UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ezequiel ANDAYA-DUARTE; Javier Sanchez-Duarte, a/k/a Javier Duarte-Sanchez, Defendants-Appellants, 25 F. App'x 200

OPINION PER CURIAM. Ezequiel Andaya-Duarte and Javier Sanchez-Duarte were charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride. Andaya-Duarte was additionally charged with illegally reentering the United States after deportation. After the district court denied their motion to suppress, Defendants pled guilty to the charges, reserving their right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Andaya-Duarte and Sanchez-Duarte were sentenced to a total of 148 months and 134 months imprisonment, respectively.

On appeal, Defendants claim that their encounter with the police officers in the parking lot constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment that was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. They thus claim that the evidence found during the search of their property should have been suppressed as tainted fruit of the illegal seizure. This court reviews the factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, while reviewing the legal determinations de novo. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir.1992).

When a suppression motion has been denied, review of the evidence is made in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.1998). We have reviewed the briefs, the material submitted in the joint appendix, and the transcript of the district court’s hearing on the motion to suppress. We find that the district court properly concluded that even assuming Defendants’ encounter with the police constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. See J.A. at 178-95.

Hence, we find no error in the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm Andaya-Duarte’s and Sanchez-Duarte’s convictions and sentences. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED.