James BEDARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; Roush Trucking Company Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, 481 F. App'x 445

ORDER AND JUDGMENT PAUL KELLY, JR., Circuit Judge. James Bedard, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of National Casualty and Roush Trucking. The district court dismissed Mr. Bedard’s federal suit based on res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as he litigated essentially the same claims before all levels of Kansas courts. Bedard v. Nat’l Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-1396-JTM, 2012 WL 602338 (D.Kan. Feb. 23, 2012). The parties are familiar with the facts and we need not restate them here, other than to say that this matter involves a dispute over uninsured motorist (UIM) benefits Mr. Bedard claims that he is entitled to, though state courts did not agree.

See Bedard v. Scottsdale Ins., 2010 WL 174069, No. 101,544, Memorandum Op. (Kan.Ct.App. Jan. 8, 2010) (per curiam); R. 44-47. Mr. Bedard argues that the prior Kansas proceedings are void based on any of four problems: (1) a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, (2) federal diversity and federal question jurisdiction, which deprived the Kansas courts of subject matter jurisdiction, (3) fraud on the part of the defendants, and (4) erroneous application of Kansas statutes. Aplt. Br. 13-16. Mr.

Bedard further argues that, because the state court proceedings are void, the district court erred by applying res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine to his federal suit. Id. at 17-18. He also suggests that the district court may have held him to too high a standard as a pro se litigant. Id. at 19-21. The district court properly dismissed Mr. Bedard’s federal suit. First, Mr. Be-dard’s challenge to the Kansas courts’ jurisdiction to hear his case is legally flawed: state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and those courts generally may entertain claims grounded in federal law.

To the extent federal claims should have been alleged and were not, that error is Mr. Bedard’s responsibility. Second, Mr. Be-dard’s allegations of fraud do not give rise to a Fourteenth Amendment or Rule 60(

b) claim. Mr. Bedard’s claim was considered by at least three Kansas courts, meaning he received all the process he was due; any allegation of fraud by a private party defendant does not change this result. Furthermore, Rule 60(

b) is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure; it can provide relief from & federal judgment that was obtained via “fraud ..., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3), but not from a state judgment. Regardless of the standard to which Mr. Bedard, a pro se litigant, was held, his claims were properly rejected by the district court. Mr. Bedard tried to present new claims and evidence in the Kansas proceedings but was not able to do so. This, he claims, precludes application of res judicata or collateral estoppel. But Mr.

Bedard filed for bankruptcy during the pendency of his state court proceedings, meaning that those proceedings became part of his bankruptcy estate. The proceedings continued under the direction of the bankruptcy trustee, and were finally resolved by Kansas courts. Mr. Bedard’s clear intent is to re-litigate claims that were finally determined in Kansas courts. The district court correctly applied res judicata, as Mr. Bedard sued the same parties and made the same claims in state court, had a full opportunity to litigate his claims, and received a judgment on the merits.

The district court correctly applied collateral estoppel, as Mr. Bedard could have raised his federal regulations claims in the state court proceedings but did not. And the district court correctly applied the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine, as Mr. Bedard asked the district court to serve as an appellate body over Kansas courts. AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.