UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shelia Gail SMITH, Defendant-Appellant, 186 F. App'x 388

PER CURIAM: Shelia Gail Smith entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). The district court imposed an eighteen-month sentence. On appeal, Smith contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the indictment, because her prior conviction was not punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and therefore did not qualify as a felony offense.

Specifically, Smith asserts that the district court erred in finding that her June 21, 2004 conviction in North Carolina for possession of cocaine was punishable by more than one year in prison, and therefore qualified as a felony drug offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) (2000). While the maximum aggravated punishment for this Class I conviction was fifteen months’ imprisonment, Smith notes that, based on her criminal history, and in the absence of aggravating factors, the maximum sentence she could have received was eight months.

Smith thus maintains that her sentence could not have exceeded a year, and that this conviction does not qualify as a felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Smith concedes that this argument is foreclosed by our opinion in United, States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir.1999), is still viable after Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531,159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)), and we agree. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err.

See id. at 246 (reaffirming that “a prior North Carolina conviction was for ‘a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more than one year.” (internal citation omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED.