Luis ESPADA-ROSADO, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant, Appellee, 25 F. App'x 5

PER CURIAM. We have reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties in this Social Security disability benefits case and have carefully considered claimant Luis Espada Rosado’s arguments that the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred by employing the incorrect legal standard in evaluating his application for reinstatement of withdrawn disability benefits and that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Espada is incorrect that the ALJ should have employed the legal standard applicable to evaluating “medical improvement” in disability benefits cessation cases.

The cessation of benefits in Espada’s case was not based on a finding of medical improvement. Rather, the cessation of benefits was initiated by a change in the social security laws, namely 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)2)(

C) and 1382(a)(3)(J). The ALJ correctly employed the applicable standards embodied in 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1535 and 416.935 to evaluate Espada’s request for reinstatement of his disability benefits. After determining, based on the medical evidence provided by both treating and consulting psychiatrists, that Espada’s emotional disorder left him unable to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ solicited the testimony of a vocational expert (VE). The VE testified at the administrative hearing that there were other jobs in the national economy which Espada could perform despite his emotional disorder.

Thus, the ALJ had specific evidence — the VE’s testimony — that there were actual jobs in the national economy which claimant could perform. Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner that claimant was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. The final judgment of the magistrate judge is affirmed. See Local Rule 27.1.