Elizabeth TEAGUE, a/n/f of C.R.T., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The TEXAS CITY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee, 185 F. App'x 355

PER CURIAM: Appellant sued the Texas City Independent School District (“TCISD”) as next Mend of her daughter, C.R.T. She claimed that TCISD violated C.R.T.’s constitutional rights. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of TCISD. We affirm in light of the general rule that the state’s failure to protect an individual from private harm does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case arises out of an unfortunate incident. Appellant alleges that C.R.T., then an eighteen-year-old special education student attending Texas City High School, was sexually assaulted by another special education student on TCISD’s watch. TCISD disputes Appellant’s version of the facts, and the district court characterized TCISD’s role in the incident as “benign.” As this appeal arises from

summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable to Appellant. Appellant argues that TCISD should be held liable for the incident, which occurred on school grounds, under

section 1983. Ordinarily, governmental entities have no constitutional duty to protect individuals from private violence. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). To secure liability against the state for private harm under

section 1983, plaintiffs must show that their claims fit within the narrow class of exceptions to the DeShaney rule. DeShaney itself recognized one exception: the state may be liable for private harm where it has a “special relationship” with the plaintiff. Id. at 197-200, 109 S.Ct. 998. Additionally, out-of-Circuit cases have adopted a “state-created danger” exception to DeShaney. See generally McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324-26 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc). Neither the special relationship exception nor the state-created danger exception applies here.

No special relationship existed because C.R.T. — an eighteen-year-old not subject to compulsory attendance laws — was not “involuntarily confined against h[er] will through the affirmative exercise of state power.” Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1299-1306 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). As to the state-created danger theory, we assume without deciding that it would be viable in this Circuit. That exception would be inapposite here because the evidence does not create a genuine issue of fact that TCISD had “actual knowledge” of, and disregarded, an “excessive risk” to C.R.T. See McClendon, 305 F.3d at 326 & n. 8.

For these reasons, the district court correctly granted

summary judgment against Appellant’s private-harm claim. Not every one of Appellant’s claims derive from the alleged private harm. She also alleges that school employees used excessive force in searching C.R.T. after the incident. The district court correctly found that Appellant did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to this claim. Appellant did not produce evidence that the alleged excessive force resulted from an official policy of TCISD, a precondition of it being liable for the acts of its employees under

section 1983. See Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 600 n. 2 (5th Cir.2001). For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, this Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.