SIMPLER SOLAR SYSTEMS, INC., Debtor. Simpler Solar Systems, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Renitta Knight Construction LLC, Defendant-Counter Claimant, Renitta knight, agent of Renitta Lundy, Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant, Sperry & Associates, Inc., Defendant, 599 F. App'x 367

PER CURIAM: Renitta Knight, proceeding pro se, appeals following the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to Simpler Solar on its breach of contract claim. Knight argues (1) the district court erred by granting

summary judgment in favor of Simpler Solar and (2) the district court erred in a prior order that allowed Knight’s frozen assets to be placed in the court’s registry. Before addressing the merits of Knight’s first argument, we must determine whether Knight has standing to appeal the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on Simpler Solar’s breach of contract claim. We conclude the record is insufficient to provide meaningful appellate review on whether Knight has standing to contest the judgment. Danley v. Allen, 480 F.3d 1090, 1091-92 (11th Cir.2007) (vacating and remanding with instructions for the district court to enter a fuller order, explaining district court “orders should contain sufficient explanations of their rulings so as to provide this Court with an opportunity to engage in meaningful appellate review”). An individual must have standing to appeal a judgment. Wolff v.

Cash 4 Titles, 351 F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir.2003). “Generally, one not a party lacks standing to appeal an order in that action.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Moreover, even a named defendant may lack standing to appeal rulings that do not affect her interests. Id. The record is ambiguous as to whether Knight was a defendant following Simpler Solar’s third amended complaint and, if so, whether the district court intended its December 3, 2013, judgment to render both Renitta Knight Construction, LLC (RKC) and Knight individually liable.

Although the style of Simpler Solar’s third amended complaint listed Knight as a defendant in her individual capacity, the body of the complaint only listed RKC as a defendant and asked for relief only from RKC. Moreover, the district court’s judgment in favor of Simpler Solar for $57,287.08 did not specify who was liable for that amount. Even if the court intended Knight to be liable, the contracts at the heart of the dispute were between Simpler Solar and RKC, not Simpler Solar and Knight, and' the district court did not explain its rationale for holding Knight liable as a nonparty to the contract.

These omissions preclude this Court from engaging in meaningful review to determine whether, and how, Knight’s interests were affected by the grant of

summary judgment. We therefore vacate the grant of

summary judgment to Simpler Solar and return so that the district court can make make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the foregoing. , With regard to the second issue, we conclude Knight’s appeal from the order allowing her frozen assets to be placed in the court’s registry is moot. “A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (11th Cir.2001).

The preliminary injunction freezing Knight’s assets has since been “vacated as to all accounts” upon remand to the bankruptcy court, and the funds were remitted to the accounts they came from. Therefore, Knight’s second argument is moot. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir.2008) (“The fundamental question with respect to mootness is whether events have occurred subsequent to the filing of an appeal that deprive the court of the ability to give the appellant meaningful relief.”) (quotations, alterations, and ellipses omitted). VACATED and REMANDED in part and DISMISSED as moot in part. .

To the extent Knight argues the issue is not moot because her husband, Douglas Lundy, is still being harmed by the preliminaiy injunction, Knight cannot appeal tp protect the rights of others. Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534, 1555 (11th Cir.1994) (explaining "the general rule that a party, may not appeal to protect the rights of others”) (quotation omitted). To the extent Knight attempts to bring a-claim under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3403, Knight "cannot assert for the first time on appeal a new claim not presented to the district court.” Glenn v. U.S.

Postal Serv., 939 F.2d 1516, 1523 (11th Cir.1991).