Dean CARBAJAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew S. HOLMAN, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the State of Colorado, in his individual and official capacity; Delta County Board of County Commissioners; a political subdivision of the State of Colorado; Sherri Price, a Deputy District Attorney for the Second Judicial District, in her individual and official capacity, Defendants-Appellees, 485 F. App'x 332

ORDER AND JUDGMENT MONROE G. McKAY, Circuit Judge. After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 84(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff appeals from the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of his pro se civil rights action against an attorney in the Colorado attorney general’s office, a deputy district attorney, and the Delta County Board of County Commissioners.

Plaintiffs complaint was premised on the fact that, allegedly in violation of the terms of his plea agreement, his name was not removed from the sex offender registry after he completed a deferred judgment. He contended that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by, inter alia, opposing his petition for removal from the registry in the then-pending state court proceedings. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), based on the ongoing state proceedings.

The court also held that Plaintiffs claims lacked merit for other reasons, such as prosecutorial immunity, the statute of limitations, and the lack of a legal basis for holding the board of county commissioners liable for the actions of the district attorney’s office. On appeal, the situation has changed somewhat. The state appellate court has issued a decision reversing the state trial court’s decision and granting the main form of relief requested by Plaintiff — the removal of his name from the sex offender registry. Thus, Plaintiffs claims are now moot to the extent they requested this relief.

Plaintiff argues his claims for monetary damages and further injunctive relief are not mooted by this decision; however, whether or not these claims are moot, they were appropriately dismissed by the district court. As explained by the district court, Plaintiffs claim for monetary damages against the board of county commissioners fails because the board cannot be held liable for his alleged injury in this case. Similarly, his claims for monetary damages against the individual defendants fail based on prosecutorial immunity.

As for Plaintiffs request for further injunctive relief, the precise form of this requested relief is not clear, but he appears to seek an injunction preventing Defendants from ever having any further involvement in any pending or future prosecutions involving Plaintiff. Such a broad restriction on state prosecutors’ prosecutorial powers would violate “the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746. We conclude that Plaintiffs vague and broad request for further injunctive relief was appropriately dismissed without prejudice.

The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice under Younger. We affirm this dismissal without prejudice as to the bulk of Plaintiffs complaint based on mootness and the notion of comity. As for Plaintiffs claims for monetary relief, however, we affirm on alternate grounds that present a complete bar to relief. Thus, while we AFFIRM the substance of the district court’s order, we VACATE the dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiffs claims for monetary damages and REMAND for the district court to enter an order instead dismissing these claims with prejudice.

We GRANT Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and remind him of his obligation to eontin-ue making partial payments until the entire filing fee has been paid in full. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.