Alyssa BISTLINE; Ruby Jessop; Susan Broadbent; Gina Rohbock; Nolan Barlow; Jason Black; May Musser; Holly Bistline; T.B.; M.B.; P.B.; A.B.; A.B.; Derrell Barlow; Alicia Rohbock; R.R.; R.R.; B.J.R.; Wallace Jeffs; Lawrence Barlow ; Steven Dockstader; Marvin Cooke; Helen Barlow; Vergel Barlow; Carole Jessop; Briell Libertae Decker; Lynette Warner; Amy Nielson; Sarah Allred; Thomas Jeffs; Janetta Jessop, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. Rodney R. PARKER ; Snow Christensen & Martineau, P.C., Defendants - Appellees, and Warren Steed Jeffs, Defendant., 918 F.3d 849
Opinion
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Background...855 A. The United Effort Plan Trust...855 B. The Formation of Attorney-Client Relationships...858 C. Concealment of Viable Causes of Action...859 D. Procedural History...861 II. Standard of Review...862 III. Discussion...863 A. Whether Plaintiffs' Allegations State a Claim...863 1. Legal Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty...863 i. Attorney-Client relationship...864 a. Subjective beliefs of representation ...865 b. Reasonableness of beliefs under the circumstances ...867 2. Fraudulent and Negligent Misrepresentation...869 3. Civil Conspiracy...869 4. RICO Violations...869 5.
Violations of the TVPRA...870 i. The means used to force labor or services...871 ii. Specific plaintiffs' labor or services...872 iii. Venture liability...873 B. Statutes of Limitations...876 1. Applicable Statutes of Limitations...877 i. Fraudulent misrepresentation...877 ii. Negligent misrepresentation...878 iii. Malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy...878 iv. TVPRA...878 2. Tolling the Limitations Periods...878 i. The age of majority...878 ii. Continuing tort doctrine...879 3. Tolling Through the Discovery Rule...880 i. Statutory tolling...880 ii.
Equitable tolling - fraudulent concealment...884 a. Concealment ...884 b. Reasonableness ...885 4. Tolling for Individual Plaintiffs...886 IV. Conclusion...889 Plaintiffs are all former members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("FLDS"), which illegally practices polygamy. On July 13, 2016, plaintiffs brought this action against the FLDS Prophet, Warren Jeffs ("Mr. Jeffs"), and Mr. Jeff's lawyers, the law firm of Snow Christensen & Martineau ("SC & M") and one of its partners, Rodney Parker. Plaintiffs allege that defendants: (1) directly worked with Mr.
Jeffs to create a legal framework that would shield him from the legal ramifications of child rape, forced labor, extortion, and the causing of emotional distress by separating families; (2) created an illusion of legality to bring about plaintiffs' submission to these abuses and employed various legal instruments and judicial processes to knowingly facilitate the abuse; (3) held themselves out to be the lawyers of each FLDS member individually, thus creating a duty to them to disclose this illegal scheme; and (4) intentionally misused these attorney-client relationships to enable Mr.
Jeffs' dominion and criminal enterprise. Mr. Jeffs defaulted, and the district court dismissed every cause of action against the remaining defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue on appeal is the district court's dismissal of all claims against SC & M and Mr. Parker (collectively "defendants"). Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as we must, see SEC v. Shields , 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014), we affirm in part and reverse in part. I. Background A. The United Effort Plan Trust Plaintiffs allege that the legal framework defendants created to facilitate Mr.
Jeffs' crimes took shape through the 1998 amendment and reinstatement of the United Effort Plan Trust ("Reinstated Trust"). The original UEP Trust ("Trust") was created in 1942 by the predecessors of the FLDS. Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg , 299 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Utah 2013). It was founded upon the tenets of the FLDS faith, and membership was established through consecrating real and personal property to the Trust (which would then be redistributed to each family according to its "just wants and needs"). Town of Colo. City v. United Effort Trust Plan , 2013 WL 1932838 at *2 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013).
The original Trust's stated purpose was primarily "charitable and philanthropic." Lindberg , 299 P.3d at 1061. However, on September 1, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the Trust was not charitable because it benefitted specific individuals. Jeffs v. Stubbs , 970 P.2d 1234, 1252-53 (Utah 1998). In response to this decision, the Reinstated Trust was executed on November 3, 1998. In the Matter of the UEP Trust , No. 053900848 (Utah Dist. Ct. Dec. 13, 2005).
The Reinstated Trust was theoretically amended and reinstated by Rulon Jeffs, the sole surviving beneficiary of the UEP Trust, who was Warren Jeffs' father and predecessor as Prophet of the FLDS. See Lindberg , 299 P.3d at 1062 ; Aplt. App. at 27-28. However, plaintiffs allege a different mechanism laboring beneath this superficial reality. By 1997, Rulon Jeffs was growing old, in ill health, becoming progressively less aware of his surroundings, and demonstrating increasing loss of memory and cognitive function. Aplt. App. at 27.
The complaint asserts that under Rulon Jeffs' leadership the FLDS had not practiced the atrocities defining plaintiffs' claims. [T]he concept of celestial or spiritual "marriage" of children was not yet broadly practiced within the FLDS Church, at least to the extent of large-scale sexual domination of children and the use of the badges of religious ceremony to formalize the criminal sexual abuse of minors under the guise of "religious" practices.
Up to that point, FLDS Church marriage practices were largely if not exclusively confined to adults, and while the polygamy laws of Utah were violated by the practice of plural marriage, underage marriage and outright child rape was not common within the FLDS Church; neither were extortion, kidnapping, forced labor or, most importantly for the purposes of this averment, the use of lawyers to create a basis of community-wide misplaced belief in the legality of what is actually fundamentally illegal conduct harming large numbers of persons. Id . at 28.
But in Rulon Jeffs' declining years, his son Warren "began to assume the mantle of authority and control." Id . at 27. In early August 1998, Rulon Jeffs suffered a massive stroke that "left him largely impaired and paved the way for [Warren] Jeffs to eventually assume complete and absolute control of the FLDS." Id . at 28. Although the Reinstated Trust was nominally executed by Rulon Jeffs, "[his] signature on the Trust instrument ... was placed with physical assistance and guidance of others holding [his] pen hand, at the direction of [Warren Jeffs]." Id . at 32-33.
FLDS members knew Rulon Jeffs was ill at this time, but the extent of Rulon's incapacity was kept secret from the people. [Warren] Jeffs controlled what little information was given to them about Rulon's incapacity and claimed to be "the mouthpiece and memory of the Prophet." By "speaking for the Prophet," Warren Jeffs stepped into the Prophet's shoes and took over his roles in late 1998 and early 1999. Warren Jeffs' assertion of power and authority continued-and became complete-while Rulon Jeffs' mental and physical health continued to decline. Id . at 111-12.
Warren Jeffs had thus become acting president of the church. See M.J. v. Wisan , 371 P.3d at 24 (labeling Warren Jeffs "acting president of both the FLDS Church and the Board of Trustees of the Trust" in 2001). He retained this role until his father's death in 2002, when he formally took over the titles of both Prophet and President of the Reinstated Trust. Aplt. App. at 112. The complaint describes how Warren Jeffs' activities included the "direction of legal counsel" in his father's declining years. Id. at 27. It then outlines the process by which the Reinstated Trust was intentionally designed to establish Mr.
Jeffs' dominion. Plaintiffs allege that Warren Jeffs was obsessed with the creation of a controlled society in which he was the absolute ruler and the wholesale rape of young girls by himself and others was treated as a ceremonially sacrosanct ritual. He sought to institutionalize this atrocious practice and to cloak it with the superficial trappings of legal acceptance, so he retained SC & M to develop an overarching scheme and plan ... Id . at 28. During 1997 and 1998, prior to executing the Reinstated Trust, Mr. Jeffs and Mr.
Parker allegedly had meetings to discuss the "complex and ongoing series of legalistic maneuvers to be carried out by SC & M in order to provide [Mr. Jeffs] absolute, unfettered control" over the FLDS members. Id . at 32.
The complaint asserts that defendants then contrived a complex and detailed scheme to manipulate the law in such a fashion to not only take advantage of the relatively lax marital laws of Nevada, but to create a new enterprise, under the guise of the existing FLDS Church, which would be legally structured to give Jeffs absolute control over all of the bodies, possessions, homes and funds of the FLDS as beneficiaries of the UEP Trust. Id . at 31. This absolute control allegedly enabled Mr.
Jeffs to subject FLDS members to physical torture, extortion, severe and extreme emotional distress, unlawful imprisonment, kidnapping, and "other extreme and atrocious inhumane punishments in order to secure their utter and complete obedience." Id . at 32. Defendants benefited from creating this scheme because rewriting the Trust would give them "peace of mind that their fees would be paid." Id . at 111 ("[B]efore the UEP Trust was rewritten, the only assurance that Parker and SC & M had that they would be paid was the unsecured signature of FLDS Prophet, Rulon Jeffs, who was in his late 80s and ill.").
The Reinstated Trust served religious purposes, as the Utah Supreme Court described: The [Reinstated] Trust makes clear that participation in the [Reinstated] Trust is conditioned on living in accordance with the principles of the United Effort Plan and the FLDS Church as determined by spiritual leaders.
It provides that [p]articipants who, in the opinion of the Presidency of the Church, do not honor their commitments to live their lives according to the principles of the United Effort Plan and the Church shall remove themselves from the Trust property and, if they do not, the Board of Trustees may ... cause their removal. Lindberg , 299 P.3d at 1062 (quoting Reinstated Trust). This structure gave Mr. Jeffs absolute control over the church members by granting him the authority to strip them of "nearly all of their possessions, their familial connections, their shelter and their livelihoods." Aplt. App. at 34.
The complaint states that the Priesthood Record, Mr. Jeffs' detailed contemporaneous account of the events that transpired in his life, contains many examples of how the Reinstated Trust was used to control the FLDS who lived on Trust lands. When revising this instrument into the Reformed Trust in 2006, one state district court concluded, and the Utah Supreme Court expressly or impliedly affirmed, that the Reinstated Trust had been drafted to facilitate illegal practices such as child rape. In the Matter of the UEP Trust , No. 053900848 (Utah Dist. Ct. Dec. 13, 2005).
Although the allegations in the complaint begin with the Reinstated Trust, plaintiffs also detail how defendants continued to take action to perpetuate this scheme. On one occasion in 2004, for instance, defendants represented the UEP Trust "in an eviction action filed in Arizona to expel a family in retaliation for the mother's refusal to consent to the 'marriage' (rape) of her fifteen-year-old daughter." Aplt. App. at 49; United Effort Plan Tr. v. Holm , 209 Ariz. 347, 101 P.3d 641, 643 (2004).
On another occasion, defendants apparently represented the FLDS in negotiations with the Attorney General of Utah, who had "offered to lessen or terminate the prosecution of bigamy and illegal polygamy if the FLDS would stop marrying (raping) underage girls." Aplt. App. at 47. Mr. Jeffs described this 2003 negotiation in his Priesthood Record and confirmed that his position was "[t]here will be no compromise." Id . (quoting Priesthood Record, January 16, 2003). Throughout these entries, Mr. Jeffs narrated Mr.
Parker's involvement in the negotiations, stating: Uncle Sam [Barlow ] reported that he gave Rod Parker the message that I wanted any lawyers fired that would talk compromise, and Rod Parker said he stands with us. So Uncle Sam will use Rod Parker to help convince these other lawyers. ... I got a call from Uncle Sam. He had me talk to Rod Parker, our lawyer from Salt Lake who flew south yesterday. He had quite a long talk with the Chief Deputy Attorney General, David Myers, who is a former judge. Rod Parker reported to me that none of our lawyers compromised our position.
They only tried to convince the Attorney Generals what a useless effort this is because, you are not going to change that community , and how damaging it was to the families. Id . at 47 (quoting Priesthood Record, January 21, 2003), 48 (quoting Priesthood Record, January 22, 2003) (emphasis added). The complaint contains numerous such averments and specific factual assertions of defendants' ongoing actions to enable and facilitate Jeffs' reign of terror over plaintiffs and other FLDS members. B.
The Formation of Attorney-Client Relationships Significantly, plaintiffs allege that SC & M continually held itself out as representing individual FLDS members. Citing a number of specific factual allegations from the complaint, their opening brief describes the defendant law firm as "knowingly misus[ing] its self-acclaimed status as the victims' personal, individual legal counsel to bring about their submission," Aplt.
Br. at 4; "creating a means to ensure that each individual FLDS member was responsible for SC & M's fees," id at 22; and "empower[ing] the firm to act as Jeffs' enforcers, compelling absolute submission on the part of its own clientele," id at 42. The complaint alleges that over the years these representations and assurances were repeatedly made to FLDS members themselves, as well as to courts, governmental agencies, and the public at-large. Aplt. App. at 42-43, 67, 70.
At church services, the FLDS congregation was also regularly given legal updates by Sam Barlow regarding their personal representation by defendants. Plaintiffs in fact contend that SC & M has never withdrawn from its legal representation of the FLDS members. Plaintiffs claim they were told that their only access to legal counsel was through SC & M and that they were therefore required to personally pay the firm's legal fees. Aplt. Br. at 15. They allege in the complaint that Mr.
Jeffs would consistently "call[ ] out to the FLDS in weekly meetings to pay the lawyers: [because] there is a 'great need for financial help ... resting upon us.' " Id . at 48. For example, on one occasion, Mr. Jeffs purportedly told the FLDS members "we owe the lawyers $ 400,000.00 and it will grow quickly." Id. at 56 (emphasis added). At another time, in early 2013, the complaint describes "a call from Jeffs to all FLDS to 'bow their backs' and submit everything they had to pay more attorney fees." Id at 114.
During one phase, "FLDS leadership regularly demanded more and more money from all FLDS for attorney fees ... [and] $ 1,000 to $ 2,000 donations were [ ] demanded from each parishioner at least once a month," id. at 85-86; during another, "[c]alls for amounts up to $ 1,000 came almost weekly," id. at 103. After the Texas raid in 2008, the call for attorney fees grew intense. All FLDS people were ordered to contribute all their extra income.
The FLDS leadership ordered all FLDS people to max their credit cards, get additional jobs, take loans on their cars and business equipment, and do anything possible to get more money to contribute toward attorney fees. Id. at 113. Plaintiffs further assert that some of this money came from the labor of children, who would work countless hours just to see their paychecks taken for attorney fees. See, e.g. , id . at 91. C.
Concealment of Viable Causes of Action The complaint alleges that at the same time plaintiffs were "assured that they were being protected by their lawyers, [defendants were] working continuously from at least 1997 to the present day to keep [them] and similarly situated persons completely in the dark" about the illegal conduct violating their rights. Id. at 43. Defendants were aware of restrictions imposed on FLDS members by Mr. Jeffs, who effectively ended members' "access to any information and media from outside the[ir] community." Id . at 46.
This constraint was allegedly accomplished through, in part, Jeffs' July 16, 2002 "address entitled 'Our Prophet's Call - Leave Apostates [non-members] Alone Severely,' in which he commanded the FLDS to 'severely' restrict and limit their communications with the outside world." Id . at 34. It was accompanied by Jeffs' strict commands to strictly shun all non-FLDS Church information by not watching television, reading newspapers or magazines, listening to the radio, reading books, or using the internet.
In this way, Jeffs prevented the FLDS adherents from learning about the fraud being perpetrated on them, that their rights were being violated and how those rights were being violated with the help of Parker and SC & M. This was intended to and did prevent discovery by Plaintiffs of the nature and extent of the various breaches of duties owed to them by Parker and SC & M. Id . at 34-35 (emphasis added).
Jeffs also forbade any communication with prior members that he had sent away or excommunicated, and he commanded the FLDS to stop patronizing businesses of non-FLDS members or using medical services outside of the FLDS community, even under emergency circumstances. Id . at 46, 73, 110; see also id . at 78-79. These restrictions compounded already existing limitations which resulted from the seclusion and isolation of the FLDS community.
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in 1998, decades ago the FLDS Church "decided to settle its membership in an isolated area to avoid interference with their religious practices." Jeffs v. Stubbs , 970 P.2d at 1239. The complaint includes many specific allegations of plaintiffs' confinement in increasingly secluded and hidden communities throughout remote parts of the country, see, e.g ., Aplt.
App. at 46, 92, 98, 133, with this sequestration being both compelled and intensified by FLDS-directed security and law enforcement personnel, see, e.g., id . at 104 ("Steven was regularly followed by the private FLDS Church security force that protects Defendant Jeffs[ ] and the FLDS enterprise and by law enforcement in Short Creek who, despite being deputized officers, are loyal to Defendant Jeffs."); id . at 122 (After Amy Nielson learned at her deposition that Mr.
Jeffs had denounced himself as a religious fraud, she planned to escape but was told that her home "was under constant video surveillance"); see also id. at 81, 113, 129. One plaintiff describes how she was "moved [twenty-six] times between secret homes and compounds in Texas, South Dakota, Colorado, Nevada, Wyoming, Arizona and Utah ," id . at 118 (emphasis added), and how she was "treated essentially as a prisoner ... and was seldom allowed to leave the secret houses and compounds in which she was hidden without being accompanied and watched by a Priesthood Caretaker," id .
Another plaintiff alleges a period of placement in hiding "inside a walled and gated compound ... where they were cut-off from all communications with everyone, except those who lived with them in that compound." Id . at 125. Local law enforcement and church security officers were "ordered" by church leaders to monitor one plaintiff "in case he attempted to leave and take his younger siblings with him," id . at 105, while another plaintiff "desperately tried to run away several times but was caught by the FLDS police," id . at 136.
The general allegations further describe FLDS members being "ordered by Jeffs to move to Texas to live in and around ... secret 'lands of refuge,' in 'safe houses,' or at other secret locations in various western states, as well as in Canada." Id . at 54. According to plaintiffs, both the restricted access to external communication and the physical isolation were supplemented by plaintiffs' lack of education. Several plaintiffs recount the rigorously limited nature of their education within FLDS communities. See, e.g ., id. at 83, 91-92.
One plaintiff describes how she had had only a small taste of life outside the religion. She had been allowed to attend Kindergarten before Defendant Jeffs pulled the FLDS children out of the public schools. ... She had also attended religious schools where they taught reading, writing, while indoctrinating the children until those schools were also shut down. Then when she was thirteen-years-old the religious schools were replaced by homeschooling and Alyssa herself became a teacher of reading, math and the basics to thirty or forty other children. Id . at 95-96.
The complaint thus alleges plaintiffs' continuing unawareness of their claims as ensured through a combination of physical isolation, forbidden access to media, and inadequate and biased education, all circumstances of which defendants purportedly had knowledge. Although plaintiffs were kept ignorant of the crimes being perpetrated against them, awareness of these atrocities and accompanying media attention was growing in the external world. Law enforcement initiated various criminal and fraud investigations into Mr. Jeffs, throughout which the alleged active concealment by defendants continued unabated. Mr.
Jeffs was arrested in Nevada in August of 2006 and was incarcerated in Utah pending trial for charges related to his arrangement of illegal marriages between adult men and young girls. While awaiting trial, Mr. Jeffs "repeatedly confesse[d] that he [wa]s a religious fraud and ha[d] deceived the FLDS," and he gave instructions to defendants that the FLDS members be told so they could "begin to put their families back together." Id . at 56. Plaintiffs assert that these instructions were ignored by defendants, who kept Mr. Jeffs' admissions from the FLDS. Id .
Moreover, they allege that [i]n April of 2007, Jeffs was frustrated that his efforts to tell the FLDS he [was] a fraud had been stymied, so he attempted to admit in open court that he is a fraud, that he is not a prophet and had never been the Prophet. He [was] stopped by his defense lawyers. Although Parker was heavily involved in Jeffs' criminal defense in Utah, he attempted to keep his involvement secret by meeting with the rest of the defense team at a home in Santa Clara, Utah and other places and by not appearing at the trial.
Despite knowing that Jeffs was still trying to publicly confess that he was a religious fraud, Parker made no effort to advise the FLDS that their "Prophet" was, by his own repeated and insistent admissions, not a prophet, but a complete fraud , and as a result continued to further the FLDS enterprise to the detriment of the FLDS [members]. Id . at 56-57 (emphasis added). On September 25, 2007, Mr. Jeffs was convicted in Utah on two counts of rape as an accomplice, and in November he was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years to life. Id . at 21.
But on July 27, 2010, the Utah Supreme Court overturned his convictions due to incorrect jury instructions. Id . Mr. Jeffs was subsequently extradited to Texas for trial, on pending charges which had arisen out of a 2008 law enforcement raid on a Texas FLDS compound called the YFZ Ranch. Id . at 21, 55. He was convicted for sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault of children, and sentenced to life in prison plus twenty years, to be served consecutively. Id . at 21. Significantly, during the process of Mr.
Jeffs' prosecutions, defendants allegedly sought to obtain judicial approval of its efforts to keep its individual FLDS member clients uninformed of the evidence regarding how Jeffs abused them. See Aplt. App. at 40-44. D. Procedural History The complaint's general allegations are supplemented by detailed assertions of plaintiffs' individual losses and recurrent traumatic experiences, which they each assert were facilitated by defendants. Each plaintiff brought claims against Mr.
Parker and SC & M for (1) legal malpractice, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) fraud, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) civil conspiracy, (6) civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), and (7) violations of the Trafficking Victims Protections Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA"). SC & M and Mr. Parker moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim, further arguing that all of plaintiffs' claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the first six claims of all plaintiffs except one minor plaintiff as barred by the relevant statute of limitations, and it dismissed the claims of that minor plaintiff as well as all TVPRA and RICO claims for failure to state a claim. II. Standard of Review We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Childs v. Miller , 713 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013).
With respect to claims dismissed as barred by the various statutes of limitations, the critical issue is the date on which the claims and causes of action "accrue" and thus "start [ ] the clock ticking on the limitations period." Robert L. Kroenlein Tr. v. Kirchhefer , 764 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2014). When the dates on which the pertinent acts occurred are not in dispute, the date a statute of limitations accrues is a question of law. Edwards v. Int'l Union, United Plant Guard Workers, 46 F.3d 1047, 1050 (10th Cir. 1995) ; see also Strong v. Cochran , No. 2:14-cv-788-TC, 2017 WL 4620984, at *5 n.10 (D.
Utah Oct. 13, 2017) ("Certainly a federal court may evaluate whether dates of events pleaded in the complaint indicate on the complaint's face that a claim is time-barred."). The traditional rule in Utah is that a right accrues "upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City , 156 P.3d 806, 810 (Utah 2007) (internal citation omitted).
In certain circumstances, however, Utah courts will apply a discovery rule under which "the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action." Myers v. McDonald , 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). The applicability of a statute of limitations and...the discovery rule are questions of law, which we review for correctness. But the application of the discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual determination-the point at which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury.
Therefore, while we review the [lower court's] decision for correctness, we apply a
summary judgment standard of review to the subsidiary factual determination, which requires us to view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Colosimo , 156 P.3d 806 at 810 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Arnold v.
Grigsby , 417 P.3d 606, 616 (Utah 2018) ("The issue of when [the plaintiff] knew of [his or her] legal injury is a question of fact, but the applicability of the discovery rule to the statute of limitations-whether [he or she] should have known about [his or her] legal injury-is a mixed question of law and fact."). With respect to the claims dismissed as inadequately pled, "[a]t this stage in the litigation, we accept as true the well pleaded factual allegations and then determine if the plaintiff has provided 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Hogan v.
Winder , 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). III. Discussion The district court dismissed the majority of plaintiffs' non-TVPRA claims on statute of limitations grounds.
The court then turned to the remaining plaintiff, whose claims were tolled until she reached the age of eighteen, considering each non-TVPRA claim in turn and dismissing it for failing to state a claim. Finally, the court held that plaintiffs' TVPRA claims were inadequately pled. We begin by examining whether plaintiffs properly stated their various claims. We will then address the pertinent statutes of limitations, viable avenues for tolling the limitations periods, and the application of tolling to specific plaintiffs.
We will conclude with an overview of what claims remain after this appeal, and what issues must be addressed on remand. A. Whether Plaintiffs' Allegations State a Claim 1. Legal Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty To succeed on a claim of legal malpractice based on negligence, a plaintiff must prove: "(
i) an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach of duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (
v) actual damages." Christensen & Jensen, P.C. v. Barrett & Daines , 194 P.3d 931, 938 (Utah 2008). The elements of a legal malpractice claim based on breach of fiduciary duty are substantially the same. Id . Plaintiffs allege that defendants committed legal malpractice by failing to inform them of their legal rights and the extent to which such rights were being violated on an ongoing basis by Mr.
Jeffs; by failing to withdraw from representation when conflicts of interest arose between plaintiffs and the FLDS; and by failing to disclose to plaintiffs the true nature and structure of the legal framework they created that was used to terrorize FLDS members. Plaintiffs similarly allege that defendants breached fiduciary duties to them by purporting to represent their best interests while simultaneously "facilitating a plan to exploit and harm them." Aplt. App. at 65.
The district court held that the factual allegations in the complaint were not legally sufficient to plead an implied attorney-client relationship between defendants and plaintiff May Musser, the only plaintiff to survive the statute of limitations analysis. It accordingly dismissed these claims as inadequately pled. For the following reasons, we reverse this holding with respect to the plaintiffs set forth below, and we leave it to the district court on remand to determine whether the remaining elements of these claims have been adequately pled. i.
Attorney-client relationship Plaintiffs do not claim the formation of express attorney-client relationships with defendants but argue instead that they adequately pled implied attorney-client relationships in their complaint. An attorney-client relationship may arise without an express contract. Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs. , 43 F.3d 1373, 1384 (10th Cir. 1994) ; Margulies v. Upchurch , 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985).
Once formed, "[t]he attorney-client relationship is an ongoing relationship giving rise to a continuing duty to the client unless and until the client clearly understands, or reasonably should understand, that the relationship is no longer to be depended on." Roderick v. Ricks , 54 P.3d 1119, 1127 (Utah 2002), citing In re Weiner , 120 Ariz. 349, 586 P.2d 194, 197 (1978). Under Utah law, "the proper determination of whether an implied attorney-client relationship exists hinges on whether the party had a reasonable belief that it was represented." Kilpatrick v.
Wiley, Rein & Fielding , 37 P.3d 1130, 1139 (Utah 2001) (emphasis in original). "In order for a person to 'reasonably believe' that an attorney represents the person, (1) the person must subjectively believe the attorney represents him or her and (2) this subjective belief must be reasonable under the circumstances." Roderick , 54 P.3d at 1127. The totality of the circumstances should be considered. Kilpatrick , 37 P.3d at 1140.
The general rule in Utah is that representation of an entity does not of itself compel representation of that entity's members, but such an implied attorney-client relationship may arise under certain circumstances. Id ."[D]irect involvement [of the attorney with the client's individual interests is] ... only one factor to consider in determining whether the specific circumstances of the case demonstrate the [client's] belief concerning representation is reasonable." Id. at 1140-41.
For example, in Marguiles , the Utah Supreme Court concluded that it was not unreasonable for the individual members of a limited partnership to "believe that [the firm] was acting for their individual interests as well as the interests of the partnership" because the firm's successful representation of the limited partnership would have in turn "protected the [individual members] from substantial ... liability." 696 P.2d at 1200.
In a later case, the court clarified that the test is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the individual members reasonably believed the lawyer "represented their interests as individuals as distinguished from their common interests with the other limited partners." Norman v. Arnold , 57 P.3d 997, 1002 (Utah 2002).
In Norman , the Utah Supreme Court cited the existence of facts that "both discredit and support a conclusion that an implied attorney-client relationship existed" to ultimately conclude that the "question is properly answered by a factfinder, [and] it was error for the district court to determine, as a matter of law, that [the lawyer] did not owe the [individual members of a joint venture agreement] any fiduciary duties." Id . Likewise, the complaint here alleges facts that both discredit and support a conclusion that implied attorney-client relationships existed.
Reading these facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs on defendants' motion to dismiss, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances in this case could lead a fact-finder to decide that the individual FLDS members reasonably believed defendants were representing their individual interests. Defendants argue that any finding of implied attorney-client relationships here would create a slippery slope where "no law firm could represent a company or organization without the risk of being found to represent every individual constituent affiliated with that entity." Aple. Br. at 42.
But plaintiffs do not argue that their individual representation was either automatic through reformation of the UEP Trust or merely incidental to their FLDS membership. See Aple. Br. At 15. Rather, as we discuss below, they contend that their attorney-client relationships arose through (1) repetitive solicitation of money from them to pay legal fees to defendants and (2) the representations made to them over the years by FLDS leaders and by SC & M affiliates.
Imputation of attorney-client relationships under the specific and unique facts of this case will not undercut the general rules of implied representation. a. Subjective beliefs of representation An implied attorney-client relationship requires that the client subjectively believe the attorney represents him or her, so it is necessary to examine each individual plaintiff to determine whether sufficient facts were pled to support a finding of this subjective belief. The district court specifically ruled only with respect to Ms. May Musser's claims. Ms.
Musser alleges facts that both support and discredit the conclusion that an implied attorney-client relationship existed between her and defendants. Ms. Musser does not allege a personal belief of an attorney-client relationship with defendants, but she does allege that various demands were made for donations of attorney fees and that her paychecks were withheld at least in part for this purpose. Aplt. App. at 91. Contrary to the district court's determination, these conflicting allegations create a genuine issue of fact under Utah law that is not appropriate for dismissal at this stage.
See Norman , 57 P.3d at 1002. The district court never reached the issue of implied attorney-client relationships between defendants and the rest of the plaintiffs. Still, many of the allegations discussed by the district court in dismissing Ms. Musser's claims are widely applicable across all plaintiffs. See, e.g ., Bistline v. Jeffs , No. 2:16-cv-788-TS, 2017 WL 108039 at *7 (D. Utah Jan. 11, 2017) (listing the relevant allegations regarding Ms. Musser's claim as her financial contributions for attorney fees and defendants' representation of the church as a whole).
Therefore, for the convenience of the district court, we highlight the relevant factual assertions regarding each plaintiff's subjective belief. Because plaintiffs Derrell Barlow, Gina Rohbock, Janetta Jessop, and Wallace Jeffs are barred by all applicable statutes of limitations, as discussed infra , the existence of an individual attorney-client relationship is a moot point with respect to them. Although Alyssa Bistline, Briell Decker and Ruby Jessop are not barred by the statutes of limitations, we nevertheless dismiss their claims as a matter of law for the following reasons.
Alyssa Bistline and Briell Decker pled no facts whatsoever in reference to either their subjective understanding of defendants as representing them legally or their personal payment of any of the attorney fees. Ruby Jessop was theoretically represented by Mr. Parker in 2008 as one of the FLDS members on the YFZ Ranch, but she never alleges a subjective belief of personal representation or an understanding of the defendants' role with respect to her community.
Most importantly, she undertook pro se legal action in 2012 against her husband, who was represented by defendants, which indicates that at least by that point she had absolutely no belief that she was personally represented by defendants. Thus, neither Alyssa Bistline, Briell Decker, nor Ruby Jessop plead adequate facts to support a finding of an implied attorney-client relationship. Like Ms. Musser, several other plaintiffs allege facts both supporting and discrediting the existence of an implied attorney-client relationship.
Although Vergel Barrow perhaps had a more sophisticated legal perspective gained through his father's work as a legal liaison, he still regularly contributed large sums of money for attorney fees based on specific requests therefor and he attests to having trusted Parker as "his" lawyer. Aplt. App. at 111-14. Steven Dockstader admits "not hav[ing] much knowledge of the FLDS lawyers," but he made regular payments in response to donation requests and states it was common knowledge that the majority of this money was being used to pay attorney fees, even when not specifically earmarked. Id . at 103.
Susan Broadbent does not attest to paying any specific attorney fees but alleges her subjective belief that the lawyers "were protecting her and the FLDS people." Id . at 82. The same is true of Jason Black, who does not specifically allege personal payment of legal fees but states that he knew based on legal updates at church meetings that defendants were the lead attorneys for the FLDS and that they needed to be paid for their representation. Id . at 87.
He further alleges that he "believed that [defendants] had the people's full interests at heart, [ ] was assured regularly that they were his lawyers as well as the lawyers for all the FLDS[,] ... [and] [i]f a legal problem arose, the people were put in contact with the Lawyer Defendants." Id . at 88. The remaining plaintiffs specifically allege their subjective belief and consequent payments in reliance thereof. Marvin Cooke believed that Mr.
Parker was his lawyer and represented his interests "[t]hrough most of his adult life," understanding that defendants represented the FLDS both as a group and as individuals. Id . at 107. He routinely contributed money in response to specific requests for attorney fees, including his substantial income tax refunds. Thomas Jeffs states that he trusted defendants to protect him, and describes several ways that he financially contributed to pay attorney fees and other expenses, including taking out signature loans and a line of credit. See id . at 128-131. Helen Barlow was familiar with Mr.
Parker and "believed that he had been hired to defend her best interests and the interests of the FLDS," also believing that the "attorney fees she regularly contributed her paychecks to pay were going to [defendants]." Id . at 108. While growing up, Carole Jessop was "told that Parker was the FLDS' attorney many times" and understood that "he was to be trusted as the lawyer protecting her and all FLDS people." Id . at 115. She remembers many specific demands for attorney fees, and believes her family's payments were being made in large part to defendants.
Sarah Allred "knew that Parker was the spokesman and head lawyer for the FLDS," "trusted that he was protecting her," "knew she would be directed to him" if she ever needed help with a legal problem, and "had personally paid money for his services." Id . at 128. Nolan Barlow "was taught to look to [defendants] for himself [and] his wife and children if a legal matter arose" and had "seen example after example of FLDS people with legal problems contact FLDS leaders who then ... would contact [defendants]." Id . at 91.
The complaint describes him as among the FLDS members who had been "sacrificing to pay [defendants'] legal bills." Id . at 90. Lawrence Barlow understood that defendants were " 'our lawyers' representing 'our best interest,' " and faithfully made monthly payments for attorney fees under the belief that they were going to approved FLDS lawyers. Id . at 99.
He also understood that "there was a process you were required to follow as a member of the FLDS church to obtain legal assistance," and if a personal legal matter arose individual FLDS members would be directed first to the legal liaison Sam Barlow and then to "approved FLDS lawyers, typically Parker." Id . Finally, several plaintiffs allege actual receipt of individual representation by defendants. Alicia Rohbock was taken to Texas because of her children's involvement in the 2008 raid, and there she witnessed Mr. Parker's representation of each FLDS member on the ranch. Id . at 79.
Holly Bistline was instructed to divorce her husband in 2003, was referred to Mr. Parker, and he handled the matter. Id . at 93. Amy Nielson received personal representation by Mr. Parker in a divorce case that did not conclude until April 2013, and she "often spoke with Parker on his cell phone and exchanged emails on many occasions." Id . at 121. Her subjective belief is evidenced through her August 2014 email specifically requesting release from their attorney-client relationship. Id . at 122. b. Reasonableness of beliefs under the circumstances Under Utah law a subjective belief is not enough.
The specific circumstances of the case, in totality, must also demonstrate that the client's belief in individual representation is reasonable. The district court incorrectly focused on the 1998 revision of the UEP Trust as the capstone of plaintiffs' alleged implied attorney-client relationships, and discounted plaintiffs' fee solicitation arguments because "it is not objectively reasonable to believe that simply donating funds to a church creates an implied attorney-client relationship with that church's retained attorneys." Id . at 833.
While plaintiffs do reference the Reinstated Trust throughout their arguments, the majority of the complaint's relationship-based allegations involve a fee solicitation scheme far greater than the mere passing of a Sunday tithing plate.
Plaintiffs rely on the following to support the reasonableness of their belief that defendants represented each of them individually: their complete sequestration within the FLDS Church that limited their information sources to those provided by church leaders; the ongoing attorney fee solicitation within this insulated environment that church leaders and SC & M affiliates explained as payment for individual as well as collective representation; and the weekly legal updates in front of the entire congregation by a person affiliated with defendants.
For example, plaintiffs allege that: The representations, promises and inferences discussed throughout this Complaint were repeated with the knowledge and consent of Parker and SC & M on their behalf in ongoing, weekly and occasionally more frequent meetings in which virtually all the FLDS assembled, either in person or listened remotely to sermons in which Plaintiffs and similarly situated persons were actively instructed to part with their funds, including sometimes entire paychecks, to "keep the lawyers paid," because "they are representing you and all of your brothers and sisters" ....
Id. at 66 (emphasis added). As outlined previously, many individual plaintiffs reiterate how they understood that defendants were protecting both them and the FLDS as a whole "in exchange for the large sums of money they were paying for that protection." Id . at 77. The complaint further plausibly alleges that defendants' regular discussions with Mr. Jeffs and other FLDS representatives ensured defendants' actual knowledge of both the express representations being made and the direct individual reliance of FLDS members.
Unlike cases falling under the general rule that representation of an entity does not include representation of that entity's members, the circumstances in this case reasonably imply individual attorney-client relationships. Like the limited partners in Marguiles , FLDS members were informed that defendants' successful representation of the FLDS church as a whole would in turn protect them individually.
See, e.g., id . at 42 (a legal update by Sam Barlow assured the church members that defendants were involved in their defense and that "all of you who are not named as defendants, if you believe in the work...you are in fact a defendant in this lawsuit...[as] they have made each and every [sic] one of us a defendant."). Furthermore, they knew they would be directed to defendants with any personal legal issues that may arise, and personally paid attorney fees in recognition of this individual guarantee.
Most importantly, on multiple occasions including one in 2008 and one in 2011, defendants held themselves out to government officials and the public-at-large as representing the individual rights of individual members of the FLDS church. See Aplt. App. at 57, 58, 60. On yet another occasion, also in 2011, the affidavit of a liaison between defendants and the FLDS leadership stated that Mr. Parker and another lawyer called the FLDS to ask "if one or more of the FLDS defendants might want them to provide representation." Id . at 60.
This once again evidences defendants' status as "on call, standing by and willing to perform at the direction of the leadership of the Church ... [and] willing to represent any or all FLDS Defendants." Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). With the many types of explicit and implicit statements made by defendants regarding individual representation, plaintiffs' assertions that they believed they were personally represented are far from unreasonable.
Thus, the totality of the circumstances indicates that individual FLDS members would have been reasonable in believing that defendants were protecting their legal interests as individuals, as distinguished from merely representing their common interests as a church. Finally, we emphasize that plaintiffs' factual allegations describe extremely unusual circumstances. Accordingly, what may be reasonable in this situation varies significantly from what may be reasonable when there are more typical, less insular living conditions. See, e.g. , Keate v. State , No. 03-10-00077-CR, 2012 WL 896200, at *12 (Tex. Ct. App.
Mar. 16, 2012) (expert witness stating that "[FLDS] indoctrination practices, based on the doctrines and teachings of FLDS, allowed members to become compliant with and complicit in underage marriages [and] sexual activity with underage children"). If individuals have been cut off from outside resources because of sincerely held religious beliefs and have been actively and repeatedly deceived as to an attorney's responsibilities and allegiances towards them personally, it is plausible that they reasonably believed they were individually and collectively represented by that attorney.
Although the district court only addressed the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Ms. Musser and defendants, this analysis of the reasonability of subjective beliefs of representation under the totality of these circumstances can be similarly applied to all plaintiffs.
We therefore reverse the district court on this issue and remand for a factual determination of whether implied attorney-client relationships existed between defendants and each of the following plaintiffs: Sarah Allred, Helen Barlow, Lawrence Barlow, Nolan Barlow, Vergel Barlow, Holly Bistline, Jason Black, Susan Broadbent, Marvin Cooke, Steven Dockstader, Thomas Jeffs, Carole Jessop, May Musser, Amy Nielson, and Alicia Rohbuck. 2.
Fraudulent and Negligent Misrepresentation Plaintiffs base their fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims on allegations that defendants falsely held themselves out as representing and acting in the best interests of the entire FLDS membership and that plaintiffs reasonably relied on these representations in donating several millions of dollars in attorney fees. See Aplt. App. at 66-69.
The district court dismissed the fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims because it concluded that the only plaintiff not barred by the statute of limitations failed to allege an implied attorney-client relationship. Because we are reversing that determination with respect to certain plaintiffs, the district court will need to determine whether those plaintiffs sufficiently pled the remaining elements of these claims. 3. Civil Conspiracy The district court dismissed the majority of plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claims on statute of limitations grounds, and then dismissed Ms.
Musser's claim because it concluded that none of the underlying torts alleged by plaintiffs were adequately pled. Once again, the district court will now need to determine whether plaintiffs sufficiently pled the remaining elements of this claim. 4. RICO Violations Plaintiffs did not adequately address this part of the district court's holding in their opening brief.
When discussing the district court's alleged mischaracterization of their specific claims regarding participation in a criminal enterprise, for example, plaintiffs stated, "[t]he District Court based its dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellants' TVPRA (and RICO) claims upon the absence of specific facts which are in fact pleaded throughout the Complaint with specificity." Aplt. Br. at 47. Although the brief then specifically argues why the TVPRA claims should survive, plaintiffs never again mention their RICO claim.
"[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant's opening brief." WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. E.P.A ., 759 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). We do so here and decline to address plaintiffs' RICO claims. 5. Violations of the TVPRA The TVPRA provides a civil cause of action for victims of any crime under
chapter 77 of title 18 of the U.S. Code. 18 U.S.C. § 1595. Plaintiffs brought claims pursuant to the TVPRA, alleging that they were subjected to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 's prohibition on forced labor or services.
Section 1589 provides the following: (
a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means- (1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint shall be punished as provided under subsection (d). (
b) Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in subsection (a), knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of such means, shall be punished as provided in subsection (d).
The statute defines "serious harm" to include "any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to [render labor] ... to avoid incurring that harm." Id. § 1589(c)(2). One can violate the statute either as a primary offender or simply by benefiting financially from participation in a "venture" with the primary offender. Plaintiffs allege the FLDS Church in general, and Mr.
Jeffs in particular, were the primary offenders who forced FLDS members to engage in labor and sexual acts. Defendants' liability is alleged to stem from their participation in a "venture" that benefitted financially from this prohibited conduct. Therefore, to succeed in avoiding dismissal of their § 1589 claims against defendants, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that they provided labor or services that were procured by a method that is prohibited under the TVPRA, and that defendants knowingly benefited from participating in this venture.
We will first address whether plaintiffs have pled facts sufficient to support a claim against a primary offender, because this is a necessary element for venture liability. i. The means used to force labor or services As recognized by this circuit in United States v. Kaufman , 546 F.3d 1242, 1261-63 (10th Cir. 2008), and described by plaintiffs in their response to defendants' motion to dismiss, Aplt. App. at 233-36, the TVPRA was enacted to encompass more subtle forms of psychological abuse and nonviolent coercion than those previously required to hold perpetrators accountable.
Nine plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to maintain a claim against Mr. Jeffs and the FLDS church under the TVPRA. According to the general allegations in the complaint, when FLDS members were "ordered" to do something they had no choice but to comply. This was due to Mr.
Jeffs' purported control over every aspect of their lives, which "create[d] the ability to punish malcontents or recalcitrant followers with swift and horrendous punishments, including the loss of all shelter, food, medical care, cash, livelihood, and other essential support mechanisms necessary to an endurable daily existence." Id . at 29; see also id . at 106 ("The FLDS Church represented not just a way of living, but over time, it made the FLDS dependent and captive. It [ ] entrapped them because it was their 'retirement plan' in this world and their ticket to salvation in the next.").
The complaint alleges that "[p]laintiffs were threatened with force, kidnapped, physically restrained, [and] threatened with other harms ... if they failed to cooperate with the dictates of the Prophet." Id . at 73. Other articulated punishments include "intense and prolonged forced labor for underage workers and adults alike, which labor was typically performed in dangerous construction or excavation activities in which safety precautions were regularly ignored." Id . at 34.
Furthermore, plaintiffs maintain that "Jeffs employed the instrumentalities of the law to illegally punish those who appeared to be unwilling to submit ... [through] loss of property, loss of a place to live, [and] loss of livelihood." Id . at 46. This domination was allegedly enabled through the Reinstated Trust and Mr. Jeffs' resulting control of FLDS members' property.
For example, one plaintiff claims he was ordered to pay more in religious "contributions" upon threat of expulsion and that he did so out of fear of the "repercussions for disobedience, which include expulsion from the FLDS Church and UEP Trust property where [he] both lived and worked." Id . at 104; see also id. at 49-50 (example of this threat being carried out, with defendants using the Trust to evict an FLDS family that disobeyed Jeffs). Another plaintiff allegedly lost her job as a result of her "disobedience" when she stated that she was not yet ready to be married. Id . at 115.
Such tangible losses and the use of legal processes to enforce these harms legitimize plaintiffs' claims under the TVPRA. These and other similar general allegations, when combined with the specific facts outlined below, are sufficient to plead violations of § 1589(a). ii. Specific plaintiffs' labor or services Three plaintiffs focus their claims solely on labor in the traditional sense.
They claim that the described threats and punishments were used to "induce them to work for free or at unlawful rates of compensation for years on end at dangerous, difficult, demeaning and unpleasant jobs as well as at jobs that would be considered acceptable but for the fact that [they] were not permitted to keep fair compensation for such work."Id . at 73. Steven Dockstader states that in 2004 he was ordered as a twelve-year-old to move to Texas and engage in hard physical labor to build up the YFZ Ranch.
For the following seven years he "did little other than construction and other forms of hard labor, receiving no payment for his work." Id . at 103. Mr. Dockstader worked extreme hours without breaks, and "[t]he stress of the labor he engaged in while in Texas caused [his] appendix to burst." Id . Similarly, Thomas Jeffs explains that his formal education stopped in 2002 when he was fifteen-years-old and he was subsequently assigned to work for a series of FLDS controlled companies. Id . at 129.
For the first couple of years, Thomas Jeffs states that he received only approximately one-fourth of each paycheck, with the rest taken by FLDS leadership. In following years, he often received a full paycheck but was expected to immediately turn it over for payment of FLDS expenses. Finally, May Musser claims that she was required at age thirteen to work at a clinic under her older sister's name, with her paychecks made out to her older sister and surrendered to the FLDS church as part of a mandated practice.
She further states that as a child she was "required to perform manual work for which she was not paid, which caused an injury to her back, and was not allowed the medical care she needed." Id . at 91. Notably, "[l]abor or services in § 1589 is not limited to work in an economic sense and extends to forced sexual acts." Ricchio v. McLean , 853 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Kaufman , 546 F.3d at 1259-63 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court's analysis in Kaufman assessed a variety of sources to reach this ultimate conclusion. 546 F.3d at 1261-63. These included one academic
article observing that the context of compelled sexual chores surrounds the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against forced labor, another
article reasoning that slaves who were victims of sadism and torture (instead of being put in the fields) were still covered by the core of the Thirteenth Amendment, and a Fourth Circuit case recognizing sexual abuse as a badge and incident of servitude. See id . at 1262. A number of plaintiffs here sufficiently allege such compelled sexual acts and sexual abuse. Janetta Jessop alleges both coerced sexual activity and forced labor in the traditional sense. She was "married" to Mr. Jeffs in 2003, when she was only sixteen-years-old.
After their marriage, she "approached Defendant Jeffs and told him she wanted to have a baby. Without giving her any explanation, Jeffs told Janetta to take off all her clothes and sit on his lap. She obeyed. He then engaged in sexual activity with her without intercourse." Aplt. App. at 135. She also worked at a clinic where, although she was paid for her work, her father made her turn all of the money she earned over to the Prophet. During this period "she desperately tried to run away several times but was caught by the FLDS police based in Short Creek and returned to her FLDS parents." Id . at 136.
Susan Broadbent alleges that Jeffs commanded her to enter into a "spiritual marriage" with her 51-year-old cousin when she was sixteen-years-old. Id . at 83. She actively avoided sexual relations with him for as long as possible but eventually "succumbed to the pressure to [have] sex with her 'husband' on the night before September 1, 2003." Id. Gina Rohbock states that she was "spiritually married" at age 16 on December 28, 2001, "at the command of Defendant Jeffs."Id . at 83.
Although sixteen-year-old Gina did not meet 23-year-old Richard until the day of her "spiritual marriage" to him, he soon engaged in sexual relations with her. Id . at 84. The complaint states that in 2001, at age fourteen, Ruby Jessop had to stop attending ninth grade and was forced into a marriage with her second cousin and step-brother, who proceeded to "viciously rape[ ]" her. Id . at 80. Eighteen-year-old Carole Jessop allegedly received a message from Mr. Jeffs on May 1, 2003, informing her that she would be married to a grown, already-married man later that same day. Although Ms.
Jessop protested, she was told that she had no choice. Id . at 115. Finally, Briell Decker asserts she was "coerced by Jeffs to enter into a plural spiritual marriage" on January 18, 2003, when she was eighteen-years-old. Id . at 117. She was then subjected to extensive "training" which included "the deprivation of certain freedoms, foods and personal items; punishments and rewards; intense indoctrination and study; medication; [and] sexual activities." Id . at 118.
Each of these plaintiffs was a teenager at the time she was purportedly ordered into a sexual relationship with a significantly older man-ordered by her Prophet, whom she had been raised since birth to believe "only does right." See id . at 121. "A victim's age or special vulnerability may be relevant in determining whether a particular type or a certain degree of physical or legal coercion is sufficient to hold that person to involuntary servitude." United States v. Kozminski , 487 U.S. 931, 948, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988).
In the same way, these plaintiffs' youth and vulnerability, particularly with respect to the parties who were forcing them into this labor, contribute to the plausibility of their allegations under § 1589. Each of the plaintiffs listed above alleges facts sufficient to preclude dismissal on the issue of whether or not they were victims of forced labor under § 1589. We now turn to whether they allege sufficient facts to support liability for defendants. iii.
Venture liability As we stated above, § 1589 holds not just primary offenders accountable but also anybody who knowingly "benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in" forced labor. § 1589(b). While the term "venture" has not been defined in the context of § 1589(b), the First Circuit recently persuasively applied the definition from another TVPRA subsection to the forced labor context. See Ricchio , 853 F.3d at 556.
In § 1591(e)(6), "venture" is defined as "any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity." The district court here held that defendants did not participate in a "venture." We disagree. In Ricchio , the First Circuit became the first court to elaborate on the definition of "venture" in the context of the TVPRA. In that case, defendant McLean took Lisa Ricchio captive and brought her to a motel owned by husband and wife defendants, the Patels. Mr.
McLean "physically and sexually abused Ricchio, repeatedly raping her, starving and drugging her, and leaving her visibly haggard and bruised." Id . at 555. The Patels and Mr. McLean had previously collaborated in unspecified "commercial dealings." Id. While Ms. Ricchio was captive, McLean and Mr. Patel enthusiastically expressed [intent to reinstate these commercial dealings] by exchanging high-fives in the motel's parking lot while speaking about "getting this thing going again," in circumstances in which McLean's coercive and abusive treatment of Ricchio as a sex slave had become apparent to the Patels. Ms.
Patel had not only nonchalantly ignored Ricchio's plea for help in escaping from McLean's custody at the motel but, when visiting the rented quarters to demand further payment, had shown indifference to Ricchio's obvious physical deterioration. And in plain daylight view of the front office of the motel, either of the Patels on duty there would have seen McLean grab Ricchio, kick her, and force her back toward the rented quarters when she had tried to escape. Id. The First Circuit concluded that these facts supported, among other TVPRA claims, a plausible § 1589 forced labor claim against the Patels.
It reasoned that the Patels profited from McLean's renting of space to use in obtaining forced sexual labor or services and thus benefited from McLean's conduct. Id . at 556. Because knowingly benefitting made them equally liable, the First Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim with respect to venture liability under § 1589(b).
The opinion, written by retired Supreme Court Justice David Souter sitting by designation, emphasized that the court "[gave] attention to the whole body of allegations as circumstantially supplying meaning to particular acts by the Patels that the trial judge found too ambiguous to support the claims when considered in isolation." Id. at 557. For instance, "the district court found it 'meaningless' that McLean and Mr. Patel exchanged high fives." Id.
But the First Circuit disagreed, explaining that "[i]n isolation this may be so, but the complaint is to be read as a whole, and we read the statement in light of the allegations of the Patels' complaisance in response to the several alleged exhibitions of McLean's coercive and brutal behavior to a physically deteriorating Ricchio." Id.
In the present case, the complaint recounts in great detail how defendants were responsible for creating the intricate scheme that both enabled forced labor and allowed the threats which enforced that labor to be effective: a scheme far surpassing the district court's limited description of merely "help[ing] with Trust documents." Bistline , 2017 WL 108039 at *9. Defendants had ample notice of the illegal activities which were taking place within the FLDS community while they were actively seeking to enforce Mr. Jeffs' control and simultaneously protecting him from any liability.
Jeffs' Priesthood Record makes various references to Parker and his awareness of Jeffs' practices with underage brides and the manner in which he claimed that the Lord instructed him to ignore the legal actions and complaints against him and the FLDS and to never compromise or retreat from his present course of action, but instead to rely upon Parker and other lawyers operating under his direction to strategically battle and evade the attacks brought by non-believing victims. Aplt. App. at 51.
The complaint alleges that the scheme set up by defendants was designed expressly for the purpose of facilitating these crimes and also ensuring that defendants would personally reap ample benefits therefrom. For instance, plaintiffs allege that defendants and Mr. Jeffs "actively discussed [Jeffs'] illegal goals" in setting up the Reinstated Trust, id . at 29-30, and that Mr. Jeffs retained defendants' legal counsel for the purpose of developing a scheme to "cloak" forced labor and ritual rape of young girls "with the superficial trappings of legal acceptance," id . at 28.
They also allege that "a large part of the reason for rewriting the Trust was to give Parker and SC & M peace of mind that their fees would be paid."Id . at 111. Plaintiffs further claim that defendants actively maintained and extended this scheme over the years. Their conduct purportedly included, but was not limited to, using the Reinstated Trust to carry out the types of threats that compelled plaintiffs' obedience to Mr.
Jeffs and consequent forced labor by, for example, representing the Trust in an eviction action "to expel a family in retaliation for the mother's refusal to consent to the 'marriage' (rape) of her 15-year-old daughter." Id . at 49-50; see also id. at 50. Importantly, like in Ricchio , some facts alleged in the complaint here indicate defendants' "complaisance" in response to exhibitions of TVPRA violations.
One enumerated example is the negotiation in which defendants explained Jeffs' refusal to compromise with the Attorney General, reiterating that "you are not going to change that community" and attempting to convince everyone involved that it was a "useless effort" to try and interfere with the marriage of underage girls. Id . at 48. Another is the allegation that Mr.
Parker personally and knowingly utilized manual labor in exchange for legal services, through construction and remodeling work on his real estate, despite knowing that he was not actually representing the best interests of these individuals and that they would not receive the benefit of their labor. See id . at 72, 212. As in Ricchio , these acts fully support the TVPRA claims when read in light of the complaint as a whole.
Defendants' knowledge extended beyond the generic religious practices that they had acknowledged as raising "serious legal questions" and included graphic evidence of the ceremonial rape of little girls (which was provided to them by the FBI in 2005 at the latest, and was also garnered from their many representations of church members accused of sexual crimes). Id . at 49, 75. Plaintiffs contend that despite extensive knowledge of the ways Mr. Jeffs was using his power to harm plaintiffs and other similarly-situated individuals, defendants continued to use their legal expertise to uphold this scheme.
See, e.g., id . at 57 ("Parker participated behind the scenes in the [Texas] criminal defense of [Mr.] Jeffs and the other men by interviewing and organizing teams of defense lawyers and by assuring that those lawyers did not share information about Jeffs' conduct with the FLDS.") All of these allegations are set within the previously described context of plaintiffs' extreme isolation from the external world, circumstances of which defendants were well aware, as well as with defendants' express and sanctioned reassurances that they individually represented plaintiffs and with their solicitation of large financial payment from plaintiffs for these purposes.
To top it off, plaintiffs allege that some of defendants' legal fees were being funded by the forced labor of children, with defendants' awareness and acquiescence. Id . at 46, 72, 91. We do not present this
summary as necessarily exhausting every variant of statutory violation and basis for civil liability that could survive the motion to dismiss, but merely to indicate that the claims so summarized are supported by factual allegations and reasonable inferences sufficient to pass muster under the plausibility standard. See Ricchio , 853 F.3d at 557. In Ricchio , the owners of a motel were aware of a woman being held against her will and sexually abused while in their hotel. Id . at 555.
They did nothing to expose the cruel conduct, even tacitly approving of it through a high-five with the offender, and benefitted from this conduct through the offender's continued payment for a room. In this case, plaintiffs allege facts supporting their claims that defendants were well aware of the crimes being committed against plaintiffs, did nothing to expose these atrocities, tacitly approved of the conduct by constructing a scheme for the purpose of enabling it, and benefited for years from plaintiffs' payments of a considerable amount of attorney fees.
These combined allegations create a reasonable inference that defendants were participating in a venture with Mr. Jeffs which involved forced labor and services. Considering all of these circumstances, the previously enumerated plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that defendants "benefit[ted], financially ... from participation in a venture which [w]as engaged in" a proscribed action under § 1589 of the TVPRA. B.
Statute of Limitations A complaint need not anticipate any affirmative defenses that may be raised by the defendant, including the statute of limitations; it is the defendant's burden to plead an affirmative defense. Fernandez v. Clean House, LLC , 883 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Gomez v. Toledo , 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) ); see also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1) (explicitly listing statute of limitations as an affirmative defense).
Indeed, it is only proper to dismiss a complaint based on an affirmative defense when the complaint itself admits all the elements of the affirmative defense. Id. With respect to plaintiffs' state-based claims, we apply Utah's statutes of limitations. We must also apply Utah's tolling rules, which are "an integral part of the several policies served by the statute of limitations." Elm Ridge Expl. Co., LLC v. Engle , 721 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiffs' claims cannot be properly dismissed, therefore, unless they allege facts plainly establishing that their claims have expired and cannot be tolled under Utah law. We now turn to plaintiffs' various claims to ascertain the applicable statutes of limitations. 1. Applicable Statutes of Limitations i. Fraudulent misrepresentation Claims in Utah for fraudulent misrepresentation have a three-year statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3).
Although plaintiffs did allege relevant activities taking place throughout 2012-2014, there is no question that many of the crucial events related to their causes of action transpired more than three years before they filed suit. As the district court noted: The Trust was amended in 1998. The collection of donations from members for attorney's fees began at least as early as 2001. Defendants allegedly held themselves out as representing individual FLDS members in 2008 and 2011. Jeffs allegedly admitted that he was not the Prophet around 2007. Defendants' involvement with the Trust ended in 2005.
Bistline , 2017 WL 108039 at *3. Plaintiffs are incorrect in assuming that their claims failed to accrue until the occurrence of the very last associated event. A cause of action accrues (and is complete) when a plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion. DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co. , 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996). As alleged in the complaint, there are events which occurred many years before plaintiffs brought suit that fulfill each element of a cause of action for fraud. See Aplt. App. at 209-219.
Accordingly, absent tolling, plaintiffs' fraud claims are time-barred. ii. Negligent misrepresentation The district court applied the three-year limitations period for fraud, relying on a 2012 Utah case. See Mackay v. America's Wholesale Lender , 2012 WL 464648, at *2 (D. Utah Feb. 13, 2012) ("The statute of limitations applicable to a negligent misrepresentation claim is three years."). The parties do not argue otherwise. iii.
Malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy Legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty both require the formation of a relationship of trust between plaintiffs and defendants, and defendants' subsequent breach of that duty. A four-year statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs' legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307(3). Subject to the analysis above, these claims are also time-barred unless they are equitably tolled. iv. TVPRA Plaintiffs also allege claims under the federal TVPRA statute.
A claim under the TVPRA must be brought within ten years either after the cause of action arose or after the victim reaches eighteen years of age (if the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged offense). 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c). The district court did not dismiss plaintiffs' TVPRA claims on statute of limitations grounds, and defendants do not argue that the claims should be time-barred. As will become clear from our analysis below, some of the events that could trigger a TVPRA cause of action happened outside of this ten year window.
However, because plaintiffs had no reason to brief any theories as to why those particular claims should be tolled, we will not address any statute of limitations issues with respect to plaintiffs' TVPRA claims. 2. Tolling the Limitations Periods i. The age of majority There are multiple exceptions to the rule that "a statute of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Colosimo , 156 P.3d at 810.
One such exception is that "in the case of a plaintiff who is under the age of majority or mentally incompetent, the statute of limitations will be tolled until plaintiff is free from the disability." Id . In this case, plaintiff May Musser turned eighteen-years-old in 2015. Accordingly, the limitations period on all of her claims only began to run in 2015, and none are time-barred because the complaint here was filed on July 13, 2016. The complaint lists eight other minor plaintiffs: A.B., A.B., M.B., P.B., T.B., R.R., R.R., and B.J.R.
But they are included only by reference in their mothers' sections, their claims do not have a nexus to defendants, and there are no allegations of facts upon which relief could be granted. Therefore, despite not being time-barred by the statute of limitations, their claims do not survive. The district court did not err in dismissing them. ii. Continuing tort doctrine Plaintiffs argue in their opening brief that the district court failed to consider key factual averments in their complaint when determining the commencement of the statutory periods, including ignoring "continuing tortious conduct." Aplt.
Br. at 41. "A tort cause of action accrues when all its elements come into being and the claim is actionable." Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774, 784 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (internal citation omitted). However, where a tort involves a pattern of continuous and ongoing tortious conduct, the cause of action accrues and the period of limitations begins to run at the time the last injury occurred or the tortious conduct ceased. See Tiberi v. CIGNA Corp ., 89 F.3d 1423, 1430 (10th Cir. 1996) ; see also Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp ., 235 P.3d 730, 745 (Utah 2010).
Continuing damages stemming from a single initial violation do not constitute a continuing tort. Hatch , 102 P.3d at 785 n.18. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the continuing tort doctrine (also referred to as "continuing wrong," "continuing harm," or "continuing violation") as an exception serving to toll the statute of limitations, and has applied it in a variety of situations including nuisance, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, continuous negligent treatment, and continuing negligence. Bingham , 235 P.3d at 745.
Utah courts have not mentioned the doctrine when analyzing any of the types of tort claims at issue here. But a number of cases bear mentioning. Construing New Mexico law, we have applied the doctrine t
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