Jane DOE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DRUMMOND COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, 782 F.3d 576

WILSON, Circuit Judge: Following a prolonged period of civil unrest in the Republic of Colombia, plaintiffs-appellants (Plaintiffs) brought the instant action on behalf of over one hundred Colombian citizens killed by violent paramilitaries in the ensuing armed conflict. Plaintiffs, the legal heirs of the decedents, filed suit in federal court against numerous defendants-appellees, including a supranational coal mining company based in Alabama, its subsidiary,- and several of its high-ranking corporate officers (collectively, Defendants).

Averring that Defendants engaged the paramilitaries, known as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), to eliminate suspected guerilla groups from around the company’s mining operations in Colombia, Plaintiffs contend their innocent decedents were incidental casualties of Defendants’ arrangement with the AUC. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the AUC, acting at the behest and on behalf of Defendants, committed a series of international law violations, including extrajudicial killings, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, against Plaintiffs’ family members in Colombia.

Claiming that Defendants aided and abetted, conspired with, and entered into an agency relationship with the AUC, Plaintiffs brought suit under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350; the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note); and Colombia’s wrongful death laws. The district court found that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1659, 185 L.Ed.2d 671 (2013), required dismissal of Plaintiffs’ ATS claims, and the court entered

summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on those claims. In a series of opinions, the district court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims on

summary judgment. Further, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims under Colombian law and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the district court’s grants of

summary judgment, which Plaintiffs sought in order to proceed with their Colombian wrongful death claims. Plaintiffs appeal each of the district court’s opinions and the holdings contained therein. We provide a general background of the proceedings below before turning to the issues presented on appeal by Plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS, the TVPA, and Colombian law, respectively. After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and those filed by the amici, the record on appeal, and the relevant legal authorities, we affirm the district court’s rulings. I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 7, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants for equitable relief and damages under the ATS, the TVPA, and the wrongful death laws of Colombia. Defendants include Drummond Company, Inc., a closely-held coal mining corporation based in Alabama (Drummond Company); Drummond Ltd., Drummond Company’s wholly-owned subsidiary in charge of day-to-day mining operations in Colombia; and two corporate officers, James Michael Tracy and Augusto Jimenez. Drummond Company and Drummond Ltd. are incorporated in and maintain their principal place of business in Alabama.

Plaintiffs, who are citizens of Colombia and resided there at time of suit, used the pseudonyms “Jane Doe” and “Peter Doe” in their initial filing. Before the district court, Plaintiffs averred that Defendants provided substantial financial and material support to the violent paramilitaries within the AUC from 1996 until 2006, when the AUC demobilized. They further contended that Defendants continued to provide this support despite being fully aware that the AUC was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. government in 2001.

The complaint alleged that Defendants paid the AUC — through both direct payments to the AUC as well as indirect payments funneled to the AUC through the Colombian military in the form of unrestricted funds — to provide “security” for Drummond Company’s mining operations and facilities. Defendants’ security objectives allegedly included driving competing, non-AUC guerilla fighters out of the area surrounding Defendants’ mining operations and rail line and ensuring that the civilian population in and around that area would not provide any support to guerilla groups or rebels.

Incidental to these objectives, the purported arrangement between Defendants and the AUC resulted in the AUC killing numerous local civilians. Asserting that each of the civilian deaths at issue was an extrajudicial killing in violation of the “law of nations” under the ATS and in violation of the TVPA, Plaintiffs contended Defendants were liable because the AUC paramilitaries carried out the atrocities as Defendants’ agents and Defendants conspired with and aided and abetted the AUC. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ initial complaint on several grounds.

The district court refused to dismiss the complaint entirely; instead, it permitted Plaintiffs to amend in order to “more carefully craft their complaint” in accordance with the court’s stated findings. However, the court did find that Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims would raise novel and complex issues of Colombian law. The district court thus declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Plaintiffs’ wrongful 'death claims, regardless of whether Plaintiffs properly alleged federal claims under the ATS and TVPA in their amended complaint.

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint added a claim for “crimes against humanity” under the ATS in addition to their existing claims under the ATS . and the TVPA. In response, Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss. The district court granted Defendants’ motion in part, dismissing the crimes against humanity claim on the grounds that the attacks by the AUC were not attacks on a civilian population. Plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint removing the pseudonyms and disclosing their identities.

The complaint identified in detail each Plaintiff, his or her relationship to the deceased, and the facts surrounding the death of the decedent at the hands of the AUC. On September 29, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint, which serves as the operative complaint in this action, and the parties proceeded to discovery. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court listed Kiobel v.

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. — a case involving ATS claims — for reargument on the question of “[w]hether and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.” See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 565 U.S. -, -, 132 S.Ct. 1738, 1738, 182 L.Ed.2d 270 (2012) (mem.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (calendaring the case for reargument). Defendants moved for a stay of proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s decisión, but the district court denied the motion.

At the close of discovery, each of the Defendants moved for

summary judgment. During the pendency of those motions, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kiobel, 569 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1659. After ordering and considering supplemental briefing by the parties on the impact of Kiobel on the instant action, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ ATS claims against all Defendants in a series of separate opinions and accompanying orders. As for Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims, in the same series of opinions, the district court found that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mohamad v.

Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012), required dismissal of the claims against any corporate entities; thus, the district court' dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against Drummond Company and Drummond Ltd. The court also granted the

summary judgment motions filed by the individual defendants, Tracy and Jimenez, thereby dismissing Plaintiffs’ remaining TVPA claims. With all claims dismissed and the litigation at a close, Plaintiffs moved to vacate the

summary judgment orders. Plaintiffs argued that the judgments should be vacated to permit limited discovery regarding actions taken by Defendants in the United States or, in the alternative, to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint for a fourth time to assert diversity jurisdiction and in that way pursue their wrongful death claims under Colombian law before the district court. The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion, and this appeal ensued. II.

ALIEN TORT STATUTE CLAIMS On appeal, we are called upon to determine whether Plaintiffs’ ATS claims — that U.S. citizens, acting in part from within the United States, aided and abetted or otherwise contributed to human rights violations committed outside the United States — sufficiently “touch and concern” the territory of the United States so that we have jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ claims. The “touch and concern” standard is set forth in Kiobel, wherein the Supreme Court held that ATS claims are subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality, a judicially created canon of statutory

interpretation that assumes U.S. law does not apply outside of the United States. See 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1664, 1669. Pursuant to Kiobel, the presumption constrains federal courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over ATS claims that have an extraterritorial component unless the claims at issue “touch and concern the territory of the United States ... with sufficient force to displace the presumption.” See id. This court’s prior

interpretations of Kiobel control our determination as to whether Plaintiffs’ claims meet this standard. Two recent decisions of this court, issued over the span of a few months, have addressed our jurisdiction over ATS cases after Kiobel: Baloco v. Drummond Co. (Baloco II) and Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc. Both decisions impose jurisdictional constraints that are not required by the Court’s holding in Kiobel, but they also leave unanswered a considerable number of questions as to this circuit’s

interpretation and application of Kiobel’s operative language. Still, the application of our prior opinions to this case compels a finding that, on the facts before us, Plaintiffs’ claims do not “touch and concern” the territory of the United States, or rather that they do not do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption and permit jurisdiction. For these reasons and those set forth in greater detail below, we are obliged to find that neither this court nor the district court have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims brought under the ATS. A.

Legal Background Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel significantly altered the landscape of ATS jurisprudence, a discussion of the relevant legal background is necessary. We look first to the statute itself before addressing the Court’s decision in Kiobel. We then consider guidance from the few circuits that have considered similar claims post-Kiobel, including the two controlling decisions of this court, which inform our

interpretation of Kiobel and direct our discussion of the ATS claims currently before us.

(1) The Alien Tort Statute The ATS states in its entirety: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. By its terms, the ATS is a “strictly jurisdictional” statute. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2755, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004).

Due to its jurisdictional nature, the ATS does not provide an independent cause of action; instead, it grants jurisdiction to district courts “on the understanding that the common law [will] provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of international law violations.” Id. at 724, 124 S.Ct. at 2761; see Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).

Consequently, the ATS empowers federal courts to recognize private claims under federal common law, when those claims sufficiently state an international law violation “with the requisite definite content and acceptance among civilized nations.” Kiobel, 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1663 (internal quotation marks omitted). The ATS will not confer jurisdiction on federal courts unless the requirements set forth in the statute are met: the plaintiff must be “(1) an alien, (2) suing for a tort, which was (3) committed in violation of international law.” See Aldana v.

Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam). However, the explicit statutory requirements are not the only requirements for jurisdiction. Some of the numerous additional jurisdictional predicates include, for example, whether liability on the part of the defendant and the plaintiffs’ theory therefor are cognizable. See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 179-80 (2d Cir.2014). Here, such initial prerequisites appear to be satisfied: Plaintiffs are citizens of Colombia bringing a civil suit for the extrajudicial killings of their decedents.

See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1316 (recognizing that claims for extrajudicial killings are actionable international law violations under the ATS). Further, Plaintiffs may pursue their claims against both corporate and individual Defendants under the ATS, and those claims may be “based on direct and indirect theories of liability.” See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam); Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315. However, our inquiry does not end there.

Because aspects of Plaintiffs’ claims occurred outside of the United States, we must address the jurisdictional predicate recently set forth in Kiobel: whether the presumption against extraterritoriality precludes subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ATS claims. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1664-65, 1669; Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 179.

(2) The Supreme Court’s Kiobel Decision In Kiobel, the Court considered “whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the [ATS], for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.” 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1662. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court found that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, to “constrain courts considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS.” Id. at 1664.

Applying the presumption to the claim before it, wherein foreign plaintiffs sought to hold foreign defendants hable under the ATS for exclusively foreign conduct, the Court held that, “[o]n these facts,” the presumption precluded jurisdiction. See id. at 1662-64, 1669 (emphasis added) (considering that “ah the relevant conduct took place outside the United States” and finding “mere corporate presence” insufficient to support jurisdiction).

Thus, the Kiobel majority opinion answered the question before the Court in the negative, providing only “under what circumstances” a court may not recognize a cause of action under the ATS — that is, when the claim involves a foreign plaintiff suing a foreign defendant where “all relevant conduct” occurred on foreign soil (a so-called “foreign-cubed” case).

The Court left open the possibility that courts may recognize other, non-foreign-cubed ATS claims, since the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS could be “displace[d]” by claims made under the statute that “touch and concern the territory of the United States ... with sufficient force to displace the presumption.” See id. at 1669. We derive three functional rules from Kiobel. First, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS claims.

Second, in order to displace the presumption for a claim brought under the ATS, the claim must touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force. Third, if the presumption is not displaced, the court does not have jurisdietion under the ATS and cannot hear the matter. The application of these rules to the facts in Kiobel led to the narrow holding of the Supreme Court: when an ATS claim is brought against foreign defendants and all relevant conduct occurred outside the United States, the presumption is not displaced by the defendants’ mere corporate presence within the United States.

The Court left important questions unresolved as to the application of these rules when claims are brought under different circumstances, especially with regard to what claims would displace the presumption and permit jurisdiction under the ATS. All three of the concurrences in Kiobel averred that the Court clearly and intentionally left these questions unanswered. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court is careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and

interpretation of the [ATS].”); id. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring) (commenting that the Court’s touch and concern “formulation obviously leaves much unanswered”); id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[The Court] offers only limited help in deciding the question presented.... It leaves for another day the determination of just when the presumption against extraterritoriality might be ‘overcome.’ ”).

Indeed, the Kiobel majority did not explain its “touch and concern” language, nor did it define the operative terms pertinent to this inquiry, such as “sufficient force,” “relevant conduct,” or what more than “mere corporate presence” would suffice to permit jurisdiction. See id. at 1669 (majority opinion). Thus, courts have been left to form their own

interpretations as to the meaning and requirements of these standards.

(3) Interpreting “Touch and Concern” Pursuant to Kiobel, the presumption against extraterritoriality plainly bars jurisdiction over foreign-cubed actions brought under the ATS. However, when an ATS claim involves a U.S.-citizen defendant or where events underlying the claim occur both domestically and extraterritorially, the courts must engage in further analysis. Four circuits including our own have addressed the effect of the presumption with regard to these types of claims, interpreting and applying the undefined “touch and concern” test from Kiobel.

We consider some of the recent decisions from the Fourth, Second, and Ninth Circuits before turning to the Eleventh, as those decisions offer guidance in understanding our own precedent and in answering questions that our two decisions do not address. (

a) Fourth Circuit In an informative opinion considering ATS claims against a U.S. corporation based on the alleged torture of foreign nationals detained in Iraq, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Kiobel’s “touch and concern” language and found that the claims before it displaced the presumption against extraterritorial application. See Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520, 529.

The Al Shimari court first noted that the Court in Kiobel intentionally and “broadly stated that the ‘claims,’ rather than the alleged tortious conduct, must touch and concern United States territory with sufficient force.” Id. at 527 (quoting Kiobel, 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1669). Thus, the Court’s operative language instructs lower courts to “apply a fact-based analysis” to determine whether ATS claims with a “close connection to United States territory” displace the presumption.

Id. at 527-28 (“[I]t is not sufficient merely to say that because the actual injuries were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch and concern United States territory.”); see Black’s Law Dictionary 281 (9th ed.2009) (a “claim” is the “aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court”). Under this

interpretation, courts must “consider all the facts that give rise to ATS claims, including the parties’ identities and their relationship to the causes of action.” Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527. Applying this fact-based analysis to the ATS claims before it, the Fourth Circuit found several factors relevant, including the defendant’s status as a U.S. corporation; the U.S. citizenship of the defendant’s employees that allegedly committed acts of torture; and the U.S. connections involved in the defendant corporation and its employees contracting with and obtaining security clearances from the U.S. government.

See id. at 530-31. The court also noted allegations that the defendant had aided and abetted acts of torture through conduct that took place within the United States; corporate managers loeated in the United States were aware of reports of misconduct and “implicitly, if not expressly, encouraged it.” Id. at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the court considered “the expressed intent of Congress, through enactment of the TVPA and 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad.” Id.

Weighing all of these factors, the Al Shimari court unanimously held that the plaintiffs’ claims touched and concerned the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. See id. at 530. Thus, the ATS conferred jurisdiction. See id. at 529. (

b) Second Circuit The Second Circuit offers a somewhat different approach to interpreting Kiobel’s touch and concern language. The court in Mastafa determined that “domestic contacts” are key: “An evaluation of the presumption’s application to a particular case is essentially an inquiry into whether the domestic contacts are sufficient to avoid triggering the presumption at all.” Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182.

Looking to the complaint before it, the court found allegations of “some contact between the injuries alleged [that occurred extraterritorially] and the territory of the United States.” Id. at 182-83 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the presumption against extraterritoriality was triggered but not dispositive, and further jurisdictional inquiry was required. See id. at 183.

To determine the requisite inquiry as well as which facts were relevant, the Second Circuit turned to Morrison, 561 U.S. 247, 130 S.Ct. 2869, an earlier Supreme Court case applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act. In Morrison, the Court set forth the “focus” test, which requires courts to determine the “focus” of the statute it is considering; “the ‘focus’ of congressional concern” or the conduct “that the statute seeks to ‘regulate’ ” must occur in the territory of the United States to rebut the presumption.

Applying the focus test, the Second Circuit found that the focus of jurisdictional inquiries under the ATS is “on conduct and on the location of that conduct”; specifically, “the conduct alleged to violate the law of nations” or, as relevant to the case before the Mastafa court, the conduct “alleged to aid and abet the violation.” Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 185,195.

To displace the presumption, then, there must be: (1) conduct of the defendant that “touche[s] and eoneern[s]” the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality, and (2) that the same conduct, upon preliminary examination, states a claim for a violation of the law of nations or aiding and abetting another’s violation of the law of nations. Id. at 187. Thus, the inquiry depended on “alleged conduct by anyone — U.S. citizen or not— that took place in the United States and aided and abetted a violation of the law of nations.” Id. at 189.

The court noted that the plaintiffs had “alleged specific, domestic conduct,” including the defendants’ purchasing and financing of oil transactions from within the United States and the facilitation of illegal payments and financing arrangements through a U.S.-based bank account. Id. at 195. Given these specific, non-conclusory allegations of domestic conduct, the Mastafa court found that the plaintiffs’ claims appeared to touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption and satisfy the “first prong” of the court’s jurisdictional analysis. See id.

However, although the domestic conduct displaced the presumption, the plaintiffs’ claims failed the second prong of the court’s jurisdictional inquiry; the plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead that the defendants’ aiding and abetting of the international law violations met the required mens rea standard of the Second Circuit. See id. at 193-96 (allegations of the requisite mens rea standard were made only in “conclusory terms”). Consequently, the Mastafa court concluded it could not exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims. See id. at 195-96. (

c) Ninth Circuit Two opinions from the Ninth Circuit are also instructive. In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit determined that, although “Morrison may be informative precedent,” the Morrison focus test and the Kiobel touch and concern test involve distinct analyses. See Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir.2014) (“[S]ince the focus test turns on discerning Congress’s intent when passing a statute, it cannot sensibly be applied to ATS claims, which are common law claims based on international legal norms.”).

The Nestle court declined to apply and refine Kiobel’s “amorphous touch and concern test” given the limited record before it. Id. at 1028-29 (granting plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to allege that some of the activity underlying their ATS claim took place in the United States). The Ninth Circuit then analyzed the touch and concern test in Mujica v. Air-Scan Inc., 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir.2014).

In Mujica, the plaintiffs contended that their claims displaced the presumption because the defendants were U.S. corporations and decisions furthering the conspiracy between the defendants and the perpetrators occurred in the United States. See id. at 591. However, the court noted that the only statement even alluding to any domestic conduct was found in the plaintiffs’ reply brief, filed after Kiobel. See id. at 592. In that statement, the plaintiffs only “speculated] that some of [the] conduct ... could have occurred in the United States.” Id. (emphasis added).

Although Kiobel “did not hold that plaintiffs may never bring ATS claims based on extraterritorial conduct,” the Ninth Circuit reasoned that permitting the plaintiffs’ claims to proceed on a speculative assertion of domestic conduct would run counter to Kiobel’s requirement that claims must touch and concern with “sufficient force.” Id. at 591-92. The court also determined that, given the absence of any non-speculative allegations of domestic conduct, the defendants’ U.S. citizenship alone was insufficient to displace the presumption. See id. at 594.

In so holding, the court was careful to note that citizenship may be “one factor that, in conjunction with other factors, can establish a sufficient connection between an ATS claim and the territory of the United States to satisfy Kiobel.” Id. at 594 & n. 9 (“We do not contend that this factor is irrelevant to the Kiobel inquiry; we merely hold that it is not dispositive of that inquiry”). The Mujica court thus concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims did not displace the presumption. See id. at 596. (

d) Eleventh Circuit Having considered some of the approaches to interpreting and applying Kiobel’s operative language, we turn now to the two opinions of this circuit that address ATS claims after Kiobel. In Cardona, the plaintiffs claimed that a U.S. company, from within the United States, made decisions to collaborate with and fund the paramilitary organizations that committed extrajudicial killings and war crimes in Colombia. 760 F.3d at 1194 (Martin, J., dissenting).

Although the Cardona majority quoted Kiobel’s touch and concern language, it stopped short of fully interpreting the test, instead noting that the case in Kiobel was “in some ways parallel” to the one before the court in Cardona. See id. at 1189, 1191 (majority opinion). Thus, without further analysis, Cardona found that, like Kiobel, “[a]ll the relevant conduct in [this] case took place outside the United States,” and the plaintiffs could not “anchor ATS jurisdiction in the nature of the defendants as United States corporations” to make the statute apply extra-territorially. See id. at 1189.

Noting the absence of an “allegation that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS touched or concerned the territory of the United States with any force,” the court in Cardona concluded it did not have jurisdiction because “[t]here is no other statute” and “the ATS does not apply ex-traterritorially.” See id. at 1189-91. The remainder of the majority opinion is couched as responding to the dissent, but it primarily discusses whether torture is cognizable under the ATS, implying that jurisdiction may be limited by the plaintiffs’ cause of action.

See id. at 1190 (“It is not nearly so clear, as our dissenting colleague believes, that acts described as ‘torture’ come within the jurisdiction created by the statute____”). The majority insinuated that torture may not be recognized as a tort in violation of the law of nations, referring to such a finding as one that would “create a cause of action within the ATS jurisdiction against the caution of Sosa” and would “expand” ATS jurisdiction. See id. at 1191, 1192.

Dissenting from the majority opinion, Judge Martin considered the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendant “violated international law from within the United States by offering substantial assistance to a campaign of violence abroad.” Id. at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting).

Plaintiffs’ claims, then, were not for conduct or “actions that took place on foreign soil,” but rather for the defendants’ domestic conduct, which included “reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and weapons shipments to Colombian terrorist organizations, all from their corporate offices in the territory of the United States.” Id. at 1192, 1194-95.

Given that the “plaintiffs s[ought] relief in a United States court for violations of international law committed by United States citizens while on United States soil,” the dissent would have found that the “claims touch[ed] and concern[ed] the territory of the United States with great force,” sufficient to displace the presumption. Id. at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority opinion in Cardona offers only limited guidance as to the

interpretation of Kiobel• and the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality. However, since the court held that the ATS did not confer jurisdiction, the majority must have concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations in the case before it did not touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption. Another panel of this court considered the impact of Kiobel in Baloco II, 767 F.3d 1229.

The claims of the plaintiffs in Baloco II and those of Plaintiffs before us now are premised on similar allegations — that the defendants made decisions within the United States to fund, aid and abet, and otherwise support the perpetrators of extrajudicial killings in Colombia. See id. at 1233. As with Cardona, the opinion in Baloco II quoted the touch and concern test from Kiobel, but Baloco II also offered an

interpretation of Kiobel’s operative. language. In so doing, Baloco II looked to the guidance in Morrison, 561 U.S. 247, 130 S.Ct. 2869, including the focus test therein, and ultimately set forth its own fact-based approach incorporating both the touch and concern test and the focus test. See Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1236-37. Baloco II’s dispositive analysis amalgamates Kiobel’s standards with Morrison’s focus test, considering whether “the claim” and “relevant conduct” are sufficiently “focused” in the United States to warrant displacement and permit jurisdiction. See id. at 1238-39.

Thus, Baloco II interpreted Kiobel’s touch and concern test to require some relevant conduct to occur in the United States; if all relevant conduct occurs entirely outside of the United States, the claim will be barred and no further jurisdictional inquiry will be required. Applying these standards, the Baloeo II panel determined that, if the “‘relevant conduct’ inquiry extend[ed] to the place of decision-making — as opposed to the site of the actual ‘extrajudicial killing,’ ” the plaintiffs would need to allege a “minimum factual predicate warranting the extraterritorial application of the ATS.” Id. at 1236.

There must be some conduct in the United States that is either “directed at” the underlying violation (the extrajudicial killing) or that indicates “an express quid pro quo understanding” that the defendants would aid and abet the perpetrators in exchange for the law of nations violation. See id. Further, the relevant conduct must be alleged “to a degree necessary to overcome the presumption.” Id. at 1239. Absent the sufficient factual predicate, the presumption will not be overcome and the claims will be dismissed.

This factual predicate was not met in Baloeo II; the plaintiffs’ allegations of the defendants’ “mere consent” from within the United States to support a terrorist organization did not suffice. See id. at 1236. Nor were there allegations of “a purported express agreement” between the defendants and the perpetrators to commit the underlying law of nations violations on the defendants’ behalf. Id. (finding no allegations that the defendants “would finance AUC operations in exchange for the AUC carrying out the killings”).

The court determined that the underlying conduct (the extrajudicial killings) might have “ ‘touch[ed] and concerned] the territory of the United States’ (because of [the defendants’] alleged involvement).” See id. at 1238. However, the court’s “consideration of all facts” led it to conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims did not do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. See id. Baloco II thus makes clear that the presumption against extraterritoriality may be displaced or overcome to permit jurisdiction. See id. at 1236-38.

Addressing whether displacement was warranted, the court considered the facts of the case before it and whether a minimum factual predicate had been met with regard to the alleged aiding and abetting conduct within the United States. See id. Based on those facts and after weighing the same, the court in Baloco II concluded that displacement was not warranted, and the presumption against extraterritoriality precluded jurisdiction.

See id. at 1237 (noting that, “when a claim brought under the ATS for violation of the law of nations fails to overcome the presumption,” the exercise of jurisdiction is improper); id. at 1238 (determining that the facts in the case before it “weighted] against a finding that [plaintiffs’ claims touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption”). The court summarized its holding and reasons therefor with the following: “[plaintiffs’ claims [we]re not focused within the United States.” See id. at 1238 (emphasis added). B.

Legal Framework In this crowded legal landscape, we must determine what framework applies to ATS claims when aspects of the claims occur both domestically and extraterritorially. Our precedent directs this navigation, while persuasive authority from the other courts guides us when our previous decisions do not provide clear directions. We find that actions under the ATS with an extraterritorial component must touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption in order for jurisdiction to be proper.

Displacement of the presumption will be warranted if the claims have a U.S. focus and adequate relevant conduct occurs within the United States. Turning to how we apply this standard, we look to the ATS claims as alleged in order to determine whether the action is focused in the United States, in addition to what aspects of the claims and conduct are relevant to our inquiry. This is a fact-intensive inquiry, requiring us to look closely at the allegations and evidence in the case before us.

See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (noting that “on these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States”); Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1235-36, 1238 (considering whether the plaintiffs’ ATS claims could “proceed under the facts of this case” and holding based on “consideration of all facts”); accord Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527. In weighing the pertinent facts, the site of the conduct alleged is relevant and carries significant weight.

Accordingly, our jurisdictional inquiry requires us to consider the domestic or extraterritorial location where the defendant is alleged to engage in conduct that directly or secondarily results in violations of international law within the meaning of the ATS. See Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 185, 195; see also Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1157-58 (noting that “where a defendant has been found directly or secondarily responsible for acts of torture or extrajudicial killing, the acts are in violation of the law of nations within the meaning of the ... [ATS]”).

When the claim is for secondary responsibility, we must also consider the location of any underlying conduct, such as where the actual injuries were inflicted. See Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1236, 1238-39; Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189, 1191. Further, the domestic conduct alleged must meet a “minimum factual predicate” to warrant the extraterritorial application of the ATS. See Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1236; accord Mujica, 771 F.3d at 592.

Thus, we must consider whether the claims are focused within the United States and to what extent — that is, whether the plaintiffs have proffered allegations and evidence to the “degree necessary” to warrant displacing the presumption. See Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1239. C. Discussion We must now ascertain whether the above requirements were met by Plaintiffs’ claims on appeal. Under Kiobel, the inquiry is whether a federal court has jurisdiction to consider claims brought under the ATS. The district court below interpreted Kiobel. to foreclose Plaintiffs’ remaining ATS claims and thus dismissed the claims on

summary judgment. We review de novo questions of subject matter jurisdiction and grants of

summary judgment. See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1313. Here, Plaintiffs brought suit under the ATS, claiming that Defendants, from within the United States, aided and abetted and conspired with the AUC to carry out extrajudicial killings and war crimes in Colombia. Since Plaintiffs’ claims as alleged involve both domestic and extraterritorial conduct, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies and will prevent jurisdiction unless it is displaced. Thus, we must address whether Plaintiffs’ claims touch and concern the territory of the United States and are focused therein.

Even if their claims touch and concern the United States, that alone will be insufficient to permit jurisdiction. We must then determine whether Plaintiffs’ claims do so to the degree necessary; that is, whether the claims act with sufficient force to displace the presumption. Plaintiffs aver that there are three distinct ways in which their claims are focused within and touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption:

(1) Defendants here, unlike the Kiobel defendants, are U.S. corporations and citizens; (2) there are strong U.S. interests because Defendants provided material support to a U.S.designated terrorist organization; and (3) key conduct occurred in the United States, including Defendants’ decisions to conspire with and aid and abet the AUC’s commission of extrajudicial killings and war crimes and agreement to fund the AUC. We address each in turn.

(1) U.S. Citizenship Plaintiffs argue that their case is distinct from Kiobel because Drummond Company and Drummond Ltd. are American corporations and Tracy is a U.S. citizen. Further, the corporate entities here maintain more than “mere corporate presence” in the territory of the United States; they also are incorporated in a state within the territory of the United States and their principal place of business is located within the United States. Cf. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (noting that “mere corporate presence” does not displace the presumption).

We must first address whether this factor is relevant to our jurisdictional inquiry. The Supreme Court did not exclude the significance of U.S. citizenship, as Kiobel did not concern U.S. citizens nor did the opinion directly address the same. Instead, Kiobel implicitly supports that citizenship or corporate status may be relevant to whether a claim touches and concerns the territory of the United States, given that, after it set forth the test, it determined that “mere corporate presence” was insufficient. See id.

Further, while the defendants’ U.S. citizenship was not dispositive in either of our post-Kiobel cases, we have not ruled out consideration of this factor altogether. In Baloco II, the court factored into its analysis the nationality of the defendants, noting that the case before it was factually distinct from Kiobel since “Kiobel did not involve a corporate national of the United States or any conduct of the defendants within the United States.” See Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1236-37.

Baloco II determined, however, that a defendant’s U.S. citizenship is not sufficient to displace the presumption, as this factor alone does not carry the “significant weight” necessary to “warrant the extraterritorial application of the ATS to situations in which the alleged relevant conduct occurred abroad.” See id. at 1236 & n. 6 (noting without holding that “the Second Circuit has held that the rule of law applied in Kiobel does not turn on a defendant’s citizenship” (emphasis added)).

Similarly, while Cardona held that plaintiffs could not simply “anchor ATS jurisdiction in the nature of the defendants as United States corporations,” it did not jettison this factor’s usefulness entirely. See Gardona, 760 F.3d at 1189. We find that the citizenship or corporate status of the defendants can guide us in our navigation of the touch and concern inquiry even .though it does not firmly secure our jurisdiction.

Thus, in determining whether a claim sufficiently touches and concerns the territory of the United States to confer jurisdiction to U.S. courts, the citizenship or corporate status of the defendant is relevant. If the defendants are U.S. citizens, some of the foreign policy concerns that the presumption against extraterritorial application is intended to reduce may be assuaged or inapplicable, since we would not be haling foreign nationals into U.S. courts to defend themselves.

Additionally, the acts of U.S. citizens may impact the United States, whether their actions occur extrat'erritorially or within the United States, particularly if those actions include international law violations. See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (considering “the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad”); cf. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v.

Empagran S.A. 542 U.S. 155, 159, 165, 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2363, 2367, 159 L.Ed.2d 226 (2004) (noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even “greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies”).

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims potentially touch and concern the territory of the United States; they are brought against U.S. citizens and entities that reside in and conduct business within the United States, and Plaintiffs allege that those same U.S. citizens aided and abetted extrajudicial killings and war crimes in violation of the law of nations. Although the U.S. citizenship of Defendants is relevant to our inquiry, this factor is insufficient to permit jurisdiction on its own.

See Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1236; accord Mujica, 771 F.3d at 594 & n. 9 (contending that U.S. citizenship or corporate status alone is not dis-positive); see also Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (considering the defendants’ U.S. citizenship in addition to other factors). Thus, we must consider it in conjunction with any other relevant factors; further analysis is required.

(2) U.S. Interests Plaintiffs also contend that important U.S. interests are triggered by the nature of Defendants’ conduct: funding a U.S.designated terrorist organization. Claims involving U.S. entities and persons funding a U.S.-designated terrorist organization may have a U.S. focus, as required by our precedent and distinct from the claims brought in Kiobel. Thus, this factor is relevant.

Here, the U.S. government designated the AUC as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO) in 2001, which means it considered the AUC an organization engaging in terrorist activity that threatens the national security of the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). This designation barred any U.S. person or entity from knowingly providing material support or resources to the AUC, or attempting or conspiring to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants continued to make payments to the AUC after the AUC was designated as an FTO, even though Defendants knew of its FTO designation.

Plaintiffs thus aver that their claims have a key U.S. component, since Defendants’ purported support of the AUC has been recognized by the U.S. government as counter to U.S. interests. Turning to whether this factor is sufficient to permit jurisdiction as alleged here, we look no further than our precedent. Allegations of U.S. entities supporting terrorist organizations were before this court in both Baloco II and Cardona.

In Cardona, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants “participated in a campaign of torture and murder in Colombia by reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and weapons shipments to Colombian terrorist organizations, all from their corporate offices in the territory of the United States.” See 760 F.3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). The majority must not have considered this factor dispositive, given that it made no reference to this allegation in holding that the presumption was not displaced.

It is not clear, however, whether or to what extent the majority considered any “terrorist organization” designation by the U.S. government of the Colombian groups receiving support from the U.S.-based defendants. In Baloco II, the plaintiffs proffered nearly the same allegations and arguments with regard to this factor as did Plaintiffs in this case. While we did not explicitly discuss the AUC’s designation by the United States as a terrorist organization, we determined the plaintiffs’ general allegations of agreement with and support of the AUC did not warrant displacement.

See Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1233, 1236, 1238-39. After having considered the argument that the defendants’ payments to a U.S.-designated terrorist organization violated U.S. interests, Baloco II still found that the plaintiffs’ claims were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. See id. at 1238-39. Thus, although the U.S. interests implicated by Defendants’ alleged support of a U.S.-designated terrorist organization constitute a relevant factor, we must conclude that, on the facts before us, this factor also does not strike with “sufficient force” to displace the presumption and permit jurisdiction.

See id. at 1236.

(3) U.S. Conduct Plaintiffs have also alleged that U.S.based conduct distinguishes their claims from those of the plaintiffs in Kiobel. In Kiobel, all relevant conduct occurred outside the United States, and the Court limited its holding to those facts. See 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1669. Plaintiffs’ case, as with the cases before the court in Cardona and Baloco II, requires us to determine whether the presumption is displaced when some relevant conduct occurs domestically. This inquiry is key.

While the previous factors are relevant to determining whether the claims touch and concern the United States and have a U.S. focus, our precedent indicates that the sufficiency question — whether the claims do so with “sufficient force” or to the “degree necessary” to warrant displacement — will only be answered in the affirmative if enough relevant conduct occurred within the United States. In Baloco II, we “[a]ssum[ed], without deciding, that the ‘relevant conduct’ inquiry extends to the place of decision-making — as opposed to the site of the actual ‘extrajudicial killing.’” 767 F.3d at 1236.

We hold now, in accord with the other circuit courts of appeals to consider this question, that the jurisdictional inquiry requires looking to the plaintiffs’ specific claim to determine what contacts with or connections to the United States are relevant; thus, the inquiry may indeed extend to the place of decision-making.

See Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182-83, 185, 195 (allegations of conduct such as purchasing and financing from within the United States were relevant to whether the aiding and abetting claim touched and concerned the territory of the United States); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (allegations that defendants approved, encouraged, and then attempted to cover up the extraterritorial misconduct from within the United States were relevant to whether plaintiffs’ claims touched and concerned the United States); Mujica, 771 F.3d at 590-91 (allegations that decisions furthering the conspiracy between defendants and perpetrators occurred in the United States were relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry although too conclusory to be sufficient).

Our precedent makes clear that claims based on aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability are cognizable under the ATS. See, e.g., Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315; Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1248; Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1157. Thus, when considering claims that the defendants aided and abetted or conspired with the perpetrators who committed the underlying violation, the domestic or extraterritorial location of all conduct in support, of those claims is relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. See Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182-83, 187; Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528-29.

And our recent decisions dictate that the claims will only displace the presumption against extraterritoriality if enough of the relevant conduct occurs domestically and if the allegations of domestic conduct are supported by a minimum factual predicate. See Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1238-39. Here, Plaintiffs’ ATS claims are that Defendants aided and abetted and conspired with the AUC from within the United States, resulting in war crimes and the extrajudicial killing of Plaintiffs’ decedents in Colombia.

The extraterritorial location of the deaths of Plaintiffs’ family members is relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims that the killing of their decedents by the AUC constituted extrajudicial killings or war crimes. However, Plaintiffs also allege relevant domestic conduct on the part of Defendants, as they allege Defendants’ actions from within the United States — such as making decisions to engage with the AUC and agreeing to fund the AUC— aided and abetted the AUC.

We must now determine whether these claims involve enough domestic conduct to touch and concern the United States to the degree necessary to displace the presumption. In Cardona and Baloco II, the plaintiffs proffered similar domestic conduct. Those opinions concluded, either implicitly or explicitly, that general allegations involving U.S. defendants’ domestic decision-making with regard to supporting and funding terrorist organizations were insufficient to warrant displacement and permit jurisdiction.

See Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1194-95 (Martin, J., dissenting) (describing the factual allegations underlying the plaintiffs’ claims, implicitly rejected by the majority); see also Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1238-39 (“Assuming arguendo that Drummond was complicit in these murders in the manner described by [pjlaintiffs ..., the allegations and evidence still do not show conduct focused in the United States.”). We must similarly find that Plaintiffs’ claims do not allege sufficient domestic conduct to displace the' presumption.

Plaintiffs allege that generally, Defendants made funding and policy decisions in the United States; but Plaintiffs specifically allege that the agreements between Defendants and the perpetrators of the killings, the planning and execution of the extrajudicial killings and war crimes, the collaboration by Defendants’ employees with the AUC, and the actual funding of the AUC all took place in Colombia. In light of our precedent, the domestic location of the decision-making alleged in general terms here does not outweigh the extraterritorial location of the rest of Plaintiffs’ claims.

See Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1238-39; Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189-91. Further, Plaintiffs’ allegations of domestic conduct and connections are not particularly extensive or specific. See, e.g., Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 195 (requiring allegations of “specific, domestic conduct”); accord Mujica, 771 F.3d at 592. This paucity is apparent when we consider the allegations before the two circuit courts that have found that the ATS claims met the touch and concern test. For example, the plaintiffs before the Fourth Circuit alleged extensive, explicit connections to and conduct within the United States.

There, the defendants made pertinent contracts and obtained necessary security clearances from the U.S. government in the United States; further, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants approved and attempted to cover up the specific extraterritorial violations at issue from -within the United States. See Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31.

Comparably, the Second Circuit found that the claims before it touched and concerned the United States after considering specific allegations of defendants’ domestic purchases, delivery, and financing arrangements in the United States, as well as defendants’ facilitation of illegal payments through a U.S.-based bank account to support the extraterritorial violations at issue in that case. See Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 195.

Likewise, district courts exercising jurisdiction after Kiobel have considered allegations that are more specific or noted further supporting evidence of domestic conduct and connections than presented by Plaintiffs’ claims here. Most importantly, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of additional domestic conduct that would meet Baloco II’s requirements.

The circumstances underlying the ATS claims in this case — including the Defendants, paramilitary perpetrators, general factual background, and allegations of Defendants’ involvement — are nearly identical to those in Baloco II, even though these Plaintiffs have had the added benefit of discovery. Plaintiffs here continue to allege that an employee obtained consent within the United States to provide substantial financial and material support to the AUC.

These are the same allegations and evidence we explicitly considered and rejected in Baloco II. ' In that case, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the employee, Jim Adkins, “obtained consent in Alabama from Garry Drummond [Drummond Company’s President] and other Drummond officials to provide substantial support to the AUC.” Baloco II, 767 F.3d at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court then considered the evidence in support of this assertion, which was derived from the discovery in this case.

See id. at 1236, 1238 (noting that “[t]hese materials were obtained from discovery in a related case” and citing to the proceedings below). Specifically, Baloco II noted witness depositions and declarations stating, “Adkins frequently traveled to the United States”; “Adkins told [the witness] he would bring up the issue of collaboration with the AUC with Garry Drummond”; “subsequently, Drummond agreed to fund the AUC”; and “the murders ... were ‘agreed to’ by Garry Drummond.” Id. at 1238.

Baloco II held that, regardless of the veracity of the above allegations and admissibility of the evidence, this was “not enough ... to establish that, assuming [plaintiffs’ claims ‘touch and concern the territory of the United States,’ they do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” See id. at 1238. Here, there are no distinguishable allegations or evidence of conduct in the United States “directed at” the extrajudicial killings and war crimes, and “mere consent” is not enough. See id. at 1236, 1238-39.

Consequently, in this closely connected case, we must find that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Defendants’ domestic conduct do not meet the requisite factual predicate or act with the forcefulness envisioned by Baloco II to warrant displacement. See id. at 1238-39. Although our two prior decisions may not clearly address the scope and

interpretation of Kiobel’s touch and concern test, we cannot say the same for their conclusions: plainly, the presumption against extraterritoriality was not displaced. In the absence of any evidence or allegations that meaningfully distinguish Plaintiffs’ claims or compel a different conclusion, we must adhere to the results required by our precedent.

Thus, although we find that the U.S. citizenship and corporate status of Defendants, the U.S. interests implicated by Plaintiffs’ claims, and the U.S. conduct alleged are relevant in considering whether Plaintiffs’ claims have a U.S. focus and touch and concern the territory of the United States, we must conclude that, in these circumstances, those factors are not sufficient to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ATS claims. In the absence of jurisdiction, the additional ATS issues raised by Plaintiffs are moot.

As a final note, we do not suggest that alternate legal standards or

interpretations of Kiobel would be met here; indeed, Plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence in support thereof may not be able to survive scrutiny for any number of reasons. Generally, plaintiffs in these suits face a veritable plethora of additional doctrinal, procedural, and evidentiary obstacles not addressed by this opinion, all of which may render the exercise of jurisdiction under the ATS impermissible, regardless of the presumption against extraterritoriality. However, Congress passed the ATS to be actionable, “to have a practical effect.” See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719, 124 S.Ct. at 2758.

Thus, even though we conclude that these particular Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, caution is warranted with regard to the legal standards implemented in reaching that result.

As Justice Kennedy noted in Kiobel, Other cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation. 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Until such time as the Supreme Court considers the issue, it is our responsibility to perform the “further elaboration and explanation” envisioned by Justice Kennedy when considering cases that are not covered by the reasoning and holding of Kiobel. See id. We are presented with such a case here. And in these circumstances, we must conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality is not displaced. Neither this court nor the district court has jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs’ ATS claims, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the same. III.

TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT CLAIMS Plaintiffs also brought suit pursuant to the TVPA, a substantive Act that explicitly creates a cause of action for claims of torture and extrajudicial killing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a). Plaintiffs are entitled to bring separate TVPA claims based on the same underlying events as any claims simultaneously brought under the ATS; the TVPA provides an independent action for claims of extrajudicial killing and torture.

See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (permitting plaintiffs to seek relief for claims of extrajudicial killing under both statutes); Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1250-51 (finding that the TVPA provides a separate but not exclusive remedy for claims of torture). As such, even when claims brought under the ATS are unsuccessful, Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims may potentially proceed on their own merit. We consider the issues raised with regard to the TVPA in three parts. In Part A., we address whether we have jurisdiction to consider actions proceeding under the TVPA in the first instance.

In Part B., we consider Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims on appeal and affirm the district court’s

summary judgment dismissal of those claims based on our de novo review of the case. Our analysis would normally end there. However, the district court erroneously turned to international law to assess Plaintiffs’ TVPA action, applying incorrect legal standards in dismissing their claims. Thus, to prevent confusion as to which standards apply—both generally and specifically, in our affirmance of the district court’s rulings in this case—we set forth and clarify the pertinent law in

Part C. A. Jurisdiction In contrast to the ATS, which can confer jurisdiction but does not include an independent cause of action, the TVPA provides a cause of action but contains no jurisdictional grant. See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315. Our jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims is grounded, instead, in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question jurisdiction statute. See id.; see also Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1269 (determining that § 1331 conferred jurisdiction over TVPA claims); Arce v.

Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1257 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that “we assume jurisdiction [for TVPA claims] under § 1331”). However, while we unquestionably have jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims, whether our jurisdiction is limited by the extraterritorial nature of Plaintiffs’ claims requires further analysis. Although we have not before had occasion to do so, we hold now that the TVPA applies extraterritorially. The text of the TVPA itself indicates that actions may arise from conduct occurring outside the United States.

The Act provides for the liability of any individual who acts “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation ”; further, it contains an exhaustion of remedies requirement instructing courts to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff has not “exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)-(b) (emphasis added); see also Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl.

Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir.2014) (finding that the text’s language “of any foreign nation” is best understood as addressing conduct that occurs in the territory of foreign sovereigns), cert. denied sub nom. Khan v. Chowdhury, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 401, 190 L.Ed.2d 289 (2014).

Accordingly, the Act itself gives “clear indication of an extraterritorial application.” See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255, 130 S.Ct. at 2877-78 (requiring “the affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed to give a statute extraterritorial effect” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Kiobel, 569 U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that “[m]any serious concerns with respect to human rights abuses committed abroad have been addressed by Congress in statutes such as the [TVPA]” (emphasis added)).

Although the text of the TVPA alone is sufficient to illustrate the Act’s intended extraterritoriality, the legislative history fully supports this conclusion. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 102-249, at 3-4 (1991) (describing the TVPA as “providing a civil cause of action in U.S. courts for torture committed abroad”); id. at 5 (“[W]hile the [ATS] provides a remedy to aliens only, the TVPA ... extend[s] a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad.”); id. (“Congress clearly has authority to create a private right of action for torture and extrajudicial killings committed abroad.”); H.R.Rep.

No. 102-367, at 3 (1991), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85’(“Judicial protections agains[t] flagrant human rights violations are often least effective in those countries where such abuses are most prevalent. A state that practices torture and

summary execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law---- The [TVPA] would respon[d] to this situation.”). Thus, we find that our jurisdiction over TVPA actions under § 1331 is not constrained by the presumption against extraterritoriality, and we turn to our discussion of the merits of Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims. B. Plaintiffs’ TVPA Claims Plaintiffs’ claims can only proceed, if at all, against Tracy and Jimenez (jointly, the individual defendants).

Plaintiffs contend that Tracy and Jimenez are each legally responsible — due to involvement with and support of the violent paramilitaries in the AUC — for the extrajudicial killings of Plaintiffs’ decedents by the AUC. Plaintiffs sued Tracy and Jimenez under § 2 of the TVPA, which provides that a person who “subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(2).

By its terms, the TVPA supports claims based on theories of indirect liability. See, e.g., Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1157; Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1248; Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1258 n. 5. Tracy and Jimenez brought individual motions for

summary judgment with regard to Plaintiffs’ claims for extrajudicial killing in violation of the TVPA. In response, Plaintiffs advanced several theories of liability, arguing that their claims should be permitted to proceed against the individual defendants under these theories. Plaintiffs’ proffered theories took several forms, including aiding and abetting, conspiracy, agency, and command responsibility. In dispensing with Plaintiffs’- TVPA claims, the district court made several findings that are relevant to the parties’ arguments before us now.

The court found that international law controls the analysis of claims brought under the TVPA, leading it to reject Plaintiffs’ agency theory of liability outright, apply a heightened mens rea standard to Plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting theory of liability, and dismiss Plaintiffs’ command responsibility theory. After making these determinations and applying the standards it articulated, the district court found that Plaintiffs’ admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to either of the individual defendants’ liability. Subsequently, the court granted

summary judgment to Tracy and Jimenez, respectively. Plaintiffs appeal the grants of

summary judgment, averring that the district court erred in its determinations. In response, Tracy and Jimenez argue that Plaintiffs’ evidence was simply insufficient to survive

summary judgment; thus, the district court’s entry of

summary judgment should stand regardless of which body of law controls or what theories are available. We agree with the individual defendants, and we affirm on that basis. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir.1993) (finding that we may affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment if any adequate ground for doing so exists). We have plenary review over the district court’s

summary judgment dismissals of Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims against Tracy and Jimenez. See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1313. Disposition of the case by

summary judgment is proper “ ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). As relevant here, when the

summary judgment movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant may show “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case”; a negation of the non-moving party’s claim is not required. See id. at 1115-16 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant shows that there is an absence of evidence, the nón-moving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must contradict this showing by demonstrating “that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion.” Id. at 1116.

In the alternative, the non-movant may “come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency.” Id. at 1116-17. At

summary judgment in the proceedings below, Tracy and Jimenez demonstrated an absence of evidence in support of Plaintiffs’ case. They proffered that, with discovery at an end, Plaintiffs had not uncovered any evidence to support liability. Specifically, there was no admissible evidence that either Tracy or Jimenez had any knowledge of an alleged corporate scheme to fund or otherwise support the AUC, much less that they had any

part in such a scheme or control over those who allegedly did. At this point, Plaintiffs could not rely upon mere allegations to survive

summary judgment, but were required to either point out evidence in the record or provide additional evidence in support of their claims sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion. See id. at 1116 n. 3; Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for

summary judgment.”). Thus, we look to see whether Plaintiffs have produced any admissible evidence from which a jury could hold Tracy and Jimenez liable for the extrajudicial killings of Plaintiffs’ decedents by the AUC. Reviewing the record de novo, we find that Plaintiffs have failed to adduce any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to Tracy’s or Jimenez’s liability for any alleged corporate scheme resulting in the killings of noncombatants along Defendants’ mining operations and rail lines by the AUC. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1117.

Even under the correct legal standards and construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there is no factual basis to sustain liability for Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims against the individual defendants. By way of a brief example, the district court set forth a heightened mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability, requiring purpose or specific intent rather than knowledge.

Consequently, the district court incorrectly stated that Plaintiffs must establish that the individual defendants “acted with the intent to have noncombatants murdered along Drummond’s rail lines.” As explained in more detail below, the district court should have instead looked for “active participation,” which is supported if the defendants gave knowing substantial assistance to the individuals committing the wrongful act. See Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1157-59.

However, despite the more challenging mens rea requirement it articulated, the district court found that there was “no evidence that Tracy knew that noncombatants were being murdered along the rail lines,” and further noted an “absence of any evidence of Tracy’s knowledge that the AUC was allegedly being paid by Drummond.” Similarly, the district court found that Plaintiffs had proffered no admissible evidence with regard to Jimenez’s knowledge other than Jimenez’s general awareness of the presence of the AUC and the AUC’s violent methods.

While we reject the legal standard that the district court set forth, our independent review of the record supports the district court’s factual findings as to the absence of evidence creating a genuine issue of fact. This forecloses Plaintiffs’ claims even under the appropriate standard. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (determining that an issue is only “genuine” if it is supported by the evidence; it is not genuine if it is created by evidence that is “merely color-able” or “not significantly probative”).

Plaintiffs’ allegations paint a different picture, but those allegations, repeated before us here, do not bear out in the record. At the

summary judgment stage, evidentiary support is required; no legal theories can sustain a claim in the absence of admissible evidence in support thereof. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116-17; see also Kesinger, 381 F.3d at 1249-50. Our de novo review of the record supports the entry of

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims against Tracy and Jimenez, and for this reason, we affirm the rulings of the district court. C. Applicable Legal Standards Having found a sufficient basis to affirm the district court’s entry of

summary judgment, our inquiry would ordinarily end. However, the circumstances of this case require further discussion, since the district court applied the wrong substantive law when dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims on

summary judgment. This error is significant because, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes

summary judgment, “[t]he substantive law applicable to the case determines which facts are material.” See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115. Accordingly, our finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact is premised on the application of the correct substantive law. See id. at 1117. Thus, we discuss the relevant legal standards raised on appeal to demonstrate the basis on which we affirmed the entry of

summary judgment in the current case and to clarify the applicable law for future actions proceeding solely under the TVPA. In the proceedings below, the district court mistakenly looked to international law to interpret the TVPA, leading to additional incorrect legal determinations with regard to Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims. We correct these errors, finding as follows: (1) the

interpretation of the TVPA is governed by its text, legislative history, and general principles of U.S. law; (2) theories of liability recognized in U.S. law are available to TVPA claimants; (3) the mens rea standard for an aiding and abetting theory of liability in this circuit is knowledge; and (4) the command responsibility doctrine is an available theory of liability contingent on sufficient allegations of authority and control. We address our reasons for these findings and precedent in support thereof in the order listed.

(1) Interpreting the TVPA Preliminarily, the district court refused to recognize theories of liability for Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims if the theories were “not accepted in international law,” a view which Defendants urge us to adopt in assessing Plaintiffs’ claims on appeal. However, international law does not determine our

interpretation of the TVPA. The TVPA and claims brought thereunder are governed by its language, its legislative history, and general principles of domestic law. Our

interpretation and application of the TVPA make this abundantly clear. See, e.g., Baloco I, 640 F.3d at 1348-50 (examining the TVPA’s text, purpose, and legislative history to interpret the TVPA and applying state wrongful death law, without reference to customary international law); Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1159 (defining accessorial liability as set forth in the federal common-law context).

Indeed, on the rare occasions when we do look to general principles of international law for guidance as to what a theory of liability or statutory definition requires, we do so only because the TVPA itself implicitly or explicitly incorporated those principles from international law. See Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v.

Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.2002) (looking to international law for guidance as to the elements of command responsibility because “legislative history makes clear that Congress intended to adopt the doctrine of command responsibility from international law as part of the [TVPA]”); see also S.Rep. No. 102-249, at 10 (noting that

interpretation of the exhaustion of remedies requirement “should be informed by general principles of international law”). In other places, the legislative history instead directs us to domestic law; we are told to apply “principles of liability under U.S. civil rights laws, in particular [42 U.S.C. § 1983], in construing ‘under color of lav/ as well as

interpretations of ‘actual or apparent authority derived from agency theory in order to give the fullest coverage possible.” See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 102-249, at 8. The district court found that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa compelled it to look to customary international law and restrict the theories of liability available to TVPA plaintiffs. However, Sosa is inapplicable here. First, Sosa warned courts to exercise “vigilant doorkeeping” when considering whether to recognize new causes of action under the ATS (that is, new “law of nations” violations). See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-29, 124 S.Ct. at 2762-64.

Even in ATS cases, we have not clearly applied this constraint to our recognition of legal theories of liability for existing causes of action under the ATS. Second, Sosa only applies to the ATS; it has no effect on the causes of action explicitly set forth in the TVPA or the theories of liability recognized in support thereof. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1263-64 (noting ways in which “[t]he TVPA is broader than the ATS”); Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1252 (“[N]either Congress nor the Supreme Court has urged us to read the TVPA as narrowly as we have been directed to read the [ATS].”).

Thus, international law does not set the standard for TVPA claims; instead, the TVPA should be interpreted through reference to its text, legislative history, and general principles of domestic law. Again, we have used this approach repeatedly in our precedent. For example, when we were recently required to interpret the TVPA, we examined the plain text of the Act, its purpose, and its legislative history to address whether the claimants before us had a cause of action. See Baloco I, 640 F.3d at 1345-47.

After determining that, as a general matter, wrongful death claimants are eligible to bring suit for damages under the TVPA, we then turned to whether the plaintiffs in the case before us were in fact proper wrongful death claimants. See id. at 1348-49. Since the TVPA did not indicate whether “Congress intended state law or federal law” to provide the answer, we considered the legislative history of the Act. See id. at 1348-50.

We found congressional intent “that state law should govern the determination ... and, where state law would provide no remedy, a court may apply the foreign law that would recognize the plaintiffs claim.” See id. at 1349. Thus, determining who could be a claimant in the action at hand implicated the conflict laws of Alabama and the substantive wrongful death law of Colombia. See id. At no point in this analysis did we consult customary international law — not to determine what cause of action was available, nor who could sue, nor whether federal or state law would govern the applicable requirements.

See id. at 1349-50.

(2) Theories of Liability under the TVPA Further, since domestic law sets the standards for the TVPA, secondary or indirect theories of liability recognized by U.S. law are available for c

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