Stephen V. KOLBE; Andrew C. Turner; Wink's Sporting Goods, Incorporated; Atlantic Guns, Incorporated; Associated Gun Clubs of Baltimore, Incorporated; Maryland Shall Issue, Incorporated; Maryland State Rifle and Pistol Association, Incorporated; National Shooting Sports Foundation, Incorporated; Maryland Licensed Firearms Dealers Association, Incorporated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Shawn J. Tardy; Matthew Godwin, Plaintiffs, v. Lawrence J. HOGAN, Jr., in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Maryland; Brian E. Frosh, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Maryland; Colonel William M. Pallozzi, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of State Police and Superintendent of the Maryland State Police; Maryland State Police, Defendants-Appellees. State of West Virginia; State of Alabama; State of Alaska; State of Arizona; State of Florida; State of Idaho; State of Kansas; State of Louisiana; State of Michigan; State of Missouri; State of Montana; State of Nebraska; State of New Mexico; State of North Dakota; State of Oklahoma; State of South Carolina; State of South Dakota; State of Texas; State of Utah; State of Wyoming; Commonwealth of Kentucky; Traditionalist Youth Network, LLC; National Rifle Association of America; CRPA Foundation; Gun Owners of California; Colorado State Shooting Association; Idaho State Rifle & Pistol Association; Illinois State Rifle Association; Kansas State Rifle Association; League of Kentucky Sportsmen, Inc.; Nevada Firearms Coalition; Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs; New Mexico Shooting Sports Association; New York Rifle & Pistol Association; Texas State Rifle Association; Vermont Federation of Sportsman's Clubs; Vermont Rifle & Pistol Association; Gun Owners of America, Inc.; Gun Owners Foundation; U.S. Justice Foundation; The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education; The Abraham Lincoln Foundation for Public Policy Research, Inc.; Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund; Institute on the Constitution; Congress of Racial Equality; National Center for Public Policy Research; Project 21; Pink Pistols; Women Against Gun Control; The Disabled Sportsmen of North America; Law Enforcement Legal Defense Fund; Law Enforcement Action Network; Law Enforcement Alliance of America; International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association; Western States Sheriffs' Association, Amici Supporting Appellants, Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence; Marylanders to Prevent Gun Violence, Incorporated; Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence; State of New York; State of California; State of Connecticut; State of Hawaii; State of Illinois; State of Iowa; State of Massachusetts; State of Oregon; District of Columbia, Amici Supporting Appellees, 849 F.3d 114

KING, Circuit Judge: On the morning of December 14, 2012, in Newtown, Connecticut, a gunman used an AR-15-type Bushmaster rifle and detachable thirty-round magazines to murder twenty first-graders and six adults in the Sandy Hook Elementary School. Two additional adults were injured by gunfire, and just twelve children in the two targeted classrooms were not shot. Nine terrified children ran from one of the classrooms when the gunman paused to reload, while two youngsters successfully hid in a restroom. Another child was the other classroom’s sole survivor.

In all, the gunman fired at least 155 rounds of ammunition within five minutes, shooting each of his victims multiple times. Both before and after Newtown, similar military-style rifles and detachable magazines have been used to perpetrate mass shootings in places whose names have become synonymous with the slaughters that occurred there — like Aurora, Colorado (twelve killed and at least fifty-eight wounded in July 2012 in a movie theater), and San Bernardino, California (fourteen killed and more than twenty wounded in December 2015 at a holiday party).

In the early morning hours of June 12, 2016, a gunman killed forty-nine and injured fifty-three at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, making it the site of this country’s deadliest mass shooting yet.

According to news reports, the Orlando gunman used a Sig Sauer MCX, a semiautomatic rifle that was developed at the request of our Army’s special forces and is known in some military circles as the “Black Mamba.” Other massacres have been carried out- with handguns equipped with magazines holding more than -ten rounds, including those at Virginia Tech (thirty-two killed and at least seventeen wounded in April 2007) and Fort Hood, Texas (thirteen killed and more than thirty wounded in November 2009), as well as in Binghamton, New York (thirteen killed and four wounded in April 2009 at an immigration center), and Tucson, Arizona (six killed and thirteen wounded in January 2011 at a congresswoman’s constituent meeting in a grocery store parking lot).

In response to Newtown and other mass shootings, the duly elected members of the General Assembly of Maryland saw fit to enact the State’s Firearm Safety Act of 2013 (the “FSA”), which bans the AR-15 and other military-style rifles and shotguns (referred to as “assault weapons”) and detachable large-capacity magazines. The plaintiffs in these proceedings contest the constitutionality of the FSA with a pair of Second Amendment claims — one aimed at the assault weapons ban, the other at the prohibition against large-capacity magazines — plus Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process claims.

On cross-motions for

summary judgment, a distinguished judge in the District of Maryland ruled in August 2014 that the FSA is constitutional and thus awarded judgment to the defendants. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F.Supp.3d 768 (D. Md. 2014) (the “Opinion”). Addressing the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claims under the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), the district court expressed grave doubt that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are constitutionally protected arms.

Nevertheless, the court ultimately assumed that the FSA implicates the Second Amendment and subjected it to the “intermediate scrutiny” standard of review. In the wake of Heller, four of our sister courts of appeals have also rejected Second Amendment challenges to bans on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, including two (the Second and District of Columbia Circuits) that utilized an analysis similar to the district court’s.

In early February of 2016, a divided three-judge panel of this Court vacated the Opinion’s Second Amendment rulings and remanded to the district court, directing the application of the more restrictive standard of “strict scrutiny” to the FSA. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2016). Pursuant to its reading of Heller, the panel majority determined that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are indeed protected by the Second Amendment, and that the FSA substantially burdens the core Second Amendment right to use arms for self-defense in the home.

We thereby became the first and only court of appeals to rule that a ban on assault weapons or large-capacity magazines deserves strict scrutiny. Meanwhile, the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims. On March 4, 2016, the panel’s decision was vacated in its entirety by our Court’s grant of rehearing en banc in this case. We heard argument en banc on May 11, 2016, and the appeal is now ripe for disposition.

As explained below, we are satisfied to affirm the district court’s judgment, in large part adopting the Opinion’s cogent reasoning as to why the FSA contravenes neither the Second Amendment nor the Fourteenth. We diverge from the district court on one notable point: We conclude— contrary to the now-vacated decision of our prior panel — that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are not protected by the Second Amendment.

That is, we are convinced that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are among those arms that are “like” “M-16 rifles” — “weapons that are most useful in military service” — which the Heller Court singled out as being beyond the Second Amendment’s reach. See 554 U.S. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (rejecting the notion that the Second Amendment safeguards “M-16 rifles and the like”). Put simply, we have no power to extend Second Amendment protection to the weapons of war that the Heller decision explicitly excluded from such coverage.

Nevertheless, we also find it prudent to rule that — even if the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are somehow entitled to Second Amendment protection — the district court properly subjected the FSA to intermediate scrutiny and correctly upheld it as constitutional under that standard of review. I. A. The General Assembly of Maryland passed the FSA on April 4, 2013, the Governor signed it into law that May 16, and it became effective several months later on October 1.

The FSA provides that a person may neither “transport an assault weapon into the State” nor “possess, sell, offer to sell, transfer, purchase, or receive an assault weapon.” See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-303(a). The banned assault weapons include “assault long gun[s]” and “copycat weapon[s].” Id. § 4-301(d). The FSA defines an assault long gun as a rifle or shotgun “listed under § 5-101(r)(2) of the Public Safety Article,” including the “Colt AR-15,” “Bushmaster semi-auto rifle,” and “AK-47 in all forms.” See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-301(b); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-101(r)(2).

The list of prohibited rifles and shotguns consists of “specific assault weapons or their copies, regardless of which company produced and manufactured that assault weapon.” See Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-101 (r)(2) (emphasis added). The FSA provides a separate definition for' a copycat weapon that is premised on a weapon’s characteristics, rather than being identified by a list of specific firearms. In relevant part, a copycat weapon means: (

i) a semiautomatic centerfire rifle that can accept a detachable magazine and has any two of the following: 1. a folding stock; 2. a grenade launcher or flare launcher; or 3. a flash suppressor; (ii) a semiautomatic centerfire rifle that • has a fixed magazine with the capacity to accept more than 10 rounds; (iii) a semiautomatic centerfire rifle that has an overall length of less than 29 inches; (

v) a semiautomatic shotgun that has a folding stock; or (vi) a shotgun with a revolving cylinder. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-301(e)(1). The FSA excludes assault long guns — those enumerated in

section 5-101(r)(2) of the Public Safety

Article and their copies — from the definition of a copycat weapon. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-301(e)(2). In banning large-capacity magazines along with assault weapons, the FSA provides that “[a] person may not manufacture, sell, offer for sale, purchase, receive, or transfer a detachable magazine that has a capacity of more than 10 rounds of ammunition for a firearm.” See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-305(b).

A detachable magazine is defined as “an ammunition feeding device that can be removed readily from a firearm without requiring disas-sembly of the firearm action or without the use of a tool, including a bullet or cartridge.” Id. § 4-301(f). A person who violates the FSA is subject to criminal prosecution and imprisonment for up to three years plus a fine not exceeding $5,000. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-306(a).

A longer prison term is mandatory if a person uses an assault weapon or large-capacity magazine in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, i.e., five to twenty years for a first violation, and ten to twenty years for each subsequent violation. See id. § 4-306(b).

Under the FSA’s exceptions, “[a] licensed firearms dealer may continue to possess, sell, offer for sale, or transfer an assault long gun or a copycat weapon that the licensed firearms dealer lawfully possessed on or before October 1, 2013,” and “[a] person who lawfully possessed, has a purchase order for, or completed ari application to purchase an assault long gun or a copycat weapon before October 1, 2013, may ... possess and transport the assault long gun or copycat weapon.” See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-303(b)(2), (3)(i). The FSA does not ban the possession of a large-capacity magazine.

Further, the FSA explicitly allows the receipt and possession of.an assault weapon or large-capacity magazine by a retired Maryland law enforcement officer if the assault weapon or large-capacity magazine “is sold or transferred to the person by the law enforcement agency on retirement” or “was purchased or obtained by the person for official use with the law enforcement agency before retirement.” Id. § 4-302(7). B. On September 26, 2013, the plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint in the District of Maryland.

The following day, they requested a temporary restraining order from the district court, seeking to bar the defendants from enforcing the challenged provisions of the FSA once it took effect on October 1, 2013. The court conducted a hearing on October 1 and denied, the requested temporary restraining order from the bench. Thereafter, the parties agreed that the court should proceed to resolve the merits of the litigation on cross-motions for

summary judgment. The operative Third Amended Complaint, filed on November 22, 2013, asks for declaratory and injunctive relief. It alleges the FSA is facially unconstitutional in four respects: (1) the assault weapons ban contravenes the Second Amendment; (2) the prohibition against large-capacity magazines also violates the Second Amendment; (3) the provision allowing receipt and possession of assault weapons and large-capacity magazines by retired Maryland law enforcement officers contravenes the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) the provision outlawing “copies” of the rifles and shotguns enumerated in

section 5-101 (r)(2) of the Public Safety

Article violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by being too vague to provide adequate notice of the conduct proscribed. The plaintiffs include Stephen V. Kolbe and Andrew Turner, two Maryland residents who have asserted that they would purchase assault weapons and large-capacity magazines but for the FSA.

Other plaintiffs are firearms dealers in Maryland and firearms-related associations: Wink’s Sporting Goods, Incorporated; Atlantic Guns, Incorporated; Associated Gun Clubs of Baltimore, Incorporated; Maryland Shall Issue, Incorporated; Maryland State Rifle and Pistol Association, Incorporated; National Shooting Sports Foundation, Incorporated; and Maryland Licensed Firearms Dealers Association, Incorporated. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F.Supp.3d 768, 774 n.3 (D.

Md. 2014) (concluding that “a credible threat of prosecution under the [FSA] ” confers standing on individual plaintiffs Kolbe and Turner, and thus “jurisdiction is secure ... whether or not the additional plaintiffs have standing” (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 & n.9, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977))). The plaintiffs’ claims are made against four defendants in their official capacities: Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr., Governor of the State of Maryland, as successor to Martin J. O’Malley; Brian E. Frosh, the State’s Attorney General, as successor to Douglas F.

Gansler; Colonel William M. Pallozzi, Secretary of the Department of State Police and Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, as successor to Colonel Marcus L. Brown; and the Maryland State Police. We hereafter refer to the defendants collectively as the “State.” C. 1. In support of its motion for

summary judgment, the State proffered extensive uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that the assault weapons outlawed by the FSA are exceptionally lethal weapons of war. A prime example of the State’s evidence is that the most popular of the prohibited assault weapons — the AR-15 — is simply the semiautomatic version of the M16 rifle used by our military and others around the world. Accord Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 603, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (observing that “[t]he AR-15 is the civilian version of the military’s M-16 rifle, and is, unless modified, a semiautomatic weapon”).

The State’s evidence imparts that the AR-15 was developed after World War II for the U.S. military. It was designed as a selective-fire rifle — one that can be fired in either automatic mode (firing continuously as long as the trigger is depressed) or semiautomatic mode (firing one round of ammunition for each pull of the trigger and, after each round is fired, automatically loading the next).

In combat-style testing conducted in 1959, it was “discovered that a 7- or even 5-man squad armed with AR-15s could do as well or better in hit- and-kill potential ... than the traditional 11-man squad armed with M14 rifles,” which were the heavier selective-fire rifles then used by soldiers in the Army. See J.A. 930. Subsequent field testing in Vietnam, in 1962, revealed the AR-15 “to be a very lethal combat weapon” that was “well-liked ... for its size and light recoil.” Id. at 968.

Reports from that testing indicated that “the very high-velocity AR-15 projectiles” had caused “imputations of limbs, massive body wounds, and decapitations.” Id. Within the next few years, the Department of Defense purchased more than 100,000 AR-15 rifles for the Army and the Air Force, and the military changed the name “AR-15” to “M16.” By that time, the former Soviet Union was already producing the AK-47, a selective-fire rifle which, like the AR-15/M16, was developed for offensive use and has been adopted by mili-taries around the world.

Various firearms companies have since manufactured civilian versions of the AR-15 and AK-47 that are semiautomatic but otherwise retain the military features and capabilities of the fully automatic M16 and AK-47. Several other FSA-banned assault weapons are— like the AR-15 and semiautomatic AK-47— semiautomatic versions of maehineguns initially designed for military use. See, e.g., J.A. 1257 (UZI and Galil rifles); id. at 1260 (Fabrique National (“FN”) assault rifles); id. at 1261 (Steyr AUG rifles). The difference between the fully automatic and semiautomatic versions of those firearms is slight.

That is, the automatic firing of all the ammunition in a large-capacity thirty-round magazine takes about two seconds, whereas a semiautomatic rifle can empty the same magazine in as little as five seconds. See, e.g., J.A. 1120 (“[S]emiautomatic weapons can be fired at rates of 300 to 500 rounds per minute, making them virtually indistinguishable in practical effect from machine-guns.”). Moreover, soldiers and police officers are often advised to choose and use semiautomatic fire, because it is more accurate and lethal than automatic fire in many combat and law enforcement situations.

The AR-15, semiautomatic AK-47, and other assault weapons banned by the FSA have a number of features designed to achieve their principal purpose — “killing or disabling the enemy” on the battlefield. See J.A. 735. For example, some of the banned assault weapons incorporate flash suppressors, which are designed to help conceal a shooter’s position by dispersing muzzle flash. Others possess barrel shrouds, which enable “spray-firing” by cooling the barrel and providing the shooter a “convenient grip.” Id. at 1121.

Additional military features include folding and telescoping stocks, pistol grips, grenade launchers, night sights, and the ability to accept bayonets and large-capacity magazines. Several manufacturers of the banned assault weapons, in advertising them to the civilian market, tout their products’ battlefield prowess. Colt’s Manufacturing Company boasts that its AR-15 rifles are manufactured “based on the same military standards and specifications as the United States issue Colt M16 rifle and M4 carbine.” See J.A. 1693.

Bushmaster describes its Adaptive Combat Rifle as “the ultimate military combat weapons system” that is “[b]uilt specifically for law enforcement and tactical markets.” Id. at 1697. In short, like their fully automatic counterparts, the banned assault weapons “are firearms designed for the battlefield, for the soldier to be able to shoot a large number of rounds across a battlefield at a high rate of speed.” See J.A. 206.

Their design results in “a capability for lethality — -more wounds, more serious, in more victims — far beyond that of other firearms in general, including other semiautomatic guns.” Id. at 1121-22. Correspondingly, the large-capacity magazines prohibited by the FSA allow a shooter to fire more than ten rounds without having to pause to reload, and thus “are particularly designed and most suitable for military and law enforcement applications.” See J.A. 891. Such magazines are “designed to enhance” a shooter’s “capacity to shoot multiple human targets very rapidly.” Id. at 1151.

Large-capacity magazines are a feature common, but not unique, to the banned assault weapons, many of which are capable of accepting magazines of thirty, fifty, or even 100 rounds. With limited exceptions, M16s and other machineguns have been banned nationwide since 1986. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(l) (rendering it “unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun”); 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (defining a “machinegun” as “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger”).

By that time, the private ownership of machineguns was substantially circumscribed as a result of heavy taxes and strict regulations imposed almost fifty years earlier by the National Firearms Act of 1934. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939) (outlining 1934 Act’s requirements for transferring and registering firearms, including short-barreled shotguns and ma-chineguns, and rejecting Second Amendment challenge thereto). There have also been various state and local prohibitions against the receipt, possession, and transfer of machineguns.

In 1994, Congress enacted a ban on certain semiautomatic military-style.weapons and magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds. The federal ban applied only to assault weapons and magazines manufactured after September 13, 1994, however, and it expired a decade later on September 13, 2004. Just months before Congress passed the 1994 federal assault weapons ban, Maryland had enacted a state law prohibiting assault pistols and the transfer of magazines with a capacity in excess of twenty rounds.

The same state law regulated what the FSA now identifies as assault long guns by requiring that purchasers first complete an application and undergo a background check. Maryland replaced that law with the FSA in 2013, spurred by Newtown and other mass shootings. The State has calculated that — accepting the plaintiffs’ estimate that there were at least 8 million FSA-banned assault weapons in circulation in the United States by 2013 — those weapons comprised less than 3% of the more than 300 million firearms in this country.

Moreover, premised on the plaintiffs’ evidence that owners of the banned assault weapons possessed an average of 3.1 of them in 2013, the State has reckoned that less than 1% of Americans owned such a weapon that year. At the same time, according to the State’s evidence, the FSA-banned assault weapons have been used disproportionately to their ownership in mass shootings and the murders of law enforcement officers. Even more frequently, such incidents have involved large-capacity magazines.

One study of sixty-two mass shootings between 1982 and 2012, for example, found that the perpetrators were armed with assault rifles in 21% of the massacres and with large-capacity magazines in 50% or more (as it was unknown to the researchers whether large-capacity magazines were involved in many of the cases). Another study determined that assault weapons, including long guns and handguns, were used in 16% of the murders of on-duty law enforcement officers in 1994, and that large-capacity magazines were used in 31% to 41% of those murders.

The banned assault weapons have also been used in other crimes, including the infamous “D.C. Sniper” shootings in 2002, in which an AR-15type Bushmaster rifle was used to kill and critically injure more than a dozen randomly selected victims, including several in Maryland. The State has emphasized that, when the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are used, more shots are fired and more fatalities and injuries result than when shooters use other firearms and magazines.

The banned assault weapons further pose a heightened risk to civilians in that “rounds from assault weapons have the ability to easily penetrate most materials used in standard home construction, car doors, and similar materials.” See J.A. 279. Criminals armed with the banned assault weapons possess a “military-style advantage” in firefights with law enforcement officers, as such weapons “allow criminals to effectively engage law enforcement officers from great distances” and “their rounds easily pass through the soft body armor worn by most law enforcement officers.” See id. at 227, 265.

For their part, large-capacity magazines enable shooters to inflict mass casualties while depriving victims and law enforcement officers of opportunities to escape or overwhelm the shooters while they reload their weapons. Even in the hands of law-abiding citizens, large-capacity magazines are particularly dangerous. The State’s evidence demonstrates that, when inadequately trained civilians fire weapons equipped with large-capacity magazines, they tend to fire more rounds than necessary and thus endanger more bystanders.

The State has also underscored the lack of evidence that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are well-suited to self-defense. Neither the plaintiffs nor Maryland law enforcement officials could identify a single incident in which a Marylander has used a military-style rifle or shotgun, or.needed to fire more than ten rounds, to protect herself. Although self-defense is a conceivable use of the banned assault weapons, the State’s evidence reflects — consistent with the Supreme Court’s Heller decision — that most individuals choose to keep other firearms for that purpose.

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (emphasizing that handguns are “overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-defense]”). Moreover, the State’s evidence substantiates “that it is rare for a person, when using a firearm in self-defense, to fire more than ten rounds.” See J.A. 649. Studies of “armed citizen” stories collected by the National Rifle Association, covering 1997-2001 and 2011-2013, found that the average number of shots fired in self-defense was 2.2 and 2.1, respectively. Id. at 650.

In support of the FSA, the State garnered evidence showing that the prohibitions against assault weapons and large-capacity magazines will promote public safety by reducing the availability of those armaments to mass shooters and other criminals, by diminishing their especial threat to law enforcement officers, and by hindering their unintentional misuse by civilians. The State does not expect the FSA to eradicate all gun crimes and accidents, but rather to curtail those that result in more shots fired and more deaths .and injuries because they are committed with military-style firearms and magazines.

The State’s evidence indicates that the FSA will reduce the availability of the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines to criminals by “reducing their availability overall.” See J.A. 228. That is because criminals usually obtain their firearms through straw purchases, by buying them on the secondary market, or by stealing them from law-abiding persons, and most criminals “are simply not dedicated enough to a particular type of firearm or magazine to go to great lengths to acquire something that is not readily available.” Id. at 282.

The State has also pointed to an important lesson learned from Newtown (where nine children were able to run from a targeted classroom while the gunman paused to change out a large-capacity thirty-round magazine), Tucson (where the shooter was finally tackled and restrained by bystanders while reloading his firearm), and Aurora (where a 100-round drum magazine was emptied without any significant break in the firing). That is, reducing the number of rounds that can be fired without reloading increases the odds that lives will be spared in a mass shooting.

For example, a shooter’s use of ten-round magazines — rather than those that hold thirty, fifty, or 100 rounds — would for every 100 rounds fired afford six to nine more chances for bystanders or law enforcement to intervene during a pause in firing, six to nine more chances for something to go wrong with a magazine during a change, six to nine more chances for the shooter to have problems quickly changing a magazine under intense pressure, and six to nine more chances for potential victims to find safety during a pause in firing. See J.A. 266.

Thus, the State has justified the FSA on the ground that limiting a shooter to a ten-round magazine could “mean the difference between life and death for many people.” Id. 2. For their part, the plaintiffs have purported to dispute the State’s evidence equating the FSA-banned assault weapons with the M16, but have not produced evidence actually demonstrating .that the banned assault weapons are less dangerous than or materially distinguishable from military arms. Otherwise, the plaintiffs have emphasized the popularity of the banned assault weapons, particularly the AR-15, semiautomatic AK-47, and their copies.

Those weapons are often referred to by the plaintiffs, and in their evidence, as “modern sporting rifles.” As previously mentioned, the plaintiffs have asserted that there were at least 8 million FSA-banned assault weapons in circulation in the United States by 2013. Rifles based on the AR-15 and AK-47 accounted for approximately 20% of firearm sales in the United States in 2012, and the banned assault weapons comprised between 18% and 30% of all regulated firearm transfers in Maryland in 2013.

The plaintiffs’ evidence reflects that, since it was first marketed to the public in 1963, “[t]he AR-15 has become the most popular civilian rifle design in America, and is made in many variations by many companies.” See J.A. 2259. The plaintiffs have also focused on the popularity of large-capacity magazines, tendering evidence that in the United States between 1990 and 2012, magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds numbered around 75 million, or 46% of all magazines owned.

Most pistols are manufactured with magazines holding ten to seventeen rounds, and many popular rifles are manufactured with magazines holding twenty or thirty rounds. Firearms capable of firing more than ten rounds without reloading may have existed since the late sixteenth century, and magazines with a capacity of between ten and twenty rounds have been on the civilian market for more than a hundred years. Individual plaintiffs Kolbe and Turner have averred that they wish to own banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines for self-defense.

The plaintiffs have more generally asserted that many owners of assault weapons cite home protection as a reason for keeping those weapons, along with other lawful purposes such as hunting and competitive marksmanship. The plaintiffs regard large-capacity magazines as especially useful for self-defense, because it is difficult for a civilian to change a magazine while under the stress of defending herself and her family from an unexpected attack.

Moreover, a civilian firing rounds in self-defense will frequently miss her assailant, rendering it “of paramount importance that [she] have 'quick and ready access to ammunition in quantities sufficient to provide a meaningful opportunity to defend herself and/or her loved ones.” See J.A. 2123. To refute.the theory that the FSA will effectuate Maryland’s goal of protecting its citizens and law enforcement officers, the plaintiffs have pointed to a variety of evidence.

For example, the FSA does not disallow the Colt AR-15 Sporter H-BAR rifle, which the plaintiffs’ evidence suggests “could be made into a compact lightweight short-barrel AR pattern rifle identical to the restricted models” while remaining “exempted from the restrictions of the law.” See J.A. 2270-71.

The plaintiffs’ evidence also indicates that rounds from firearms not prohibited by the FSA are capable of penetrating building materials and soft body armor; that “[t]he banned firearms are almost never used in crimes”; that, “in 2012, there was a greater probability that a person in the United States would be killed by someone strangling them than by an assault rifle in a mass shooting”; and that “[m]ore officers are killed in car accidents than with the banned firearms.” See id. at 2160, 2280-81, 2871-97.

Additionally, the plaintiffs have emphasized that, because the FSA does not prohibit the possession of large-capacity magazines, a criminal can legally purchase those magazines in another state and return with them to Maryland. II. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in ruling in favor of the State on the parties’ cross-motions for

summary judgment. More specifically, the plaintiffs seek reversal of the adverse

summary judgment award and entry of judgment in their favor. We review de novo the district court’s

summary judgment decision. See Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2013). With respect to each side’s motion, “we are required to view the facts and all justifiable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in order to determine whether ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. at 312-13 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). III. We begin with the’ plaintiffs’ claims that the FSA’s assault weapons ban and its prohibition against large-capacity magazines contravene the Second Amendment. According to the plaintiffs, they are entiT tied to

summary judgment on the simple premise that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are protected by the Second Amendment and, thus, the FSA is unconstitutional per, se. We conclude, to the contrary, that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are not constitutionally protected arms. Even assuming the Second Amendment reaches those weapons and magazines, however, the FSA is subject to — and readily survives — the intermediate scrutiny standard of review. Consequently, as to the Second Amendment claims, we must affirm the district court’s award of

summary judgment to the State. A. The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” See U.S. Const, amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court recognized that the Second Amendment is divided into a prefatory clause (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, ... ”) and an operative clause (“... the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). See 554 U.S. 570, 577, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008).

The Heller majority rejected the proposition that, because of its prefatory clause, the Second Amendment “protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service.” Id. Rather, the Court determined that, by its operative clause, the Second Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Id. at 592, 128 S.Ct. 2783.

The Court also explained that the operative clause “fits perfectly” with the prefatory clause, in that creating the individual right to keep and bear arms served to preserve the militia that consisted of self-armed citizens at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification. Id. at 598, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Second Amendment’s “core protection,” the Heller Court announced, is “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” See 554 U.S. at 634-35, 128 S.Ct. 2783.

Concomitantly, the Court emphasized that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,” in that it is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Court cautioned, for example, that it was not “casting] doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id.

Of utmost significance here, the Heller Court recognized that “another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms” is that the right “extends only to certain types of weapons.” See 554 U.S. at 623, 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (discussing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939)). The Court explained that “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,” including “short-barreled shotguns” and “machineguns.” Id. at 624-25, 128 S.Ct. 2783.

The Court elsewhere described “the sorts of weapons protected” as being “those in common use at the time,” and observed that such “limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.” Id. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter aha, 4 Blackstone 148-49 (1769)). Continuing on, the Heller Court specified that “weapons that are most useful in military service — M-16 rifles and the like — may be banned” without infringement upon the Second Amendment right. See 554 U.S. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783.

The Court recognized that the lack of constitutional protection for today’s military weapons might inspire the argument that “the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause.” Id. The Court explained, however, that the fit between the prefatory and operative clauses is. properly measured “at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification,” when “the conception of the militia ... was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.” Id.

The fit is not measured today, when a militia may “require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large,” including arms that “could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks.” Id. It was therefore immaterial to the Court’s

interpretation of the Second Amendment that “modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right.” Id. at 627-28, 128 S.Ct. 2783. And thus, there was simply no inconsistency between the Court’s

interpretation of the Second Amendment and its pronouncement that some of today’s weapons lack constitutional protection precisely because they “are most useful in military service.” Deciding the particular Second Amendment issues before it, the. Heller Court deemed the District of Columbia’s prohibition against the possession of handguns in the home to be unconstitutional. See 554 U.S. at 628-29, 128 S.Ct. 2783.

Without identifying and utilizing a particular standard for its review, the Court concluded that, “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s home and family would fail constitutional muster.” Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). The Heller Court clearly was concerned that the District of Columbia’s ban extended “to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.” See 554 U.S. at 628, 128 S.Ct. 2783.

Significantly, however, the Court also was troubled by the particular type of weapon prohibited — handguns.

Indeed, the Court repeatedly made comments underscoring the status of handguns as “the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s home and family,” including the following: • “The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of arms that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] lawful purpose [of self-defense]”; • “It is no answer to say ... that it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.

It is enough to note ... that the American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon”; and, • “Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.” See id. at 628-29, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained therein, the Heller decision was not intended “to clarify the entire field” of Second Amendment jurisprudence. See 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Since then, the Supreme Court decided in McDonald v.

City of Chicago “that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States,” but did not otherwise amplify Hellers analysis. See 561 U.S. 742, 750, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). Just recently, in Caetano v.

Massachusetts, the Court reiterated two points made by Heller: first, “that the Second Amendment ‘extends ... to ... arms ... that were not in existence at the time of the founding’ ”; and, second, that there is no merit to “the proposition ‘that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.’ ” See Caetano, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1027, 1028, 194 L.Ed.2d 99 (2016) (per curiam) (alterations in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, 624-25, 128 S.Ct. 2783) (remanding for further consideration of whether Second Amendment protects stun guns).

The lower courts have grappled with Heller in a variety of Second Amendment cases. Like most of our sister courts of appeals, we have concluded that “a two-part approach to Second Amendment claims seems appropriate under Heller.” See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 788 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v.

Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); Nat'l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Hel ler II”); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703-04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010).

Pursuant to that two-part approach, we first ask “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” See Chester, 628 F.3d at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the answer is no, “then the challenged law is valid.” Id. If, however, the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct protected by the Second Amendment, we next “apply[] an appropriate form of means-end scrutiny.” Id.

Because “Heller left open the level of scrutiny applicable to review a law that burdens conduct protected under the Second Amendment, other than to indicate that rational-basis review would not apply in this context,” we must “select between strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny.” Id. at 682. In pinpointing the applicable standard of review, we may “look[ ] to the First Amendment as a guide.” Id.

With respect to a claim made pursuant to the First or the Second Amendment, “the level of scrutiny we apply depends on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.” Id. To satisfy strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the challenged law is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82, 117 S.Ct. 1925, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997). Strict scrutiny is thereby “the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” See City of Boerne v.

Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). The less onerous standard of intermediate scrutiny requires the government to show that the challenged law “is reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest.” See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (“[T]he government must demonstrate under the intermediate scrutiny standard that there is a reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and a substantial governmental objective.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Intermediate scrutiny does not demand that the challenged law “be the least intrusive means of achieving the relevant government objective, or that there be no burden whatsoever on the individual right in question.” See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 474. In other words, there must be “a fit that is ‘reasonable, not perfect.’ ” See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir. 2012)).

Until this Second Amendment challenge to the FSA’s bans on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, we have not had occasion to identify the standard of review applicable to a law that bars law-abiding citizens from possessing arms in their homes. In Masciandaro, we “assume[d] that any law that would burden the ‘fundamental,’ core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny.” See 638 F.3d at 470.

Thereafter, in Woollard, we noted that Masciandaro had “ ‘assume[d]’ ” any inside-the-home regulation would be subject to strict scrutiny, and we described the plaintiff’s related — and unsuccessful— contention that “the right to arm oneself in public [is] on equal footing with the right to arm oneself at home, necessitating that we apply strict scrutiny in our review of [an outside-the-home regulation].” See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876, 878 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470).

Notably, however, neither Mascian-daro nor Woollard purported to, or had reason to, decide whether strict scrutiny always, or even ever, applies to laws burdening the right of self-defense in the home. See also, e.g., United States v. Hosford, 848 F.3d 161, 168 (4th Cir. 2016) (declining to apply strict scrutiny to a firearms prohibition that “addresses only conduct occurring outside the home,” without deciding if or when strict scrutiny applies to a law reaching inside the home). B.

Guided by our two-part approach to Second Amendment claims, but lacking precedent of this Court or the Supreme Court examining the constitutionality of a law substantively similar to the FSA, the district court began its analysis by questioning whether the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are protected by the Second Amendment.

Addressing assault weapons in particular, the Opinion disclosed the court’s “inclin[ation] to find the weapons fall outside Second Amendment protection as dangerous and unusual,” based on “serious[ ] doubts that [they] are commonly possessed for lawful purposes, particularly self-defense in the home.” See Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F.Supp.3d 768, 788 (D. Md. 2014).

The Opinion further observed that, “[g]iven that assault rifles like the AR-15 are essentially the functional equivalent of M-16s — and arguably more effective — the [reasoning of Heller that M-16s could be banned as dangerous and unusual] would seem to apply here.” Id. at 789 n.29 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783). Ultimately, however, the district court elected to assume that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are constitutionally protected, and thus that the FSA “places some burden on the Second Amendment right.” See Kolbe, 42 F.Supp.3d at 789.

The Opinion then identified intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review, because the FSA “does not seriously impact a person’s ability to defend himself in the home.” Id. at 790. In so ruling, the court recognized that the FSA “does not ban the quintessential weapon — the handgun — used for self-defense in the home” or “prevent an individual from keeping a suitable weapon for protection in the home'.” Id. at 790.

Finally, applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, the Opinion recognized that the State of Maryland possesses an interest that is not just substantial — but compelling: — “in providing for public safety and preventing crime.” Id. at 792. A reasonable fit between that interest and the FSA was shown, according to the Opinion, by evidence of the heightened risks that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines pose to civilians and law enforcement officers. See id. at 793-97. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the FSA “does not violate the Second Amendment.” Id. at 797.

In its analysis, the district court relied in part on the 2011 decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Heller II. The Heller II court assumed that the District’s prohibitions against military-style assault rifles and large-capacity magazines impinge upon the Second Amendment right and then upheld the bans under the intermediate scrutiny standard. See 670 F.3d at 1261-64.

After the district court issued its Opinion, statewide bans on the AR-15 and semiautomatic AK-47, other assault weapons, and large-capacity magazines in New York and Connecticut were similarly sustained by the Second Circuit’s 2015 decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n.

There, the court of appeals proceeded “on the assumption that [the challenged] laws ban weapons protected by the Second Amendment”; determined “that intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny is appropriate”; and concluded “that New York and Connecticut have adequately established a substantial relationship between the prohibition of both semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines and the important — indeed, compelling — state interest in controlling crime.” See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 257, 260, 264.

The Supreme Court recently denied the Connecticut plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari in that matter. See Shew v. Malloy, — U.S. ——, 136 S.Ct. 2486, 195 L.Ed.2d 822 (2016). In the time period between Heller II and N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, two other courts of appeals refused to enjoin or strike down bans on assault weapons or large-capacity magazines. Affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction in Fyock v.

City of Sunnyvale, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court neither “clearly err[ed] in finding, based on the record before it, that a regulation restricting possession of [large-capacity magazines] burdens conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment,” nor “abused its discretion by applying intermediate scrutiny or by finding that [the regulation] survived intermediate scrutiny.” See 779 F.3d 991, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2015). Thereafter, in Friedman v.

City of Highland Park, the Seventh Circuit upheld prohibitions against assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, albeit without applying either intermediate or strict scrutiny.

Under Friedman’s reasoning, “instead of trying to decide what ‘level’ of scrutiny applies, and how it works,” it is more suitable “to ask whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or those that have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.” See 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 447, 193 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015). C.

We could resolve the Second Amendment aspects of this appeal by adopting the district court’s sound analysis and thereby follow the lead of our distinguished colleagues on the Second and District of Columbia Circuits. That is, we could simply assume that the assault weapons arid large-capacity magazines outlawed in Maryland are protected by the Second Amendment and then deem the FSA constitutional under the intermediate scrutiny standard of review.

It is more appropriate, however, in light of the dissent’s view that such constitutional protection exists, that we first acknowledge what the Supreme Court’s Heller decision makes clear: Because the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are “like” “M-16 rifles” — “weapons that are most useful in military service” — they are among thpse arms that the Second Amendment does not shield. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (recognizing that “M-16 rifles and the like” are not constitutionally protected). 1.

On the issue of whether the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are protected by the Second Amendment, the Heller decision raises various questions. Those include: How many assault weapons and large-capacity magazines must there be to consider them “in common use at the time”? In resolving that issue, should we focus on how many assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are owned; or on how many owners there are; or on how many of the weapons and magazines are merely in circulation? Do we count the weapons and magazines in Maryland only, or in all of the United States?

Is being “in common use at the time” coextensive with being “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”? Must the assault weapons and'large-capacity magazines be possessed for any “lawful purpo.se[ ]” or, more particularly and importantly, the “protection of one’s home and family”? Is not being “in common use at the time” the same as being “dangerous and unusual”? Is the standard “dangerous and unusual,” or is it actually “dangerous or unusual”? See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, 627, 629, 128 S.Ct. 2783; see also N.Y.

State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 254-57; Friedman, 784 F.3d at 408-10; Fyock, 779 F.3d at 997-98; Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1260-61. Thankfully, however, we need not answer all those difficult questions today, because Heller also presents us with a dispositive and relatively easy inquiry: Are the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines “like” “M-16 rifles,” i.e., “weapons that are most useful in military service,” and thus outside the ambit of the Second Amendment? See 554 U.S. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The answer to that dispositive and relatively easy inquiry is plainly in the affirmative.

Simply put, AR-15-type rifles are “like” M16 rifles under any standard definition of that term. See, e.g., Webster’s New International Dictionary 1431 (2d ed. 1948) (defining “like” as “[h]aving the same, or nearly the same, appearance, qualities, or characteristics; similar”); The New Oxford American Dictionary 982 (2d ed. 2005) (defining “like” as “having the same characteristics or qualities as; similar to”).

Although an M16 rifle is capable of fully automatic fire and the AR-15 is limited to semiautomatic fire, their rates of fire (two seconds and as little as five seconds, respectively, to empty a thirty-round magazine) are nearly identical. Moreover, in many situations, the semiautomatic fire of an AR-15 is more accurate and lethal than the automatic fire of an M16. Otherwise, the AR-15 shares the military features— the very qualities and characteristics — that make the M16 a devastating and lethal weapon of war. In any event, we need not rely solely on dictionary

definitions, because Heller itself expounds on what it means to be “like” the M16. As the plaintiffs would have it, Heller drew a “bright line” between fully automatic and semiautomatic firearms, and thus the AR-15 cannot be considered “like” the M16 for purposes of the Second Amendment. That contention is baseless, however, because Heller did not restrict the meaning of “M-16 rifles and the like” to only fully automatic weapons.

Rather, Heller described “M-16 rifles and the like” more broadly, specifically identifying them as being those “weapons that are most useful in military service.” Therefore, we identify the line that Heller drew as not being between fully automatic and semiautomatic firearms, but between weapons that are most useful in military service and those that are not. Whatever their other potential uses— including self-defense — the AR-15, other assault weapons, -and large-capacity magazines prohibited by the FSA are unquestionably most useful in military service.

That is, the banned assault weapons are designed to “kill[ ] or disabl[e] the enemy” on the battlefield. See J.A. 735. The very features that qualify a firearm as a banned assault weapon — such as flash suppressors, barrel shrouds, folding and telescoping stocks, pistol grips, grenade launchers, night sights, and the ability to accept bayonets and large-capacity magazines — “serve specific, combat-functional ends.” See id. at 1120.

And, “[tjhe net effect of these military combat features is a capability for lethality — more wounds, more serious, in more victims — far beyond that of other firearms in general, including other semiautomatic guns.” Id. at 1121-22. Likewise, the banned large-capacity magazines “are particularly designed and most suitable for military and law enforcement applications.” See J.A. 891 (noting that large-capacity magazines are meant to “provide[] soldiers with a large ammunition supply and the ability to reload rapidly”).

Large-capacity magazines enable a shooter to hit “multiple human targets very rapidly”; “contribute to the unique function of any assault weapon to deliver extraordinary firepower”; and are a “uniquely military feature[]” of both the banned assault weapons and other firearms to which they may be attached. See id. at 1151. Because the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are clearly most useful in military service, we are compelled by Heller to recognize that those weapons and magazines are not constitutionally protected. On that basis, we affirm the district court’s award of

summary judgment in favor of the State with respect to the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claims. 2. In the alternative, assuming that the assault weapons and large-capacity magazines prohibited by the FSA are somehow entitled to Second Amendment protection, we conclude that the district court properly upheld the FSA as constitutional under the intermediate scrutiny standard of review. a.

First of all, intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard because the FSA does not severely burden the core protection of the Second Amendment, i.e., the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms for self-defense in the home. See N.Y.

State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 260 (“Heightened scrutiny need not ... be akin to strict scrutiny when a law burdens the Second Amendment — particularly when that burden does not constrain the Amendment’s core area, of protection.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chester, 628 F.3d at 682 (“A severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense should require strong justification. But less severe burdens on the right ... may be more easily justified.” (quoting United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 813-14 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010))).

The FSA bans only certain military-style weapons and detachable magazines, leaving citizens free to protect themselves with a plethora of other firearms and ammunition. Those include magazines holding ten or fewer rounds, nonautomatic and some semiautomatic long guns, and — most importantly — handguns. The handgun, of course, is “the quintessential self-defense weapon.” See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629, 128 S.Ct. 2783. In contrast, there is scant evidence in the record before us that the FSÁ-banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are possessed, or even suitable, for self-protection.

See Kolbe, 42 F.Supp.3d at 791 (observing that, although the FSA prohibits “a class of weapons that the plaintiffs desire to use for self-defense in the home, there is no evidence demonstrating their removal will significantly impact the core protection of the Second Amendment” (emphasis and citation omitted)). Notably, the plaintiffs invoke the district court’s passing reference to “a class of weapons” in an effort to frame the AR-15 and other FSA-banned assault weapons as a “class” entitled to the same treatment afforded handguns in Heller.

See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (deeming the District of Columbia’s handgun ban to be unconstitutional because it prohibited “an entire class of arms that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-defense]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The initial weakness in the plaintiffs’ theory is that the banned assault weapons cannot fairly be said to be a “class” like that encompassing all handguns, in that the banned assault weapons are just some of the semiautomatic rifles and shotguns in existence. Accord N.Y.

State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 260 (explaining that “New York and Connecticut have not banned an entire class of arms,” but rather “only a limited subset of semiautomatic firearms, which contain one or more enumerated military-style features”). The more critical flaw in the plaintiffs’ theory is that it ignores the status of handguns as not merely “an entire class of arms,” but as “an entire class of arms that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-defense].” See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As the Third Circuit recently explained, “Heller gives special consideration to the District of Columbia’s categorical ban on handguns because they ‘are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home.’ This does not mean that a categorical ban on any particular type of bearable arm is unconstitutional.” See United States v. One

(1) Palmetto State Armory PA-15 Machinegun Receiver/Frame, Unknown Caliber Serial No.: LW001804, 822 F.3d 136, 144 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629, 128 S.Ct. 2783). At bottom, the FSA’s prohibitions against assault weapons and large-capacity magazines simply do “not effectively disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend themselves.” See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 260 (quoting Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1262). Nor can the FSA be compared to the handgun ban struck down as unconstitutional in Heller.

Hence, assuming the Second Amendment protects the FSA-banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, the FSA is subject to the intermediate scrutiny standard of review. b. Turning to the application of intermediate scrutiny, the FSA survives such review because its prohibitions against assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are — as they must be — “reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest.” See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471. To be sure, Maryland’s interest in the protection of its citizenry and the public safety is not only substantial, but compelling.

See id. at 473 (noting that, “[although the government’s interest need not be ‘compelling’ under intermediate scrutiny, cases have sometimes described the government’s interest in public safety in that fashion” (citing cases)). The plaintiffs have acknowledged that Maryland has a compelling interest in protecting the public, but argue that such purpose cannot be advanced by the FSA.

In support, the plaintiffs have pointed to evidence that non-banned firearms have some of the same attributes as the FSA-banned assault weapons, including the capability to penetrate building materials and soft body armor; that the banned assault weapons are used in few crimes, especially compared to handguns; and that the FSA will not prevent criminals from obtaining the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines from other states. For its part, the State contends that there is a reasonable fit between the FSA and Maryland’s interest in public safety.

The State emphasizes the military-style features of the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines .that render them particularly attractive to mass shooters and other criminals, including those targeting police. The same military-style features pose heightened risks to innocent civilians and law enforcement officers— certainly because of the capability to penetrate building materials and soft body armor, but also because of an amalgam of other capabilities that allow a shooter to cause mass devastation in a very short amount of time.

Upholding the prohibitions against assault weapons and large-capacity magazines in New York and Connecticut, the Second Circuit summarized that, [a]t least since the enactment of the federal assault-weapons ban, semiautomatic assault weapons have been understood to pose unusual risks. When used, these weapons tend to result in more numerous wounds, more serious wounds, and more victims. These weapons are disproportionately used in crime, and particularly in criminal mass shootings like the attack in Newtown. They are also disproportionately used to kill law enforcement officers. See N.Y.

State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 262 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 263 (“The record evidence suggests that large-capacity magazines may present even greater dangers to crime and violence than assault weapons alone, in part because they are more prevalent and can be and are used in both assault weapons and non-assault weapons.” (footnote, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the plaintiffs fault the FSA for not targeting the firearms most used in crime and for not thereby promising to reduce gun crimes in Maryland overall, that is not the FSA’s purpose.

Rather, as the State has described it, the primary goal of the FSA “is to reduce the availability of assault long guns and large-capacity magazines so that when a criminal acts, he does so with a less dangerous weapon and less severe consequences.” See Br. of Ap-pellees 42. Another objective is to prevent the unintentional misuse of assault weapons and large-capacity magazines by otherwise law-abiding citizens.

Maryland relied on evidence that, by reducing the availability of such weapons and magazines overall, the FSA will curtail their availability to criminals and lessen their use in mass shootings, other crimes, and firearms accidents. The judgment made by the.General Assembly of Maryland in enacting the FSA is precisely the type of judgment that legislatures are allowed to make without second-guessing by a court. That is, “[i]t is the legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy judgments.” See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 881 (quoting Kachalsky v.

Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 99 (2d Cir. 2012)). And, “we must ‘accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of [the legislature].’ ” See Satellite Broad. & Commc’ns Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 356 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“Turner /”)). Our obligation is simply “to assure that, in formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.” See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666, 114 S.Ct. 2445; accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.

FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (“Turner II”). Being satisfied that there is substantial evidence indicating that the FSA’s prohibitions against assault weapons and large-capacity magazines will advance Maryland’s goals, we conclude that the FSA survives intermediate scrutiny. Simply put, the State has shown all that is required: a reasonable, if not perfect, fit between the FSA and Maryland’s interest in protecting public safety. That is our alternative basis for affirming the district court’s award of

summary judgment in favor of the State with respect to the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claims. D. We are confident that our approach here is entirely faithful to the Heller decision and appropriately protective of the core Second Amendment right. In contrast, our dissenting colleagues would expand that constitutional protection to even exceptionally lethal weapons of war and then decree that strict scrutiny is applicable to any prohibition against the possession of those or other protected weapons in the home.

At bottom, the dissent concludes that the so-called popularity of the banned assault weapons — which were owned by less than 1% of Americans as recently as 2013— inhibits any efforts by the other 99% to stop those weapons from being used again and again to perpetrate mass slaughters. We simply cannot agree. 1. To start with, the dissent would extend Second Amendment protection to each and every weapon deemed sufficiently popular — no matter how violent or dangerous that weapon is. See post at 152-60 (Trax-ler, J., dissenting).

Therefore, it is somehow of immense significance to the dissent that, “in 2012, the number of AR- and AK-style weapons manufactured and imported into the United States was more than double the number of the most commonly sold vehicle in the U.S., the Ford F-150.” Id. at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, it is entirely an irrelevance if “some court concludes [an AR-15 or other banned weapon] has militarily useful features or is too dangerous for civilians to possess.” Id. at 157.

Under the dissent’s popularity test, whether an arm is constitutionally protected depends not on the extent of its dangerousness, but on how widely it is circulated to law-abiding citizens by the time a bar on its private possession has been enacted and challenged. Consider, for example, short-barreled shotguns and machineguns. But for the statutes that have long circumscribed their possession, they too could be sufficiently popular to find safe haven in the Second Amendment. Consider further a state-of-the-art and extraordinarily lethal new weapon.

That new weapon would need only be flooded on the market prior to any governmental prohibition in order to ensure it constitutional protection. As the dissent points out, the same concerns about the popularity test were raised by Justice Breyer in his four-justice Heller dissent. See post at 153 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 720-21, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). In our dissenting colleagues’ view, “the Heller majority was obviously unmoved by [Justice Breyer’s dissent],” thus indicating that Heller adopted the popularity test. Id.

Actually, however, Justice Breyer simply expressed that it was not “at all clear to [him] how the majority decides which loaded ‘arms’ a homeowner may keep,” and then he explained why popularity is not a standard that makes sense. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 720-21, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Meanwhile, the Heller majority said nothing to confirm that it was sponsoring the popularity test.

Nevertheless, our dissenting colleagues also claim support for the popularity test from the recent two-justice concurring opinion in Caetano, which propounded that, under Heller, “the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class of arms. commonly used for lawful purposes.” See Caetano, 136 S.Ct. at 1031 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Of course, that reading of Heller failed to garner a Court majority in Caetano. We reject the

interpretation of Heller embraced by our dissenting colleagues because it is incompatible with Hellers, clear and dispositive pronouncement: There is no Second Amendment protection for “M-16 rifles and the like,” i.e., “weapons that are most useful in military service.” See 554 U.S. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783. It would be incongruous to say that Heller makes an exception for such weapons if they are sufficiently popular.

That is, although we do not endeavor today to resolve the difficult questions raised by Heller concerning the interplay of “in common use at the time,” “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,” and “dangerous and unusual,” see id. at 625, 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783, we are entirely convinced that the correct answers to such inquiries cannot and do not culminate in the dissent’s popularity test. . In seeking to impugn our ruling on Second Amendment protection, the dissent accuses the en banc majority of a laundry list of misfeasance.

That list includes improperly conjuring up “a heretofore unknown ‘test’ ” of “whether the firearm in question is ‘most useful in military service’ flouting “basic fairness” by neither affording an opportunity to the parties (particularly the plaintiffs) “to squarely meet the issue” nor remanding for the district court to address the issue in the first instance; employing our own “military opinion” to conclude that the assault weapons and large-capacity magazines prohibited by Maryland’s FSA are not constitutionally protected; and “abandoning] the

summary judgment standard and reaching] a conclusion based on facts viewed in the light most favorable to the State.” See post at 155-56 & nn.4-5. With all respect, those accusations are entirely unfounded. Although our ruling ón Second Amendment protection may seem novel in some quarters, it is solidly predicated on the plain language of Heller and was raised and argued by the State in both the district court proceedings and this appeal. See supra note 10.

Specifically, the State has consistently asserted that — because the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are “like” “M-16 rifles” and “most useful in military service” — they are “dangerous and unusual weapons” beyond the reach of the Second Amendment. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783; see also Br. of Appellees at 2-4, 16-23; Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. at 3-10, 32-37, Kolbe v. O’Malley, No. 1:13-cv-02841 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2014), ECF No. 44.

That very argument was acknowledged and discussed both in the district court’s Opinion and in the dissent to our panel majority’s now-vacated Second Amendment decision. See Kolbe v.

Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 194, 196 (4th Cir. 2016) (King, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part) (expressing a strong inclination to “proclaim that the Second Amendment is not implicated by the FSA,” in that there is no “reasonable basis for saying that, although the M16 is a dangerous and unusual weapon, the AR-15 and similar arms are not”); id. at 195 n.2 (recognizing that large-capacity magazines also “could be deemed dangerous and unusual, in view of evidence that, inter alia, they are particularly designed and most suitable for military and law enforcement applications” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kolbe, 42 F.Supp.3d at 789 n.29 (observing that, “[gjiven that assault rifles like the AR-15 are essentially the functional equivalent of M-16s — and arguably more effective — the [reasoning of Heller that M-16s could be banned as dangerous and unusual] would seem to apply here” (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783)).

In our analysis, we simply de-emphasize the term “dangerous and unusual,” more directly concluding under Heller that, be-' cause the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are “like” “M-16 rifles” and “most useful in military service,” they are beyond the reach of the Second Amendment. Consequently, the problem for the plaintiffs is not that they have been deprived of an ample opportunity to squarely meet the issue of whether the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines- are most useful in military service.

Instead, the plaintiffs’ problem is that, despite full notice of the issue, they have not and apparently cannot forecast evidence adequately helpful to their cause. Meanwhile, the State’s evidence readily establishes that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are most useful in military service, causing us to neither employ our own “military opinion” nor abandon the

summary judgment standard to rule as we do. Our distinguished dissenting colleagues just as ineffectively attack the merits of our ruling on Second Amendment protection, chiefly complaining that we do not adopt the dissent’s illogical popularity test. Elsewhere, the dissent strategically removes the word “most” from Heller's enunciation of the “most useful in military service” inquiry.

The dissent thereby incorrectly insists that we are foreclosing Second Amendment protection for weapons that may have some use in military service, including the stun guns at issue in Caetano and even the handguns at issue in Heller. The dissent goes so far as to claim that we “would remove nearly all firearms from Second Amendment protection as nearly all firearms can be useful in military service.” See post at 157.

At another point, the dissent acknowledges the critical distinction that the Heller Court drew between military weapons at the time of Second Amendment’s ratification (arms entitled to constitutional protection because they were otherwise possessed at home by citizen militia members for self-defense) and the military weapons of today (sophisticated arms like the M16 that were developed for modern warfare and thus lack constitutional protection). But the dissent inconsistently reckons that we have placed a settler’s musket outside the ambit of the Second Amendment.

Taking a last shot at our ruling on Second Amendment protection, the dissent endeavors to make the case for the plaintiffs that the FSA-banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are not, in fact, most useful in military service. In so doing, the dissent simply resorts to further obfuscation.

For example, the dissent underscores that the AR-15 and other prohibited semiautomatic rifles are not themselves “in regular use by any military force, including the United States Army, whose standard-issue weapon has been the fully automatic M16- and M4-series rifles.” See post at 158; see also id. at 159 (“If these firearms were such devastating weapons of war, one would think that they would be standard issue for military forces across the globe.”).

The dissent characterizes the relevant inquiry as being whether a weapon’s “only legitimate purpose is to lay waste to a battlefield full of combatants,” id. at 158 (emphasis added), and then invokes evidence that there are citizens who possess and use the banned assault weapons for sporting purposes and self-defense, id. at 159-60. The dissent also treats rate of fire as the sole determinative factor and proffers its own evidence that an M16 in semiautomatic mode cannot fire as rapidly — at least not “effectively” — as the State’s evidence reflects.

Id. at 158; see also id. at 159 n.6 (noting that fully automatic and semiautomatic firearms do not “spray-fire” in precisely the same manner). Additionally, the dissent parses other individual features of the banned assault weapons, pointing out that some features are shared by non-banned firearms, do not on their own make weapons “more lethal or battle-ready,” and can actually render firearms “easier and safer to operate.” Id. at 159.

The dissent even emphasizes evidence opining that “[t]he semi-automatic AR15 carbine is likely the most ergonomic, safe, readily available and effective firearm for civilian self-defense.” Id. at 159 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the dissent would have it, we groundlessly deem the banned assault weapons to be military-style weapons of war when they are actually nothing of the sort, thereby welcoming prohibitions against a multitude of other firearms. On that score, however, the dissent is patently alarmist and wrong.

Our ruling on Second Amendment protection is limited and clear: Because the FSA-banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are like M16s, in that they are most useful in military service, they are not protected by the Second Amendment. The relevant question is not whether they are themselves M16s or other arms used by a military; or whether they are useful at all or only useful in military service; or whether they have this or that single feature in common with a non-banned firearm.

Rather, the issue is whether the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines possess an amalgam of features that render those weapons and magazines like M16s and most useful in military service. The uncontroverted evidence here is that they do.

See, e.g., J.A. 735, 1121-22 (reflecting that the banned assault weapons are designed to “kill[ ] or disabl[e] the enemy” on the battlefield, and that “[t]he net effect of [their] military combat features is a capability for lethality — more wounds, more serious, in more victims — far beyond that of other firearms in general, including other semiautomatic guns”); id. at 891, 1151 (indicating that large-capacity magazines “are particularly designed and most suitable for military and law enforcement applications,” as well as a “uniquely military feature[ ]” of both the banned assault weapons and other firearms to which they may be attached).

Nothing in our decision today affects or calls into question the Second Amendment protection of weapons that are not most useful in military service — including, of course, Heller's, handguns. 2. Finally, unlike us, our esteemed dissenting colleagues would subject the FSA’s prohibitions against assault weapons and large-capacity magazines to the ultra-demanding strict scrutiny standard. See post at 159-63. Indeed, the dissent would apply strict scrutiny to any ban on in-home possession of any weapon that satisfies the dissent’s popularity test.

Meanwhile, we conclude that no more than intermediate scrutiny applies here, in part because the FSA leaves citizens free to protect themselves with handguns and plenty of other firearms and ammunition, and thus does not -severely burden the core Second Amendment right to use arms for self-defense in the home. We also take notice of the scant evidence in the record that the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are possessed or suitable

[…]