UNITED STATES v. J. H. WINCHESTER & CO., Inc., 40 F.2d 472

SWAN, Circuit Judge. This action was brought to recover penalties under

section 20 of the Immigration Act of 1924 (8 USCA § 167) for failure to detain on board the Norwegian steamship Erie two alien seamen, after the master had been required by an immigration officer to detain them. A written demand to detain them was served on the master after inspection of the crew at the quarantine anchorage on a Saturday afternoon. The defendant, local agent of the vessel’s foreign owner, had no knowledge of it until the following Monday, and in the meantime the aliens had deserted and escaped at Edgewater, N. J., whither the vessel had proceeded from quarantine.

Subsequently, and after the vessel had been allowed to clear with knowledge by_ the immigration officials of the seamen’s desertion, a demand was made upon defendant for the payment of $2,000 penalty. The appeal presents a single question of narrow compass, namely, whether the notice to the master constitutes a sufficient notice to the defendant to impose liability upon it. The relevant portions of the

section are as follows: “Sec. 20. (

a) The owner, charterer, agent, consignee, or master of any vessel arriving in the United States from any place outside thereof who fails to detain on board any alien seaman employed on such vessel until the immigration officer in charge at the port of arrival has inspected such seaman (which inspection in all cases shall include a personal-physical examination by the medical examiners), or who fails to detain such seaman on board after such inspection or to deport such seaman if required by such immigration officer or the Secretary of Labor to do so, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located the sum of $1,000 for each alien seaman in respect of whom such failure occurs.

No vessel shall be granted clearance pending the determination of the liability to the payment of such fine, or while the fine-remains unpaid, except that clearance may be granted prior to the determination of such question upon the deposit of a sum sufficient to cover such fine, or of a bond with sufficient surety to secure the payment thereof approved by the. collector of customs. “(

b) Proof that an alien seaman did not appear upon the outgoing manifest of the vessel on which he arrived in the United States from any place outside thereof, or that he was reported by the master of such vessel as a deserter, shall be prima facie evidence of a failure to detain or deport after requirement by the immigration officer or the Secretary of Labor.” This

section finds its origin in

section 32 of the Act of February 5, 1917 (39 Stat. 895), which it expressly repealed.

Section 32 imposed liability only for the “negligent failure” to detain or deport, and made “notice in writing by tbe immigration officer” a condition precedent to liability for tbe penalty. Sinclair Nav. Co. v. United States, 32 F.(2d) 90 (C. C. A. 5); The Kathlambra, 18 F.(2d) 113 (D. C. E. D. N. Y.); The E. W. Sinclair, 1 F.(2d) 453 (D. C. S. D. Fla.). Although tbe provision for a written notice is not expressly contained in

section 20 of tbe Immigration Act of 1924 (8 USCA § 167), tbe practice of tbe immigration officials has been to continue to use under tbe later act tbe same form of notice as was used under tbe earlier; and it seems clear that the-nature of tbe situation, as well as tbe phrase, “if required by sueb immigration officer,” necessitates some form of demand upon tbe owner, charterer, agent, consignee, or master before any of tbe persons named becomes liable for failure to detain tbe particular alien seaman whom tbe immigration officer has selected for detention.

Tbe matter left ambiguous is upon whom tbe demand must be made to impose liability on others than tbe person notified. It is not argued that notice to any one of the named classes of persons would suffice to bind all the others. The government asks only that the statute be construed to permit notice to the master to bind all. Indeed, its contention is even narrower, for it urges the desired construction merely in respect to foreign owned vessels. But the statute makes no distinction between foreign owned and domestic vessels, so that whatever construction is adopted must apply to both alike.

The appellee contends, on the other band, that notice must be given to the person to be held, or to bis authorized agent. Coneededly, the master is under ordinary circumstances tbe agent of the owner only. See American Asiatic Co. v. Robert Dollar Co., 282 F. 743, 749 (C. C. A. 9); Tbe Penza, 9 F.(2d) 527 (C. C. A. 2); cf. Suzuki v. Nat. Surety Co., 290 F. 942 (C. C. A. 2). An examination of tbe congressional history of

section 20 of tbe Immigration Act of 1924 (8 USCA § 167) throws no light on tbe precise question. It does show that

section 32 of the 1917 act bad been found inadequate to prevent tbe unlawful entry of aliens posing, as seamen and jumping ship upon arrival in this country, and that

section 20 was intended to provide more effective means to combat this evil. Its provisions are much more stringent than those of tbe earlier act. Tbe first clause of

section 20 was new; it imposed an absolute duty upon each of tbe persons named to keep alien seamen on board until tbe immigration officer has inspected tbe crew. Tbe second clause eliminated tbe element of “negligence” in penalizing tbe failure to detain after inspection “if required” by tbe immigration officer. A new remedy was provided by forbidding clearance of tbe vessel until tbe penalty was paid or secured; under tbe former statute tbe procedure was to file a libel. Paragraph (

b) was also new, and simplified tbe matter of proving violations. It may be argued that the absolute duty imposed by the first clause presupposes that the charterer, agent, and consignee, as well as the owner, will probably rely upon the master of the vessel to perform their obligation to detain the crew until after inspection, and that there is no greater hardship after inspection than before, in requiring them to be bound by the master’s failure to prevent a seaman’s escape.

Nevertheless tbe statute has drawn a distinction between the two duties ; tbe first being in terms absolute, while tbe second is conditional upon demand by tbe inspector. With respect to escape before inspection, Congress imposed an absolute obligation on each of those specified so to act as to prevent an escape by any of the crew. They could trust to tbe master’s diligence or take independent precautions as they might choose. But tbe statute did not make the master their agent in tbe premises; it imposed an absolute duty regardless of what means or agents they employed.

After inspection, however, tbe duty exists only if tbe insp ector has required detention. For breach of tbe duty a penalty is imposed, and penalties are not to be created by implication. To tbe majority of tbe court it seems reasonable to believe that Congress did not intend to impose tbe penalty for failure to heed tbe inspector’s demand unless tbe demand was brought home to tbe person sought to be - charged, by notice to him or to bis authorized agent.

Had Congress wished to impose tbe more stringent obligation it could readily have found an apt expression, by using tbe phrase “if tbe master be required.” It is true that convenience of enforcement would be served by bolding that notice to the master is notice to all, but Congress provided, what it evidently thought to be an adequate remedy for collection by authorizing the withholding of clearance of the vessel, and mere convenience of enforcement cannot justify a strained construction of tbe language used. To us tbe appellant’s contention requires, not an

interpretation of tbe language used, but an addition of words by implication, so that it shaE read, as above suggested, “if the master be required.” Such an amendment by implication we do not think justified in a penal statute, where, if the language is ambiguous, the courts lean in favor of the defendant. See United States v. 1150½ Pounds of Celluloid, 82 F. 627, 634 (C. C. A. 6); First Nat. Bank v. United States, 206 F. 374, 376, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1139 (C. C. A. 8); Bolles v. Outing Co., 175 U. S. 262, 265, 20 S. Ct. 94, 44 L. Ed. 156; United States v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 190,193, 37 S.

Ct. 22, 61 L. Ed. 240; Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch, 347, 365, 2 L. Ed. 643. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.