Stephen A. MOBLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Frederick HEAD, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison, Respondent-Appellee, 306 F.3d 1096

BARKETT, Circuit Judge: Having determined that the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in Abdur’Raham v. Bell, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1605, 152 L.Ed.2d 620 (2002) (granting certiorari to consider whether every Rule 60(

b) motion constitutes a prohibited “second or successive” habeas petition as a matter of law), will determine our resolution of the issues Mobley raises in this appeal, we hereby stay Mobley’s execution pending a decision in that case or until further order of this Court or the Supreme Court. Because the dissent fully describes the factual and procedural background of this case, we write only to explain our disagreement. Unlike the dissent, we believe that the district court fairly read Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 657 (11th Cir.1996), to have established a bright-line rule that the restrictions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(

b) for “second or successive” petitions apply to all Rule 60(

b) motions filed by habeas corpus petitioners. See Felker, 101 F.3d at 661 (“We hold that the successive petition restrictions contained in the amendments to § 2244(

b) apply to Rule 60(

b) proceedings, even where those proceedings seek to amend a judgement that became final before the effective date of the amendments.”); In re Medina, 109 F.3d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir.1997) (“We held in Felker that the second and successive petition restrictions of amended § 2244(

b) apply to Rule 60(

b) motions.”). That is the same unequivocal rule that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review in Ab-dur’Raham, and we believe the outcome in that ease will determine the outcome here. The dissent apparently believes, notwithstanding Felker and Medina, that Mobley’s 60(

b) motion is not subject to § 2244(b)’s restrictions. Assuming ar-guendo that the dissent is correct on that score, we believe that our precedent squarely precludes us from affirming the district court. Mobley has clearly alleged that the State’s actions regarding Fuller’s testimony created infirmities in his federal habeas hearing, not just in the state proceedings. In his 60(

b) motion, Mobley claims that recently discovered evidence demonstrates that the district court’s prior resolution of his habeas claim was tainted because it was based upon facts (regarding Fuller’s prior testimony) that the State knew or should have known were false. Mobley argues that, because of these “extraordinary circumstances,” the district court should have exercised its discretion under Rule 60(

b) to grant him relief from the judgment denying his request for ha-beas relief. The district court denied Mobley’s motion because of what it perceived to be Felker’s absolute rule. This Court reviews a denial of a 60(

b) motion for abuse of discretion. See Booker v. Singletary, 90 F.3d 440, 442 (11th Cir.1996). As we have explained previously, under that standard of review, A discretionary decision that falls within permitted bounds, but is based on false premises, raises the question on review as to whether the trial court would have come to the same conclusion using proper premises. That it could have does not satisfy the inquiry as to whether it would have reached the same result.

The affirmance of a discretionary decision that is based on an improper view of the facts or the law merely reflects the appellate court’s exercise of discretion that rightfully belongs to the trial court. The proper role of appellate review permits a remand for further proceedings when a discretionary decision has been made on false premises. Collins v. Seaboard C.R. Co., 681 F.2d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir.1982).

Therefore, if the dissent were right that the district court misread Felker, then under Collins we would be required to remand; we would not be free to affirm by substituting for the district court’s discretion our conjecture that it would have reached the same result had it been guided by a proper view of the law. Of course, we believe the district court correctly interpreted Felker, but recognizing that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the same issue in Abdur’Rahman, we find it appropriate to issue a stay pending a decision in that case. Appellant Stephen A. Mobley’s Stay of Execution is GRANTED. .

We disagree with the dissent that the language of Mobley's motion is restricted to Rule 60(b)(3). Mobley has not limited his motion to that enumerated ground. The district court would also have discretion to reopen under 60(b)(2) ("newly discovered evidence”) or 60(b)(6) ("any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment”).