JING YUN LI, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent, 189 F. App'x 227

PER CURIAM: Jing Yun Li, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) order affirming the immigration judge’s decision to deny her applications for asylum, withholding from removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We deny the petition for review. The INA authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2000).

It defines a refugee as a person unwilling or unable to return to her native country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000). An applicant can establish refugee status based on past persecution in her native country on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2005). “An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Ngarurih, v.

Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.2004). This presumption can be rebutted on a finding of a fundamental change of circumstances so that the alien no longer has a well-founded fear, or a finding that the alien could avoid persecution by relocating within the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(l)(i)(A), (B) (2005). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187.

The well-founded fear of persecution standard contains both a subjective and an objective component. “An applicant may satisfy the subjective element by presenting ‘candid, credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution.’ ” Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir.1999) (quoting Berroteram-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution. Huaman-Cornelio v.

Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 979 F.2d 995, 999 (4th Cir.1992). An applicant has the burden of demonstrating her eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2005); Gonahasa v. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir.1999). Credibility findings, relevant to the subjective component, are reviewed for substantial evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony on credibility grounds must offer specific, cogent reasons for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir.1989). We accord broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings supported by substantial evidence. Camara v.

Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir.2004). To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an alien must show a clear probability that, if she was removed to her native country, her “life or freedom would be threatened” on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000); see Camara, 378 F.3d at 370 (4th Cir.2004). A “clear probability” means it is more likely than not the alien would be subject to persecution. INS v.

Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984). “The burden of proof is on the applicant for withholding of removal ... to establish that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal” on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) (2005). A showing of past threat to life or freedom on such a ground creates a rebuttable presumption that the threat would recur upon removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(l)(i); Camara, 378 F.3d at 370. Withholding of removal is mandatory if the alien meets the standard of proof. Stevie, 467 U.S. at 429-30,104 S.Ct. 2489.

A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). Administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000). We will reverse the Board “only if ‘the evidence presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.’ ” Rusu v.

INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n. 14 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Huaman-Comelio, 979 F.2d at 999 (internal quotation marks omitted)). We find the immigration judge’s negative credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence. We further find the evidence was not so compelling as to warrant reversal. With respect to the Board’s affirmation of the immigration judge’s finding regarding relief under the Convention Against Torture, we find Li failed to establish it was more likely than not she will be tortured if she were to return to China. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. PETITION DENIED