Patrick J. RICHARDSON, individually, and as guardian for the minor children P.F.R. and M.E.R. and M.C.R. and D.J.R. and B.P.R., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEXUAL ASSAULT/SPOUSE ABUSE RESOURCE CENTER, INC., (SARC) of Harford County; Luiza Caiazzo-Nutter, Individually and in her capacity as Executive Director of SARC; Stephanie Powers, individually & in her capacity as an employee of SARC; John Doe, 1 through 50 individually; Jane Doe, 1 through 50 individually, Defendants-Appellees, and United of Central Maryland, Defendant, 474 F. App'x 992

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Patrick J. Richardson appeals the district court’s orders granting

summary judgment for Defendants on his gender discrimination claim and "denying his motion to amend the complaint. Finding no error, we affirm. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “that all persons similarly situated ... be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.2001). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Richardson, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants were entitled to

summary judgment on Richardson’s allegations of gender discrimination. See Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir.2008) (providing standard of review). Turning to the district court’s denial of Richardson’s motion to- amend, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint. See Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 504, 178 L.Ed.2d 370 (2010) (providing standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED.