UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Morey Bernal CHAMPION, Defendant-Appellant, 384 F. App'x 245

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: A federal grand jury indicted Morey Bernal Champion for possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Champion filed a motion to dismiss the indictment that the district court denied. Champion then entered a guilty plea to the charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.

The court sentenced Champion to fifty-one months of imprisonment and Champion now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. On appeal, Champion argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment de novo. United States v. Brandon, 298 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir.2002) (citation omitted); see United States v. Thornton, 554 F.3d 443, 445 (4th Cir.2009) (reviewing whether state felony offense is a crime of violence de novo).

Champion argues that he was legally innocent of violating § 922(g)(1) because his prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana was not punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. While Champion’s argument is concededly foreclosed by United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246-47 (4th Cir.2005), he argues that the subsequent decisions in United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 128 S.Ct. 1783, 170 L.Ed.2d 719 (2008), and United States v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.2008), have undermined this court’s holding in Harp.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant legal authorities and conclude that our holding in Harp is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriquez. Further, to the extent Pruitt may be inconsistent with Harp, decisions by our sister circuits are simply not binding upon this court. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. AFFIRMED.