PER CURIAM: Rafael Linares, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We review a district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de novo. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (11th Cir.2013). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review,, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir.2009).
The doctrine applies to cases in which a party complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment and invites the district court to review and reverse that judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). If at any time the district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(h)(3). Here, Linares sought to have the district court review the state court’s judgment and send the ease back to state court.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction either to review the state court judgment or to grant the requested relief. The district court did not err by dismissing the case sua sponte. Fed.R.CivP. 12(h)(3). AFFIRMED. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).