Jean DENNY; Seandria Denny, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ELIZABETH ARDEN SALONS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee, 456 F.3d 427

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: In this case an African American woman bought her mother a gift package from a beauty salon and day spa.

Upon visiting the salon to check on her mother and to add a hair coloring to the package, a receptionist told her that there was “a problem” because the salon did not “do black people’s hair.” The mother and daughter brought this suit against the salon under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (2000), which prohibits racial discrimination in a “place of public accommodation,” and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which disallows such discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts. Plaintiffs also asserted a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The district court granted

summary judgment to the salon on all claims. We hold that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ Title II claim, because the salon is not a “place of public accommodation,” as that term is defined in the statute. Congress has clearly delineated those entities that fall within Title II’s ambit, and we are not at liberty to go beyond what it has plainly enacted. But neither can we disregard a congressional edict that proscribes racial discrimination in the contractual setting.

We thus hold that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim, because plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to create a triable dispute of fact over whether the salon engaged in the form of discrimination that § 1981 expressly prohibits. Finally, we conclude that the district court appropriately dismissed plaintiffs’ state law claim. We thus affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. I. Plaintiffs are Seandria Denny and her mother, Jean Denny. They are African American.

Defendant is Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., which operates Red Door Salon and Spa, an upscale beauty salon and day spa with locations in Virginia and several other states. The salon offers its customers a variety of different beauty services, including hair, skin, and nail care, makeup artistry, and massages, facials, and other body treatments. The dispute in this case arose from incidents at a Red Door salon in the Tysons Corner Shopping Center in Northern Virginia. On May 26, 2002, Seandria Denny visited the salon to purchase a gift for her mother.

She decided to buy Elizabeth Arden’s $295 “Miracle Morning” package, which included a massage, facial, manicure, hair style, and lunch. Four days later, Jean Denny went to the salon to redeem her gift package. She received a facial and massage, and the salon then provided her with a salad for lunch. She obtained these services without incident, and planned to have her hair styled after lunch. While Jean Denny was being served, Seandria Denny called the salon to request that it also color her mother’s hair. Over the phone, the employee with whom she spoke agreed that the salon would perform the coloring.

Seandria Denny indicated that she would arrive at the salon shortly to pay for the hair coloring (which cost extra) and to see how her mother was doing. Upon her arrival, she approached the receptionist, Raha Ashrafi, and told her that she would like to check on her mother. Ashrafi responded, “[w]ell, Ms. Denny, I think we have a problem.” The salon, she explained, did not “do black people’s hair.” Denny suggested that her mother’s hair was straight and similar to Caucasian hair, but Ashrafi continued to maintain that the salon did not do African American hair.

Ashrafi indicated that the salon’s manager, Chelsey Orth, would shortly be able to speak with Denny. According to Seandria Denny, upon Orth’s arrival, Orth reiterated the salon’s refusal to work on Jean Denny’s hair. Seandria Denny, outraged, suggested that one of the salon’s eight or nine hair stylists should be able to do her mother’s hair. Orth responded, however, that she had discussed the situation with each stylist, and all had refused. Seandria Denny told the salon not to touch her mother’s hair and that she wanted her mother to leave once she was done with her massage.

She then exited the salon, without having seen her mother during the visit. The record is unclear what treatments Jean Denny had received at the time her daughter left the salon. Orth remembers the events quite differently. She contends that she spoke with Seandria Denny only about her mother’s hair coloring. Since the hair coloring would have added an hour to Jean Denny’s visit, Orth was unable to include it on such short notice. Orth claims that she explained this to Jean (but not Seandria) Denny, who responded that she did not want her hair colored in any event.

Seandria Denny disputes that anyone from Elizabeth Arden ever suggested to her that the ham coloring could be done on a different day. After Jean Denny had eaten lunch, one of Elizabeth Arden’s employees shampooed her hair. Denny then had to wait approximately ten to fifteen minutes for a hair stylist, which, in her opinion, was a little long as compared to other customers. The hair stylist appears not to have asked Jean Denny how she wanted her hair styled, and Denny did not instruct her. Denny expected that the hair stylist would use hot curlers, but the stylist only blow-dried and round brushed Denny’s hair.

When she had finished, she gave Denny a mirror to view her hair, but never asked Denny if she approved. Denny was shocked when she saw her hair, because the stylist had left it looking like “a bush.” Jean Denny was so surprised and embarrassed by her hair’s appearance that she wanted to leave immediately. Without expressing disapproval, Denny got out of the chair, grabbed her coat, and quickly left for her car. She did not stay for the manicure that was included in her package, and did not ask for her money back. She went home, to find her daughter waiting for her.

Seandria Denny was aghast when she saw her mother’s hair, and furious that the salon had disregarded her instructions not to touch it. The next day, Jean Denny washed and styled her own hair. Plaintiffs filed suit against Elizabeth Arden on May 20, 2004. They brought two discrimination claims, one under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (2000), and the other under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. They also alleged a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Virginia law. Elizabeth Arden moved for

summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court first held that Title II did not cover the salon. It then concluded that plaintiffs did not proffer evidence sufficient to illustrate either that they were discriminated against in the making and enforcing of a contract under § 1981 or that their emotional distress was severe. II. Plaintiffs first argue that the district court improperly dismissed their Title II claim.

Title II entitles individuals “to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation ... without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). It sets forth a comprehensive list of establishments that qualify as a “place of public accommodation,” id. § 2000a(b), and in so doing excludes from its coverage those categories of establishments not listed.

Places of public accommodation include: (1) hotels and other businesses providing “lodging to transient guests,” id. § 2000a(b)(l); (2) restaurants and other facilities “principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises,” id. § 2000a(b)(2); (3) “placets] of exhibition or entertainment,” id. § 2000a(b)(3); and (4) establishments that are, inter alia, within a covered establishment, id. § 2000a(b)(4). Whether an entity qualifies as a “place of public accommodation” can be a fact-intensive inquiry, because establishments “differ markedly in their operations.” Nesmith v.

YMCA of Raleigh, N.C., 397 F.2d 96, 98 (4th Cir.1968). Plaintiffs rely on only one subsection of Title IPs definition provision, contending that the salon is a “place of entertainment” under § 2000a(b)(3).

Section 2000a(b)(3) defines “place of public accommodation” to include “any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment.” Id. We cannot agree with plaintiffs’ argument. The plain text of the statute demonstrates that beauty salons are not covered by Title II. They are not mentioned in any of the numerous

definitions of “place of public accommodation.” They also bear little relation to those places of entertainment that are specifically listed, which strongly suggests that a salon would not fall within the catchall language “other place of exhibition or entertainment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3). As the Supreme Court has indicated, “the statutory language ‘place of entertainment’ should be given full effect according to its generally accepted meaning.” Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 308, 89 S.Ct. 1697, 23 L.Ed.2d 318 (1969) (emphasis added). A “place of entertainment” is one whose particular purpose is to entertain.

See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1478 (2d ed.1987) (defining “place” as, inter alia, “a space, area, or spot, set apart or used for a particular purpose: a place of worship; a place of entertainment”) (emphasis added). Unlike a theater, concert hall, or sports arena — all of which are specifically designed to entertain their patrons — the principal function of the salon in this case is to offer its customers hair, skin, and body care. Visiting a salon does not fairly approximate the experience of attending a movie, symphony, or sporting match.

Rather, the salon is more similar to businesses that offer tangible services, not entertainment. Our friend in dissent would have us believe that Elizabeth Arden was doing anything other than styling hair and providing other beauty services, but such treatments were of course central to its business. Indeed, the styling of Jean Denny’s hair is what this entire dispute is all about. This is not enough to transform a beauty salon into a “place of entertainment” remotely akin to the movies, concerts, and sports facilities Congress listed in the statute.

Unfortunately, the dissent takes such an expansive view of the term “place of entertainment” that an automobile repair shop is apparently the only thing that does not fit within it. See infra at 439, 440 n. 6. The other subsections setting forth Title II’s definition of “place of public accommodation” reinforce the ordinary textual reading that “place of entertainment” refers to those establishments designed to entertain. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).

For Congress specifically included within Title II other service establishments, such as hotels and restaurants, see id. § 2000a(b)(l)-(2), and it chose not to cover with particularity facilities that sell salon services. If, however, Congress had intended for “place of entertainment” to encompass any service establishment with tangential entertainment value, there would have been no reason for Congress to include separate subsections for hotels, restaurants, and similar establishments in the statute.

Thus to include in the statute all places where patrons might go in some part for relaxation, as the dissent would have it, renders unnecessary the entire exercise in statutory draftsmanship that Congress undertook in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). We therefore decline to allow plaintiffs to bootstrap defendant’s establishment into the “place of entertainment” provision, and thereby circumvent the congressional balance evidenced in § 2000a(b).

The case law delimiting the breadth of § 2000a(b)(3) also supports the plain and ordinary meaning of “place of entertainment.” In Paul, the Supreme Court held that “a 232-acre amusement area with swimming, boating, sun bathing, picnicking, miniature golf, dancing facilities, and a snack bar” was a place of entertainment. 395 U.S. at 301, 306, 89 S.Ct. 1697.

The Court explained that the phrase should be interpreted in accord with its ordinary meaning to include both those “establishments where patrons are entertained as spectators or listeners” and “those where entertainment takes the form of direct participation in some sport or activity.” Id. at 306 & n. 7, 308, 89 S.Ct. 1697. As Paul illustrates, a place of entertainment is one designed to entertain its patrons, even if a customer participates in the entertainment.

The salon in this case — primarily offering body maintenance services with tangential entertainment value — does not readily compare to the “amusement business” in Paul, whose raison d’etre was to sell entertainment to its customers. 395 U.S. at 301, 89 S.Ct. 1697. Nor are the salon’s services analogous to the great bulk of establishments that lower courts have held to be places of entertainment: most have had amusement and recreational elements front and center. See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1091 n. 15 (5th Cir.1991) (public parks); United States v.

Lansdowne Swim Club, 894 F.2d 83, 87 (3d Cir.1990) (community swimming facility); Smith v. YMCA of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634, 636, 648 (5th Cir.1972) (YMCA that offered “numerous recreational activities, such as swimming, scuba diving, table tennis, basketball, [and] tennis” and also maintained several recreational facilities, including “five gymnasiums, a health club, and eight swimming pools”); Evans v. Seaman, 452 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir.1971) (roller skating rink); United States v. Cent. Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 431 F.2d 972, 973-74 (4th Cir.1970) (golf course); Scott v.

Young, 421 F.2d 143, 144-45 (4th Cir.1970) (recreational area that was “a virtual carbon copy” of the business in Paul); Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 351 (5th Cir.1968) (en banc) (amusement park); see also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir.1993) (noting that § 2000a(b)(3) includes “bowling alleys, golf courses, tennis courts, gymnasiums, swimming pools and parks”); Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 100 (suggesting that a YMCA’s “swimming pool, gymnasium and exercise activities” might fall under § 2000a(b)(3)).

Plaintiffs — and the dissent — have not directed us to even a single case in which a court has found that Title II covered a salon like the instant one. In fact, in the one case presenting facts most similar, the court held that a hair salon was not a “place of entertainment.” See Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., 94 F.Supp.2d 856, 862 (N.D.Ohio 2000). The Hatton court found that such a salon fell outside the ordinary meaning of the phrase. Id. It went on to explain that had Congress wished to in-elude a salon within Title II, it could have easily done so. Id.; see also Pinkney v.

Meloy, 241 F.Supp. 943, 947 (N.D.Fla.1965) (quoting legislative history from Title II indicating that “barber shops, beauty parlors and other establishments are not covered [by the Act] unless they are contained within a hotel”). Congress has, for instance, specifically listed beauty shops as “public accommodations” covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Halton, 94 F.Supp.2d at 862-63 & n. 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F)). Plaintiffs primarily rely on Rousseve v.

Shape Spa for Health & Beauty, Inc., 516 F.2d 64, 65 (5th Cir.1975), which held that a health and exercise studio was a place of entertainment. To be sure, the health club in Rousseve, like the salon in this case, offered its clients massages and facials. See id. at 67. But the similarities end there. The health club in Rousseve supplied its customers with recreational areas and facilities, such as gymnasium equipment and swimming pools, that are conspicuously absent in the present case. Id.

Indeed, plaintiffs overlook the fact that the Rousseve court explicitly indicated that the health club’s facilities were akin to those provided by the YMCA, which the Fifth Circuit had already found to be a place of public accommodation. Id. at 68 (citing Smith, 462 F.2d at 648). Simply put, Rousseve cannot provide plaintiffs with the cornerstone necessary to support their atextual construction of Title II. As the foregoing discussion of statutory text and case law makes clear, Title II approached the question of what is an establishment not through a generic definition, but through a series of extended lists.

Indeed, § 2000a(

b) lists no fewer than fourteen examples of establishments, and subsection (b)(3) lists no fewer than five different places of entertainment. Barber shops and beauty salons are sufficiently common and pervasive that we cannot casually attribute their omission to mere oversight. Indeed, it would have been easy enough for Congress to have included them. And while some of the salon’s services might have provided its customers with relaxation, the salon is not a “place of entertainment” within the meaning of Title II, because it is designed to market high-quality hair, skin, and body care, not amusement.

We note, however, that we have interpreted the statute as it does read, not perhaps as it should read. One can think of good reasons why Title II should include both beauty salons and barber shops, even those catering to specific clienteles. That, however, is a matter for legislative debate. It remains our job to respect what Congress has said, not to put words in its mouth. III. Plaintiffs next contend that the district court committed error when it dismissed their § 1981 claim.

Section 1981 establishes that “[a]ll persons ... have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). It defines “make and enforce contracts” to include “the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” Id. § 1981(b). To prove a § 1981 claim, therefore, a plaintiff must ultimately establish both that the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race, and that the discrimination interfered with a contractual interest.

See, e.g., Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662, 667 (4th Cir.2004); Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 751-52 (5th Cir.2001); Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413-15 (7th Cir.1996). There can be no doubt that plaintiffs have presented not only strong but direct evidence of the salon’s intent to discriminate. See Murrell v. Ocean Mecca Motel, Inc., 262 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir.2001). Indeed, plaintiffs have presented evidence that suggests the salon refused to perform on a contract — either denying plaintiffs a hair styling, hair coloring, or both — for an explicit race-based reason.

This is what § 1981 forbids. In fact, it is hard to imagine plainer evidence of purposeful discrimination than when services are denied expressly because the purchaser is African American. When Seandria Denny arrived to pay for her mother’s hair coloring, the receptionist explained that the salon did not “do black people’s hair.” Denny also alleges that Chelsey Orth, the salon’s manager, confirmed this view from management’s perspective. Orth further explained that each and every one of the eight or nine hair stylists present refused to work on Jean Denny’s hair.

While there may be a more benign explanation for the salon’s refusal to fully serve plaintiffs, the receptionist’s overt racial explanation creates a triable dispute. See Williams, 372 F.3d at 667. There can likewise be no doubt that plaintiffs have demonstrated a concrete contractual relationship. “[A] plaintiff must establish the loss of an actual, not speculative or prospective, contract interest.” Dillard, 277 F.3d at 751. Seandria Denny bought an expensive gift package that gave her mother the specific contractual right to receive a massage, facial, manicure, lunch, and hair style.

She also reached an agreement with the salon’s receptionist over the phone to add a hair coloring to the package. These transactions plainly satisfy § 1981’s contract requirement. This case is different therefore from those where a plaintiffs failure to advance a pending or current contractual relationship proved fatal to a § 1981 claim.

See, e.g., Dillard, 277 F.3d at 751-53 (dismissing § 1981 claim when defendant retail establishment banned plaintiff from its premises after her alleged shoplifting because plaintiff failed to “offer evidence of some tangible attempt to contract with [defendant]”); Office Max, 89 F.3d at 414-15 (dismissing § 1981 claim when defendant retail establishment summoned “the police to ‘check out’ African-American patrons” because the patrons could not point to the “actual loss of a contract interest” resulting from defendant’s conduct).

In this case, by contrast, the beauty establishment offered in advance a carefully crafted package for a specified price. Seandria Denny’s purchase of the package for her mother operated as an acceptance, and the existence of the contractual relationship cannot be in serious question. We do not suggest, of course, that every person who walks into a commercial establishment and is denied service or is otherwise dissatisfied can maintain a § 1981 cause of action. Beauty salons cater uniquely to taste, and loss of business — not litigation — is the usual cost of customer dissatisfaction.

We do not have before us, however, the question of whether Denny did or did not receive hair styling to her liking, but whether for reasons of race she was denied hair styling altogether or in any meaningful sense of the term. Defendant argues that the § 1981 claim fails because plaintiffs received all the services for which they contracted. See, e.g., Williams, 372 F.3d at 667 (plaintiff must show that “he was denied the opportunity to contract for goods or services”). At this stage of litigation, however, defendant’s argument fails: there is sufficient disagreement on this material fact to withstand

summary judgment with respect to Jean Denny’s hair styling and hair coloring. To begin with, the salon offered insufficient evidence that its employees came close to styling Jean Denny’s hair. Denny received a shampoo, brush, and blow dry. This combination left her hair looking like “a bush.” The record provides no indication of what Elizabeth Arden considers a “hair style,” and in view of the evidence before us, we cannot conclude summarily that the contract was ever performed.

Indeed, defendant’s employees themselves expressed an unwillingness to perform, telling Seandria Denny that her mother’s race prevented it. Moreover, if Jean Denny did in fact receive a hair style, it was no large task for the salon to so prove — by way of advertisements, 'its employees, or customary standards of salon service. But again, the salon made essentially no effort to rebut plaintiffs’ claim that they did not receive for racial reasons the basic service for which they contracted.

There is also a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the salon refused to provide a hair coloring on the basis of race. According to Seandria Denny, one of defendant’s employees agreed over the phone that the salon would color her mother’s hair. When Seandria Denny arrived at the salon to pay for the coloring, however, the receptionist backpedaled and told her that the salon did not “do black people’s hair.” While Orth, the salon’s manager, suggests that the salon did not have time to color Jean Denny’s hair, Seandria Denny was never so informed.

And though the true basis of the decision may be in some dispute, what is not disputed is that Jean Denny never received a hair coloring. Defendant’s contention that Jean Denny may not actually have wanted her hair colored ignores the fact that this was a third-party beneficiary contract. See, e.g., Levine v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 250 Va. 282, 462 S.E.2d 81, 83 (1995). Seandria Denny, the purchaser, wanted to buy her mother a gift and was refused that opportunity on race-based grounds. If the salon refused to contract with Seandria Denny because of her mother’s race, that is all that § 1981 requires.

It is, of course, entirely possible that the trier of fact may ultimately see this matter Elizabeth Arden’s way. The record before us, however, at least draws into serious question the neutral and non-racial explanations for whatever happened here. IV. Plaintiffs lastly argue that the district court erred in dismissing their state claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. We disagree. This tort is “not favored” under Virginia law, Ruth v.

Fletcher, 237 Va. 366, 377 S.E.2d 412, 415 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted), and liability only arises if, inter alia, a defendant’s conduct results in severe emotional distress “that no reasonable person could be expected to endure,” Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1991). Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that they suffered sufficiently severe distress. They have alleged that defendant’s conduct made them nervous, caused them stress, and resulted in an inability to adequately sleep and eat. It is not to minimize these effects to say that they fall short under Virginia law.

Plaintiffs make no claim “that [they] had any objective physical injury caused by the stress, that [they] sought medical attention, that [they were] confined at home or in a hospital, or that [they] lost income.” Russo, 400 S.E.2d at 163 (dismissing claim where plaintiff only alleged nervousness, stress, and inability to sleep or concentrate at work); see also Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 624 S.E.2d 24, 34 (2006) (same). If the distress plaintiffs allege was sufficient to be actionable, courts could become arbiters of every human interaction that culminated in embarrassment, disappointment, or hurt feelings.

Virginia law has refused to countenance this possibility, and the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ state law claim. V. While Title II clearly excludes this salon from coverage,

section 1981 just as clearly governs racial animus in the making and enforcement of contracts. Our distinguished colleague in dissent simply overlooks the fact that the Reconstruction Congress and the 1964 Congress went about their work in different ways. The Reconstruction Congress wrote broadly, and we have given effect to that breadth as expressed in

section 1981. The 1964 Congress also wrote broadly, but made clear through a series of specific references that Title II’s reach, while ample, was not wholly without limit. Courts can no more place words in Title II than they can ignore the core command of § 1981. Since plaintiffs have proffered sufficient evidence that the salon discriminated against them on the basis of race in its performance of contractual obligations, their § 1981 claim must survive

summary judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. . Our dissenting friend alights on the term "spa” as distinguished from "salon.” But this distinction is one without a difference. For the statute requires an establishment to be a "place of entertainment,” rather than a service establishment with incidental relaxation value.

Thus the fact that Elizabeth Arden writes the word "spa” above its doorpost no more converts its beauty service business into a "place of entertainment” than does the fact that some clients might find hair styling and beauty treatments relaxing. Indeed, the “spa” cases on which the dissent relies differ markedly from Elizabeth Arden- — they offered YMCA-like facilities with, inter alia, gyms, exercise equipment, and fitness classes. Moreover, our dissenting brother travels far afield to obscure the issue in this case.

In an attempt to demonstrate that its view of the term "entertainment” is not infinitely elastic, the dissent first offers up, albeit only illustratively, an auto repair shop as something not designed to entertain. Then, it offers, but again only illustratively, visions of "resorts” and of a Belgian town known for the curative properties of its mineral springs. For good measure, we are told about a 7,800 square-foot day spa and clubhouse in Avignon, France, and that Guantanamo is not a spa. See infra at 441-42. Apparently, there are spas and there are spas.

All this globetrotting, interesting as it might be, has unfortunately little enough to do with the defendant’s business or the statutory text or structure with which the dissent has yet to deal. . When a plaintiff has presented no direct evidence of the defendant’s discriminatory intent, we have applied the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework to § 1981 claims involving contracts for the purchase of goods or services. See Williams, 372 F.3d at 667; Murrell v. Ocean Mecca Motel, Inc., 262 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir.2001); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Plaintiffs do not make use of this framework here, however, and instead rely on direct evidence of the salon’s discriminatory intent.