AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF FLORIDA, INCORPORATED, Miami-Dade County Student Government Association, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Rudolph F. Crew, Defendants-Appellants, 557 F.3d 1177

CARNES, Circuit Judge: Kafka advised a friend that “we ought to read only books that bite and sting us. If the book we are reading doesn’t shake us awake like a blow on the skull, why bother reading it in the first place?” The kind of biting, stinging, and shaking Kafka advocated, however, is not the kind we feel when we read a purportedly nonfiction book filled with factual errors, distortions, and misrepresentations. Juan Amador was outraged when he read the inaccurate portrayal of life in Cuba that was contained in a book on the shelves of the library where his young daughter [R:19:397] went to school.

He asked that the book be removed from the shelves, explaining that “[a]s a former political prisoner from Cuba, I find the material to be untruthful. It portrays a life in Cuba that does not exist.” ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 439 F.Supp.2d 1242, 1247 (S.D.Fla.2006). After a lengthy review process, the School Board removed the book. Illustrating something akin to Newton’s Third Law of Motion, the action the School Board took at Amador’s request caused an equal and opposite reaction from another parent and two organizations. They promptly sued the Board.

Agreeing with their claims that the School Board’s action violated the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause, a federal district court enjoined the Board from removing the book. Id. at 1294. This is the Board’s appeal. I. The Miami-Dade County Public School District has forty-nine copies of the book, A Visit to Cuba, and its Spanish-Ianguage counterpart, ¡Vamos a Cuba!, spread out among thirty-three of its elementary and middle schools.

Id. at 1249. (For convenience we will refer to all forty-nine copies by the Spanish language title Vamos a Cuba.) The Vamos a Cuba book is part of a series of books which “targets readers between the ages of 4 to 8 years old, and [is] written to provide basic information about what life is like for a child” in various countries. Id. at 1248. The “A Visit to” series also includes books about Puerto Rico, Costa Rica, Colombia, Brazil, Cambodia, England, Egypt, the United Kingdom, Canada, Vietnam, Wales, Australia, China, Japan, Scotland, Mexico, Italy, Israel, Ireland, India, Greece, Germany, and France.

The school district has at least one copy of those other “A Visit to” books in some of its elementary and middle school libraries. Id. at 1248-49. [R:28]. The “A Visit to” series is located in the libraries’ nonfiction (history, geography, cultures) section. [R:19:59], The books in the “A Visit to” series all follow the same “formulaic format.” Id. at 1254.

They offer the young reader “superficial introductions to geography, people, customs, language, and daily life.” Id. at 1249 n. 8 (quoting a peer review of the series). “The large-print texts are accompanied by color photos of varying quality and relevance.” Id.

For example, the thirty-two pages of Vamos a Cuba contain general statements about Cuba’s geography (“Cuba is a country in the Caribbean Sea, south of Florida.”), people (“Most Cubans live in cities.”), customs (“Cubans dress to keep cool in the hot weather.”), language (“Most people in Cuba speak Spanish.”), and daily life (“People in Cuba eat, work, and go to school like you do.”). Id. at 1247 n. 4, 1249 n. 8. [R:28 Ex:A Visit to Cuba]. The library at Marjory Stoneman Douglas Elementary School is one of the thirty-three district libraries with Vamos a Cuba in its collection. Id. at 1248.

On April 4, 2006, Juan Amador, the father of a young girl at Douglas Elementary, filed a “Citizen’s Request for Reconsideration of Media” to have Vamos a Cuba removed from the library at his daughter’s school. Id. at 1247. [R:19:Ex.32]. On the request form Amador identified himself as a former political prisoner and complained that the material in the book was not truthful and “portrays a life in Cuba that does not exist.” Id.

Amador also wrote that, “I believe [Vamos a Cuba] aims to create an illusion and distort reality.” [R:19:Ex.32], He recommended that the book be replaced by one “that truly reflects the plight of the Cuban people of the past and present.” [Id] The school district has a four-tiered administrative procedure for reviewing citizen requests to remove books from the district’s libraries. [R:8:Ex.G:86-90].

The initial complaint about a book goes to the school’s principal, even though he does not have the authority on his own to remove a book. [Id. at 86], Apparently, the only authority the principal has is to explain why the school has the book in its library collection. If the complainant is not satisfied with the explanation, he can file a formal request that the book be removed. [Id. at 86-87].

The formal request is heard by a School Materials Review Committee, an ad hoc group composed of teachers, administrators, counselors, library specialists, students, and parents from the school where the complaint was made. [Id. at 87], This School Committee reviews the book. It considers the Board’s fifteen criteria for selecting library materials: educational significance, appropriateness, accuracy, literary merit, scope, authority, special features, translation integrity, arrangement, treatment, technical quality, aesthetic quality, potential demand, durability, and lack of obscene material.

The School Committee may also solicit any “professional written reviews” of the book and any comments by library experts and “appropriate audiences.” [Id. at 83, 87-88]. After the review the School Committee recommends to the principal whether to retain, remove, or limit the use of the book as part of the library’s collection. [Id. at 83, 87-88].

If the complaining citizen is dissatisfied with the School Committee’s recommendation, he may appeal it to the superintendent, who has the option of issuing a decision based on that committee’s recommendation or submitting the appeal to the District Materials Review Committee. The District Committee is an ad hoc group made up of district administrators, principals from other schools, library specialists from other schools, a student, a union official, a member of the parent-teacher association, and a “lay person.” [Id. at 88-89].

If the superintendent submits the appeal to the District Committee, it will review the same materials as the School Committee and will make its own independent recommendation to the superintendent of schools. [Id. at 89]. The superintendent then considers the District Committee’s recommendation and decides whether to remove the book. [Id. at 89-90]. The superintendent’s decision can be appealed to the School Board, which has the final say insofar as the school system is concerned. [Id. at 90]. In this case Amador followed the administrative review process from start to finish.

Because he was not satisfied with the principal’s explanation about Vamos a Cuba, he submitted a formal request to the School Committee to remove the book from the Douglas Elementary library. [R:19:Ex.lO:55-57]. The School Committee considered the book in light of the district’s fifteen written criteria for evaluating books for its school library collections. [Id. at 54-55; see id. at 64-71].

Some of the eight committee members believed that Vamos a Cuba was “factually accurate,” “apolitical,” and “appropriate for the age group,” while one member felt that the “author could have better written and researched the topic,” and another was convinced that the book did not meet the district’s criteria for accuracy. [Id. at 64-71], All eight members checked the “meets criteria” box for the categories of “educational significance” and “appropriateness.” [Id.; see also ACLU Br. 10]. The School Committee’s vote was seven to one in favor of retaining Vamos a Cuba in the Douglas Elementary library. [Id. at 56].

Amador appealed the School Committee’s decision to retain the book in the Douglas Elementary library to the superintendent, who submitted the appeal to the District Committee. [R:19:Ex.8:49]. The seventeen-member District Committee decided to evaluate Vamos a Cuba based on what it determined to be the three most important of the fifteen criteria: educational significance, appropriateness, and accuracy. [R:19:Ex.7:44].

As to those three factors, one committee member said that the title of the book was inaccurate because “Cuba is not a country [one is] free to visit,” and that the cave drawings pictured on page 29 of the book “were not painted 1,000 years ago as the text states.” [Id. at 46-47].

Another District Committee member said that other books in the “A Visit to” series, and specifically the one on Vietnam, another communist country, “contain[] more specific information and ha[ve] more accuracy whereas, A Visit to Cuba detracts [sic] factual information and contains inaccuracies when comparing formulaic sentences.” [Id. at 46].

Still another member commented that the “A Visit to” series consists of “formula books” that “contain the same type of information presented in the same formulaic matter.” [Id.] The District Committee, by a vote of 15 to 1, recommended that the superintendent retain Vamos a Cuba in the Douglas Elementary library. [R:19:Ex.5:8], (One member resigned before the vote, stating that “he had concerns regarding the ability of the committee to render an objective decision.”) [R:19:Ex.36:3].

The superintendent adopted the District Committee’s recommendation and informed Amador of his decision to leave Vamos a Cuba on the library shelves. [R:19:Ex.4:6; R:19:Ex.3:4-5], Amador appealed the superintendent’s decision to the School Board the same day and asked that the Board take up his appeal at its next meeting. [R:19:Ex.2:3]. It did so. [R:8:Ex.I]. In its April 18, 2006 meeting, the Board heard comments from guest speakers in the community and considered the issue of removing Vamos a Cuba from the libraries. [R:19:297-390].

In its June 14, 2006 meeting, Board members spoke about their views on the subject, and a majority of the Board voted for removal of Vamos a Cuba. [R:19:449]. At that June 14 meeting, after Amador spoke, Board chairman Augustin Barrera began the discussion for the Board. He stated that the “issues before us, to me are quite clear, it’s issues of inaccuracies, it’s issues of omissions, because sometimes the words that are not said are more powerful than those words which are said, and sometimes there’s generalities, which [is] how this book is portrayed.” [R:19:Ex.34:9].

Chairman Barrera continued: We talk about censorship, the parent, Mr. Amador, talked about censorship. Censorship is when you want to stop somebody from giving another opinion, something that goes against what you believe in. In this particular case, when I read the book, it doesn’t really give an opinion, what it does is it gives a lack of information, and it’s in that lack of information that I think we as the Cuban community are offended.... I cannot support the recommendations that are made here today by the superintendent.

What I can support is the replacement of this book with a book that really talks about the richness and the culture that the Cuban people have lived and, if it was up to me, I would replace the whole series, because those books do not do justice to those 24 countries, and I think we owe it to the students in Miami-Dade County public schools to give them the best education possible. [Id. at 13,15]. Board member Ana Rivas Logan spoke next. [Id. at 15]. She said that “from the very first day” she reviewed Vamos a Cuba she had “found the book extremely offensive, inaccurate, full of omissions.” [Id at 17].

Board member Logan continued: “I reviewed the other books [in the series]. The other books don’t paint the same portrait; in other words, they also have omissions.” [/&] Noting that the school district replaces outdated library books “every few years” as a matter of course, Logan said: At the appropriate time, Mr. Chair, I’d like to make the motion to replace the series with a new and updated series, which is nothing different than what we’re going to be doing across this county, and across this state, and probably across this nation in every single school. [Id. at 18].

After Logan spoke, Board member Frank Bolanos noted that the School Board rules “put[ ] in place and set[ ] forth very clear educational standards that must be met by books that are placed in our public school library.” [Id. at 19]. Vamos a Cuba, he said, “does not meet those standards, that is crystal clear.” [Id.] He continued: We’re talking here about a simple right, I believe it’s also a right protected by The U.S. Constitution, and that is the right and the responsibility that we teach our children the truth; that is a sacred right and responsibility.

And if we recognize as, even members of the committee that looked at this book, as the superintendent has recognized when he made an offer to place a label of distinction and separation of the book, if we recognize that this book due to its acts of commission, and omission does not teach our children the truth about Cuba, then it should be removed from our public school libraries, we have that sacred responsibility. [Id. at 19-20].

Board vice-chair Perla Tabares Hant-man explained that she did not view the issue to remove the Vamos a Cuba book as “one of censorship or about banning a book.” [Id. at 21, 24]. “I view this,” she continued, “as one of accuracy and truth.” She explained: I don’t think anyone here would support the presence of a math book in our libraries that taught that two plus two equals five. I don’t think anyone here would support the presence of a geography book in our libraries that says that Miami is boarded [sic] by the Pacific Ocean.

Similarly, I cannot support the presence of a book in our school that creates a misleading and inaccurate portrait of Cuba.... ... I read the book, and in many pages, I would say at least 14 omissions or statements that are not true, so that’s why I said that this is not about censorship or banning.

This is about a book that is not accurate, and there’s nothing that — I cannot support this book in our libraries. [Id. at 24-25], Board member Marta Perez thanked “all of the people on both sides of this issue that have come together to express their opinions,” but regretted “that this issue so divides our community.” [Id. at 25-26] She seconded Bolanos’ motion to remove the book. [Id.] Board member Evelyn Langlieb Greer explained that the “beauty” of the administrative procedure for requesting that a book be removed from the library was that “it takes the emotion and the politics out” of the decision-making process “and substitutes professional judgment.” [Id. at 29, 33-34], She explained: Once a book is in a system, and has enjoyed the consent of the administrative, of being in the system, it can only be legitimately removed in this country based on serious, material, irrevocable and clear inaccuracies and biases.

The 22 professional educators who reviewed this book have affirmatively determined that that is not the case, therefore, we are here today in essentially a political process....

We are rejecting the professional recommendation of our staff based on political imperatives that have been pressed upon members of this board, which I completely understand, and with which I sympathize, but one of the things we did when we took an oath of office today is to uphold The Constitution of The United States as it has been set down and interpreted by The United States Supreme Court. [Id. at 34-35], Board member Martin Karp explained that “the author’s intent in Vamos a Cuba was not to say anything about the politics of the country, and the harsh realities that exist there, but sometimes, as our Chair said, when you do not say anything or avoid addressing real problems, you say a lot.” [Id. at 36-37], He said that the way to handle the problem “is to give our children a more accurate, age appropriate picture.” [Id. at 37].

Finally Board member Robert Ingram spoke. [Id. at 38]. He suggested that if some of his colleagues on the School Board did not vote to remove Vamos a Cuba from the libraries, “they can’t walk out of here. If they don’t vote for it, they can’t go home, they might find a bomb under their automobiles, and I feel that’s a shame to be put upon a school system that we are trying to train our children to have equality and justice.” [Id. at 40], Board member Ingram continued: To say that if I say, no, that I’m pro-communist; to say if I say, yes, I’m anti [i]s to create a context that doesn’t fit me.

I move for what I believe to be right and what I believe to be accurate .... Will there be some condemnations? I honestly believe there will be. Will my children and my grandchildren be at risk? They just might be, because of the e-mails, and many of the things that have come in my direction have not been pleasant. And I cannot believe that this community, that this Miami-Dade County community, who wants to grow, and be as diverse and, clearly, all it’s claimed to be diverse in representing everybody to create a context that promotes threats, that promotes violence....

I can’t vote my conscience without feeling threatened. That should never happen in this community anymore. That should never happen anymore, and especially at this place that we call Miami-Dade County Public Schools, especially at this dias [sic], where we’re supposedly setting a tone for our children. [Id. at 42-44], After all Board members who wished to speak (eight of the nine) had done so, Board member Logan made a motion.

Her motion was to reject the superintendent’s decision to retain the Vamos a Cuba book in the Douglas Elementary library and to replace the entire “A Visit to” series in the district’s libraries “with updated books that are more actual to real life in these countries.” [Id. at 57-58]. Logan stated that the “findings” for her motion were “that the book is inaccurate, it has omissions.” [Id. at 59].

Board member Bolonas seconded the motion. [Id.] The motion was approved by a vote of 6 to 3. [Id.] The Board’s decision, as contained in its written order, provided: Upon a review of the complete Record of the proceedings below, including the transcript of the proceedings on Board Agenda Item 6-3 (incorporated herein by reference and attached hereto, and made a part of this Final Order), the Superintendent’s recommendation sustaining the District Materials Review Committee’s decision is hereby rejected.

The foregoing is based upon the findings reflected by the record of these proceedings, and more specifically the finding that the book is inaccurate and contains several omissions. It is further ordered that, this book and the series it is a part of, be replaced, throughout the school district, with a more accurate set of books that is more representative of actual life in these countries. [R:19:Ex.l5], That order was issued on June 14, 2006.

About a week later the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. and the Miami-Dade County Student Government Association filed a complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the Southern District of Florida against the School Board and the superintendent seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. [R:l:l — 2]. The ACLU and the student government association alleged that the defendants had violated their members’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and access to information as well as their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. [Id. at 14-16].

The plaintiffs also requested that the district court enjoin the School Board from enforcing its removal order. [R:7]. The plaintiffs argued to the district court that both the ACLU and the student government association had standing. The ACLU’s standing was premised on the fact that many of its members, who object to removal of the books, have school children in the district. [R:23:4-5]. Howard Simon, the ACLU’s executive director, swore in his declaration that its Greater Miami

Chapter had “approximately 3,500 members within the Miami-Dade County School District including many parents of children who attend Miami-Dade county elementary and middle schools, and who want their children to have access to the books the School Board ordered removed from the libraries.” [R:19:Ex.26:4-5], Mark Balzli, a member of that

chapter of the ACLU, swore in his declaration that: (1) his son was a student at North Beach Elementary School; (2) he wanted his son to have access to Vamos a Cuba and the other books in the “A Visit to” series; (3) he saw Vamos a Cuba in the North Beach Elementary library; and (4) he had planned to check the book out of the library with his son “in the future,” but they “will be unable to do so when school resumes on August 14, 2006” because of the School Board’s order removing the series. [R:19:Ex.27], As for the standing of the student government association, Ronald Bilbao, its former president and a member of its executive board [R:8:Ex.M:l], swore in his supplemental declaration that he had “spoken to several student members of the SGA who have told me they would like to have access to the books ¡Vamos a Cuba! and A Visit to Cuba and other books in the series.” [R:19:Ex.25:l-2].

Specifically, the plaintiffs proffered the declaration of Mark Balzli, who swore that he “want[ed] [his] son to have access to the books ¡Vamos a Cuba! and A Visit to Cuba and the other books in the series of which they are a part.” [R:19:Ex.27:l; Rl:23:10 n. 8], The defendants, in response, sought dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing. [R:24:l]. They contended that the ACLU, through its member Mark Balzli, did not have organizational standing to bring the lawsuit because any First Amendment right of access to school library books belongs to the student, not the parent. [R:29:2-3].

Since Mark Bal-zli’s son was not a member of the ACLU, the defendants argued, there was no member of that organization whose First Amendment rights had allegedly been violated by the School Board’s order to remove the books. [Id. at 3].

As to the student government association, the defendants contended that because the organization did not exist separate and apart from the School Board — it was created by the Board and is administered and run by Board employees — it could not, in effect, sue itself by suing the Board. [Id. at 3-4], Even if it could do that, the defendants argued, the student government association is made up of, and represents, only high school students. [Id. at 5-6].

Because the books in the “A Visit to” series, including Vamos a Cuba, had never been shelved anywhere except in elementary and middle school libraries, none of the student government association’s members had access to the books before they were removed. Therefore, they could not have been injured by removal of the books. [Id. at 6-7]. Shortly after the defendants filed their motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add Mark Balzli, individually and on behalf of his son Aidan, as a plaintiff to the lawsuit. [R:39:l, 3].

It was on the basis of that amended complaint that the district court decided the standing-issue. ACLU, 439 F.Supp.2d at 1260. The district court found it unnecessary to decide whether the student government association had standing because it concluded that Balzli and the ACLU did. Id. at 1260, 1264. Crediting Balzli’s affidavit, the court found that he “had planned to check out the book and read it with his son before the School Board entered its Final Order.” Id. at 1261.

Not only did Balzli want his son to have access to the book, the court found, but before the Board’s action the book had also been available to both parents and students through the school district’s “inter-library loan system of exchanging books between schools.” Id. Based on these facts, the district court concluded that Balzli had standing to litigate his First Amendment and due process claims against the defendants. Id. at 1262.

As to the ACLU’s standing, the district court rejected the defendants’ argument that Aidan Balzli was the true party in interest, and because Aidan was not a member of the ACLU the organization itself did not have standing. Id. at 1264. The court reasoned that this “novel” argument would lead to “an illogical result” because “[a]s Defendants acknowledge, under Florida law, Aidan Balzli may only bring suit through a next friend, in this case, his father. Therefore, his father has standing to pursue relief on his behalf.” Id.

And because Mark Balzli is a member of the ACLU, the district court reasoned, the organization has standing to litigate the suit on his behalf. Id. at 1263-64.

After concluding that Balzli and the ACLU had standing, the court found that: (1) the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, id. at 1283, 1292; (2) they would be irreparably harmed if the School Board’s removal order were allowed to stand pending a trial on their complaint, id. at 1292-93; (3) this irreparable harm to the plaintiffs outweighed the harm to the defendants in keeping the “A Visit to” series books on the library shelves, id. at 1293; and (4) it was in the public interest to protect the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to have access to the books, id. at 1294.

Considering these four factors, which it determined all favored the plaintiffs, the court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the School Board from enforcing its removal order, and it also ordered that any of the books in the “A Visit to” series that had already been removed be returned to the libraries. Id. The defendants filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s preliminary injunction order. The books in the “A Visit to” series remain in the school district’s libraries. [R:48]. II.

The School Board challenges here, as it did before the district court, the plaintiffs’ standing to bring their lawsuit. [Board Br. 30-33]. The Board contends that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite imminent injury in fact. [Id.} Because standing is a necessary component of our jurisdiction to hear “cases” and “controversies” under

Article III of the Constitution, we must address it first. See Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1169 (11th Cir.2006). We review the matter anew, without deference to the district court’s legal conclusions. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir.2006). A. “The constitutionally minimum requirements for standing are three-fold.” Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1159 (11th Cir.2008) [hereinafter Fla.

NAACP], First, the plaintiff must have suffered, or must face an imminent and not merely hypothetical prospect of suffering, an invasion of a legally protected interest resulting in a “concrete and particularized” injury. Second, the injury must have been caused by the defendant’s complained-of actions. Third, the plaintiffs injury or threat of injury must likely be redressible by a favorable court decision. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)).

The battle over standing in this case centers on the first requirement, and specifically on whether the injury the plaintiffs suffered was imminent. [Board Br. 30-33]. In Lujan the plaintiff environmental organizations challenged the joint regulation of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, which required that federal agencies consult with the Secretary of the Interior about threats to endangered species or their habitats caused by agency action only if that action was “taken in the United States or on the high seas.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59, 112 S.Ct. at 2135.

The environmental organizations sought a declaratory judgment that the joint regulation was contrary to the language of the Endangered Species Act. They also sought an injunction forcing the Services to expand their joint regulation to require consultation with the Secretary of the Interior about threats to endangered species and their habitats even when the agency action is to occur outside the United States. See id. The Secretary of the Interior moved to dismiss the environmental organizations’ lawsuit for lack of standing. Id. at 559, 112 S.Ct. at 2135.

The district court did so, but the court of appeals reversed. Id. In discussing the injury in fact requirement, the Supreme Court stated that the environmental organization plaintiffs needed to submit evidence or affidavits establishing that at least one of their members wanted to use or enjoy an endangered animal species in a way that would be directly affected by the Services’ regulation. Id. at 562-63, 112 S.Ct. at 2137-38.

The environmental organizations had submitted the affidavits of two of their members, Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred, to establish that the Services’ regulation would cause them to suffer the requisite injury. Id. at 563, 112 S.Ct. at 2138. Ms. Kelly swore in her affidavit, which was filed in 1988, that she had “traveled to Egypt in 1986 and ‘observed the traditional habitat of the endangered [Njile crocodile there and intends to do so again, and hopes to observe the crocodile directly.’ ” Id. (quoting Ms. Kelly’s affidavit) (alterations omitted).

She also swore she intended to return and at that time would “ ‘suffer harm in fact as the result of the American role in overseeing the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile and in developing Egypt’s Master Water Plan.’” Id. (quoting Ms. Kelly’s affidavit) (alterations and omission omitted). In Ms. Skilbred’s affidavit, which was filed in 1988, she swore that “she traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and ‘observed the habitat’ of ‘endangered species such as the Asian elephant and the leopard’ at what is now the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development.” Id. (quoting Ms.

Skilbred’s affidavit) (alteration omitted). That project, she predicted, “ ‘will seriously reduce endangered, threatened, and endemic species habitat including areas that I visited, which may severely shorten the future of these species.’ ” Id. (quoting Ms. Skil-bred’s affidavit) (alteration and omission omitted). Her desire to use and enjoy these endangered species will be harmed, Ms. Skilbred said, “because she ‘intends to return to Sri Lanka in the future and hopes to be more fortunate in spotting at least the endangered elephant and leopard.’ ” Id. (quoting Ms. Skilbred’s affidavit) (alternations omitted).

When asked at her deposition “when she had any plans to return to Sri Lanka,” Ms. Skilbred answered that “ T intend to go back to Sri Lanka,’ ” but “ T don’t know when. There is a civil war going on right now. I don’t know. Not next year, I will say. In the future.’ ” Id. at 563-64, 112 S.Ct. at 2138 (quoting Ms. Skilbred’s deposition) (alteration omitted). Those two affidavits, the Supreme Court found, “plainly contain no facts ... showing how damage to the species will produce ‘imminent’ injury to Mses. Kelly and Skilbred.” Id. at 564, 112 S.Ct. at 2138.

The Court explained: [T]he affiants’ profession of an “inten[t]” to return to the places they had visited before — where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species — is simply not enough. Such “some day” intentions — without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be — do not support a finding of the “actual or imminent” injury that our cases require. Id. (second alteration in original).

And: Although “imminence” is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for

Article III purposes-— that the injury is certainly impending. It has been stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiffs own control. In such circumstances we have insisted that the injury proceed with a high degree of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all. Id. at 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. at 2138 n. 2 (citation omitted).

In the decade and a half since Lujan we have applied and expounded on the Supreme Court’s “some day intentions” language three times. The first time was in National Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2003), where two environmental organizations had sued the National Park Service for violating the equal protection rights of their members by failing to evict the occupants of the Stiltsville properties (buildings on stilts in the middle of Biscayne Bay, Florida) following the expiration of the lease agreement between the occupants and the Service.

That failure, the organizations claimed, was “tantamount to the grant of an exclusive lease to the occupants.” Id. at 1234. The district court dismissed for lack of standing the organizations’ equal protection claim. Id. at 1241. We reversed, citing the affidavits of the groups’ members who swore that they “had visited Biscayne National Park (and specifically the area that includes Stiltsville) with frequencies ranging from once per month to fifty times per year,” and “indicated an intent to maintain the frequency of these visits in the future.” Id. at 1242.

The members also averred that: (1) their “lack of access to Stiltsville or its surrounding environs impairs [their] recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of the park,” and (2) the impairment “they suffer as a result of the [Service]’s failure to discontinue the exclusive private use of the structures is continually present when they are at or near Stiltsville.” Id. at 1242-43. Those facts, we concluded, were sufficient to avoid the “some day intentions” problem of Lujan. Id. at 1243.

We explained that the case before us was not one “in which the affiants have asserted only ‘some day intentions’ to return to the site of their harm ‘without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be.’ ” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. at 2138). Instead, “[t]he affiants state with particularity that they have definite plans to continue visiting Stiltsville with precisely the same frequency that they have to date, and that in the absence of remedial action they will continue to experience the aesthetic and recreational harms described.” Id.

On the other hand, in Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir.2006), we found the plaintiffs’ future intentions insufficiently clear to establish standing. Id. at 1208. On November 2, 2002 the three plaintiffs in that case had been protesting outside the Sun Dome in Tampa, Florida during a speech by President Bush when they were ordered by the Secret Service to move to an authorized “protest zone,” which was further away. Id. at 1202-03.

They sued for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the Secret Service from taking similar action in the future, which they claimed would violate their First Amendment rights. Id. at 1203. The protestors contended that they had standing because they “ ‘fully intend to peacefully express their viewpoints in the future in a manner similar to their activities on November 2, 2002 in concert with presidential appearances at the USF Sun Dome and at other locations around the country.’ ” Id. at 1204.

The district court dismissed the claims on the ground that the plaintiffs’ assertion that they would protest in a similar manner in the future was too speculative. Id. We affirmed, noting that “the injury alleged in this case remains wholly inchoate.” Id. at 1209.

We explained: Plaintiffs’ intention in this case to protest “in concert with presidential appearances at the USF Sun Dome and at other locations around the country” fails to provide any limitation on the universe of possibilities of when or where or how such a protest might occur.... ... [I]t is entirely conjectural that President Bush would return to speak at a political rally at the Sun Dome. In fact, we have no indication that he has done so again since November 2002 despite numerous presidential visits to Florida.

Nor is it even remotely permissible to presume future injury from Plaintiffs’ intention to protest “at other locations around the country.” To find that this somehow constitutes “real and immediate” injury sufficient to confer standing would eviscerate the meaning of both words.

Indeed, the Plaintiffs’ avowed intention to protest in a similar manner in the future is akin to the plaintiff in Lujan who declared, “I intend to go back to Sri Lanka [to observe endangered species],” but confessed that she had no current plans: “I don’t know [when].” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351. “Such ‘some day’ intentions — without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be — do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Id.

In the four years since Plaintiffs’ alleged First Amendment violation, they have not asserted that they protested President Bush at the Sun Dome or any other venue, for that matter. The entirely speculative nature of the “future protests” would render wholly advisory any prospective relief. Id. (third paragraph alterations in original). Finally, in the recent Fla. NAACP case, the state of Florida required that all voter registration applications include the applicant’s name, address, date of birth, and driver’s license number or the last four digits of her social security number. Fla. NAACP, 522 F.3d at 1156.

If the applicant inadvertently gave information on the application that did not match the information in the state’s driver’s license or social security database, the state would not register her until the error was fixed. Id. at 1156-57. The problem was that the applicant often was not notified of the error in time to fix it before the voter rolls were closed in advance of an upcoming election. Id.

The plaintiff voting rights organizations sued the state in September 2007 alleging that the matching requirement, and its interference with the registration of some applicants, violated a number of their members’ constitutional and statutory rights to vote. Id. at 1158. The state moved to dismiss asserting that the organizations lacked standing in part because they had not alleged an imminent injury. Id. The district court disagreed, id., and so did we, id. at 1164. We noted that “[a]n imminent injury is one that is ‘likely to occur immediately.’ ” Id. at 1161 (citation omitted).

The injury the plaintiffs had alleged was “the denial of voter registration and hence the right to have one’s vote counted,” which would occur “before the scheduled elections in November 2008.” Id. The organizations also alleged that “they intend to increase voter registration efforts and anticipate increased registration applications ahead of the upcoming presidential election.” Id. Without a change in Florida’s voter registration law, they argued, the new registrants would be unconstitutionally denied the right to vote in the November 2008 election. Id.

That was enough, we concluded, to satisfy the immediacy requirement. Id. The key in all three of our decisions applying Lujan is that “[i]mmediacy requires only that the anticipated injury occur with[in] some fixed period of time in the future.” Id. Immediacy, in this context, means reasonably fixed and specific in time and not too far off. In National Parks, the injury alleged by the environmental groups — destruction of the Stilts-ville area in Biscayne Bay — was imminent because, according to their members, they visited Stiltsville from once a month to once a week and planned to continue these trips.

National Parks, 324 F.3d at 1242-43. In Fla. NAACP the voting rights organizations alleged that their members would be injured — denied the right to register to vote and have their votes counted — in the November 2008 presidential election. Fla. NAACP, 522 F.3d at 1161. In both cases, the imminence requirement was met because the respective plaintiffs alleged that they would be injured within a “fixed period of time in the future.” In Elend, on the other hand, “the plaintiffs failed to allege when, where, and how [their] protests were going to occur in the future.” Fla.

NAACP, 522 F.3d at 1161 Instead, all that the Elend plaintiffs alleged was that they intended to protest again at some indefinite time and place in the future. Elend, 471 F.3d at 1206. As we said, “the Plaintiffs’ avowed intention to protest in a similar manner in the future is akin to the plaintiff in Lujan who declared, T intend to go back to Sri Lanka [to observe endangered species],’ but confessed that she had no current plans: ‘I don’t know [when].’ ” Id. at 1209 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. at 2138) (alterations in original).

We explained that “[s]uch ‘some day’ intention — without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be — do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury our cases require.” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. at 2138). B. The plaintiffs in this case have alleged that they will be injured by the removal of Vamos a Cuba and the other “A Visit to” books from the school district’s libraries. [R:39:13-15].

Individual plaintiff Balzli, a member of the ACLU, swore in his declaration that he: want[ed] [his] son to have access to the books ¡Vamos a Cuba! and A Visit to Cuba and the other books in the series of which they are a part. In fact, before the School Board’s Order in this case ¡Vamos a Cuba! was part of the library collection at North Beach Elementary School and I had seen it with my son and we had planned to check it out and read it together in the future.

Unless the Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief we will not be able to do so when the school resumes on August 14, 2006. [R:19:Ex.27:l-2]. The School Board contends that Balzli’s declaration is insufficient to establish an injury in fact regarding Vamos a Cuba because the asserted injury is not imminent. Balzli’s professed future plans are, the Board argues, no more than the kind of someday intention that Lujan holds is insufficient. [Board Br. 32]. We disagree. We stated in Fla.

NAACP that “[immediacy requires only that the anticipated injury occur withfin] some fixed period of time in the future, not that it happen in the colloquial sense of soon or precisely within a certain number of days, weeks, or months.” Fla. NAACP, 522 F.3d at 1161. Balzli’s declaration, which is dated July 5, 2006, states that he anticipated checking out Vamos a Cuba “when school resumes on August 14, 2006” — a specific intention pegged to a sufficiently fixed period of time. [R:19:Ex.27]. In its immediacy the injury claimed is like that asserted by the voting rights plaintiffs in Fla. NAACP.

The injury there, unless redressed, would have occurred when voters were prevented from registering and voting in an election that was to be held on a specific date fourteen months after the complaint in that case was filed. Id. The injury here, unless redressed, would have occurred when Balzli and his son were prevented from checking out Vamos a Cuba after school resumed in six weeks. Lujan and our decisions interpreting it require no more immediacy than that.

The School Board contends that, even if the injury alleged is sufficiently imminent, Balzli still lacks standing to challenge the School Board’s order because the right to check out Vamos a Cuba from the district’s libraries belongs not to him but to his son. [Board Br. 30-31]. We agree with the district court’s analysis rejecting this contention. ACLU, 439 F.Supp.2d at 1261-62. Florida law, which applies to capacity determinations in this case, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(1), requires that “a child sue by his next friend” because the child does not have capacity to sue on his own, Kingsley v.

Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780, 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The only way for Aidan Balzli to seek redress for his injuries is for his father to sue on his behalf, which is what his father did. In addition to misfiring on the law, this real party in interest argument of the Board also misses on the facts. The School Board’s rules provide parents with the “right to visit the library” and to “review books that are kept there, accompany [their children] through the check-out process, and transfer books between libraries.” ACLU, 439 F.Supp.2d at 1262.

Balzli, in other words, had the right as a parent to access Vamos a Cuba with and for his son. The Board’s decision to remove the book from the school district’s libraries injured Balzli by taking away that right.

The School Board also contends that it presented “unrebutted” evidence that Vamos a Cuba was not in the library collection at the school Aidan attended, and therefore Balzli could not have checked out the book for his son. [Board Br. 31-32], But the evidence was not “un-rebutted.” Balzli himself disputed the School Board’s account when he swore in his declaration and testified at the July 21, 2006 preliminary injunction hearing that he saw Vamos a Cuba in the library at the North Beach Elementary School, which his son attended. [R:19:Ex.27:l; R3:62:12].

The district court recognized that “[t]here was an issue of fact at the preliminary injunction hearing as to whether Mr. Balzli and his son had seen Vamos a Cuba at the North Beach Elementary School library.” Id. at 1247 n. 2. And the court resolved it in Balzli’s favor. Id. We review the fact-findings underlying a standing determination only for clear error. See Wooden v. Board of Regents, 247 F.3d 1262, 1271 n. 9 (11th Cir.2001). We cannot say that the district court’s resolution of the conflicting factual assertions was clear error.

For these reasons, we conclude that Bal-zli has sufficiently asserted that he and his son will suffer an Imminent injury from the removal of Vamos a Cuba from the school district libraries. None of the other requirements of standing are disputed. It follows that the district court was correct in concluding that Balzli has standing to pursue his First Amendment and due process claims against the School Board for removing Vamos a Cuba from the district’s libraries. Because Balzli has standing to raise those claims, we need not decide whether either of the organizational plaintiffs also has standing to do so.

See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160, 102 S.Ct. 205, 212, 70 L.Ed.2d 309 (1981) (“Because we find California has standing, we do not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs.”); Glassroth v.

Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir.2003) (“Having concluded that those two plaintiffs have standing, we are not required to decide whether the other plaintiff, the one who has not altered his behavior as a result of the monument, has standing.”)- We will, however, refer to the “plaintiffs” in the plural to remind ourselves that we have not ruled out the standing of the other groups and individuals who want to challenge the removal of the Vamos a Cuba book. C. The standing of any of the plaintiffs to challenge the Board’s removal of the other books in the “A Visit to” series is more problematic.

The plaintiffs point to three declarations. One is Balzli’s, which we have already discussed in connection with the Vamos a Cuba book. About the other books in the series, Balzli’s declaration merely stated that he “want[ed] [his] son to have access to ... the other books in the series.” He did not state, as he did about the Vamos a Cuba book, that he and his son planned to check out any of the other books when school resumed. [R:19:Ex.27], The other two declarations are similar.

In his declaration Ronald Bilbao states that: “I have spoken to several student members of the SGA who have told me they would like to have access to the books ¡Vamos a Cuba! and A Visit to Cuba and other books in the series.” [R:19:Ex.25:l-2], Likewise, Howard Simon, the executive director of the ACLU stated in his declaration that the “Greater Miami

Chapter of the ACLU has approximately 3,500 members within the Miami-Dade County School District including many parents of children who attend Miami-Dade County elementary and middle schools, and who want their children to have access to the books the School Board ordered removed from the libraries.” [R:19:Ex.26:4-5]. Those three declarations merely establish a free-floating desire to access the other books in the “A Visit to” series, a desire untethered to any intended action during any reasonably specific period of time.

In that respect these declarations are more like the ones in the Lujan and Elend cases, where imminence was found to be lacking, than they are like the ones in National Parks and Fla. NAACP, where it was found to be present. In Lujan the plaintiffs who submitted affidavits wanted wildlife in Egypt and Sri Lan-ka preserved so that they could view it. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563-64, 112 S.Ct. at 2138. They had no concrete and definite plans to visit those countries, only a desire to keep the wildlife there alive so that they could go see it someday. Id.

The Supreme Court held that absent “any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be,” the statements in the affidavits “d[id] not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury’ required for standing.” Id. at 564,112 S.Ct. at 2138. Just as the Lujan plaintiffs’ general desire to have wildlife preserved for their viewing someday was insufficient to establish an imminent injury in fact, the general desire of the plaintiffs in this case to have the other books in the “A Visit to” series kept in the school library for their use someday is insufficient as well.

In both cases it is not enough to have an injury in fact. The injury must be imminent, and in both cases it was not. See id., 112 S.Ct. at 2138. The Elend decision illustrates the same point. There the plaintiffs, claiming a violation of their First Amendment right to protest, averred only that “ ‘they fully intended] to peacefully express them viewpoint in the future.’ ” Elend, 471 F.3d at 1206. As we have since explained, the plaintiffs in Elend “failed to allege when, where, and how such protests were going to occur in the future.” Fla. NAACP, 522 F.3d at 1161.

The protestors’ “intention ... to protest [in the future] ... fails to provide any limitation on the universe of possibilities of when or where or how such protest might occur.” Elend, 471 F.3d at 1209. Likewise in this case, the plaintiffs have not stated with sufficient specificity their plans for accessing the books in the “A Visit to” series. They have not given any indication of some fixed period of time in the reasonably foreseeable future during which they want to use the books.

The plaintiffs seek to distinguish Lujan on the ground that it would have been much more difficult for the plaintiffs in that case to travel halfway around the world to see wildlife than it would be for a plaintiff in this case to visit a school library and check out a book. Apparently they would distinguish Elend on similar grounds, arguing perhaps that it is more difficult to

schedule a specific protest of a presidential speech than to go get a book. Their theory is that the easier it is to take the action that will be prevented by the defendant’s conduct, the easier it should be to satisfy the imminent injury requirement for standing. We don’t think so. The imminence requirement does not depend on the burden of taking some action that will be prevented by the alleged injury — going to Egypt or Sri Lanka in Lujan or going to the school library in this case. Instead, it depends on the imminence of the action, regardless of how much effort that action involves.

A trip to Egypt that is planned for the next week would be more imminent than a trip to a school library when it reopens in a few months. There is no good reason that the specificity of a statement that is acceptable should vary inversely with the difficulty of engaging in the activity that is threatened by the alleged injury. Intricate drafting is not required to describe a threatened injury. Plain English and clear language work best. There is either an imminent injury or there is not. If there is not, there is no standing. If there is an imminent injury, then there may be standing.

All the plaintiff has to do is describe the threatened injury and specify why it is imminent. The penalty for failing to do so is dismissal for lack of standing. It does not matter, as the plaintiffs argue it should, that it is easier to imagine a parent stopping by the school library when dropping off his child than it is to imagine people flying halfway around the world to see wildlife. The allegation of standing requires specification, not imagination. As we explained a few years ago: Even though the [plaintiffs] complaint sets forth facts from which we could imagine an injury sufficient to satisfy

Article Ill’s standing requirements, we should not speculate concerning the existence of standing, nor should we imagine or piece together an injury sufficient to give plaintiff standing when it has demonstrated none. The plaintiff has the burden to “clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy [] Art. Ill standing requirements.” If the plaintiff fails to meet its burden, this court lacks the power to create jurisdiction by embellishing a deficient allegation of injury. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Fla.

State Athletic Comm’n, 226 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (11th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted, second alteration in original). Without embellishment, which we are powerless to provide, the plaintiffs’ declarations do not carry their burden of showing that they face a threat of imminent injury from the removal of any of the “A Visit to” books from the school district’s libraries except for Vamos a Cuba.

To the extent that the district court’s preliminary injunction enjoins the School Board from enforcing that part of the Board’s removal order, we will vacate the injunction and remand for the district court to dismiss for lack of standing the portions of the plaintiffs’ complaint that concern any of the “A Visit to” series books other than Vamos a Cuba. III.

Because there is no standing problem with regard to the attack on the School Board’s order to remove copies of the Vamos a Cuba book itself from the libraries, we turn to other questions about that part of the preliminary injunction. “A district court may grant [preliminary] in-junctive relief only if the moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Siegel v.

LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc); accord Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1128 (11th Cir.2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-1226 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam); Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir.2004). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to the four requisites.” All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir.1989) (quotation marks omitted).

Failure to show any of the four factors is fatal, and the most common failure is not showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. See, e.g., Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1226 n. 2, 1237; Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir.1994); Cunningham v. Adams, 808 F.2d 815, 821 (11th Cir.1987). That is what the School Board says has occurred here. It argues that we should reverse the preliminary injunction, because the plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on their claims.

We generally review preliminary injunctions only for an abuse of discretion, but we review de novo the legal conclusions on which they are based. Fla. NAACP, 522 F.3d at 1166; SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1198 (11th Cir.1999); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir.1999). An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court bases its decision on an erroneous factual premise. See Chi Trib. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir.2001); Drill South, Inc. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2000); Jones v.

Int’l Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 694 (11th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Varner, 13 F.3d 1503, 1508 (11th Cir.1994) (“Abuse of discretion occurs when the court ... bases its decisions upon considerations having little factual support.” (quotation marks omitted)); Arlook v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 374 (11th Cir.1992) (same). Ordinarily, factfindings that matter to the issuance of a preliminary injunction are reviewed only for clear error, Unique Fin. Concepts, 196 F.3d at 1198, but that changes in First Amendment free speech cases like this one.

For reasons we will explain later, we review de novo the core constitutional fact relating to the Board’s motive. That means if we disagree with the district court’s finding about the Board’s motive, its decision to enter a preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion. It was an abuse of discretion because if we find that the Board was motivated by the factual errors in the book, the plaintiffs have no chance of success on the merits, much less a substantial one.

Insofar as the First Amendment issue is concerned the disagreement in this case is not about the standard of review applicable to preliminary injunctions but about the Board’s motive in removing the book from the school library shelves. IV. The district court based the preliminary injunction it entered on both the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim and their due process claim. Because they are separate claims we will examine the likelihood of success on the merits as to each in turn. A.

The parties disagree about the contours of the legal standard we should apply to decide whether it is likely that the plaintiffs will succeed on their claim that the School Board’s decision to remove the Va-mos a Cuba book from all the school district’s libraries violated their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs contend [ACLU Br. 35-40], and the district court found, ACLU, 439 F.Supp.2d at 1272-73, that we should apply the test enunciated by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982).

In Pico, a New York school board voted to remove nine books from the libraries of the school district’s middle and high schools because the books, according to the school board, were “anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy,” and as a result posed a “moral danger” to the students. Id. at 857, 102 S.Ct. at 2803 (alteration omitted). Some students at those schools sued the school board claiming that the removal of the books for “social, political, and moral” reasons violated their First Amendment rights to have access to the books. Id. at 856, 858-59, 102 S.Ct. at 2802, 2804.

After the district court granted

summary judgment for the school board, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for a trial on the students’ First Amendment claim. Id. at 859-60, 102 S.Ct. at 2804-05. The Supreme Court affirmed in a badly fractured decision. The lead opinion by Justice Brennan was joined in full only by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 855, 102 S.Ct. at 2802.

Justice Blackmun joined parts of that opinion, id. at 882, 102 S.Ct. at 2816 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), including its statement of this constitutional standard: “[L]ocal school boards may not remove books from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’” Id. at 872, 102 S.Ct. at 2810 (plurality opinion) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1187, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943)); see also id. at 879-80, 102 S.Ct. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[SJchool officials may not remove books for the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when that action is motivated simply by the officials’ disapproval of the ideas involved.”). All four of the justices in the Pico plurality gave examples of reasons for which a school board could constitutionally remove books.

Justice Brennan’s opinion acknowledged the students’ concession that it would be “perfectly permissible” to remove a book based on its lack of “educational suitability.” Id. at 871, 102 S.Ct. at 2810 (plurality opinion).

Justice Blackmun, in his separate opinion, acknowledged that: “First Amendment principles would allow a school board to refuse to make a book available to students because it contains offensive language, or because it is psychologically or intellectually inappropriate for the age group, or even, perhaps, because the ideas it advances are ‘manifestly inimical to the public welfare.’ ” Id. at 880, 893, 102 S.Ct. at 2815 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). The other five members of the Court did not join in the views of Justice Brennan or Justice Blackmun.

There were four dissenters, who were of the opinion that the First Amendment placed no limits on a school board’s power to remove books from school libraries.

Id. at 885, 893, 102 S.Ct. at 2817, 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ.); see also id. at 921, 102 S.Ct. 2835 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If the school board can set the curriculum, select teachers, and determine initially what books to purchase for the school library, it surely can decide which books to discontinue or remove from the school library so long as it does not also interfere with the right of students to read the material and to discuss it.”).

A fifth justice “expresse[d] no opinion on the First Amendment issues, being of the opinion that the Court should not, until after remand, ‘issue a dissertation on the extent to which the First Amendment limits the discretion of the school board to remove books from the school library.’ ” See Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1045 n. 30 (Former 5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (plurality opinion of Hill, J.) (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at 883, 102 S.Ct. at 2816 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)).

The result is that “Pico is of no prece-dential value as to the application of the First Amendment to these issues.” Id.; see also id. at 1051 n. 18 (Rubin, J., concurring, joined by Politz, Randall, and Williams, JJ.) (“Seven Justices filed opinions in Pico. The Court divided four-four on the constitutional issue of the extent to which the first amendment limits the discretion of a school board to remove books from a school library. Justice White concurred in the judgment of the Court but did not reach this issue.”); Chiras v.

Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 619 n. 32 (5th Cir.2005) (“[Tjhis court concluded in Muir that Pico has no precedential value as to the application of First Amendment principles to the school’s decision to remove the books from the library.”). With five different opinions and no part of any of them gathering five votes from among the nine justices— only one of whom is still on the Court— Pico is a non-decision so far as precedent is concerned. It establishes no standard. The School Board contends that it did not violate the First Amendment regardless of whether we apply Pico or the test from Hazelwood School District v.

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). [Board Br. 41-45], Hazelwood involved a school board decision about the content of the student newspaper as part of the school’s curriculum. See id. at 262, 108 S.Ct. at 565. The Board argues that the Vamos a Cuba book, like all books in the district’s libraries, should be considered as part of the curriculum for elementary school students, and when viewed in that light its removal was a curricular decision entitled to deference under the Hazelwood decision. [Board Br. at 44-45].

In Hazelwood the principal at a Missouri high school directed that the student newspaper, which was written and edited as part of a journalism class, withhold from publication the pages of an issue containing one story about pregnant students and another about the impact of divorce on students. Id. at 263-64, 108 S.Ct. at 565-66. The principal was concerned that the story about the pregnant students might indirectly reveal their identities, and he believed that the article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students. Id. at 263, 108 S.Ct. at 566.

He decided to stop publication of the divorce

article because in the draft of the

article that he reviewed, a student identified by name was quoted complaining about her father’s behavior, and her parents had not been given an opportunity to respond. Id. Some of the staff members of the student newspaper sued the school board in Hazelwood claiming that preventing publication of the two articles had violated their First Amendment rights. Id. at 262, 108 S.Ct. at 565. The district court concluded that no First Amendment violation had occurred. Id. at 264, 108 S.Ct. at 566.

The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the school newspaper was a public forum and as a result the school could censor its content only when “ ‘necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with school work or discipline or the rights of others.’ ” Id. at 265, 108 S.Ct. at 567 (citation and alteration omitted). The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the court of appeals. Id. at 266, 108 S.Ct. at 567. In doing so the Court distinguished its decision in Tinker v.

Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), concluding that suppression of individual student expression on school premises differs from control of expressive activities that “may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71, 108 S.Ct. at 569-70. The Court rejected the argument that the school newspaper was a public forum, because the school had not, by policy or practice, opened it up for indiscriminate public use. Id. at 267, 108 S.Ct. at 568.

School officials had consistently treated the newspaper as a component of the journalism course, which was part of the curriculum taught at the school. Id. at 262-63, 108 S.Ct. at 565. Because the newspaper in Hazelwood was part of the curriculum, it bore “the imprimatur of the school” and entitled school officials to exercise greater control over it. Id. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 570.

The Court held that the school could censor the newspaper in order to disassociate itself from speech that would interfere with the school’s work or impinge on the rights of others, or in order to correct “speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id., 108 S.Ct. at 570.

In overseeing the newspaper, the school could “take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics.” Id. at 272, 108 S.Ct. at 570. The Hazelwood decision establishes that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 273, 108 S.Ct. at 571.

The School Board in our case equates its decision about which books to remove from school library shelves with the decision the principal made in Hazelwood about which articles to remove from the school newspaper. Both decisions, it asserts, relate to control over curriculum. [Board Br. 43-45]. Alternatively the Board argues that, even if its decision to remove the Vamos a Cuba books were not curricular, its libraries are nonpublic fora and the book collection (and book removal) decisions of the Board should be treated as government speech. [Id. at 45-50].

Government speech, we have said, is “expression delivered directly though the government or indirectly through private intermediaries.” Bannon v. Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir.2004). As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “in the case of a public library ... there is still government speech.... [T]he government speaks through its selection of which books to put on the shelves and which books to exclude.” PETA, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 28 (D.C.Cir.2005).

The government’s ability to limit speech in a nonpublic forum, however, is not unlimited. “The government can restrict access to [the] nonpublie forum ‘as long as the restrictions are reasonable and are not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.’ ” Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 1641, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998) (alteration omitted).

The argument against applying the Ha-zelwood standard here is that this is not a school newspaper situation, and the speech at issue does not form part of a course of study in a school’s curriculum. This is a school library book case. The two situations may be sufficiently analogous to extend the Hazelwood standard here, or they may not be. The question of what standard applies to school library book removal decisions is unresolved. And for reasons that will become apparent later we have no need to resolve it here.

Even if the plaintiffs won the argument about the applicable standard and got the one of their dreams, the furthest we could possibly go in their favor is the standard that failed to attract a majority in the Pico case: school officials may not remove books from library shelves “simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.” Pico, 457 U.S. at 872, 102 S.Ct. at 2810 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ., and in that part by Blackmun, J.).

That is the standard the plaintiffs want. [ACLU Br. 35]. Even assuming that standard applies, however, the plaintiffs still lose if the School Board removed Vamos a Cuba not for those prohibited reasons but instead, as the Board insists, for legitimate pedagogical reasons such as concerns about the accuracy of the book. Whatever else it prohibits, the First Amendment does not forbid a school board from removing a book because it contains factual inaccuracies, whether they be of commission or omission.

There is no constitutional right to have books containing misstatements of objective facts shelved in a school library. The plaintiffs do not dispute that the School Board may remove a book because it is educationally unsuitable. Nor do they dispute that one of the Board’s written criteria for determining the educational suitability of a nonfiction book is factual accuracy. [Board Br.App.C:6A-1.26(IV)(A)(1)-(15), (VIII); ACLU Br. 6]. What they dispute is the Board’s actual motive for ordering Vamos a Cuba removed from the library shelves.

They contend that the Board acted to suppress the viewpoint expressed in Vamos a Cuba. The viewpoint the plaintiffs ascribe to the book, and describe as content neutral and apolitical, is one in which the people of Cuba are portrayed as eating, working, and going to school like students in the Miami-Dade County School District do. See ACLU, 439 F.Supp.2d at 1283. The Board’s conclusion that Vamos a Cuba is inaccurate, according to plaintiffs, is nothing but a pretense for enforcing the politically orthodox view — especially prevalent in South Florida — that opposes the Castro regime.

The Board responds that it decided to remove the Vamos a Cuba books because they were “inaccurate and rife with omissions in their portrayal of life in Cuba,” and that reason “does not constitute viewpoint discrimination.” [Board Br. 45], The district court agreed with the plaintiffs.

It found, for the purposes of the preliminary injunction, that “the majority of the Miami-Dade County School Board members intended by their removal of the books to deny schoolchildren access to ideas or points-of-view with which the school officials disagreed, and that this intent was the decisive factor in their removal decision.” Id. at 1283. The court also found “that the School Board’s claim of ‘inaccuracies’ is a guise and pretext for ‘political orthodoxy.’ ” Id. B. Ordinarily, we review district court fact-findings only for clear error, but First Amendment issues are not ordinary.

Where the First Amendment Free Speech Clause is involved our review of the district court’s findings of “constitutional facts,” as distinguished from ordinary historical facts, is de novo. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir.2006) (CAMP II) (“We review the district court’s determination of the ‘constitutional facts’ in a First Amendment case de novo.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1316 (11th Cir.2000) (CAMP I) (same); Falanga v.

State Bar of Ga., 150 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir.1998); Don’s Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1053 n. 9 (11th Cir.1987) (“In cases involving [F]irst [Ajmendment claims, an appellate court must make an independent examination of the whole record” and “is not bound by the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review.”). The plaintiffs contend that we should review only for clear error the district court’s finding that the Board acted with a political motive when it decided to remove Vamos a Cuba from the school libraries. [ACLU Br. 21].

To support their argument that clear error review generally applies to the question of whether a defendant’s motivation is unconstitutional, the plaintiffs rely on Hatcher v. Board of Public Education, 809 F.2d 1546, 1559 (11th Cir.1987), and Hoover v. Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.2002). [ACLU Br. 20]. Those cases involved claims that public employers retaliated against employees based on the employees’ exercise of their First Amendment rights.

However, neither of those cases held that an appellate court should apply the clear error standard to a district court’s findings of fact about the employer’s motive; they simply determined that motive is a fact question in retaliation cases.

See Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1556 (“Only the question of whether the conduct is protected by the First Amendment is a question of law; the other elements are questions of fact.”); Hoover, 307 F.3d at 467 (labeling the district court’s determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the motivation element a “factual determination” for purposes of deciding whether there was interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity). The standard of review for factual determinations concerning motive in First Amendment retaliation cases has spawned some confusion. See Bickel v.

Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1256 n. 7 (5th Cir.1980) (“There is some uncertainty as to the proper scope of appellate review of a trial court’s resolution of this causation issue.”). Compare Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir.1995) (“[I]ssues of causation in a retaliatory discharge claim present questions of fact. In cases tried before a jury, the jury should decide questions of motive and intent behind a government employment decision.”), with Schneider v.

City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915, 920 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980) (describing motivation in retaliation claims as a “factual issue[]” but noting that “any factual issues decided by a jury that might relate to ultimate questions of law are nonetheless subject to careful review by the district court and this court which are invested with the power to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary” (citation and quotation marks omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir.1984).

Even if we were to assume that clear error is the proper standard of review for factual determinations involving motive in First Amendment retaliation cases, that does not mean that the same is true in non-retaliation cases. The law that applies in the present First Amendment case is different from that which applies in a retaliation case, and the Supreme Court has instructed us that when it comes to distinguishing between factfinding and application of legal rules to facts, “[w]here the line is drawn varies according to the nature of the substantive law at issue.” See Bose Corp. v.

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1960 n. 17, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). The substantive law relating to the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim based on the School Board’s decision to remove Vamos a Cuba differs from the substantive law of First Amendment retaliation claims in a way that makes de novo review appropriate in this case, even if it would not be in a retaliation case.

Our predecessor court explained what it labeled as a “strong argument” for why motivation in retaliation cases should be treated as “simply a question of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard:” The question of whether an employee’s speech was a substantial or motivating factor in an employer’s decision to discipline the employee cannot similarly be described as one of ultimate fact, for it is not “the ultimate issue for resolution in this case”; rather, it is a preliminary issue, the resolution of which cannot provide grounds for the employee to recover unless (1) the speech is also found to be constitutionally protected, and (2) the employer does not establish that the same decision would have been made in the absence of the constitutionally protected speech.

Bickel, 632 F.2d at 1256 n. 7. In this case by contrast, under the Pico plurality standard we are assuming applies, the Board’s motive is the ultimate fact upon which the resolution of the constitutional question depends. Under the Pico standard, the Board members violated the First Amendment if they removed Vamos a Cuba “simply because they dislike[d] the ideas contained in [the] book[ ]” and sought by its removal “‘to prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’ ” Pico, 457 U.S. at 872, 102 S.Ct. at 2810 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).

Unlike the question of motive in retaliation cases, motive in this case is not just a preliminary issue. Instead, discerning the nature of the Board’s motive will, under the standard we are assuming applies, determine the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. “In cases in which there is a claim of denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, this Court is not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will re-examine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are founded.” Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271, 71 S.Ct. 325, 327, 95 L.Ed. 267 (1951) (conducting in a First Amendmen

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