David L. CHAPMAN, Appellant v. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS; John Does 1-10 (Fictitious); Corporation A-Z; Senior Manager Ellen Goria; Director Lisa Snyder, 233 F. App'x 141

OPINION OF THE COURT NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. David L. Chapman appeals the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment against him on his claim that his employer failed to promote him, and eventually terminated him, because of his race. We will affirm. I. Because we write for the benefit of the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our analysis. Chapman, an African-American male, was a technical manager for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) for over three years. While at AICPA, he was the only African-American in the Professional Ethics Division, and his supervisor was a white female.

During his second year with AICPA, he was placed in the organization’s System to Accept Responsibility for Job Performance (STAR) program. After 14 months in the program, Chapman was terminated. He was replaced by a Latino female. Chapman filed suit against AICPA in the Superior Court of New Jersey, alleging (1) gender discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) race discrimination under § 1981; (3) gender discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD); (4) race discrimination under the NJLAD; and (5) wrongful discharge. AICPA removed the action to the U.S.

District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Court dismissed counts one and five, and granted

summary judgment in favor of AICPA on the remaining counts. Chapman filed a timely appeal with respect to counts two and four. II. On appeal, Chapman claims that AICPA failed to promote him and then terminated him because of his race. Racial discrimination claims under the NJLAD and § 1981 are analyzed under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie claim.

Establishment of a prima facie claim raises an inference of discrimination, which the defendant may rebut by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for the adverse employment action. If the defendant successfully rebuts the inference of discrimination, the plaintiff may still defeat a motion for

summary judgment by pointing to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a fact-finder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s proffered justification; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory motive was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.1994). AICPA contends that Chapman failed to establish a prima facie discrimination claim because he was not qualified for his position. We disagree. Chapman worked as a technical manager for nearly two years before being placed in the STAR program.

This fact was sufficient to establish that he met his position’s objective qualifications. See Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729 (3d Cir.1995). Nevertheless, AICPA presented more than sufficient evidence to show that Chapman was not promoted, and was ultimately terminated, because he consistently failed to meet performance requirements. To avoid

summary judgment, Chapman was therefore required to demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in AICPA’s explanation that a reasonable fact-finder could find that unlawful discrimination was the real reason behind AICPA’s decisions. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. He did not present any evidence that white employees with similar performance records were either promoted or retained by AICPA. Nor did he present any other evidence of racial bias or hostility at AIC-PA.

Like the District Court, we conclude that Chapman failed to demonstrate that AICPA’s proffered justification was merely pretextual and that AICPA discriminated against him because of his race. III. We conclude that Chapman failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome

summary judgment against his claims of racial discrimination under the NJLAD and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.