UNITED STATES of America v. Billy CAULTON, Appellant, 309 F. App'x 631

OPINION SMITH, Circuit Judge. Billy Caulton pleaded guilty to possession and intent to distribute crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District Court sentenced Caulton to seventy-eight months of imprisonment on December 6, 2007. Caulton filed a timely notice of appeal on December 13, 2007. After reviewing the record in this case, Caulton’s counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

In Anders, the Supreme Court stated that the “constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process” means that appellate counsel must act as an advocate for the defendant. 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396. Thus, counsel’s role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw.

That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Id. As we explained in United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir.2001), the Anders brief must demonstrate that counsel has “thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,” and it must “explain why the issues are frivolous.” Accordingly, our inquiry is twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders', and (2) “whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” Id. (citing United States v.

Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir.2000)); see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (explaining that the court must proceed, “after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous”). If review fails to reveal any nonfrivolous issues, the court “may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396. After considering counsel’s Anders brief, we are satisfied that he thoroughly examined the record for issues of arguable merit and fulfilled the requirements of Anders.

In fact, we commend counsel for his obvious attention to and consideration of the issues presented. Counsel correctly observed that, because Caulton pleaded guilty, Caulton’s appeal is limited to the District Court’s jurisdiction, the validity of the guilty plea, and the legality of the sentence. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570-75, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). As Caulton’s counsel noted, there is no basis for disputing the District Court’s jurisdiction. With respect to the validity of Caulton’s guilty plea, counsel fully satisfied his obligation under Anders.

He considered not only whether the guilty plea proceeding complied with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), but also addressed each of the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Counsel cited to the record to further demonstrate compliance with the obligations set forth in Boykin and Rule 11. Counsel also conscientiously examined Caulton’s sentence.

Prior to sentencing, Caulton’s trial counsel objected to the sentencing range on the ground that the government had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt the quantity of cocaine base possessed by Caulton. During the sentencing hearing, the District Court heard argument on this issue. After discussing and considering two lab reports, the District Court found that Caulton possessed 94.4 grams of cocaine base. Before this Court, counsel correctly noted that the District Court was permitted to make such findings by a preponderance of the evidence under United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir.2007) (en banc).

Our independent review of the record confirms that the District Court had sufficient evidence to support its finding and computation of Caulton’s sentencing range. In sum, we agree with counsel’s assessment of Caulton’s appeal. Our own independent review of the record fails to reveal any nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and will affirm the judgment of the District Court entered on December 6, 2007.

We certify that the issues presented in the appeal lack legal merit and thus do not require the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. 3d Cir. LAR 109.2(b). . The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). . We note that, consistent with Local Appellate Rule 109.2(

a) of the Third Circuit, counsel advised Caulton of his intention to file an Anders brief and that Caulton was entitled to file a pro se brief. Caulton did not file a pro se brief raising any other issues.