PER CURIAM: E-Yage Bowens, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal without prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, in which six inmates joined their claims together in a single suit. The district court held that to conform to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), as interpreted by Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1195 (11th Cir.2001), each inmate must file a new, individual complaint, and either pay the full filing fee or submit an individual motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).
On appeal, Bowens argues that because Hubbard aimed to curtail the flux of frivolous lawsuits by inmates, the Court never ruled on inmates (1) sharing the mandatory filing fee for non-frivolous civil rights lawsuits brought under exigent circumstances. We affirm. The district court’s
interpretation of the PLRA constitutes a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 1196. We have held that the PLRA “amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915(
b) to require a prisoner to pay the full amount of the filing fee when a prisoner brings a civil suit IFP.” Id. In Hubbard, 18 prisoners filed a single pro se civil rights action under § 1983 against a correctional facility and other defendants. The prisoners alleged that the correctional facility failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical care and diet. Id. at 1195. We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, holding that the plain language of the PLRA requires that each prisoner proceeding IFP pay the full initial filing fee and the appellate filing fee. Id. at 1195, 1198.
To the extent that the Rules Enabling Act, as expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, actually conflicts with the PLRA, we held that the statute repeals the Rule. Id. at 1198. Here, as a preliminary matter, this Court only has jurisdiction to hear this appeal as to Bowens, because only Bowens signed the document that was construed as a notice of appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(2).
Bowens, however, has faded to show that the district court erred when it dismissed the original complaint because the PLRA, as interpreted by Hubbard, did not provide exceptions for joinder of inmate plaintiffs based on the nature of the claims that they raised. To the contrary, because the prisoners in Hubbard claimed inadequate medical care, the court in Hubbard arguably anticipated claims that could involve exigent danger to the prisoners, such as those claims seemingly raised by Bowens here. Accordingly, upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm AFFIRMED.