Zuzanna JURIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INAMED CORPORATION, McGhan Medical Corp., et al., Defendants-Appellees, 685 F.3d 1294

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge: In 1999, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama approved a mandatory, limited fund class settlement, which resolved tens of thousands of claims arising out of injuries allegedly caused by defective silicone breast implants manufactured by Inamed Corporation (“Inamed”). Several years later, in 2006, Zuzanna Juris filed an individual action in California state court against Inamed and Allergan, Inc. (“Allergan”), Inamed’s successor, alleging injuries caused by her Inamed implants.

The defendants contended that Juris’s lawsuit was barred because the 1999 class settlement resolved her claims; Juris posited that she could avoid the settlement’s res judicata effect on due process grounds. The district court held that the class settlement precluded Juris from prosecuting the California case. This is Juris’s appeal. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND Well after the creation of silicone breast implants, women implanted with them began claiming that leaking gel was causing them various diseases.

In 1992, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) first banned the use of silicone gel implants, and a flood of litigation followed. The FDA relaxed the ban later that year to permit the use of such implants for specified medical procedures. The number of lawsuits only increased further. As a result, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated more than 21,000 cases against various breast implant manufacturers for pretrial proceedings and transferred them to District Judge Sam Pointer in the Northern District of Alabama. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab.

Litig., 793 F.Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L.1992); In re Silicone Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 926, 2:92-ev-10000 (N.D.Ala.). The transfer included all pending federal lawsuits against Inamed regarding allegedly defective implants. A. Inamed’s Pre-Settlement Financial Condition In 1991, women with Inamed breast implants began filing individual suits against Inamed and its subsidiaries. The litigation ballooned. At one point, more than 15,000 lawsuits were pending against Inamed across the country. Breast implant litigation forced the company to divert substantial capital to funding defense efforts.

In 1994, in an attempt to stem the tide, Inamed and the plaintiffs’ settlement committee negotiated a global settlement agreement, which would have required Inamed to pay $1 million per year for twenty-five years. Anticipating approval of that proposal, Inamed booked the $25 million annuity as a contingent liability in the amount of $9.2 million (the present value of twenty-five annual payments of $1 million). Inamed sought to certify a limited fund settlement class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(

B) in an effort to secure a mandatory, global resolution of all present and future claims. The plaintiffs’ settlement committee retained Ernst & Young to review Inamed’s finances and determine whether limited fund treatment was appropriate. Ernst & Young issued a report confirming Inamed’s claims that its liabilities, both operational and litigation-related, dwarfed its assets. Counsel for the plaintiffs did not dispute this. However, they questioned whether the $9.2 million present value contribution was prudent considering Inamed’s potential future earnings.

Disagreement yielded further negotiations, and the possibility of a global settlement languished. Responding to its growing financial troubles, in 1996, Inamed approached a high risk investment group and raised $35 million through the private placement of senior secured convertible notes. The notes were senior to all claims, including operational liabilities and tort claims, and were secured by interests in substantially all of Inamed’s assets.

Pursuant to the terms of the offering, Inamed deposited $15 million in escrow for the sole purpose of financing a non-opt-out class settlement if approved before January 23, 1997. That temporal condition was not met. Inamed returned the $15 million to the noteholders in exchange for warrants to purchase Inamed common stock in the event a mandatory class settlement was later approved. Inamed quickly exhausted the balance, $20 million, which provided necessary cash to stay in business and cover expenditures related to inventory, payments to vendors, and other operational items.

In January of 1997, Inamed secured an additional $6.2 million through another private debt placement. All proceeds were immediately applied towards day-to-day operational expenses and payments against past-due income tax liabilities. Around this time, Inamed defaulted on its repayment obligations under the senior secured notes and its stock price dropped. The company continued to explore options for raising working capital.

However, between the senior secured noteholders exercising their veto authority over Inamed’s ability to raise capital through equity offerings and, more generally, the unavailability of commercially reasonable lending opportunities given the company’s dire financial predicament, Inamed’s only option was to borrow approximately $10 million from an entity associated with its former chairman.

Throughout the 1990s, each audit letter prepared by Inamed’s independent auditing firm, Coopers & Lybrand, included a qualified opinion expressing “substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern.” For fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997, Inamed reported pre-tax operating losses of $8.6 million, $6.0 million, and $6.6 million, respectively. By the end of 1997, the company’s consolidated book value — subtracting liabilities from assets — was negative $10.9 million.

Setting aside the $9.2 million contingent liability booked in 1994 in anticipation of the proposed global settlement, Inamed’s book value was still negative $1.7 million. And, significantly, other than the $9.2 million contingent liability, Inamed’s balance sheet did not account for any other litigation expenses, including possible settlements, attorneys’ fees, and potential judgments. Those litigation expenses, however, were staggering. For example, it cost Inamed’s attorneys approximately $150,000 to take a single case to the brink of trial, and an additional $150,000 to defend through trial.

In 1997 alone, Inamed settled sixteen breast implant cases. The settlement values ranged from $2,500 to $50,000, averaging out to $18,500 per case. During this time, neither Inamed nor its subsidiaries had products liability insurance coverage. In light of Inamed’s rapidly deteriorating financial condition, in the latter part of 1997, the company and plaintiffs’ counsel revisited settlement negotiations. By this time, investors were unwilling to finance any settlement that would not extinguish substantially all of the breast implant litigation.

They considered elimination of the enormous costs and risks associated with the implant litigation an essential precondition to the economic turnaround that would be necessary to repay any investment. Coupling this pressure with the senior secured noteholders’ authority over Inamed’s financial decisions, Inamed’s ability to afford any settlement was dependent on the senior creditors’ willingness to finance it. The parties considered the possibility of Inamed pursuing bankruptcy.

Chapter 7 liquidation, as opposed to

Chapter 11 reorganization, was the only viable solution to Inamed’s financial stresses. If Inamed had elected to pursue

Chapter 7 bankruptcy at the end of 1997, the company’s saleable assets, discounted by the impairment likely to result from a forced liquidation, would have totaled between $11.4 million and $20.4 million. From this sum, the senior secured noteholders would have been entitled to $19 million, leaving unsecured creditors — trade creditors, subordinated noteholders and tort claimants— with somewhere between $0 and $1.4 million.

At best, the tort claimants would have been left to compete for $1.4 million against trade creditors, with rights to payment valued at $12.5 million, and subordinated noteholders, with rights to payment valued at $10 million. Plaintiffs’ counsel, including Ernest Hornsby, an attorney designated to represent the interests of Inamed breast implant recipients with potential, future injury claims, negotiated with Inamed and its senior secured noteholders.

The senior secured noteholders- — the only lenders open to advancing Inamed funds for settlement — conditioned financing on the settlement being mandatory and not exceeding $31.5 million. These senior creditors had no obligation to contribute funds. If plaintiffs’ counsel demanded either opt-out rights or settlement funds beyond $31.5 million, Inamed, steered by its senior creditors, was prepared to pursue liquidation. Thus, the proposed class settlement created a substantial recovery fund that otherwise would not exist.

Plaintiffs’ counsel ultimately accepted the comparative benefit of the $31.5 million limited fund, obtained by Inamed from the senior secured noteholders, as the only available resolution. They concluded that all Inamed implant claimants, whether their injuries had manifested or not, had a common interest in securing a certain source of recovery for their claims; none would be well served by the alternatives of default, insolvency, or bankruptcy. B.

Notice of the Proposed Settlement Class The parties presented Judge Pointer with the proposed settlement, which called for class certification of a $31.5 million mandatory, limited fund class and imposed on Inamed certain disclosure obligations with respect to ongoing breast implant studies. On June 2, 1998, Judge Pointer provisionally certified and approved the mandatory, limited fund class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).

He expressly conditioned permanent certification and final approval “upon an evidentiary showing, to this Court’s satisfaction, that a ‘limited fund’ or other circumstances exist satisfying the criteria for mandatory class certification under Rule 23, and that the proposed settlement is in the best interests of the class and should be approved under Rule 23(e).” District Court order, Docket No. 10 at 3. Subsequently, on October 7, 1998, Judge Pointer entered Order 47. Among other things, that order directed that notice be given to all individuals potentially affected by the class settlement.

In furnishing the notice plan, Judge Pointer attempted to approximate the level and quality of notice required by Rule 23(b)(3), even though the class was provisionally certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Judge Pointer first directed notice to be sent to approximately 250,000 women registered with the MDL 926 claims office, estimating that 80,000 were potential class members. He also directed notice to 28,-000 attorneys known to represent plaintiffs with breast implant-related claims against Inamed.

However, because not all Inamed breast implant recipients were registered with the claims office or represented by counsel, Judge Pointer ordered that notice of the proposed settlement be published in various periodicals. Judge Pointer approved the text of the proposed notice, and class counsel retained Hilsoft Notifications to design the layout and select the appropriate publications. Notices of the proposed settlement appeared in the October 28, 1998, edition of USA Today and the October 30, 1998, edition of People Magazine. Together, these publications reached an estimated 26,641,000 females.

In addition, Judge Pointer approved another notice that was placed in the December 7, 1998, edition of Modem Healthcare Magazine, a publication with a total readership of 76,482. The magazine posted the same notice on its website from November 23, 1998, through December 7, 1998. Finally, Judge Pointer had notice of the proposed settlement placed on the court-supervised website from October of 1998 through January of 1999.

Each of the above-described notices contained the following details: The district court had preliminarily certified and approved a $31.5 million mandatory class settlement against Inamed; if approved, the class settlement would extinguish all claims, filed or otherwise, against Inamed in connection with implants received prior to June 1, 1993; certification and settlement objections had to be postmarked by December 11, 1998; a copy of the proposed settlement could be obtained for free; and a hearing on the propriety of final class certification and settlement approval would be held on January 11, 1999, at the federal courthouse in Birmingham, Alabama.

C. Certification of the Inamed Settlement Class On January 11, 1999, Judge Pointer held a hearing for the purpose of considering class certification and approval of the settlement. The class’s negotiation committee agreed with Judge Pointer that, to the extent there was a conflict between current injury and future injury claimants, it was relevant only to the distribution plan. There were no conflicts with respect to the initial decision as to whether to certify a limited fund class.

More specifically, Judge Pointer explained that it would be premature to consider potential conflicts or proper distribution methods before he could be certain that there was, in fact, a settlement fund with money to distribute. He believed it was in the best interest of all members of the proposed class to secure the largest fund possible, as soon as possible, and to bring that fund under the control of the court. Various concerns were presented at the hearing through oral and written objections.

Among the objections presented were the following: (1) the settlement fund was insufficient; (2) future claimants should be entitled to opt out and reserve their legal rights; (3) the settlement lacked a predetermined distribution plan; (4) mandatory class members should nevertheless be given a right to opt out under Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985); (5) notice was inadequate as to future injury claimants; (6) the settlement would violate the Rules Enabling Act; (7) the settlement would improperly side step bankruptcy;

(8) Inamed was not a limited fund in light of the slight economic turnaround the company experienced after provisional approval of the mandatory class settlement; (9) the district court should delay consideration of the proposed class settlement in light of the Supreme Court’s pending decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999); and (10) the district court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin parallel state court proceedings.

After carefully considering these objections, on February 1, 1999, Judge Pointer entered Order 47A, certifying the non-opt-out settlement class. Judge Pointer concluded that the proposed class satisfied the threshold requirements for certification found in Rule 23(a).

In doing so, he found as follows: There were tens of thousands of individuals in the Inamed settlement class, making joinder impracticable; questions of fact and law common to the class existed, including whether Inamed’s breast implant products were defective and unreasonably dangerous, and whether the company’s conduct, level of knowledge, or duty would give rise to liability; the class members had a common interest in determining whether a limited fund existed, avoiding that fund’s diminishment through bankruptcy, and establishing equitable procedures for its distribution; and the claims of the class representatives were typical of the class in that they asserted the same types of factual and legal liability theories generally asserted by the class members.

With respect to Rule 23(a)(4), Judge Pointer noted that the “Representative Plaintiffs, who reflect the full spectrum of breast implant claimants ranging from claimants with no manifested injuries to claimants with serious illnesses ... will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Inamed Settlement Class.” District Court order, Docket No. 59 at 3.

The class was certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which authorizes certification when “prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of ... adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” Based on evidentiary submissions, Judge Pointer found that Inamed’s probable liability to the class members from the implant litigation greatly exceeded Inamed’s limited financial resources; that the settlement fund made available by certification was substantially greater than the amount, if any, that would be available in the absence of certification; and that Inamed constituted a “limited fund” against which claims are properly subject to certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).

Thus, Judge Pointer found that mandatory certification was warranted because “continued prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Inamed Settlement Class would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual Inamed Settlement Class members that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other Inamed Class Settlement members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interest.” District Court order, Docket No. 59 at 3.

Judge Pointer certified the class even though Inamed had experienced a slight financial rebound following announcement of the proposed settlement. Inamed’s stock price had risen, suggesting an increased aggregate market value, and class objectors argued that Inamed was therefore not a limited fund. Inamed responded that market capitalization was not an appropriate valuation method. First, it was circular to say that Inamed was not a limited fund because the announcement of a mandatory class settlement caused its stock to rise.

The stock value reflected a market expectation that the settlement would be completed and the company would achieve total relief from the expense and uncertainty surrounding the breast implant litigation. Second, the increase in Inamed’s stock price in no way measured the company’s ability to pay, especially if the flood of pending breast implant cases was not resolved with the proposed settlement. Inamed reiterated that it was the settlement’s preliminary approval that had, in large part, made possible the restructuring efforts that further contributed to the company’s improved financial condition.

After careful consideration of the arguments of the parties and the underlying evidence, Judge Pointer overruled the objection grounded in the recent improvements in Inamed’s operation performance and stock price.

He later found that the $31.5 million settlement fund was substantially greater than the amount that would be available in the absence of certification, that the settlement fund was the maximum fund that feasibly could be expected, and that Inamed’s probable liability to the class members greatly exceed the $31.5 million fund (which in turn greatly exceeded the value of the entirety of all other resources available to pay claims to the class members). Judge Pointer additionally evaluated the settlement for fairness pursuant to Rule 23(

e) and determined it was non-collusive, negotiated in good faith, fair, adequate, and reasonable. Importantly, he found: The evidence shows, inter alia, that— absent the new capital contributed to the company conditioned upon approval of this settlement — Inamed has negative net worth, net liquidation value of essentially zero, and no resources to pay claims. The company has had to borrow heavily in order to stay afloat.

The settlement is to be funded by additional borrowing available only in the context of this settlement, and the amount Inamed was able to raise for that purpose was constrained both by restrictions associated with its existing debt and the willingness of its lenders to assume the risk that the company’s post-settlement operations would repay their investment.

The record establishes that Inamed would be unable to raise such additional funds in the absence of this settlement, that the alternative of continued litigation of individual claims would drive Inamed to bankruptcy, and that the funds available to class members from this settlement are substantially greater than the funds, if any, that would remain for class members after an Inamed bankruptcy. Considering the record evidence of Inamed’s financial condition, the court finds a substantial risk that an Inamed bankruptcy would leave all class members with nothing. District Court order, Docket No. 59 at 4.

The class included “all persons and entities, wherever located, who have or may in the future have any unsatisfied claim (whether filed or unfiled, pending or reduced to judgment, existing or contingent, and specifically including claims for alleged injuries and damages not yet known or manifest) ... related to, or involving Inamed Breast Implants that were implanted in an operation that occurred before June 1, 1993.” Id. at 1-2.

In addition, Order 47A expansively defined “settled claims” as follows: [A]ny and all Breast Implant Related claims ... whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, regardless of legal theory, that are or may be asserted now or in the future by any and/or all Settlement Class Members against any or all of Inamed .... “Settled Claims” include, without limitation: (1) any and all claims of personal injury and/or bodily injury, damage, death, emotional or mental harm; (2) any and all claims for alleged economic or other injury or loss or for statutory damages under any state statute; (3) any and all claims for medical monitoring and claims for injunctive or declaratory relief based on, arising out of, or relating to Breast Implants; (4) any and all claims for loss of support, services, consortium, companionship, and/or society by spouses, parents, children, other relatives or “significant others” of persons implanted with Breast Implants; (5) any and all claims for conspiracy or concert of action; (6) any and all wrongful death or survival actions; and (7) any and all claims for punitive or exemplary damages based on or arising out of or related to Breast Implants.

Id. at 2. The settlement “conclusively compromised, settled and released” all “settled claims” of each member of the class. Id. at 5. Correspondingly, Order 47A permanently enjoined all members of the class “from instituting, asserting or prosecuting against Inamed ... in any pending or future action in any federal or state court, any Settled Claim that the member had, has, or may have in the future.” Id. Judge Pointer made explicit that there was no just reason for delay and that Order 47A constituted a final judgment with respect to all settled claims.

All questions regarding distribution of the settlement fund would be subject to subsequent orders enforcing the court’s judgment, based on Judge Pointer’s belief that these considerations were irrelevant to the question of whether the overall fund available was adequate.

Accordingly, Order 47A states that, “[wjithout deferring or delaying the finality of this order and judgment, this court retains exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to (1) implement, interpret, and enforce the Settlement Agreement, (2) administer, allocate, and distribute the settlement fund, and (3) rule on any applications for cost and expenses incurred in implementing this order and the Settlement Agreement.” Id. No appeal was taken from Order 47A. D.

Distribution of the Settlement Fund Order 47A merely certified the limited fund class and approved the settlement insofar as it required Inamed to infuse the settlement fund with $31.5 million. Having tabled a decision regarding a plan for allocation of the settlement recovery, Judge Pointer revisited the issue. Class counsel — including Hornsby, the attorney designated to represent solely future injury class members' — -presented a proposed plan of fund distribution, which called for a pro rata division of the $31.5 million among all claimants, without reference to extent of injury.

In May of 1999, the court preliminarily approved the proposed distribution plan and ordered notice of it sent to approximately 350,000 implant recipients on file, of whom 45,000 were likely Inamed settlement class members. The notice requested comments and objections to the proposal. The court received sixty-two objections to the proposal. Many of the objections concentrated on the perceived inequity of the plan’s failure to differentiate between claimants without injuries and claimants with current injuries.

Following a July 6, 1999, hearing, Judge Pointer overruled these objections, citing the unique financial constraints affecting the settlement terms. He explained that the fund was so severely limited in relation to the number of claimants, that a distribution plan differentiating between claimants with varying degrees of injuries would have “substantially increased administrative costs,” “not greatly increase[d] the amount of distribution to those determined to be eligible for enhanced benefits,” and “decrease[d] even more the meager distribution to other claimants.” District Court order, Docket No. 70 at 5.

In sum, Judge Pointer agreed with class counsel that pro rata division remained “the only workable solution under the facts of this case,” and he approved the proposed distribution plan. Id. On July 7, 1999, he entered Order 47B, pursuant to which the settlement fund was promptly distributed by equal pro rata division, without reference to the extent of injuries or expenses, to eligible class members who returned satisfactory claim forms prior to October 1, 1999. Each claimant ultimately received approximately $725. Class counsel received no fees out of the Inamed settlement fund. Order 47B was not appealed. E.

Events Following the Inamed Class Settlement For fiscal year 1998, Inamed’s net sales increased by twenty-four percent. It reported a net income in 1998, compared to a substantial net loss in 1997. However, Inamed’s book value in 1998 was still negative $15,625,000, and it remained a debt-ridden company. By 1999, Inamed began reporting a much improved operating income, openly attributing its profitability to settling the breast implant litigation and an aggressive cost-reduction program.

On September 1,1999, Inamed purchased Collagen Aesthetics, Inc., for approximately $159 million, the funding for which was provided by substantial borrowing. Nevertheless, even after undergoing a public offering to raise proceeds to pay the debt incurred in the purchase, Inamed’s financial viability remained precarious.

Around 2002, Plaintiff Zuzanna Juris began experiencing “chronic fatigue, severe chest wall and breast pain, capsular contraction, joint and muscle pain, muscle weakness, significant weight loss, severe headaches, skin rashes, memory loss, and loss of mental acuity.” In May of 2005, a surgeon removed her implants. Upon removal, the surgeon discovered that the implants, which Juris received in 1991, had deflated and leaked silicone and gel into her chest cavity and lymph nodes.

She was, according to her physician, suffering from “silicone-related immune dysfunction, atypical neurological disease and infection.” On March 23, 2006, Allergan purchased substantially all of Inamed’s outstanding common stock, as well as its wholly-owned subsidiary, McGhan Medical Corporation (“McGhan”). Shortly thereafter, on May 16, 2006, Juris filed suit against Allergan, Inamed, and McGhan (hereinafter, collectively, “Allergan”) in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles.

She alleged that Inamed/McGhan breast implants caused her injuries and asserted claims for strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, deceit/negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Allergan filed a demurrer to Juris’s complaint, arguing that the “doctrine of res judicata ... gives conclusive effect to the [Inamed] settlement and bars [Juris] from re-litigating her claims in this case.” Juris responded that applying res judicata as a bar to her claims would deprive her of due process. F.

Procedural History On September 20, 2006, Allergan filed a motion in the district court for the Northern District of Alabama — the Inamed class action court — requesting that Juris and her attorney show cause why they should not be held in contempt for violating Order 47A’s anti-suit injunction. Allergan contended that Juris was a member of the Inamed settlement class and her claims were “settled claims” as defined in Order 47A. As a result, the company argued, the settlement’s injunction prohibited Juris’s lawsuit.

In her opposition to Allergan’s contempt motion, Juris argued that she had a right to collaterally attack the class judgment and that the Anti-Injunction Act denied the district court power to enjoin the California state court action. Subsequently, on October 19, 2006, counsel for both parties jointly requested that the California court stay the proceedings before it, pending a decision from the district court.

Their joint motion stated that they “agree that [Juris’s] legal and constitutional challenge to Order No. 47A should be brought before the Alabama district court, and that the Los Angeles Superior Court should not rule on this issue.” On October 3, 2008, District Judge U.W. Clemon traveled to California, where he heard evidence and oral argument from the parties on Allergan’s show cause motion. The parties filed post-hearing briefs addressing various issues.

In November of 2009, Juris filed a motion in the California state court seeking a hearing and requesting that the stay be lifted, and she notified the district court of her intention to proceed with the California litigation. The district court promptly informed the parties that a second hearing would be held with respect to Allergan’s motion for an order to show cause. On December 14, 2009, Judge Proctor heard oral argument from counsel representing Juris, Allergan, and the Inamed settlement class. The parties again submitted post-hearing briefs.

Thus, in all, the issues before the district court were explored at two hearings and through three rounds of briefing. Juris advanced four arguments: (1) she may raise a collateral attack against the Inamed class settlement in the forum of her choice; (2) in light of Ortiz v.

Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999), the district court erroneously certified the Inamed class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B); (3) even if correctly certified, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and application of res judicata to her claims would violate her due process rights; and (4) the anti-suit injunction contained in Order 47A is unenforceable because it violates the Anti-Injunction Act. Judge Proctor considered each argument in turn.

Judge Proctor noted that, although Juris had initially argued that the California court was the only proper court to entertain her collateral challenge to the Inamed class settlement, she subsequently abandoned that position and agreed to resolve the collateral challenge in the district court in Alabama. However, in an abundance of caution, Judge Proctor nevertheless addressed the merits of the issue of the appropriate forum.

Concluding that “Juris’ arguments have evolved from defensive, forum-specific contentions to offensive, relief-oriented requests,” Judge Proctor construed Juris’s filings as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). District Court order, Docket No. 303 at 33-34. He held that the class action court properly could consider Juris’s collateral challenge. In addition, with respect to Juris’s contention that Rule 23(b)(1)(

B) certification was improper under the requirements outlined in Ortiz, Judge Proctor held that Juris’s substantive attack on Orders 47A and 47B, which were not appealed, were foreclosed by res judicata. In the alternative, he held that “even if Juris were able to contest Judge Pointer’s conclusions of law ... the Inamed Class Settlement was properly certified as a limited fund.” Id. at 45.

Judge Proctor specifically rejected Juris’s contention that post-settlement financial disclosures, which placed Inamed’s economic status in a more positive light than the evidence presented at class certification, provided a basis for setting aside the judgment. He emphasized the fact that the reports at issue reflected Inamed’s financial position after announcement and final approval of the settlement. He additionally observed that provisional certification of the class had an “incalculable impact” on Inamed’s financial status by enjoining all litigation by the then-putative class.

Most importantly, Judge Proctor found that Juris was ignoring one essential point: “If Inamed had not resolved the breast implant cases on a global scale, then the company was destined for liquidation at the direction of its senior secured creditors — a fact which Juris has never disputed.” Id. at 62. Thus, Judge Proctor concluded that Juris’s argument was circular; it simply made no sense to say that certification of the Inamed settlement was flawed because Inamed rebounded, when it was the settlement itself that prompted the rebound.

Judge Proctor undertook an independent analysis of Inamed’s financial condition at the time of the certification, examining the evidence on which Judge Pointer had relied. Judge Proctor’s analysis confirmed Judge Pointer’s previous findings. Judge Proctor found that the $31.5 million settlement fund was “the maximum value available for settling the pending tort claims.” Id. at 52, 65.

Judge Proctor also confirmed the earlier findings by Judge Pointer that the $31.5 million was substantially greater than the then-value of the entirety of Inamed’s net assets, and that the magnitude of the claims of the class members greatly exceeded that amount. Judge Proctor then held that Juris’s due process and personal jurisdiction arguments could not enable her to escape the Inamed class settlement. As more fully-developed below, Judge Proctor concluded that opt-out rights are not required in the case of a Rule 23(b)(1)(

B) limited fund, Juris was adequately represented, and the class notice ordered by Judge Pointer was adequate. Finally, Judge Proctor held that Order 47A’s anti-suit injunction did not violate the Anti-Injunction Act because the injunction was necessary in aid of the court’s jurisdiction and to protect or effectuate its judgments. Accordingly, the district court granted in part and denied in part Allergan’s motion for an order to show cause.

Although the court declined to hold Juris or her counsel in contempt for violating Order 47A’s anti-suit injunction, it held that she was bound by Judge Pointer’s injunction, prohibiting her from proceeding with the California litigation. Correspondingly, the district court denied Juris’s request to be excluded from the Inamed class settlement, which the court construed as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(

b) motion. II. DISCUSSION On appeal Juris argues: (

A) that she can collaterally challenge the res judicata effect of the Inamed class settlement; (

B) that the California court — not the Northern District of Alabama — is the appropriate forum for the collateral attack; and (

C) that she was denied fundamental due process during the Inamed class proceedings in that (1) she did not receive adequate notice, (2) she was not adequately represented, and (3) she was denied the right to opt out. In addition, Juris seeks to escape the preclusive effect of the class settlement by arguing that Judge Pointer erred in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) (which we address in

Part II.D). Finally, she urges us to conclude that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the district court from enjoining her state court suit (which we address in

Part II.

E) A. Availability of Collateral Attacks Class action judgments will typically bind all members of the class. Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir.1979). Thus, “[generally, principles of res judicata, or claim preclusion, apply to judgments in class actions as in other cases.” Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir.1998). There is an exception to this rule, however, which is grounded in due process. Kemp, 608 F.2d at 1054.

This Court has explained: Before the bar of claim preclusion may be applied to the claim of an absent class member, it must be demonstrated that invocation of the bar is consistent with due process, see, e.g., Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 435, 437 (5th Cir.1979), and an absent class member may collaterally attack the prior judgment on the ground that to apply claim preclusion would deny him due process, see, e.g., Silber v. Mahon (Mahon), 957 F.2d 697, 699-700 (9th Cir.1992); Gonzales v.

Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 74-75 (5th Cir.1973), see generally Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 589 (1974). Twigg, 153 F.3d at 1226; see also 3 William B. Rubenstein et a!., Newberg on Class Actions § 8:30 (4th ed. 2011) (“A right of collateral attack, through which the essential fairness of a judgment is questioned during subsequent litigation, remains a potential limitation on the binding effect of determinations in representative actions.”). The propriety of collateral attacks “is amply supported by precedent.” Stephenson v. Dow Chem.

Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258 (2d Cir.2001), ajfd in part by an equally divided court and vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111, 123 S.Ct. 2161, 156 L.Ed.2d 106 (2003); see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42, 61 S.Ct. 115, 118, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940) (“[TJhere has been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted [in the representative action], fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it.”).

Absent class members can collaterally challenge the res judicata effect of a prior class judgment either because they were not adequately represented, see, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir.1973); Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261; Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433, 440 n. 15 (2d Cir.1978), or because there was not adequate notice, see, e.g., Twigg, 153 F.3d at 1229; Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 434 (5th Cir.1979); King v. S. Cent. Bell Tel., 790 F.2d 524, 530 (6th Cir.1986); Pate v. United States, 328 F.Supp.2d 62, 73-74 (D.D.C.2004).

In addition, absent class members have successfully attacked a class action court’s ability to bind them by arguing that they were denied the ability to opt out or exclude themselves from the class. See, e.g., Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir.1992), cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 117, 114 S.Ct. 1359, 128 L.Ed.2d 33 (1994).

The traditional collateral attack involves a class member commencing a separate suit on a similar subject matter as a prior class settlement, the defendant’s assertion that the prior class settlement has preclusive effect and bars the new suit, and the class member’s contention that giving res judicata effect to the prior settlement would violate her rights to due process. At the same time, “[a] related, collateral method for attacking judgment finality after expiration of the appeals period is available under federal Rule 60(b).” 3 William B. Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 8:30 (4th ed.2011).

Courts treat Rule 60(b)(4) motions, pursuant to which a litigant can seek relief from a final judgment on the grounds that “the judgment is void,” as a vehicle for absent class members to advance the same due process challenges that can be raised in a traditional collateral attack. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir.2005) (“This [due process] challenge can take the form of an appeal of the class certification itself, a collateral attack on an already-certified class, or a Rule 60(

b) motion.”); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Ohio (In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig.), 502 F.2d 834, 842-44 (10th Cir.1974) (analyzing due process challenge to binding effect of prior class settlement in the context of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion); Battle v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins.

Co., 770 F.Supp. 1499, 1522-23 (N.D.Ala.1991) (same), aff'd, 974 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir.1992). “Since the claim in both instances is that the judgment is void and since the requirements for a valid judgment are not altered by the setting in which validity is tested, this treatment seems logical.” Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 589, 598 n.55 (1974). The primary difference is that a Rule 60(

b) motion must be brought in the class action court, and a traditional collateral attack is typically litigated in a second, reviewing court. B. Appropriate Forum for Juris’s Due Process Challenge As a preliminary matter, we must ensure that the district court was the proper forum to resolve Juris’s due process challenge. Early on, in response to Allergan’s contempt motion, Juris posited that she had the right to select the court where she would pursue her attack on the binding effect of the Inamed class settlement.

She complained that she should not be forced to travel across the country to Alabama to litigate her constitutional challenge in the class action court. Instead, Juris maintained, she should be allowed to launch a traditional collateral attack in the California state court. Juris relies principally on the Third Circuit’s decision In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Services Antitrust Litigation, 869 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.1989).

In that case, following settlement of a multidistrict class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, absent class members filed an Arizona state court action collaterally attacking the class settlement. Id. at 762. The Pennsylvania district court enjoined the Arizona litigation, holding that if the plaintiffs wished to challenge the due process safeguards they received in the class proceeding, they could only do so in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id.

On appeal, the Third Circuit observed: In this case, the [plaintiffs] were haled across the country ... merely because of the fortuity that plaintiffs in Pennsylvania had similar claims and the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation elected to consolidate all the MDL 633 cases there. Thus we must look carefully at the protections that the [plaintiffs] were given in the class action proceeding, to assess whether it would violate due process to force them to litigate their adequacy as part of an injunction action in Pennsylvania district court. Id. at 768.

The court characterized the issue as “whether an absent class member can be enjoined from relitigation if the member does not have minimum contacts with the forum.” Id. at 769. On this point, the court held that “if the member has not been given the opportunity to opt out in a class action involving both important injunctive relief and damage claims, the member must either have minimum contacts with the forum or consent to jurisdiction in order to be enjoined by the district court that entertained the class action.” Id.

Because the plaintiffs were not given an opportunity to opt out of the class settlement, did not have minimum contacts with Pennsylvania, and had not consented to jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania district court, the Third Circuit vacated the injunction; and the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with their collateral attack in Arizona. Id.

Juris complains that she was similarly “haled across the country” to defend Allergan’s contempt motion, even though she did not have the opportunity to opt out of the Inamed class settlement, she did not have minimum contacts with Alabama, and she did not consent to the jurisdiction of the Alabama district court. That is, she ended up litigating in Alabama by nothing more than the “fortuity” that, years earlier, thousands of lawsuits related to silicone breast implants were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and transferred to the Northern District of Alabama.

Juris contends that the California state court action should have been allowed to proceed to decide whether she was afforded due process in the Inamed class settlement. We cannot agree. First, Real Estate did not involve a limited fund class action. The prior settlement in that case involved a “hybrid class,” which sought substantial damages, but primarily injunctive relief, certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(

A) and Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 764, 768. The Third Circuit limited its holding to the facts before it, stating that it was not “addressing] the due process requirements in a class action certified under 23(b)(l)[B] in which there is only a limited common fund from which the plaintiffs can obtain relief.” Id. at 768 n. 8. Thus, even if Real Estate were binding authority in this Circuit, that decision would not control our analysis because the ease at bar involves a limited fund. Second, and more importantly, we hold that Juris consented to jurisdiction in the court below.

Juris and Allergan filed a consent motion to stay the California case, which stated that they “agree that [Juris’s] legal and constitutional challenge to Order No. 47A should be brought before the Alabama district court, and that the Los Angeles Superior Court should not rule on this issue.” The joint motion similarly provided: “To the extent Plaintiff intends to pursue a constitutional challenge to Order 47A, Plaintiff and Defendants agree that the Northern District of Alabama is the proper court to interpret and review said order, and to determine its effect on Plaintiffs claims herein.” In support, Juris’s counsel filed a sworn declaration explaining that “[c]ounsel for the Plaintiff and counsel for the Defendants, including their respective local Alabama counsel, have jointly agreed to seek to resolve the legal and constitutional issues related to Plaintiffs commencement of the above-entitled action before the federal court in Alabama.” Given her express consent, we have no difficulty concluding that the Alabama district court was the proper forum to resolve Juris’s constitutional challenge to the res judicata effect of the Inamed class settlement.

Juris cannot now be heard to complain that she was “haled across the country” to a forum for which she did not have minimum contacts or consent to jurisdiction. We do not reach the issue left open by the Third Circuit in Real Estate— whether, in the absence of her express consent to jurisdiction, it would have run afoul of the due process clause to require Juris to litigate her collateral attack on the limited fund settlement in the certifying court. C. Juris’s Due Process Arguments 1.

Adequate Notice Juris argues that the Inamed settlement should not be given res judicata effect because she did not receive adequate notice of the class proceedings. She does not challenge the class judgment on the theory that the content of the notices was constitutionally inadequate. See Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir.1998) (concluding that prior class judgment could not bar absent class member’s claims because, “even if Twigg had received the notices, their language was insufficient to notify him that claims like his were being litigated in the action”).

Rather, her due process argument takes aim at the method of distributing class notice approved by Judge Pointer. Juris specifically urges us to find that the class notice was constitutionally deficient because she did not receive actual, individual notice. The notice provisions of Rule 23, which are meant to protect the due process rights of absent class members, set forth “different notice requirements to different kinds of cases and even to different phases of the same case.” Battle v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 770 F.Supp. 1499, 1515 (N.D.Ala.1991), aff'd, 974 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir.1992).

The rule itself does not require notice in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(A)-(B). Instead, in these “mandatory” class actions, Rule 23 allows courts to exercise their discretion to provide appropriate notice “to protect class members and fairly conduct the action.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(A), (d)(1)(B); see also 3 William B.

Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 8:5 (4th ed. 2011) (“[T]he court may make appropriate orders requiring notice to some or all of the members regarding the pendency of the class, proposed judgment or settlement, soliciting input on the adequacy of class representation, opportunity to intervene or present claims or defenses, and the like.”). “Regardless of the category under which a class suit may be or potentially may be certified, however, Rule 23(

e) requires that absent class members be informed when the lawsuit is in the process of being voluntarily dismissed or compromised.” Id. § 8:17; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(1). Under certain circumstances, however, even when not provided for by Rule 23, due process may require that class members receive notice of the pendency of the proceeding. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that due process required notice, “[although under the text of Rule 23 and the cases interpreting it notice is not required in all representative suits”).

Although other courts have held that adequate representation alone is a sufficient test for assessing due process in the context of a limited fund class action, see, e.g., Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos), 90 F.3d 963, 986-87 (5th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999), we have held that due process will additionally require at least some notice to potential absent members prior to class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). See In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir.1988).

In Temple, an asbestos manufacturer moved to consolidate all present and future asbestos-related injury actions against it and to certify a mandatory class action. Id. at 1270. The company asserted that certification was warranted under Rule 23(b)(1)(

B) because its assets constituted a limited fund in the sense that they were insufficient to satisfy all claims. Id. at 1271. Without notifying any putative class members or conducting an adversarial proceeding on the existence of a limited fund, the district court accepted the defendant’s assertions. Id. The district court found that the company’s insurance and other funds would not be able to cover its potential tort liability, and it observed that the costs of defending numerous small actions were rapidly depleting the company’s resources. Id.

On appeal, we held that the certification was due to be reversed because, inter alia, “[t]he [district] court’s failure to notify petitioners of the certification hearing violated due process.” Id. at 1272. We reasoned that, “[u]nlike class members in cases certified under 23(b)(3) who may opt out of the action and have no need for prior notice of efforts to obtain class certification, members of a mandatory class need to be provided with notice to contest the facts underlying a certification they may strenuously oppose.” Id.

The lack of notice produced a non-adversarial proceeding that “almost certainly led to the premature and speculative finding that a limited fund existed.” Id. Therefore, we held, the district court’s order “clearly violate[d] the individual constitutional rights of the petitioners.” Id. The due process violation in Temple arose because the district court certified a mandatory, limited fund class action without any notice to absent class members. The decision does not stand for the proposition that the Constitution requires that each individual class member receive actual notice.

Instead, our concern was with the total absence of notice, which led to the “non-adversarial nature of the [class certification] proceedings.” Id. at 1272. We therefore agree with the district court that Temple is not controlling in this case. Where the notice afforded reaches a critical mass of putative class members, such that the facts underlying certification are contested and approached in a sufficiently adversarial manner, the due process pitfall identified in Temple can be avoided. The careful analysis of the notice mandated by due process in Battle, 770 F.Supp. 1499, is also persuasive here.

In that case, years after a class settlement, absent members sought to circumvent the prior judgment on the theory that it violated their due process rights to actual, personal notice. Battle, 770 F.Supp. at 1508, 1510. Although the court stopped short of holding that no notice at all would have passed constitutional muster, it concluded that individual notice to certain class members as well as certain “media” notice “was enough to subsequently bind this 23(b)(2)-type plaintiff class ... consistent with due process.” Id. at 1519-20.

The court reasoned: Because such notice was appropriately designed not to afford absent members the chance to exclude themselves from the class, but rather to inform them of the pendency of the action and permit them to challenge the representation by the named plaintiffs and class counsel or to otherwise intervene, the fact that paid-up policyholders did not receive notice did not frustrate this purpose. Because such policyholders shared the same interests as those who did receive notice, the latter could adequately speak for them vis-a-vis the named plaintiffs and class counsel. Id. at 1520 (citation omitted).

As such, Battle holds that when a mandatory class is composed of plaintiffs with singular interests, and where the representatives and objectors reflect the interests of those who did not receive notice, failure to individually notify each class member will not equate to a constitutional violation. To the extent that Temple and Battle require notice to ensure that the class certification and the underlying facts supporting it are Sufficiently scrutinized and to ensure that the varied interests of non-participating class members are represented, notice in the present case was sufficient to satisfy due process.

Judge Pointer directed individual notices to be mailed to 250,000 women who had registered with the claims office and 28,000 attorneys representing Inamed breast implant recipients. He also ordered that notice of the proposed settlement and the certification-fairness hearing be published in People Magazine, USA Today, and Modem Healthcare Magazine, as well as on Modem Healthcare Magazine’s website and the district court’s website.

At the certification-fairness hearing, potential class members — including those with no manifested injury — objected, arguing among other things that the settlement fund was too small, that the named class representatives did not adequately reflect the putative class members’ varying degrees of injuries, that future claimants should be allowed to opt-out of the class, that the settlement would improperly sidestep the bankruptcy system, and that Inamed did not constitute a limited fund in light of the company’s economic rebound.

The hearing was far different from “[t]he district court’s ex parte proceeding” in Temple, which “denied petitioners their right to contest [the asbestos company’s] assertions.” 851 F.2d at 1272. The proceedings before Judge Pointer were sufficiently adversarial. Even with the benefit of hindsight, Juris cannot point to a single objection that she would have raised that was not actually advanced by putative class members before Judge Pointer. Accordingly, the ordered notice amply satisfied the requirements of Temple and Battle that absent class members be sufficiently informed of the pendency of the action.

We likewise find that the notice with respect to the proposed plan for distribution of the Inamed settlement fund satisfied due process. See Battle, 770 F.Supp. at 1520 (explaining that, apart from notice of the pendency of the action, a court must analyze whether class members received constitutionally sufficient notice of and the right to object to the settlement). Per Judge Pointer’s orders, notices requesting objections and comments on the proposed fund distribution plan were mailed to 350,000 implant recipients registered with the claims office.

The court received sixty-two objections to the proposal, and Judge Pointer held a hearing to consider the propriety of pro rata distribution of the fund. For example, Judge Pointer addressed concerns that the plan was inequitable because it failed to differentiate between claimants with current injuries and those without injuries; he also overruled objections that certain claimants could not identify the manufacturer of their breast implants and thus could not provide the necessary information to be eligible to claim from the Inamed settlement fund.

Judge Pointer was not required to provide each absent class member individual notice of the proposed settlement allocation plan, and the notice here satisfied “the broad reasonableness standards imposed by due process.” Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir.1979); see also Franks v. Kroger Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1222-23 (6th Cir.1981), aff'd on reh’g, 670 F.2d 671 (1981).

Importantly, under the circumstances, “the interests of those class members ... who did receive notice of the settlement were essentially identical to the interests of [those] who were not alerted to the settlement ... and the former raised just the sort of objections that the latter would have raised.” Battle, 770 F.Supp. at 1521. Juris’s conclusory assertion that the Inamed class settlement cannot be given preclusive effect because “[t]here is no dispute that she did not receive actual notice” rests on a faulty premise.

As demonstrated by our discussion of Temple and Battle, where due process calls for absent members of a mandatory class to receive notice, it does not automatically require that the notice match that in a 23(b)(3) class action. That is, something less than “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort,” may suffice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B); see also 3 William B.

Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 8:13 (4th ed. 2011) (“As a rule, class certification notice, even if held to be required in a Rule 23(b)(1) ... class suit by ... due process, will invariably mean significant cost savings by means of published or other general notice, compared to the corresponding but stricter requirements of individual Rule 23(c)(2) notice to members of classes certified only-under Rule 23(b)(3).”); Johnson v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 438 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that individual monetary claims in a 23(b)(2) class cannot be barred where absent class members received no notice, but stating that “[i]t will not always be necessary for the notice in such cases to be equivalent to that required in (b)(3) actions”). However, even assuming this heightened standard applied, Juris would be unable to demonstrate that the notice in the class proceeding was constitutionally deficient.

Courts have consistently recognized that, even in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, due process does not require that class members actually receive notice. See Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir.1994) (explaining that even in an opt-out class action, class notice standard is “best practicable,” as opposed to “actually received”); Adams v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins.

Co., 417 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1380 n. 6 (M.D.Ga.2006) (“The analysis for purposes of due process is on the notice plan itself, and actual receipt of notice by each individual class member is not required.”), aff'd, 493 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir.2007); In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P’ships Litig., 164 F.R.D. 362, 368 (S.D.N.Y.1996), (“It is widely accepted that for the due process standard to be met it is not necessary that every class member receive actual notice ....”), aff'd, 107 F.3d 3 (2d Cir.1996); Trist v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chester, 89 F.R.D. 1, 2 (E.D.Pa.1980) (“Mullane [v.

Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)], has never been interpreted to require the sort of actual notice demanded by the defendants .... ”); see also 4 William B. Rubenstein et ah, Newberg on Class Actions § 11:53 (4th ed. 2011) (“Thus, due process does not require actual notice, but rather a good faith effort to provide actual notice.

Courts have consistently recognized that due process does not require that every class member receive actual notice so long as the court reasonably selected a means likely to apprize interested parties.”); 7AA Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1789.1 (3d ed. 2005) (“[A]s long as the notice scheme that is adopted meets [the constitutional standards], courts generally have ruled that an absent class member will be bound by any judgment that is entered, even though the absentee never actually received notice.”).

Where certain class members’ names and addresses cannot be determined with reasonable efforts, notice by publication is generally considered adequate. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 168-69 (2d Cir.1987) (finding that, with respect to a 23(b)(3) class, unidentified absent class members that could not be located through reasonable efforts did not need to be provided with individual, mailed notice in order to be bound); Gordon v.

Hunt, 117 F.R.D. 58, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“This combination of mailed notice to all class members who can be identified by reasonable effort and published notice to all others is the long-accepted norm in large class actions.”). Juris cites no case law to the contrary. Judge Pointer constructed a notice campaign which he intended to approximate the level of notice that would have been provided to a Rule 23(b)(3) class. Juris has done nothing to call into question the fact that the dissemination of notice was— as Judge Pointer intended, and Judge Proctor later found — the best practicable under the circumstances.

We hold that the notice campaign in the Inamed class action was sufficient in a constitutional sense, and we cannot conclude that there was a deficiency in notice that prevents res judicata from attaching to the class settlement. 2. Adequate Representation Juris additionally seeks to circumvent the binding effect of the Inamed class settlement on the basis that she was not adequately represented.

She claims she was inadequately represented for several reasons; we address her arguments in turn. “Due process of law would be violated for the judgment in a class suit to be res judicata to the absent members of a class unless the court applying res judicata can conclude that the class was adequately represented in the first suit.” Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir.1973). To answer the question whether the class representative adequately represented the class so that the judgment in the class suit will bind the absent members of the class requires a two-pronged inquiry:

(1) Did the trial court in the first suit correctly determine, initially, that the representative would adequately represent the class? and

(2) Does it appear, after the termination of the suit, that the class representative adequately protected the interest of the class? The first question involves us in a collateral review of the [class action] court’s determination to permit the suit to proceed as a class action with [the named plaintiffs] as the representative^], while the second involves a review of the entire suit — ■ an inquiry which is not required to be made by the trial court but which is appropriate in a collateral attack on the judgment such as we have here. Id. at 72.

Juris argues that Judge Pointer erred by failing to create discrete subclasses for those breast implant recipients with current injuries and those with only potential, future injuries. She relies primarily on Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). In Amchem, the Supreme Comet analyzed, on direct appeal, the certification of a settlement-only class action involving persons exposed to asbestos products. The “sprawling class” included not only presently injured individuals, but also those who had only been exposed to asbestos with no present manifestation of injury.

Id. at 602-03, 117 S.Ct. at 2239-40. The Court reversed class certification, noting, among other defects, that Rule 23(a)(4)’s requirement that the named representatives “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” had not been satisfied. Id. at 625, 117 S.Ct. at 2250. Importantly, the Court reasoned: [N]amed parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses. In significant respects, the interests of those within the single class are not aligned.

Most saliently, for the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future. Id. at 626, 117 S.Ct. at 2251. Quoting from a Second Circuit decision, the Court shed light on its precise concern: “The class members may well have thought that the Settlement serves the aggregate interests of the entire class.

But the adversity among subgroups requires that members of each subgroup cannot be bound by a settlement except by consents given by those who understand that their role is to represent solely members of their respective subgroups.” Id. at 627, 117 S.Ct. at 2251 (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 742-43 (2d Cir.1992), modified on reh’g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.1993)).

The crux of the problem in Amchem was that there was “no assurance ... either in the terms of the settlement or in the structure of the negotiations — that the named plaintiffs operated under a proper understanding of their representational responsibilities.” Id.; see id. (“The settling parties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected.”). Two years later, in Ortiz v.

Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999), the Court again discussed the potentially conflicting interests within a class of current and future injury asbestos claimants certified for global settlement purposes. Id. at 856, 119 S.Ct. at 2319. According to the Court, under the law of Amchem, “a class divided between holders of present and future claims (some of the latter involving no physical injury and attributable to claimants not yet born) requires homogenous subclasses under Rule 23(c)[ ], with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.” Id.

Ortiz involved Rule 23(b)(1)(

B) certification requirements, as opposed to Rule 23(a)(4), but the Court found that the intra-class conflict was “as contrary to the equitable obligation entailed by the limited fund rationale as it was to the requirements of structural protection applicable to all class actions under Rule 23(a)(4).” Id. at 856, 119 S.Ct. at 2320; see id. at 856 n. 31, 119 S.Ct. at 2319 n. 31 (noting that the Rule 23(b) “adequacy of representation concern parallels the enquiry required at the threshold under Rule 23(a)(4)”).

The cases describe a requirement that there be structural assurances of adequate representation that protect against the conflicting goals of present and future injury class members. These protections must ensure that class representatives understand that their role is representing solely members of their respective constituency, not the whole class. Although we need not rule definitively, Amchem and Ortiz appear to hold that Rule 23(a)(4) calls for some type of adequate structural protection, which would include, but may not necessarily require, formally designated subclasses.

Of course, both Amchem and Ortiz involved review on direct appeal of the Rule 23 pre-certification requirements, as opposed to the collateral challenge context of our case in which Juris must show that her due process rights were violated. In the context of this case, we are unwilling to hold that the due process concept of adequate representation is so rigid and inflexible as to demand formal subclasses in the case at bar. Judge Pointer and class counsel put in place procedures to protect against antagonistic alignment within the class and avoid the fatal flaw in Amchem.

Judge Pointer appointed six Inamed breast implant recipients as class representatives, among them, a representative with no manifested injury, one with minor to moderate injuries, and one who was totally disabled. He appointed five attorneys with extensive breast implant trial experience as class counsel. Most significantly, and anticipating an Amchem problem, separate counsel, Ernest Hornsby, was specifically brought in for the sole purpose of representing those plaintiffs with only potential, future injuries.

Thus, even prior to provisional certification of the class, the interests of those claimants with unmanifested injuries were represented and given a separate seat at the negotiation table through qualified and independent counsel. Hornsby continued his representation of exposure-only plaintiffs throughout the case, including when, at the certification stage, Judge Pointer considered approving the settlement and the settlement fund, and, more significantly, later, when he considered various proposals for allocating the fund.

This combination of named plaintiffs representing the full spectrum of breast implant claimants and separate counsel to represent the present injury and future injury claimants addressed the potential and actual divergent interests within the Inamed class. In contrast with Amchem and Ortiz, the structure of the negotiations in the case at bar ensured that class representatives operated with a proper understanding of their representative responsibilities.

The negotiation process did not resemble that in Amchem and Ortiz where there were no structural assurances whatsoever and where nobody “exclusively advanced the particular interests of either subgroup.” In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 250 (2d Cir.2011). Because of this, we are confident that the class settlement, as well as the plan for distribution, was achieved only by the consent of those who understood that their role was to advocate on behalf of their respective subgroups.

We therefore conclude that the structural protections put in place were sufficient to meet the demands of due process. Our holding that formal subclasses were not constitutionally required is reinforced by Judge Proctor’s unchallenged findings. According to Judge Proctor, “the class’s court-appointed representatives and counsel served as the functional equivalents of formally sub-classed groups, which ensured that the class representatives, as well as their counsel, participated directly in negotiations and litigation.” District Court order, Docket No. 303 at 93.

He additionally found that formal sub-classing would have been “superfluous” because Judge Pointer received objections that mirrored the concerns that subdivided “currents” and “futures” subclasses likely would have produced respectively. Id. at 95. On appeal, Juris does not contest Judge Proctor’s findings, and she has not articulated how formal subclasses would have provided increased assurance of adequate representation.

Juris does argue that “Hornsby did not, and could not, vigorously and tenaciously protect the plaintiffs interests” because “Hornsby represented all kinds of plaintiffs in the Inamed litigation — those who had no current injuries, some who had current injuries, and some who were going to develop a condition or disease in the future.” Juris’s initial appellate brief makes this conclusory assertion, without even labeling it a conflict of interest, and provides no follow-up argument on the issue.

Even more problematic, Juris has raised this claim for the first time on appeal. “A federal appellate court will not, as a general rule, consider an issue that is raised for the first time on appeal.” In re Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 905 F.2d 1457, 1461-62 (11th Cir.1990). “The corollary of this rule is that, if a party hopes to preserve a claim, argument, theory, or defense on appeal, she must first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it.” Id. at 1462.

In her appellate briefs, Juris cites to a portion of the hearing before Judge Proctor in which Hornsby made a stray remark that, at the beginning, he represented some breast implant plaintiffs with current injuries and some with no manifested injuries. Juris’s counsel did not respond, at that point or any other point during the hearing, by arguing that Hornsby had a conflict of interest which deprived Juris of adequate representation. Most importantly, Juris discussed adequate representation in five briefs in the court below, and she never once suggested that Hornsby suffered from a conflict of interest.

Having foregone an opportunity to explore Hornsby’s representation before Judge Proctor (at which time the matter could have been investigated and clarified), and having raised the conflict-of-interest claim in such a vague and tangential manner on appeal, Juris has waived it. Having doubly waived the conflict of interest issue, and especially having deprived Allergan of the opportunity to adduce evidence to clarify the situation, Juris is deemed to have abandoned the issue. See id. at 1461-62; Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1298 n. 2 (11th Cir.1995).

Even setting aside Juris’s abandonment of this issue, we would hold that the record amply supported Judge Proctor’s finding that counsel in this case served as the functional equivalents of formal subclasses, such that the situation falls far short of a due process violation. The record reveals that the parties agreed, and Judge Pointer was aware, that Hornsby represented solely future claimants with no current manifestations of injury.

An affidavit submitted by class counsel in support of provisional certification of the Inamed settlement class provides as follows: One concern that we raised and explored, as discussions and negotiations proceeded, was whether breast implant recipients with manifest injuries, and those who have not yet suffered injuries from their implants, had a common interest in a mandatory fund settlement as opposed to the inevitable alternative of Inamed insolvency.

To assure that all interests and perspectives were represented, Ernest Hornsby, a plaintiffs’ attorney with extensive Breast Implants trial experience, who represents Inamed implant recipients with potential future claims, was added as class counsel in this action, and participated in the final round of discussions and negotiations that led up to the instant settlement.

Subsequently, when adopting the proposed distribution plan, Judge Pointer stated: “Class counsel — some of whom represent clients with existing medical problems and others of who represent clients without presently documented problems — have, with the Court, struggled ... and reluctantly come to the conclusion that pro rata division remains the better — and indeed only workable — solution under the facts of this case.” District Court order, Docket No. 70 at 5.

This establishes not only that Hornsby was brought in and designated to represent exposure-only class members, but also that this procedural safeguard was put in place for the express purpose of addressing the divergent interests that could arise between present and future injury claimants. For this reason, even if Hornsby had previously represented some clients with current injuries, he, by agreeing to be the designated representative for the named plaintiff with merely future, potential claims, implicitly ceded the representation of any other clients to class counsel representing currently injured plaintiffs.

We conclude that Juris has failed to show that her due process rights were violated. Juris next urges us to find that she was not in fact adequately represented because Hornsby did not prosecute an appeal of Order 47A, the order certifying the settlement-only class and approving the settlement as fair, based on Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999). The Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz, which was still pending when Judge Pointer entered Order 47A, ultimately narrowed the grounds upon which certification of a limited fund class settlement could be supported.

In support of her failure-to-appeal argument, Juris cites Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.1973). In Gonzales, the plaintiffs collaterally attacked a class action judgment on the grounds that they had not been adequately represented. Id. at 72. In the prior proceeding, a three-judge district court declared a Texas statute unconstitutional. Id. at 71. However, that court limited the scope of relief by holding that its order only applied retroactively to the named plaintiff himself; with respect to all other class members, the court’s order granted only prospective relief.

Id. “Having obtained relief for himself, [the class representative] did not appeal the court’s denial of retroactive relief to the other members of his class.” Id. The district court rejected the argument that this constituted inadequate representation. Id. 72. On appeal, the former Fifth Circuit found that the named plaintiffs representation was adequate up through the time that the three-judge court entered its final order. Id. at 75.

The Court then characterized the “narrow question” before it as “whether [the class representative’s] failure to appeal this order, which denied retroactive relief to all members of the class except [himself], constitutes inadequate representation so that they are not bound by the judgment.” Id.

Concluding that the failure to appeal rendered the representation inadequate, the court explained: The problem is that he was representing 150,000 persons, who, although having had their licenses and registration receipts suspended without due process, were denied any relief by the three-judge court’s prospective only application of its decision.

So long as an appeal from this decision could not be characterized as patently meritless or frivolous, [the named plaintiff] should have prosecuted an appeal .... [His] failure to prosecute an appeal deprived the members of his class, whose rights were not vindicated by the three-judge court’s decision, of full participation in [the judicial] process. Id. at 76. Gonzales is easily distinguished from the case at bar. That case does not hold that a class representative’s failure to appeal, in the abstract, will render representation inadequate.

Critically, the absent plaintiffs in Gonzales had been “denied any relief’ by the unappealed judgment’s prospective application, and the fact that the representative had secured a better deal for himself than the remainder of the class prompted him not to pursue an appeal. See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir.1992) (“In Gonzales, the class members collaterally attacked the settlement, demonstrating that the class representativ

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