylum application statement and his cellmate’s letter, neither of which mentioned that Jiang was beaten after his first day of detention although they described less relevant deprivations, such as the limited amount of food and inability to sleep through the night. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166-67 & n.3 (concluding that an omission is the equivalent of an inconsistency and may be relied on to support an adverse credibility determination).

Jiang did not provide a compelling explanation for these inconsistencies. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. In addition, Jiang and a fellow practitioner from his church in the United States testified inconsistently regarding whether, the evening before the hearing, they had left church and walked several blocks together before saying goodbye. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), The witness had no recollection of this episode, which the petitioner testified had happened the previous day.

Having questioned Jiang’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his credibility with reliable corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007).

The agency did not err in affording limited weight to Jiang’s father’s and friend’s unsworn letters because, in addition to the inconsistency between his testimony and his friend’s letter, the authors of the letters were not available for cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013).

The agency also did not err in giving diminished weight to an unsworn form letter purportedly from the pastor at Jiang’s church in the United States because no church official testified on Jiang’s behalf and his fellow church member testified inconsistently regarding the circumstances surrounding Jiang’s most recent attendance. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that determination of the weight of evidence is largely matter of agency discretion).

Given the inconsistency and lack of corroboration findings that relate to Jiang’s alleged past harm and his practice of Christianity, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. That determination is dispositive of Jiang’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).