Clarice BLAKE v. GOVERNMENT OF The VIRGIN ISLANDS, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING, PARKS AND RECREATION; Ira Hobson, as Commissioner of Housing, Parks and Recreation; Charles Turnbull, Governor Charles Turnbull, Appellant, 198 F. App'x 216

OPINION ROTH, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from the District Court’s order affirming the Magistrate Judge’s order that denied Governor Charles W. Turnbull’s motion to stay discovery. For the reasons stated below, we will dismiss the appeal for a lack of jurisdiction. I. Factual Background and Procedural History As the facts are well known to the parties, we give only a brief description of the issues and procedural posture of the case. On May 21, 2001, Clarice Blake filed a civil rights action against Governor Turn-bull and others stemming from the termination of her employment.

During discovery, Governor Turnbull filed a motion to stay discovery on the ground that he had qualified immunity from suit as the Governor of the Virgin Islands. On April 30, 2003, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion to stay because, inter alia, the Governor had delayed filing his motion for

summary judgment, where he first asserted qualified immunity, and he did not make a showing of irreparable injury. The Magistrate Judge’s order did not rule on the merits of the Governor’s alleged immunity. On June 5, 2002, the District Court affirmed the denial of the stay, and this appeal followed. The Governor’s motion for

summary judgment is still pending. II. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over the Appeal This Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. Generally, only final orders of the district court are appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Here, no final order has been issued. Moreover, the collateral order doctrine articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), and its progeny is inapplicable. Often, orders denying qualified immunity are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The instant order does not, however, deny the Governor’s qualified immunity; rather, it focuses on the Governor’s lack of irreparable injury and his delay in seeking

summary judgment, all in the context of discovery. As such, the order does not “conclusively determine the disputed question” of the Governor’s immunity and, therefore, is not appealable. Id. at 527, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)); see also Schrob v.

Catterson, 967 F.2d 929, 938 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that “the finality aspect of the collateral order doctrine is not satisfied” when the order “conclusively determined the immunity issue [only] to the extent that it requires the appellants to engage in such limited discovery proceedings.”). Finally, the Governor’s argument that the District Court lacks jurisdiction over the case due to Blake’s failure to obtain a Right-to-Sue letter is best left to the District Court in the first instance. III. Conclusion As this Court lacks jurisdiction, we will dismiss the appeal.