UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Everett Oshae BROWN, Defendant-Appellee, 401 F.3d 588

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINS wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge DUNCAN joined. Judge NIEMEYER wrote a dissenting opinion. OPINION WILLIAM W. WILKINS, Chief Judge: Everett Oshae Brown was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000). The United States appeals a decision of the district court suppressing a firearm discovered in Brown’s back pocket as well as statements made by Brown following his arrest. Because the officers lacked sufficient justification under the Fourth Amendment to arrest and search Brown, we affirm. I.

In September 2003, police in Newport News, Virginia, received an anonymous telephone tip that a short, black male with glasses was carrying a firearm outside the Roseman Court apartment complex. Two officers approached the scene: Officer C.J. Lewis in a marked patrol car and Officer Randall Petrosky on foot. Officer Petro-sky was accompanied by a K-9 police dog. Officer Petrosky was the first to arrive at the scene. When he arrived, Brown was standing on the sidewalk outside one of the apartments. Brown generally matched the description provided in the anonymous tip.

As Officer Petrosky approached, Brown turned and walked into the apartment. Through the open blinds of the apartment window, Officer Petrosky could see people in the apartment telling and motioning for Brown to leave. Brown left the apartment and walked out onto the sidewalk. By this point, Officer Lewis had arrived in a patrol car. She approached Brown on the sidewalk and asked, “Excuse me, can we talk to you a minute?” J.A. 103 (internal quotation marks omitted). Officer Pe-trosky and the police dog were standing just behind her. Brown voluntarily and without prompting produced his Virginia identification card.

Officer Lewis ran the identification through dispatch and returned it to Brown. The officers then told Brown that he matched the description of the anonymous tip. Brown responded that he was not the person for whom they were looking. Officer Lewis asked Brown if he would consent to a pat-down for weapons. Brown refused. According to Officer Lewis, throughout the conversation Brown had “the strong odor of alcoholic beverage emitting from his breath, [and] his eyes were bloodshot and glassy.” Id. at 50.

Officer Petrosky agreed that Brown’s eyes were “bloodshot and glassy” and added that he was “fidgety and nervous.” Id. at 35. At one point, Officer Lewis asked Brown if he had been drinking that evening and Brown responded, “I’m going to be honest. Yes, I have.” Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). Brown exhibited no other physical impairments, such as slurred speech or staggered movements. Based on the conversation with Brown and the impairments she observed, Officer Lewis testified that she decided to place Brown under arrest for public intoxication.

Before she could do so, a fight broke out inside the apartment from which Brown had exited. Officer Petrosky called for backup to assist with the fight. Especially important to this appeal is the chronology of events that took place after the fight broke out. At the suppression hearing, Officer Petrosky described the ensuing events as follows: [Officer Lewis] told Mr. Brown to go ahead and place his hands on [a nearby] car. He started to bend over to place his hands on the ear.

When he bent over, I noticed in the pants that he was wearing, on the left rear pocket of his pants I noticed this bulge that was in the shape of a gun. So immediately to me I knew he had a gun in his left rear pocket. Id. at 34. Officer Lewis’ testimony supported this account: “For our safety, I asked [Brown] to place his hands on the car that was directly in front of him.... As he placed his hands on the car, I saw Officer Petrosky immediately draw his weapon and order Mr. Brown to keep his hands on the car.” Id. at 51. At that point, Officer Lewis also drew her weapon and pointed it at Brown.

Brown became very nervous and began to lift his hands up and down on the car. According to Officer Lewis, Brown then said, “‘The weapon is in my back pocket. Just take it, just take it.’ ” Id. at 52. Officer Lewis removed the firearm from Brown’s pocket. Officer Petrosky ordered Brown to his knees, and one of the backup officers who had arrived placed Brown in handcuffs and into a patrol car.

According to Officer Lewis, during the car ride to the booking station Brown “was speaking pretty freely and just stated that someone in the apartment had told him to take this burn and bounce,” which meant to take the firearm and leave the apartment. Id. at 53. Brown also stated that “the only reason he had taken the gun out of the apartment was because there were children present in the apartment.” Id. at 54. At no point before Brown made these statements had the officers informed him of his Miranda rights, though Brown’s statements in the patrol car were not in response to any police questioning.

Brown moved to suppress evidence of the firearm and his statements in the patrol car as having been obtained in violation of, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment. The district court found that a reasonable person in Brown’s position during his initial encounter with the police — faced with two uniformed officers, a police dog, and information about an anonymous tip— would not have considered himself free to disregard the police and go about his business. The district court concluded, therefore, that the initial encounter between the officers and Brown was a Terry stop, see Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), not a consensual police-citizen encounter, and the officers thus needed reasonable, articulable suspicion that Brown was armed and dangerous to justify the stop. Citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), the district court explained that the anonymous tip alone did not provide adequate suspicion because the tip contained no information predicting future acts by which the officers could corroborate the substance of the tip.

Therefore, the district court ruled that the Terry stop was illegal and suppressed the firearm and statements obtained after the stop. The district court ruled alternatively that even if the initial encounter between the officers and Brown was a consensual police-citizen encounter, not a Terry stop, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Brown for public intoxication. Glassy, bloodshot eyes, the smell of alcohol, and Brown’s admission that he had been drinking, the district court explained, were not sufficient under Virginia law to establish probable cause for the arrest.

Evidence of the firearm and Brown’s statements was therefore suppressed as fruit of the illegal arrest. This appeal followed. II. Designed “to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals,” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const, amend. IV; see Mapp v.

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is incorporated and applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

The Supreme Court has identified three distinct types of police-citizen encounters, each requiring a different level of suspicion to be deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: “(1) arrest, which must be supported by probable cause; (2) brief investigatory stops, which must be supported by reasonable articulable suspicion; and (3) brief encounters between police and citizens, which require no objective justification.” United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Evidence gathered as fruit of an unreasonable search or seizure is generally inadmissible against a defendant.

See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 694, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); cf. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding illegally obtained evidence admissible for purposes of impeachment). In the context of a motion to suppress evidence alleged to have been obtained illegally, “we review the factual findings of the district court for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.2000). A.

The first issue presented is at what point during the exchange between Brown and the officers was Brown seized, thereby triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment. “[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business,’ the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (citation omitted) (quoting California v.

Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)). A number of circumstances inform the inquiry of whether a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police, including “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); accord Weaver, 282 F.3d at 312.

The district court reached alternative conclusions as to when Brown was seized. First, the court concluded that the initial encounter between Brown and the officers — during which Officer Lewis asked Brown if they could talk to him, informed him that he matched the description of the anonymous tip, and asked if he would consent to a pat-down search — constituted a seizure which triggered Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights. Alternatively, the court concluded that Brown was seized when Officer Lewis decided to arrest him for public intoxication and ordered him to place his hands upon an adjacent car.

We examine each of these conclusions in turn. 1. The district court first concluded that the initial encounter between Brown and the officers “amounted to a Terry stop, and not a consensual discussion between a citizen and police officers.” J.A. 108. The court noted that two uniformed officers were present during the initial encounter, one of those officers had a K-9 police dog at his side, and Brown had not acted in “an unusual fashion to raise any suspicion of illegal activity,” id. at 108-09.

The court added that it was Officer Lewis’ “resolute position that she intended to pat-down” Brown when she first approached him, and she asked Brown to consent to the pat-down “only because it is easier [to obtain] consent than to explain ... the contours of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 109. “[I]n view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident,” the court concluded, “a reasonable person would not believe that he was free to leave the premises.” Id.

The Government argues that “[t]he facts found by the district court establish nothing more than a consensual police-citizen encounter that required no objective justification.” Br. of United States at 8. It characterizes Officer Lewis’ initial inquiry of Brown as a “friendly request for a word with [him].”. Id. at 9. Among other facts, the Government emphasizes that Brown refused to consent to the pat-down search requested by Officer Lewis, which in the Government’s view shows that Brown “believed he was free to refuse Officer Lewis’s requests during the encounter.” Id.

The Government also asserts that the “resolute position” of Officer Lewis to pat-down Brown upon approaching him was irrelevant to the determination of whether Brown considered himself free to disregard the officers, see Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (explaining that officer’s subjective intention to detain suspect is irrelevant in determining whether suspect believed he was free to leave unless that intention was communicated to suspect).

We need not resolve whether the initial encounter between Brown and the officers was a Terry stop or a consensual police-citizen encounter, for our ultimate disposition of this ease would be the same either way. Assuming that the initial encounter was a Terry stop, our conclusion below that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop warrants affirming the district court decision to suppress the firearm and statements.

Alternatively, assuming that the initial encounter was consensual, our conclusion below that subsequent actions of the officers constituted an arrest without probable cause also warrants affirming the district court decision to suppress the firearm and statements. In either event, as detailed below, the firearm recovered from Brown’s back pocket and his statements in the patrol car were fruits of an illegal seizure and therefore properly suppressed. 2.

In the alternative, the district court concluded that even if the initial encounter between Brown and the officers was a consensual police-citizen encounter, Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights were triggered when Officer Lewis decided to place Brown under arrest for public intoxication and ordered him to place his hands on a nearby car. In its opening brief, the Government conceded that Brown was seized when “he was ordered to place his hands on the car, which is the point at which Officer Lewis had decided to arrest [him].” Br. of United States at 13.

At oral argument, however, the issue was raised that Brown’s actions after being ordered to place his hands on the car may have affected the point at which his Fourth Amendment rights were implicated. Specifically, rather than placing his hands on the nearby car and leaving them there, Brown leaned toward the car, placed his hands on the car, and then began “lifting his hands up and down, [and] did not want to keep his hands on the car.” J.A. 52. Indeed, the officers, weapons drawn, had to order him repeatedly to place his hands on the car.

We are mindful of the general rule that a seizure “requires either physical force ... or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). A defendant who flees the police in response to an assertion of authority has not been seized, and thus his Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated. See id. at 626, 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547.

Because no physical force was used against Brown until after the firearm was discovered, the critical inquiry here is at what point did Brown submit to the assertion of authority by Officers Lewis and Petrosky. We conclude that Brown submitted to the officers’ show of authority when, at the officers’ command, he first leaned over and placed his hands on the car. Officer Lewis ordered Brown to place his hands on a car that was directly in front of him. In response to that order, Brown leaned over toward the car and placed his hands on it.

When he leaned over, Brown’s shirt (apparently a long, jersey-style shirt) lifted slightly and exposed the upper portion of his pants. It was at this point that Officer Petrosky first noticed the gun-shaped bulge in Brown’s back pocket. Both officers then drew their weapons on Brown. Throughout the exchange, Brown was nervous and fidgety. He lifted his hands up and down, and he told the officers to take the firearm out of his back pocket.

To be sure, by lifting his hands up and down, Brown may have suggested that he might stop submitting to the officers’ assertion of authority and possibly attempt to flee the scene or confront the officers. However, that Brown lifted his hands up and down does not nullify the fact that he initially submitted to Officer Lewis’ order by leaning toward and placing his hands on the car, and that submission led to the discovery of the firearm in his back pocket.

Therefore, we agree with the district court that Brown was seized, and his Fourth Amendment rights triggered, at least as early as when he submitted to Officer Lewis’ order by leaning toward and placing his hands on the adjacent car. B. We now turn to whether Officers Lewis and Petrosky had sufficient justification under the Fourth Amendment when they seized Brown. There are two potential sources of authority for the seizure.

Under Terry, the officers would have been justified in stopping and frisking Brown if they had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that Brown was armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Alternatively, the officers could have properly searched Brown if the search was incident to a valid arrest. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 5.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). We address each of these sources of authority in turn. 1.

First, we address whether Brown’s seizure was proper under Terry. As noted above, we decline to resolve whether the initial encounter between Brown and the officers was a consensual encounter or a Terry stop, for in our opinion the ultimate resolution of the case is the same either way. This is in part because we conclude that at no point before Brown was ordered by Officer Lewis to place his hands on the car — ie., at no point before Brown was unquestionably seized— did the officers have reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (“The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search”). “[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868).

Though the quantum of suspicion necessary for a Terry stop is “less demanding than that for probable cause,” an officer “must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.” ’ ” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Here, Officers Lewis and Petrosky initially approached Brown in response to an anonymous telephone tip that Brown was carrying a firearm.

An anonymous telephone tip that alleges illegal possession of a firearm but that merely identifies a suspect and his location does not itself provide reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 271-72, 274, 120 S.Ct. 1375. To justify a Terry stop, such a tip must contain sufficient “indicia of reliability” to enable officers to evaluate the veracity of the tip before stopping whomever the tip identifies. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

For example, an anonymous telephone tip sufficient to justify a Terry stop might predict a suspect’s future actions, which can then be corroborated by police surveillance of the suspect’s movement. Once the predictions are corroborated, police may have reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop. See id. Or, police may be able to credit an anonymous telephone tip based on their experience in having received reliable tips from the same informant in the past (identified by the sound of the informant’s voice), thereby justifying a Terry stop. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 275, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Here, the tip provided nothing more than a brief, general description of Brown, his whereabouts, and an allegation that he was carrying a firearm. While the officers were able to corroborate immediately the identification and location components of the tip, at no point before Officer Lewis ordered Brown against the car did the officers observe any conduct by Brown that would cause them to suspect that he was carrying a firearm.

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (“The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.”). Moreover, nothing in the record indicates either a history of reliable tips from the anonymous informant or a basis for the informant’s knowledge on this occasion.

Therefore, regardless of whether a seizure occurred during the initial encounter between Brown and the officers, or whether a seizure did not occur until Brown submitted to Officer Lewis’ order, the anonymous tip alone did not provide reasonable suspicion to justify seizing Brown. Because the officers had acquired no additional information that Brown was carrying a firearm before Officer Lewis ordered him against the car, we agree with the district court that the officers lacked authority under Terry to seize Brown. 2.

Second, we consider whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Brown for public intoxication, which would have authorized a search incident to his arrest. Under Virginia law,“[i]f any person ... is intoxicated in public ... he shall be deemed guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor.” Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-388 (2004). A person is “intoxicated” if he “has drunk enough alcoholic beverages to observably affect his manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or behavior.” Va.Code Ann. § 4.1-100 (Supp.2004).

During his conversation with Officers Lewis and Petrosky, Brown exhibited some outward signs of having consumed alcohol. His eyes were glassy and bloodshot, his breath smelled strongly of alcohol, and he admitted that he had been drinking. The Government argues that these signs were sufficient to give the officers probable cause to arrest Brown for public intoxication. The district court disagreed, finding that Brown “did not exhibit enough physical impairment to justify an arrest for public intoxication.” J.A. 111.

The district court explained that “[Virginia] courts interpret [§ 4.1-100] to require police officials [to] find some form of mental or physical impairment beyond bloodshot eyes to establish probable cause.” Id. The Government contends that the district court overstated what Virginia law requires for probable cause to arrest for public intoxication. The Government notes that while the Virginia Supreme Court has held that the strong smell of alcohol alone is not enough to show that someone is intoxicated, see Hill v.

Lee, 209 Va. 569, 166 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1969), no Virginia case has held that physical impairment is required to establish probable cause. We agree with the Government that no Virginia case has held expressly that physical impairment is required for probable cause - under Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-388. However, it is equally true that no Virginia case has held that probable cause may be established without evidence of physical impairment.

Additionally, while we acknowledge that § 4.1-100 is framed in the disjunctive, suggesting that a person is intoxicated if he has consumed enough alcohol to affect only his “general appearance” and not his physical movements or speech, we find it significant that in every reported Virginia decision in which the court found probable cause to arrest a person for public intoxication, there was evidence that the person had consumed enough alcohol to impair his physical movement or speech. See Clagett v.

Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263, 268 (1996) (defendant was unconscious outside apartment complex); Fierst v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 757, 173 S.E.2d 807, 809-10 (1970) (defendant was slumped in his vehicle with his head leaning back on the seat); Clarke v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 286, 527 S.E.2d 484, 489 (2000) (officer “detected the odor of alcohol on [defendant], observed his bloodshot eyes, and noted his erratic speech”).

Moreover, our research has uncovered, and the Government has cited, no published- opinion of the Virginia appellate courts finding probable cause for public intoxication based solely on 'glassy, bloodshot eyes and the strong smell of alcohol. During the exchange between Brown and the officers, Brown showed no signs of physical impairment caused by alcohol consumption. As no Virginia case has ruled that probable cause can be established without physical impairment, we decline to expand Virginia law ourselves.

We hold, therefore, that Officers Lewis and Petro-sky lacked probable cause to arrest Brown for public intoxication. The arrest was illegal, and its fruits — including the firearm and statements made in the patrol car — were properly suppressed. See Taylor, 457 U.S. at 694, 102 S.Ct. 2664; Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-86, 83 S.Ct. 407. III. For the reasons stated above, we find no error in the suppression of the firearm and statements. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court. AFFIRMED. .

It does not appear that Officer Petrosky could discern the words they were saying— i.e., why they wanted Brown to leave the apartment. He could only observe that they were telling and motioning for Brown to leave. . This was the district court

interpretation of the inquiry, presumably based upon its synthesis of the testimony at the suppression hearing. Officer Petrosky described Officer Lewis' inquiry as" 'May I speak with you?' " J.A. 38, though he "[could not] recall her exact words,” id. at 33. Officer Lewis described her inquiry as, "I asked him if we could speak to him, which he consented.” Id. at 50. . At the suppression hearing, both officers testified that Brown’s speech was slightly slurred.

The district court refused to credit this testimony, however, because the officers had not documented the slurred speech in their contemporaneous arrest report. We find no clear error in this factual determination and assume for purposes of this appeal that Brown's speech was not slurred. See United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir.1997). . Accord J.A. 35 (testimony of Officer Petrosky that Brown stated, " 'Just take the gun out of my pocket, just take the gun out of my pocket.’ ”). .

Our colleague in dissent asserts that when the gun was discovered, “the officers had only made a request that Brown place his hands on the vehicle for the officers' safety,” and this "request” then "changed to a command only after one officer saw the gun and stated that he ‘ordered’ Brown to place his hands on the vehicle.” Post, at 18-19 (emphasis added).

While it is true that Officer Lewis testified that she "asked [Brown] to place his hands on the car,” J.A. 51, 64, the entire record demonstrates that Brown did not have the option of refusing Officer Lewis’ "request.” Officer Lewis later described the event as follows: "I told Mr. Brown to please place his hands on the car because the fight was breaking out.” J.A. 65 (emphasis added). Similarly, Officer Petrosky testified that Officer Lewis “told Mr. Brown to go ahead and place his hands on the car.” J.A. 34 (emphasis added).

And, Officer Petrosky’s testimony demonstrates that he equates the word “told” with the word "ordered.” See J.A. 35 (“I was still ordering him to place his hands on the car. Mr. Brown was becoming very nervous, he was kind of fidgety. I told him again to put his hands on the car." (emphasis added)). Moreover, both officers testified that Brown was under arrest when he bent over toward the car. See J.A. 40-41, 61.

Indeed, the Government argued to the district court, in attempting to justify discovery of the firearm, that "although [Officer Lewis] didn’t say the magic words 'you are under arrest,' ” Brown "was under arrest; therefore, she had the authority to search him incident to that arrest.” J.A. 73-74. . Brown does not dispute that the officers would have been justified in conducting a pat-down if they had already garnered reasonable suspicion that he was in possession of a firearm. .

We emphasize that these cases were probable cause cases and not those involving proof by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Hill, 166 S.E.2d at 276 (finding evidence that defendant smelled of alcohol and admitted to having consumed alcohol insufficient to prove by a preponder-anee that defendant was intoxicated); Farren v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 234, 516 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1999) (finding evidence that defendant was driving erratically, smelled of alcohol, and had to lean on car for balance sufficient to sustain criminal conviction for driving under the influence).