PER CURIAM: Shirley Green, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissing her suit for racial and sexual discrimination in employment arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h-6; and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.001 et seq. We review a district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo. Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir.2003). “The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law [if] the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have carefully examined the briefs, the record excerpts, and relevant portions of the record itself.
For the reasons stated in the district court’s comprehensive Memorandum and Order, we affirm the decision to enter final judgment against Green. AFFIRMED. Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.