UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Donald ANSON, Defendant-Appellant, 707 F. App'x 51

SUMMARY ORDER Defendant-appellant Donald .Anson (“Anson”) appeals from a final judgment convicting him of two counts of transporting child pornography, one count of receiving child pornography, and 39 counts of possessing child pornography. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we briefly recount below. Anson’s case was remanded for resen-tencing twice. See United States v. Anson, 304 Fed. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2008) and United States v. Anson, 429 F.App’x 61 (2d Cir. 2011).

At the third sentencing proceeding — the subject of this appeal — the District Court held a full resentencing. It established the sentencing range at 210-262 months. It sentenced Anson to 180 months in prison on two counts of transporting child pornography and on one count of receiving child pornography, and concurrent sentences of 120 months on 39 counts of possessing child pornography. Most pertinently, it revised Anson’s supervised release down to 25 years. Anson appealed once more, contesting the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

However, on September 29, 2017, he was released from prison. Although his prison sentence ended, he remains under supervised release. Before we address the merits of Anson’s appeal, we must determine whether it presents a live case or controversy likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496-97, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). We conclude that it does not.

We have held that a criminal appeal may not be moot where an appellant has been released from prison but remains under supervised release — if there is a “possibility of the district court’s reducing the term of supervised release on remand” such that the defendant has “a continuing stake in the outcome.” United States v. Blackburn, 461 F.3d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, Anson asserts no claim regarding his term of his supervised release. In addition, the District Court already reduced the length of Anson’s supervised release.

In these circumstances and on this record, we find it unlikely that the District Court might again alter the term of supervised release. We therefore conclude that Anson lacks a continuing stake in the outcome of this appeal and that there is no live case or controversy before us. In view of this disposition, we may not reach the merits of Anson’s appeal. CONCLUSION Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS Anson’s appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction.