Tarrance Daron WHITLOCK, Petitioner-Appellant v. Doug DRETKE, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee, 129 F. App'x 880

PER CURIAM: Tarrance Daron Whitlock, Texas prisoner # 930799, was granted a certificate of appealability on the issues whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance with respect to securing testimony of witnesses who may have corroborated Whit-lock’s alibi and whether the district court erred when it denied Whitlock’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition without an evidentiary hearing. Whitlock v. Dretke, No. 04-10116, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. June 29, 2004). Whitlock argues that the district court should have granted him habeas relief because the state habeas court’s application of Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), was unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The state court’s factual findings “shall be presumed to be correct” unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption “by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to explicit and implicit findings of fact which are necessary to the state court’s conclusions of mixed law and fact and to the state court’s credibility determinations. Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n. 11 (5th Cir.2001); Galvan v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2002).

The state habeas court found Whit-lock’s trial counsel’s affidavit to be credible and implicitly found that counsel did not call the individuals who filed affidavits purporting to support Whitlock’s alibi testimony because either they were unavailable to testify or their testimony would not have supported Whitlock’s alibi. The district court found that Whitlock had not rebutted this credibility determination with clear and convincing evidence. The district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous because the state court’s decision did not involve an unreasonable application of Strickland.

Whether the district court erred in denying Whitlock an evidentiary hearing is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Whit-lock has not explained why he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under this standard, nor do we independently discern any basis for a hearing. Even if a evidentiary hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2), Whitlock makes only a conclusional assertion that he was denied a full and fair hearing. He has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in denying a hearing. See Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 815 (5th Cir.2000). AFFIRMED. Pursuant to 5th Cir.

R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.