DANIEL S., a minor by his parents and next friends, Cynthia and Scott S.; Cynthia S.; Scott S., on their own behalf, v. SCRANTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, 230 F.3d 90

OPINION OF THE COURT NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. In this case, filed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1490, the Scranton School District appeals from an order granting attorneys’ fees to the parents of Daniel S. under § 1415(i)(3)(

B) of the Act. The School District argues that the meeting for which attorneys’ fees were awarded was not “convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action,” and that the fee award was thus barred by the Act. We disagree, and will affirm the District Court’s order. I. Background Law Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to ensure that educational programs were available to children with disabilities, to enable responsible educational authorities to provide appropriate educational programs, and to assure the effectiveness of such programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).

To that end, the Act provides financial assistance to states that comply with its requirements. See id. §§ 1411, 1412. One provision requires each participating state to identify and evaluate the needs of all children residing within its borders who are disabled and who need special education or related services. See id. § 1412(a)(3)(A). Once the state has identified and evaluated a disabled child in need of special education and related services, it must have an Individual Educational Program (IEP) in effect for that child at the beginning of each school year.

See id. § 1414(d)(2)(A); see also id. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (identifying the required components of an IEP). Each IEP is designed by an “IEP Team” composed of the parents of the child, a multi-disciplinary collection of appropriately qualified educational professionals,' and, when appropriate, the child. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). The Act requires participating states to establish a comprehensive set of procedural safeguards designed to protect the interests of all parties. See id. § 1415.

One such safeguard allows parents who have lodged complaints about the identification, evaluation, placement, or IEP development processes to request an impartial administrative due-process hearing. See id. § 1415(f)(1). If the hearing is conducted by a local educational agency, any party aggrieved by its findings and decision may appeal to the state educational agency. See id. § 1415(g). If, however, the hearing is conducted by the state educational agency, an aggrieved party may bring a civil action in a state court of competent jurisdiction or in federal district court. See ■id. § 1415(i)(2).

In addition to granting-other appropriate relief, a court may, in-its discretion, “award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Following a 1997 amendment, however, “[attorneys’ fees may not be awarded relating to any meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened, [inter alia], as a result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action." Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) (emphasis added). It is this limitation, and its application to a specific IEP Team meeting, that is at issue in this appeal. II.

Background Facts & Procedure In December 1996, the Scranton School District identified Daniel S. as a student in need of special educational services. An IEP Team consisting of Daniel’s parents and education professionals engaged in a series of meetings intended to produce an IEP for Daniel. The School District then presented Daniel’s parents with an IEP, which they rejected. The School District again presented the same IEP, which Daniel’s parents again rejected.

Sometime during the summer of 1997, the advocate representing Daniel’s interests in the IEP process contacted Mary Anne Clausen, a private attorney specializing in education law. See App. at 191:15-23. Thereafter, Daniel’s advocate “from time to time asked [Clausen] a few questions about things” concerning the effort to develop an acceptable IEP for Daniel. See id. In August, the IEP Team met again, but again failed to produce a mutually acceptable IEP. The School District then requested an administrative due-process hearing to determine the adequacy of the IEP it was offering Daniel.

A hearing was scheduled, and, in the interim, Daniel’s parents decided it would be best to teach him at home until an appropriate IEP was in place at school. While awaiting the hearing, Daniel’s mother contacted Attorney Clausen directly concerning truancy proceedings that the School District had initiated against Daniel. See id. at 192:8-193:15. Attorney Clausen had further conversations on the truancy matter with Daniel’s mother and with his advocate in the ensuing weeks. See id. at 194:20-195:15.

Ultimately, Attorney Clausen performed a few minor legal services on Daniel’s behalf regarding the truancy proceedings against him. See id. at 196:2-197:9. In September, the IEP Team then met again for a third time, but again failed to produce a mutually acceptable IEP for Daniel. Shortly thereafter, the School District presented his parents with a revised IEP that conceded to some, but not all, of them demands. In response, Daniel’s mother sent the School District a letter explaining why she was dissatisfied with the latest IEP and setting forth her remaining demands. See id. at 197:15-22; 208:11-19; 207:16-18.

Daniel’s parents asked Attorney Clausen to represent them in their continuing battle with the School District over Daniel’s IEP. See id. at 197:23-198:1. In the hope that the parties would be able to resolve the matter without her assistance, Attorney Clausen refused to represent them until after they had received a response to their letter. See id. In October, the School District sent Daniel’s pai’ents yet another version of the IEP, conceding to some, but again not all, of the demands expressed in their previous letter.

Thereafter, Attorney Clausen “entered into a retainer agreement [with Daniel’s parents] to negotiate on their behalf at that point in time and to see if we could get a settlement of the matter for them.” Id. at 198:13-24. Daniel’s parents rejected the School District’s latest IEP and, on the same rejection form, checked a box requesting a due process hearing. See id. at 479. Attorney Clausen called the School District’s attorney and requested a “settlement conference” to, break the impasse.

More specifically, she explained that the efforts to produce a mutually acceptable IEP for Daniel “had' been ongoing for a long time” and that she would “like to try to settle it rather than going to due process.” Id. at 212:24213:4. The School District’s attorney agreed, and the parties met on October 20 and signed an attendance sheet labeled “Settlement Conference.” See id. at 46. The School District made a number of concessions at the conference and, in the course of the ensuing few days, made several more. As a result, the parties produced a mutually acceptable IEP that Daniel’s mother signed.

The request for a due-process hearing was then withdrawn. Shortly thereafter, Attorney Clausen asked the School District to pay her fees related to the October 20 settlement conference and subsequent services rendered on Daniel’s behalf. When the School District refused, Daniel’s parents filed a civil action in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Following a bench trial, the District Court entered an order awarding attorneys’ fees to Daniel’s parents. In a memorandum explaining its order, the District Court found that the October 20 conference was not a settlement conference at all.

In “the Court’s view,” because everyone who attended the meeting, with the exception of Attorney Clausen, was a member of the IEP Team, “regardless of what the meeting was labeled, it was a meeting of the IEP Team within the meaning of the Act.” Dist. Ct. Mem. of 02/12/1999 at 3. The District Court also concluded that the School District’s request for a due process hearing had “initiated” an “administrative proceeding.” Id. at 5.

The court further concluded that “[gjiven the initiation of that proceeding, and the impending hearing, it is inescapable that the meeting of October 20, 1997 ... was convened as a result of the administrative proceeding.” Id. The District Court concluded: It seems quite clear ... that counsel fees may be awarded in any instance where a party prevails as a result of an IEP team meeting which is convened as a result of an administrative proceeding. Such is exactly what occurred here, and therefore fees will be awarded to ... plaintiffs counsel. Id. at 6.

The School District disagrees that the meeting was “convened as a result of an administrative hearing,” and appeals from the order awarding Attorney Clau-sen’s fees. III. Discussion The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the 1997 amendment of the Act bars this award of attorneys’ fees. The parties both contend that “[t]his case is first and foremost a matter of statutory construction.” Appellee’s Br. at 10; see also Appellant’s Br. at 12 (“The Appellant believes that the language of § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) is clear, unambiguous and therefore no further analysis is required.”). To a degree, they are correct.

But resolution of this issue ultimately does not turn on a question of law. The operative statutory phrase calls for the Court to determine if the IEP team meeting was “convened as a result of an administrative proceeding,” thus raising a question of causation. In applying the pre-1997-amendment version of § 1415, we have held that causation can be established on either of two theories. See Wheeler v. Towanda Area School Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir.1991) (considering when litigation is casually connected to the relief obtained by a prevailing party).

In the context of pre-amendment§ 1415, litigation was held to be causally connected to the relief if it either produced that relief directly (i.e., through a favorable judgment), or, under an alternative “catalyst” theory, if “the pressure of the lawsuit was a material contributing factor in bringing about extrajudicial relief.” Id. (citations omitted).

In the context of this case, an administrative proceeding can be causally connected to the prevailing party’s relief if the pressure of the proceeding was a material contributing factor in bringing about the relief sought and ultimately obtained by the child’s parents. Thus, the real question in this case is one of fact: was the scheduled due process hearing the catalyst for the October 20 meeting that ultimately produced a mutually acceptable Program for Daniel?

The School District takes no issue with the District Court’s conclusion that the October 20 meeting was an IEP Team meeting, but argues, essentially, that an IEP Team meeting can never be convened as a result of an administrative hearing that has not yet occurred. See Appellant’s Br. at 10. That is incorrect. An administrative hearing need not actually have occurred for it to be the cause of an IEP Team meeting.

The mere threat of a scheduled hearing alone may induce opposing parties to agree to meetings in which they would not otherwise have participated, if only to avoid the cost, burden and uncertainty of the hearing itself. Cf. Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Labor & Indus., 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.1981) (finding the requisite causal link to recover attorneys’ fees on Title VII claim where EEOC complaint caused union to take case to arbitration where relief was ultimately granted).

Despite a series of IEP Team meetings, as well as exchanges in writing and by telephone, the parties were unable to produce a mutually acceptable IEP for Daniel. By September 3, the School District had determined that the Program it was offering Daniel was appropriate, and that IEP Team meetings were becoming “off focus” and “counter productive.” App. at 336:19-23. In short, it, too, had lost confidence in the IEP Team process, and had decided that a due process hearing would likely be necessary to break the impasse. Thereafter, the parties held one more “regular” IEP Team meeting on September 30.

The October 20 meeting at issue was unlike the previous meetings in several significant respects. First, by the time the October 20 meeting was scheduled Daniel’s parents had made their own request for a due process hearing, implying that they believed the IEP Team process had broken down. Second, whereas all prior meetings had been scheduled by the parties themselves following the notice requirements set forth in the Act, the October 20 meeting was scheduled by the parties’ respective attorneys.

Third, although the attorneys did not attend any of the previous meetings, and Daniel’s attorney declined to become directly involved in the IEP process until it was clear that the IEP Team was deadlocked and an administrative hearing was imminent, both attorneys attended the October 20 meeting. See App. at 46. As noted, the District Court concluded that the School District’s September 3 request for a due process hearing “initiated” an administrative proceeding. See Dist. Ct. Mem. of 02/12/1999 at 5.

We reject the parties’ invitation to formulate a bright-line test for determining when an IEP Team meeting results from an administrative proceeding. Under Appellant’s proffered test, an IEP Team meeting would never result from an administrative proceeding if it occurs before the administrative proceeding has actually been convened. Conversely, Appellees ask us to hold that an IEP Team meeting results from an administrative proceeding any time it occurs after the administrative proceeding has been requested, whether or not the requested proceeding was the catalyst for the meeting in question.

We reject both tests, and hold that whether a particular IEP Team meeting results from an administrative proceeding is first a factual question of causation, opening the District court’s findings to our review for clear error. Thereafter, the decision to award fees remains within the discretion of the court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), which we review for an abuse in the exercise of its discretion.

Against this factual backdrop, we see no error in the District Court’s finding the meeting was convened as a result of the pending administrative hearing, nor in its determination that the pending due process hearing was the catalyst for the October 20 IEP Team meeting. Looking at the facts, we cannot accept the School District’s claims that it was merely being proactive when it filed its September 3 request for a due process hearing. The evidence is to the contrary.

The record indicates that by the time the School District requested a due process hearing it had concluded that the IEP Team process had become unfocused and counter productive. Although it subsequently scheduled one final IEP Team meeting for September 30, that meeting was also unproductive. By the time the parties scheduled the October 20 meeting, all involved believed the IEP Team process had reached an impasse and that a due process hearing was imminent without the successful intervention by their attorneys.

Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court’s finding that the October 20 meeting was convened as a result of the due process hearing scheduled for November 10 is fully supported by the evidence. Upon that finding, an award of attorney fees was well within its discretion. IV Conclusions We hold that the District Court did not err in finding, as a matter of fact, that the IEP Team meeting at issue in this case was convened as a result of an administrative proceeding, nor did it abuse its discretion by awarding fees. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.