In the Matter of: LILJEBERG ENTERPRISES, INC., Debtor. Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Appellee-Cross-Appellant; Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., Appellant-Cross-Appellee; Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, Louisiana, L.L.C., Appellee-Cross-Appellant; Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc.; Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.; American Medical International; Tenent Healthcare Corporation, Appellants-Cross-Appellees, 304 F.3d 410

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge: This appeal brings to us three of four consolidated actions arising from a failed relationship formed to build and manage a hospital and medical office building in Kenner, Louisiana, the latest round in the parties’ protracted litigation. Following a bench trial of the consolidated cases, the district court overturned a judicial sale of the hospital, reinstated various contracts which defined the financing and lease of the hospital, and denied the holder of the hospital mortgage a claim for a deficiency judgment.

The court also ruled that, under a Clinical Pharmacy Management Agreement governing the operation of the hospital pharmacy and the flow of drugs to the hospital, Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., the hospital pharmacy-operator and principal supplier of drugs to the hospital, was due almost $12.5 million and the hospital operators and principal purchasers of the drugs for the hospital were owed $741,879. In

Chapter 11 proceedings, the district court conditionally granted the debtor Lil-jeberg Enterprises, Inc.’s request to assume the Clinical Pharmacy Management Agreement as an executory contract pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365. We reverse the district court’s judgment setting aside the judicial foreclosure of the hospital and declining to award the deficiency due on the mortgage debt, we reverse the district court’s order allowing the debtor in the

Chapter 11 proceedings to assume the pharmacy agreement, and finally we affirm in part and reverse in part the various awards made under the pharmacy agreement. I. First, the dramatis personae. The four consolidated actions involve Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., American Medical International, and Tenet Healthcare Corporation on one side, and Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc. (“Lil-jeberg Enterprises”) and St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, La., L.L.C. (“St.Jude”) (collectively the “Liljebergs”) on the other.

Liljeberg Enterprises is a corporation whose sole shareholders are John Lilje-berg and his brother Robert Liljeberg, both licensed pharmacists. The Lilje-bergs, through Liljeberg Enterprises, formed a series of corporations and a partnership to own or operate a medical complex consisting of a hospital, a hospital pharmacy, and a medical office building. St. Jude, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lil-jeberg Enterprises, owned the St. Jude Hospital (“hospital”), which is now known as Kenner Regional Medical Center. St. Jude Medical Office Building, Ltd. Partnership (“St. Jude Limited Partnership”), of which St.

Jude was the general partner, owned the adjacent medical office building. Funding for that building came from Travelers Insurance Company, a loan of $25 million on October 10, 1985, secured by a mortgage on the medical office building and an assignment to Travelers of rents to be paid on leased spaces in the building. Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. was a national hospital management company that provided financing to St. Jude to build the hospital. Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Life-mark Hospitals, Inc., entered into an agreement with St. Jude to lease and operate the hospital.

American Medical acquired Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. in 1984, and Tenet became the successor to American Medical in 1995. II. On August 26, 1981, the Liljebergs obtained a “certificate of need” under

Section 1122 of the Social Security Act to build and operate a 300-bed acute care facility in the New Orleans area. This

Section 1122 certificate was the only one available in the New Orleans area and the last one to be granted in Louisiana. Lacking the money to build a hospital, the Liljebergs immediately solicited participation by many companies, including Health Services Acquisition Corporation. The Lilje-bergs’ negotiations with Health Services extended over several months before disintegrating into heated litigation. The Lil-jebergs began their discussions with Life-mark in the latter part of 1981, under the shadow of the approaching deadline under the

Section 1122 certificate of need. In their negotiations with Lifemark, John Liljeberg was assisted by a team of two attorneys, one of whom was a CPA, an economist, and two pharmacy consultants. John Liljeberg insisted from the outset that, as part of any deal, the Liljebergs had to be given a contract to provide pharmaceutical services to the hospital. On December 21, 1982, the parties signed a letter of intent setting forth the principal terms of their agreement.

The final documents were executed in early 1983, including: (1) a loan agreement, wherein Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. agreed to provide financing of over $44 million to St. Jude for construction of the hospital; (2) a promissory note signed by St. Jude and made payable to Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.; (3) a collateral mortgage, a collateral mortgage note, and a pledge of the collateral mortgage note, all signed by St. Jude to secure the note to Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.; (4) a lease agreement wherein Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. agreed to lease and operate the hospital from St.

Jude; and (5) the Clinical Pharmacy Management Agreement (“pharmacy agreement”), signed by Lilje-berg Enterprises and Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., wherein Liljeberg Enterprises agreed to provide pharmaceutical services to the hospital. Additionally, the Liljebergs received a cash payment of $2.5 million as called for by the letter of intent. These agreements were intertwined in at least two ways:

(1) St. Jude’s note payments and Lifemark’s lease payments were offsetting transactions so that their monthly payment was only a bookkeeping entry; and (2) the pharmacy agreement contained a cross-default provision. A dispute arose between Lifemark and St. Jude over the financing and project management involved in the construction of the hospital. That dispute was settled by written agreement in 1991 after arbitration. As part of the settlement, St. Jude executed a renewal note, renewing and extending the original note.

Like the original note, the renewal note was secured by the original collateral mortgage, collateral mortgage note, and pledge of collateral mortgage note. To further secure the renewal note, St. Jude executed a “Collateral Assignment of Basic Rent” (“collateral assignment of rents”), which was recorded, providing Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. a secured interest in rents in the event of a future default by St. Jude. The hospital, hospital pharmacy, and medical office building became operational in 1985. By March of 1990, St.

Jude Limited Partnership had defaulted on its Travelers loan and, in June 1990, Travelers sued St. Jude Limited Partnership and other defendants. The suit, seeking seizure and sale by judicial process of the medical office building, was successful, and the building was sold at public auction on October 18, 1991 to Travelers, the sole bidder.

More protracted litigation ensued, in the course of which a panel of this court commented that the conduct of the Liljebergs constituted “as egregious and unconscionable of bad faith contractual dealings as the members of this panel can recall having encountered.” Travelers obtained an amended judgnent in December 1992 awarding Travelers both unpaid rents and damages from St. Jude Limited Partnership based on, inter alia, a jury verdict finding waste committed by the Liljebergs with respect to the collateral in the medical office building securing the repayment of Travelers’s loan to St.

Jude Limited Partnership for the construction of the building. When efforts to collect the amended judgnent against the partnership failed, Travelers filed a separate action against St. Jude, the general partner of St. Jude Limited Partnership, in which Travelers obtained a

summary judgment on July 30, 1993, which this Court affirmed. On August 12, 1993, Travelers secured a lien on the hospital by filing its $7.8 million judgment against St. Jude. The Travelers lien primed Lifemark’s collateral mortgage because Lifemark had not at that time reinscribed its lien. Lifemai-k reinscribed its collateral mortgage on June 29, 1994. Within the same time frame, on January 27, 1993, within one month after Travelers obtained its $7.8 million judgment, Lilje-berg Enterprises filed for bankruptcy protection.

In the course of these bankruptcy proceedings, Liljeberg Enterprises as the debtor in possession, sought the federal district court’s permission to assume, that is, continue to operate under, the pharmacy agreement, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365 and 1107. Shortly thereafter, on August 11, 1993, within one month after Travelers sought to collect its judgment against St. Jude, St. Jude filed for

Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court dismissed that action one year later, finding that St. Jude had filed in bad faith. On August 30, 1994, Travelers began the process of foreclosing on the hospital. Once again, St. Jude asked the district court to vacate Travelers’s writ of execution and to find Travelers’s lien inferior to Lifemark’s lien. At St. Jude’s request, Lifemark filed a memorandum setting forth the facts concerning the ranking of the liens. The court denied St. Jude’s motions and allowed the foreclosure sale to proceed.

Prior to the sale, Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. filed a motion in the federal distinct court before Judge Henry A. Mentz, Jr. seeking permission to bid credits against the value of its collateral mortgage instead of cash at the judicial sale, subject to any obligation to pay the amount of cash necessary to satisfy the superior judicial mortgage of Travelers. The court granted Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.’s motion. The United States Marshal’s seizure and judicial sale of the hospital occurred on October 28, 1994.

Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. was the sole bidder and purchased the hospital for $26 million, or two-thirds of the $37.5 million appraised value as the minimum price prescribed by Louisiana statute. The purchase price was distributed as follows: (1) $7,786,083.83 went to Travelers to satisfy its lien; (2) $18,165,483.74 went to Life-mark Hospitals, Inc. to reduce the deficiency owed on St. Jude’s note to Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.; and (3) the balance was applied to costs of the sale. The district court subsequently confirmed the sale. St.

Jude appealed the orders of the district court, and this court affirmed, dismissing as moot St. Jude’s challenge to the confirmed judicial sale. As a result, Lifemark became the owner of the hospital, and Lifemark’s lease with St. Jude was extinguished as a matter of law under the doctrine of confusion. At the same time, Lifemark accelerated the debt owed by St. Jude under the renewal note, and Lifemark sought to terminate the pharmacy agreement based upon the cross-default provision in that agreement. III.

Ultimately four lawsuits were consolidated and tried to the bench in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in June and July 1997. The district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and a partial judgment on April 26, 2000, later amending the judgment by adding a certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(

b) on August 1, 2000, three years after the case was tried. The amended judgment included a Rule 54(

b) certification for immediate appeal of “all claims other than Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc.’s claim in Cause No. 93-4249 for damages accruing from the commencement date of the trial and continuing through the date of’ the amended judgment. In the first lawsuit, Cause No. 94-3993, Lifemark sued St. Jude to collect the unpaid balance of a promissory note evidencing the debt incurred in building the hospital. St. Jude counterclaimed for damages asserting a variety of lender liability claims. The district court awarded no damages to Lifemark or St. Jude.

Rather it set out to undo the transaction and overturned the 1994 confirmed judicial sale of the hospital. This upset was made contingent upon either St. Jude or its parent company Liljeberg Enterprises reimbursing Lifemark the amount that Lifemark had paid to Travelers, the holder of the superior lien and judicial mortgage. The district court also reinstated all of the related commercial instruments as if the judicial sale had never taken place and denied Lifemark’s deficiency claim. In the second suit, Cause No. 93-1794, Liljeberg Enterprises, as the

Chapter 11 debtor in possession, sought permission from the bankruptcy court to assume the pharmacy agreement between Lifemark and Liljeberg Enterprises as an executory contract pursuant to Bankruptcy Code

section 365. On October 19, 1993, the district court withdrew the reference to bankruptcy court of LEI’s motion to assume. The district court, over Lifemark’s objection, granted the motion to assume the pharmacy contract. The third suit, Cause No. 93-4249, was filed in Louisiana state court but removed to the federal district court. Here Lilje-berg Enterprises claims that Lifemark, acting in bad faith, breached and wrongfully “circumvented” the pharmacy agreement. Lifemark denied the allegations and counterclaimed for overcharges and breaches of the pharmacy agreement.

The district court found that Lifemark owed Liljeberg Enterprises $12,432,905.92 for breach of payment due under the pharmacy agreement and that Liljeberg Enterprises owed Lifemark $741,879 in overcharges. Finally, in the fourth suit, Cause No. 95-2922, Liljeberg Enterprises sought an injunction to prohibit Lifemark from unlawfully dispensing legend drugs at the hospital. The district court denied Liljeberg Enterprises’s request. IV. Lifemark here attacks judgments in Cause Nos. 94-3993, 93-1794, and 93-4249 on many grounds.

In Cause No. 94-3993, Lifemark argues that the district court erred by rescinding the judicial sale of the hospital when this court of appeals decided in prior litigation that St. Jude’s challenge to the judicially confirmed sale was moot; that the judgments are flawed by the following erroneous rulings: that Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. had a duty to St.

Jude to reinscribe the collateral mortgage, and that Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. had a duty to terminate the Travelers foreclosure; that Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. had a duty to prevent Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. from purchasing the hospital at the foreclosure sale; that Lifemark acted in bad faith or colluded to chill the bidding at the foreclosure sale which proximately caused St. Jude’s loss; and that Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. did not properly purchase the hospital at two-thirds of its appraised value.

Lifemark also argues that the district court erred in concluding that Lifemark is not entitled to recover on its deficiency claim under the renewal promissory note. In Cause No. 93-1794, Lifemark argues that the district court erred in allowing Liljeberg Enterprises to assume the pharmacy agreement on several grounds. First, it erred in its ruling that the pharmacy agreement did not terminate by its own terms prior to the district court’s order allowing assumption. Second, by failing to properly interpret sections 5.1(

e) and 5.1(

b) of the pharmacy agreement and

section 11.1 of the lease and the fourth and fifth covenants of the mortgage. In Cause No. 93^4249, Lifemark argues that the district court erred in its

interpretation of sections 2.4, 2.6, 4.1, and Exhibit B of the pharmacy agreement and in denying Lifemark’s motion to reopen the evidence. Further, Lifemark argues that the district court erred: in awarding damages based upon a procedurally flawed audit; in awarding duplicative damages; in allowing Liljeberg Enterprises to recover costs greater than those allowed by the hospital’s prime vendor contract under

section 2.4 of the pharmacy agreement; in allowing Liljeberg Enterprises to recover based on unexplained bills; in failing to award damages to Lifemark for Liljeberg Enterprises’s overbilling; and in its

interpretation of the parties’ stipulation as to actual acquisition costs payable under an earlier state court judgment. Finally, Lifemark argues that the district court erred in awarding any relief against Tenet, a non-party. On its cross-appeal, in Cause No. 94-3993, Liljeberg Enterprises argues that the district court erred in requiring St. Jude and Liljeberg Enterprises to reimburse Lifemark the $7,834,516.26 it paid to Travelers for the allegedly collusive purchase of the hospital. The Liljebergs also contend on their cross-appeal in Cause Nos. 94-3993, 93-1794, and 93-4249 that Liljeberg Enterprises and St.

Jude are entitled to attorneys’ fees by the parties’ lease agreement and under Louisiana Civil Code articles 1997 and 1958. V. Cause No. 94-3993 The district court in Cause No. 94-3993 overturned the confirmed 1994 judicial sale of the hospital contingent upon either St. Jude or Liljeberg Enterprises reimbursing Lifemark the approximately $7.8 million that Lifemark paid to Travelers to purchase the hospital at foreclosure.

The district court also reinstated the renewal promissory note, collateral mortgage note, pledge of collateral mortgage note, collateral mortgage, hospital lease, and collateral assignment of rents which existed before the judicial sale and held that all rental payments that were due by Life-mark to St. Jude under the lease shall be deemed paid by St. Jude to Lifemark and the renewal promissory note, collateral mortgage note, pledge of collateral mortgage note, and collateral mortgage are deemed current and not in default as of the date of judgment.

Finally, the district court denied Lifemark’s claim for a deficiency pursuant to the renewal promissory note. We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions, but review its findings of fact for clear error.

We have explained that “ ‘a finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,’” and that, “despite an appellate court’s conviction that it would have weighed the evidence differently had it been sitting as the trier of fact, .it may not reverse a district court’s findings when they are based on a plausible account of the evidence considered against the entirety of the record.” Accordingly, “when ‘two permissible views of the evidence exist, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be dearly erroneous.’ ” Further, “as to mixed questions of law and fact, we review the district court’s fact findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions and application of law to fact de novo.” A.

The district court premised its decision setting aside the judicial sale of the hospital on a finding that Lifemark breached fiduciary duties and an obligation of good faith owed to St. Jude. It found these obligations in the Louisiana law of pledge. The district court found that Life-mark Hospitals, Inc. became the pledgee of St. Jude by holding the collateral mortgage note and the right to basic rent under the collateral assignment of rents. As pledgee, Lifemark owed fiduciary duties to St.

Jude, its pledgor, to protect that collateral, the collateral mortgage note and the right to basic rent under the collateral assignment of rents. The found breach came when Lifemark failed to timely reinscribe the collateral mortgage and “allowed” Travelers’ judgment mortgage to prime the collateral mortgage. The district court also found a breach of a duty to preserve the lease covering the assigned rents as pledgee of the right to basic rent under the collateral assignment of rents. This breach came, it found, when Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. allowed Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. to acquire the hospital.

That acquisition extinguished the lease under the doctrine of confusion pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code

article 1903 as well as the rental stream assigned to Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. As the district court explained it, when St. Jude became liable to Travelers for over $7.8 million, specifically $7,834,516.26, and the hospital became subject to Travelers’s approximately $7.8 million lien, Life-mark Hospitals, Inc. was obligated to buy out the Travelers lien, to add the Travelers debt to the debt owed by St. Jude to Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. Relatedly, it found an obligation to refrain from having Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. purchase the hospital at the foreclosure sale.

All these were found to be duties, all of which Lifemark breached. In this diversity case, we are controlled by the substantive law of Louisiana. We are to determine and apply its law as we believe the Supreme Court of Louisiana would, looking to the decisions of intermediate Louisiana appellate courts for guidance where the Supreme Court of Louisiana has not spoken clearly to the issue. We conclude that the foundational principles of the entire set of the district court’s rulings are deeply flawed. Such duties are not to be found in Louisiana law.

There is no question but that, under Louisiana law, “ ‘a trust relationship between the pledgor and pledgee’ ” carries with it “‘attendant duties to protect the debt or the obligation and the collateral.’ ” But holding the collateral mortgage note and the right to basic rent under the collateral assignment of rents did not create a pledgor-pledgee relationship giving rise to the duties discovered by the district court.

To understand why this is so it is helpful to review the Louisiana law of pledge and collateral mortgages. “The pledge is a contract by which one debtor gives something to his creditor as a security for his debt.” The Supreme Court of Louisiana has very recently repeated the Louisiana law of pledge: Pledge is an accessory contract by which one debtor gives something to a creditor as security for the debt. Invariably, the thing given as security for the debt is a movable, in which case the contract is more accurately called pawn. A person may give a pledge not only for his own debt, but also for that of another.

The pledge secures only that debt or debts contemplated in the contract between the pledgor and pledgee.

A “collateral mortgage” is statutorily defined as “a mortgage that is given to secure a written obligation, such as a collateral mortgage note, negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument, or other written evidence of debt, that is issued, pledged, or otherwise used as security for another obligation.” We recently summarized the basic operation of a typical collateral mortgage transaction under Louisiana law: In a typical Louisiana collateral mortgage transaction, the borrower contemporaneously executes a promissory note (known as a collateral mortgage note) and

an act of mortgage (known as a collateral mortgage). In this latter instrument, the mortgagor acknowledges his indebtedness and states his intent to pledge the collateral mortgage note, which is secured by the collateral mortgage, as security for the advancement of funds. The collateral mortgage note is customly made payable on demand, to “Bearer” or “Myself’ or “Any Future Holder,” and is “paraphed” for identification with the mortgage.

This collateral mortgage package is then delivered by the borrower in pledge to the lender to secure an indebtedness which is usually represented by a separate “hand note.” The pledge of a collateral mortgage note and collateral mortgage to secure a debt is a contract. The pledge secures only the debt or debts contemplated in the act of pledge between the pledgor and the pledgee.

A collateral mortgage package may be pledged to secure particular debts, either previously existing or contracted contemporaneously with the pledge, or future loans by the pledg-ee to the pledgor — or both — up to the limits of the pledge.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana has made clear that “[t]he collateral mortgage, though now recognized by statute, is a form of conventional mortgage that was developed by Louisiana’s practicing lawyers and has long been recognized by Louisiana courts.” It “arose out of the need for a special form of mortgage to secure revolving lines of credit and multiple present and future cross-collateralized debts for which there was no provision in the Civil Code.” More specifically, the Supreme Court of Louisiana explained: “A mortgage is an accessory right which is granted to the creditor over the property of another as security for the debt.

La. Civ.Code arts. 3278, 3284. Mortgages are of three types: conventional, legal and judicial. La. Civ.Code art. 3286. Within the area of conventional mortgages, three different forms of mortgages are recognized by the Louisiana statutes and jurisprudence: an ‘ordinary mortgage’ (La. Civ.Code arts. 3278, 3290); a mortgage to secure future advances (La. Civ.Code arts. 3292, 3293); and a collateral mortgage. See Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Foy, 261 La. 573, 260 So.2d 628 (1972).

Unlike the other two forms of conventional mortgages, a collateral mortgage is not a ‘pure’ mortgage; rather, it is the result of judicial recognition that one can pledge a note secured by a mortgage and use this pledge to secure yet another debt.” “A collateral mortgage indirectly secures a debt via a pledge. A collateral mortgage consists of at least three documents, and takes several steps to com-píete. First, there is a promissory note, usually called a collateral mortgage note or a ‘ne varietur’ note. The collateral mortgage note is secured by a mortgage, the so-called collateral mortgage.

The mortgage provides the creditor with security in the enforcement of the collateral mortgage note.” “Up to this point, a collateral mortgage appears to be identical to both a mortgage to secure future advances and an ordinary mortgage. But a distinction arises in the collateral mortgage situation because money is not directly advanced on the note that is paraphed for identification with the act of mortgage.

Rather, the collateral mortgage note and the mortgage which secures it are pledged to secure a debt.” As such, “[bjecause the mortgagor, after executing the collateral mortgage and the collateral mortgage note,' then pledges the collateral mortgage note as security for a debt, usually represented by a separate hand note, the collateral mortgage package combines the security devices of pledge and mortgage.” Synthesizing the law of pledge and on collateral mortgages, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has observed that a “[pjledge is an accessory contract which secures the performance of an existing principal obligation,” and “[t]he principal obligation in the collateral mortgage scheme is the actual indebtedness, usually represented by a hand note, and the collateral mortgage note is pledged to secure payment of the principal obligation.” The district court and Liljeberg Enterprises make much of the fact that the collateral mortgage “package” involves a “pledge,” but, under the facts of this case, this is word play.

A collateral mortgage often involves a hand note that is a third party’s note made payable to the mortgagor, which note is pledged by the mortgagor to the mortgagee. In such an instance, a pledgor-pledg-ee relationship with attendant duties — including a statutory duty of reasonable care and fiduciary duties — to protect the rights of the mortgagor in the third party’s note against other creditors of the third party may well arise under statute by the virtue of the nature of the pledgor-pledgee relationship. Here, however, St.

Jude executed a collateral mortgage on the hospital site and pledged a collateral mortgage note to Life-mark Hospitals, Inc. to secure the collateral mortgage, which was itself created to secure the promissory note evidencing Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.’s loan to St. Jude for construction of the hospital. There was no third-party obligation involved.

In such a case, where the mortgagor has “pledged” to the mortgagee the mortgagor’s own hand note on which the mortgagor is directly obligated to the mortgagee, the mortgagee has a duty to keep the note so that it may be returned to the mortgagor upon payment of the underlying debt to the mortgagee.

It' is true that the Supreme Court of Louisiana has cited Professor Slovenko’s observation that: ... [I]n the case of promissory notes, bills of exchange, and other evidences of indebtedness pledged as security, a duty exists on the -part of the pledgee to preserve the rights of the pledgor against the obligors in the deposited documents.

The pledgee is held responsible if he neglects to have a promissory note, the subject of the pledge, protested for non-payment, and the endorser is discharged in consequence; or, if he neglects to have a mortgage which is pledged to him reinscribed or reregis-tered in proper time, and it loses its rank and effect. It is also the case that Professor Sloven-ko’s discussion assumes that a third-party obligation is involved with the pledge, where here it is not. To the contrary, the obligor of the underlying document and the pledgor (and the collateral mortgagor) were one and the same — St. Jude.

Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. loaned money to St. Jude to build a hospital, a loan evidenced by a loan agreement and a promissory note, or hand note, in turn collateralized by the pledge of a collateral mortgage note, itself secured by a collateral mortgage on the hospital site. The extraordinary duty the district court imposed upon Lifemark, who loaned the money to build the hospital and held the mortgage on it to secure its payment, is inexplicable.

Whatever duty Lifemark may have owed as the pledgee of the collateral mortgage note, they do not include a requirement that Lifemark reinscribe the mortgage executed in Lifemark’s favor to secure a debt owed by St. Jude to Lifemark, in order that the mortgage may retain priority for Lifemark’s benefit as pledgee and mortgagee. As Lifemark aptly points out, ordinarily a debtor such as St. Jude is happy to have its creditor fail to record its lien.

We reject the assertion that Lifemark as the mortgagee here owed a duty to its mortgagor to reinscribe the mortgage, as illustrated in part, indeed, by the very difficulty of describing exactly how not protecting a mortgage’s first position, in and of itself, could possibly harm the mortgagor. Nor can this theory explain how it can lie beside the undisputed right of Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. to, “at any time, without notice to anyone, release any part of the Property from the effect of the Mortgage.” This right of release is explicitly recited in the collateral mortgage itself.

In addition, the renewal note provides that St. Jude “agree[s] to any ... release of any [of the security herefor].” The right of Lifemark to unilaterally release any part of the property from the mortgage is wholly at odds with the district court’s discovery of a “duty” to reinscribe the collateral mortgage. It was Lifemark’s contracted-for right to retain the collateral mortgage’s priority against other creditors, under both the renewal note and the collateral mortgage itself. The grant of a security interest to secure St. Jude’s debt was to protect the lender, Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., not the borrower.

Nor did Lifemark as mortgagee have a duty to protect the hospital owner from other creditors asserting their rights against the hospital, as the district court held Lifemark did.

It is self-evident that there is a vast difference between a statutory duty to prevent loss or decay of a third party’s note evidencing a debt owed to the collateral mortgagor/pledgor in order to preserve against other third parties the collateral mortgagor’s rights in the third party’s note pledged by it to the collateral mortgagee, and a supposed fiduciary duty on the part of the collateral mortgagee to protect the collateral mortgagor against a third party’s exercise of its rights in an entirely different instrument or judgment. This is a mere chimera, existing nowhere in Louisiana law.

It was apparently constructed out of whole cloth. In sum, Lifemark had no duty to timely reinscribe the collateral mortgage, and the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Lifemark had a consequential duty to “mitigate” any harm allegedly caused by Lifemark’s failure to reinscribe by buying out the Travelers lien and adding the Travelers debt to the debt owed by St. Jude to Lifemark. As for any duties arising out of Lifemark’s holding the right to basic rent under the collateral assignment of rents, Lifemark argues in part that the statutory duty of reasonable care under Louisiana Civil Code

article 3167 does not apply to an assignment of rents because such an assignment is not a pledge where Life-mark did not take possession of a corporeal movable or evidence of a credit, such as a note, as required by Louisiana Civil Code

article 3152. Lifemark argues that

article 3167 imposes only custodial duties on pledgees and that no such duties attend its collateral assignment of rents from St. Jude. This argument, however, does not account for Louisiana Civil Code

article 8153, which provides: “But this delivery is only necessary with respect to corporeal things; as to incorporeal rights, such as credits, which are given in pledge, the delivery is merely fictitious and symbolical.” An assignment of rents may be a pledge, because “[o]ne may, in fine, pawn incorporeal movables, such as credits and other claims of that nature.” Indeed, Louisiana statutes provide that “[cjlaims, credits, obligations, and incorporeal rights in general not evidenced by written instrument or muniment of title, shall be subject to pledge, and may be pledged in the same manner as other property” and that “[t]he pledge shall be valid as to all persons without delivery of the claim, credit, obligation, or incorporeal right to the pledg-ee.” But again, that is beside the point, the duty attributed by the district court to Lifemark as pledgee of the right to basic rent under the collateral assignment of rents did not exist.

The recorded collateral assignment of rents simply gave Life-mark a secured right to rents upon default by St. Jude under the renewal note. The collateral assignment of rents specifically provides that Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. “shall not be obligated to perform or discharge nor does [Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.] hereby undertake to perform or discharge any obligation, duty or liability under said Lease.” As we observed, the renewal note itself gave Lifemark the right to release any security, including the collateral assignment of rents, under the renewal note.

In the face of these contractual provisions, holding the right to basic rent under the collateral assignment of rents imposed no duty upon Lifemark to preserve the lease covering the assigned rents. We are persuaded that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Lifemark breached any duties by failing to timely reinscribe the collateral mortgage, buy out the Travelers lien, add the Travelers debt to the debt owed by St. Jude to Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., and refrain from having Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. purchase the hospital at the foreclosure sale.

In sum, Lifemark did not owe the duties to St. Jude upon which the district court premised its order reversing the judicial sale of the hospital. The district court erred in upsetting the confirmed judicial sale on these grounds. B. The district court pointed to its findings of Lifemark’s bad faith, collusion, and self-dealing in forcing the judicial sale of the hospital, chilling the bidding at the sale, and purchasing the hospital as an alternative ground for its upset of the judicial sale. The district court relied upon two unpublished district court decisions setting aside a judicial sale.

Both were in admiralty and prior to sale confirmation. That slender reed aside, the district court’s findings of a “conspiracy” to wrest control of the hospital and medical- office building from St. Jude and Liljeberg Enterprises border on the absurd. We are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, that the findings are not supported by the evidence and are clearly erroneous. The district court’s “conspiracy theory” conclusion is based, in part, on the view that Liljeberg Enterprises’s or St. Jude’s losses were caused by Lifemark.

Specifically, not reinscribing the collateral mortgage and not buying out the Travelers lien and adding the Travelers debt to the debt owed by St. Jude to Lifemark. These findings turn on the remarkable but largely implicit conclusion, asserted directly by the Liljebergs’ counsel at oral argument, that, under Louisiana law, a second mortgagee, which Travelers would have been had the collateral mortgage been timely reinscribed, cannot initiate foreclosure proceedings.

The district court and Liljeberg Enterprises offer no statutory or case law support for this proposition, for the simple reason that this is not the law. The theory that Lifemark proximately caused any loss to Liljeberg Enterprises or St. Jude from the Travelers foreclosure on its judicial mortgage cannot accommodate the undisputed fact that, under Louisiana law, St. Jude could have reinscribed the collateral mortgage itself. A subordinate position for the Travelers judgment is now said to have been critical for «St. Jude and its loss the centerpiece of a conspiracy to take the hospital. Yet, St.

Jude could have checked the records and protected its own interest. That it could háve and did not do so is telling. It rends a large hole in the conspiracy claim and leaves St.- Jude’s inaction unexplained. This, with the reality we have explained that Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. had no duty to buy out the Travelers Hen, no duty to add the Travelers débt .to the debt owed by ,St. Jude to Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., and no duty to prevent the purchase of the hospital at the foreclosure sale by Life-mark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc.

Even if we were to somehow “explain” aH of this by the theory that this foreclosure was part of Lifemark’s plan from the beginning, the theory cannot be squared with one large undisputed fact: Liljeberg Enterprises and St. Jude faced the Travelers lien because of Liljeberg Enterprises’s and St. Jude’s own failed litigation against Travelers, arising out of an independent dispute with Travelers. Any suggestion that Lifemark somehow worked that result is defied by the record.

Indeed, a panel of this court described the Liljebergs’ conduct involved that litigation as “as egregious and unconscionable of bad faith contractual dealings as the members of this panel can recall having encountered.” The cases before ‘ us only reinforce that panel’s observation. The record is clear that any losses by St. Jude and.Liljeberg Enterprises were proximately caused by the Liljebergs, who defaulted to Travelers and whose post-default conduct, in part, led to the Travelers judgment and its resulting judicial mortgage and lien on the hospital.

The foreclosure of this lien led to the foreclosure of the hospital that the district court order would set aside. Indeed, despite Liljeberg Enterprises’s contention on appeal that Lifemark’s efforts to “circumvent” the pharmacy agreement and refusal to renew the medical office building lease caused St. Jude and Liljeberg Enterprises to experience significant shortfalls which foreclosed any possibility of paying the note on the medical office building to Travelers, the district court made no findings of fact that Life-mark’s conduct was the cause of the debt to Travelers or St.

Jude’s inability to pay that debt, which resulted in the judicial mortgage Travelers filed encumbering the hospital property. With or without such findings, however, the idea that Lifemark deliberately subordinated its mortgage interest to Travelers, knowing it would result in a required payment, to wit, approximately $7.8 million, to Travelers at any judicial sale, comes close to being nonsensical. It rests upon the assertion that Louisiana law somehow obligated Lifemark to lend the money to bail the Liljebergs out of their litigation fiasco with Travelers.

That is so because, as we will explain, Travelers would most certainly have foreclosed its second mortgage. Although the district court made no such explicit finding, Liljeberg Enterprises argues on appeal that Lifemark deliberately failed to reinscribe its collateral mortgage in order to facilitate the Travelers foreclosure and the judicial sale of the medical office building and the hospital to Life-mark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., where-after Lifemark conspired to manipulate the judicial sale, colluded to minimize the price offered at the judicial sale, and schemed to terminate the lease and St.

Jude’s right to collect rents from Life-mark. In answer to the palpable flaws in their theories, the Liljebergs would simply expand the conspiracy.

They argue that this court should consider documents from Lifemark’s legal malpractice .suit against their former attorneys for their attorneys’ failure to reinscribe the collateral mortgage and, more specifically, in a footnote in their original brief, the Liljebergs state for the first time that they “challenge the court’s denial of their motion to supplement the record with documents from the trial between Lifemark and [its former attorneys],” which “documents clearly show that Defendants and their attorneys conspired to defraud St.

Jude/Liljeberg Enterprises out the hospital, the lease, and the pharmacy.” It tells that this argument was not raised or briefed as a separate issue until the Liljebergs’ final reply brief. It is therefore waived. Moreover, the district court ruled in an order dated April 25, 2000 that the Liljebergs’ motion to supplement was rendered moot by the court’s order and final judgment issuing its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which therefore quite obviously did not rely on the supplemental materials proffered with the motion.

Under these circumstances, even if we were to consider this issue, the Liljebergs could not show an abuse of discretion on appeal. In sum, we conclude that the district court’s findings that Lifemark engaged in bad faith, collusion, and self-dealing to force the judicial sale of the hospital, chill the bidding at the sale, and purchase the hospital are clearly erroneous. In the absence of any breach of duty to St.

Jude or Liljeberg Enterprises on the part of Life-mark or a Lifemark breach having proximately caused any loss to the Liljebergs resulting from the Travelers lien, there is no bad faith or collusion in Lifemark’s decision to bid at the judicial sale or Life-mark’s purchase of the hospital at the legally-permitted two-thirds of its appraised value.

The other sidfe of the no-duty coin is that Lifemark was free to act in its own self-interest, including ■ allowing Lifemark, which had the license, to own and operate the hospital, and to escape the burden of the pharmacy agreement, which functioned much like an overriding royalty payment.

As Lifemark persuasively argues on appeal, and the record is clear: the various lending and lease transactions and instruments, as agreed to by the Liljebergs and Lifemark, permitted the outcomes which Lifemark sought in Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc.’s bidding at the judicial sale as well as Lifemark’s decision not to renew the lease on the medical office building. Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. was legally entitled to obtain permission to bid credits, and received a court order granting such permission, to give it the option to bid at the sale should the circumstances warrant.

The district court’s findings and the Lilje-bergs’ arguments on appeal offer no logical connection between a decision to seek authority to bid credits and the absence, let alone the chilling, of other bids on the hospital property at the judicial sale — the credits represent a debt Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. was owed, so a payment in cash and credits or simply in cash would make no difference for the bottom line in Life-mark’s accounting.

Moreover, although the Liljebergs argue that Lifemark’s knowledge that the priority of the lease on the hospital and collateral assignment of rents would deter other bidders at the judicial sale somehow supports their conspiracy theory, it demonstrates quite the opposite. As counsel for Lifemark aptly noted at oral argument, the judicial sale could almost be considered “chill-proof,” in that it is hard to imagine anyone bidding $26 million on a property that would, by virtue of the lease and collateral assignment of rents, provide no cash-flow until at least sixteen years later, in 2010.

On the basis of its clearly erroneous “conspiracy theory” findings, the district court erred as a matter of law in disregarding long-standing Louisiana jurisprudence that a judicial sale, once completed, cannot generally be undone. Freed from the district court’s clearly erroneous “conspiracy theory” findings, the evidence concerning Lifemark’s actions following Travelers’s filing its judicial mortgage does not support findings of bad faith, collusion, and self-dealing on the part of Lifemark that would permit the district court to overturn the confirmed judicial sale.

Rather, the evidence considered against the entirety of the record shows that Lifemark’s actions consisted of commercially reasonable, albeit aggressive, steps in reaction to the Travelers judgment, all of which were within their contractual rights and applicable law. We have detected several warring premises internal to the Liljebergs’ theories.

In concluding this section, we mention one more: the Liljebergs attempt to maintain both that Lifemark never intended to perform under the various commercial instruments between the parties and that Life-mark drafted these instruments to allow Lifemark to engage in conduct it challenges — declining to renew the lease on the -medical office building, purchasing the hospital at a judicial sale, and terminating the pharmacy agreement based on a cross-default provision. C. Lifemark argues that the district court erred in denying its claim for a deficiency judgment, a sum of $20,600,060.91 that St.

Jude owed Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. under the renewal promissory note after Life-mark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc.’s purchase of the hospital at the judicial sale. The Liljebergs respond that the same bad faith and collusive conduct that tainted the judicial sale also bars any claim for deficiency and that the alleged defaults and acceleration were caused by the bad faith and collusive wrongdoing of Life-mark, which alone is legally responsible.

The district court denied Lifemark’s deficiency judgment claim based on its decision to overturn the judicial sale, such that “[a]ll rents which would have been paid absent the judicial sale will be deemed paid on the mortgage in favor of [Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.] and the mortgage note shall be deemed current at the time of transfer,” and, “[i]nasmuch as this Court has restored the status quo prior to sale and reinstated the collateral mortgage, collateral mortgage note, and note, the claim of [Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.] on the note is disallowed.” Having found the district court’s findings and conclusions in favor of this order to be in error, and rejected the Liljebergs’ arguments on appeal, we must in turn reverse the district court’s order denying this claim.

As discussed infra in connection with the motion to assume the pharmacy agreement, the judicial mortgage and lien on the hospital won in court by Travelers and the judicial sale that followed were defaults under the fourth covenant of the collateral mortgage. These events of default gave Lifemark the contractually-secured right to accelerate the renewal promissory note and immediately recover all amounts and interest due thereunder. We remand to the district court for calculation of the amount of deficiency owed to Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. and for entry of judgment in that amount. D.

On its cross-appeal, Liljeberg Enterprises argues that the district court erred in requiring St. Jude and Liljeberg Enterprises to reimburse Lifemark the approximately $7.8 million it paid to Travelers. Having reversed the district court’s order overturning the judicial sale, we must reverse the order of reimbursement, part of the district court’s set-aside of the judicial sale. Because Lifemark will maintain ownership of the hospital pursuant to the confirmed judicial sale, the Liljebergs need not reimburse Lifemark’s payment of the Travelers debt made at foreclosure.

Lilje-berg Enterprises’s cross-appeal on this issue is now moot. VI. Cause No. 93-1794 The district court concluded in Cause No. 93-1794 that Liljeberg Enterprises, as the debtor in possession in its

Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, should be allowed to assume the pharmacy agreement pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365. The district court rejected Lifemark’s arguments that the pharmacy agreement terminated under its own terms and was therefore not available to be assumed and that Liljeberg Enterprises committed incurable defaults under the pharmacy agreement which, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1), precluded an order granting Liljeberg Enterprises’s motion. to .assume. 11 U.S.C. § 365(

a) provides that “the trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor,” but 11 U.-S.C. § 1107(

a) provides that, “[s]ub-ject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter, and to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall.have all the rights, other than the right to compensation under

section 330 of this title, ... of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.” Thus, as a debtor in. possession, Liljeberg Enterprises was required to satisfy all the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) in order to assume the pharmacy agreement as an executory contract under

section 365: If there has been a default in an execu-tory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee— (

A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure, such default; (

B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and (

C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease. A. As an initial matter, Lifemark argues that the pharmacy agreement was no longer an executory contract subject to assumption.

To determine if a contract is executory for purposes of this provision, “the relevant inquiry is whether performance remains due to some extent on both sides,” such “that an agreement is executory if at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the failure of either party to complete performance would constitute a material breach of the contract, thereby excusing the performance of the other party.” Lifemark argues that the district court erred in treating the pharmacy agreement as ■ an executory contract subject to assumption by Liljeberg Enterprises.

They contend that, when Lifemark ceased to lease the hospital on October 28, 1994, the pharmacy agreement terminated by its own terms pursuant to

section 5.1(e). It provides: “This Agreement shall be effective as set forth above and shall continue in full force and effect, unless sooner terminated with the first to occur of the following: ... (

e) LIFEMARK ceases to lease or operate Hospital.” Liljeberg Enterprises filed for

Chapter 11 relief on January 27, 1993. Lifemark’s lease of the hospital did not end until almost twenty months later-when Travelers foreclosed and Lifemark bought the hospital at the judicial sale. There is no dispute but that throughout this period the pharmacy agreement was in full force and effect and a failure of either party to complete performance would have been a material breach.

Lifemark argues, however, that a line of authority out of the Tenth Circuit provides that “[a] contract that provides for termination on the default of one party , may terminate under ordinary principles of contract law even if the defaulting party has filed a petition under the Bankruptcy Act.” Although this holding arose under the old Bankruptcy Act, Lifemark argues that it remains valid under the Bankruptcy Code, pointing to a bankruptcy court’s conclusion to that effect.

That Michigan bankruptcy court reviewed several decisions involving the issue of whether a contract terminated by its own terms or time limits post-petition and concluded that “the issue must be whether termination requires the non-debtor party to undertake some post-petition affirmative act,” such that, “[wjhen termination of the contract requires an affirmative act of the non-debtor party, the contract remains execu-tory because such

an act is stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a),” but; “[wjhen termination occurs without any action by the non-debtor 'party, the contract is no longer executory and no longer subject to assumption or rejection.” The parties have pointed to no Fifth Circuit decisions treating this issue, and we have located none.

The Liljebergs argue that even under this authority the pharmacy agreement did not terminate post-petition where Lifemark not only participated in the alleged defaults, they intentionally precipitated them; that, under the pharmacy agreement and Louisiana law, the pharmacy agreement could not terminate automatically but required Life-mark to place Liljeberg Enterprises in default and obtain judicial dissolution. We agree and conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that the pharmacy agreement was an executory agreement subject to assumption by Liljeberg Enterprises.

Lifemark’s affirmative acts — its purchase of the hospital — caused the lease to be extinguished under the doctrine of confusion, which in turn caused any alleged default under

section 5.1(

e) of the pharmacy agreement. Moreover, Louisiana law provides that, except in limited circumstances which the district court correctly concluded do not apply here, a contract will not terminate unless the non-breaching party seeks judicial dissolution of the contract or at least provides notice of the intent to exercise the right to terminate the contract for default, even if the contract explicitly provides for automatic termination. And

section 5.1(

e) does not do so. Lifemark was required to give Liljeberg Enterprises written notice of termination under

section 15 of the pharmacy agreement. In short, terminating the pharmacy agreement for default under

section 5.1(

e) required an affirmative act of Lifemark. Lifemark gave no notice and did not seek judicial dissolution. The pharmacy agreement remained executory. B. Turning then to whether the district court erred in allowing Liljeberg Enterprises to assume the executory pharmacy agreement, under

section 365, “[a]n assumed lease or contract will remain in effect through and then after the completion of the reorganization,” and “[t]he non-debtor party to the agreement is not released from its duties and must continue to perform; likewise, the debtor must continue to perform or pay for the services or other costs that are not discharged.” We have further explained that “ ‘[t]he act of assumption must be grounded, at least in part, in the conclusion that maintenance of the contract is more beneficial to the estate than doing without the other party’s services,’ ” a determination that assumption of the pharmacy agreement by Liljeberg Enterprises “represented a proper exercise of business judgment.”

Section 365(b)(1) essentially “ ‘allows a debtor to “continue in a beneficial contract provided, however, that the other party is made whole at the time of the debtor’s assumption of said contract.” ’ ” That is, “[s]eetion 365 is intended to provide a means whereby a debtor can force another party to an ex-ecutory contract to continue to perform under the contract if (1) the debtor can provide adequate assurance that it, too, will continue to perform, and if (2) the debtor can cure any defaults in its past performance.” As such, “the debtor party must take full account of the cost to cure all existing defaults owed to the non-debtor party when assessing whether the contract is beneficial to the estate.” Further, to determine if the debtor in possession has provided “adequate assurance” of future performance, we have held that courts must look to “ ‘factual conditions,’” including “consideration of] whether the debtor’s financial data indicated its ability to generate an income stream sufficient to meet its obligations, the general economic outlook in the debt- or’s industry, and the presence of a guarantee.” To the extent that such determinations turn on contested factual disputes, and not errors of law, we review only for clear error and not under de novo review.

Lifemark argues that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1), the district court should have denied Liljeberg Enterprises’s motion to assume because Liljeberg Enterprises’s transactional and operational defaults under the pharmacy agreement are incurable and because Liljeberg Enterprises cannot provide adequate assurance of future performance. Lifemark’s arguments regarding transactional defaults require

interpretation of several contractual documents. “The district court’s

interpretation of a contract is reviewed de novo,” and “[t]he contract and record are reviewed independently and under the same standards that guided the district court.” At the same time, “if the

interpretation, of the contract turns on the consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as evidence of the intent of the parties, the standard of review is clearly erroneous,” but, if “intent is determined solely from the language of the contract, then contractual

interpretation is purely a question of law,” and' “[t]he threshold question whether extrinsic evidence should be considered in determining the intent of the' parties is itself a question of law and thus reviewáble de novo.” In this diversity case, we look to Louisiana law for the applicable standard of contract

interpretation. “Under Louisiana law, a contract is the law between the parties, and is read for its plain meaning.” Thus, “[u]nder Louisiana law, where the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, the contract’s meaning and the intent of its parties must be sought within the four corners of the document and cannot be explained or contradicted by extrinsic evidence,” such that, “[i]f a court finds the contract to be unambiguous, it may construe the intent from the face of the document—without considering extrinsic evidence—and enter judgment as a matter of law.” Further, “ ‘[u]nder Louisiana law, a contract is ambiguous when it is uncertain as to the parties’. intentions and susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning under the circumstances and after applying established rules of construction.’ ” Put another way,- “under Louisiana law, ‘when the words of the contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further

interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent,’ ” and “[t]his established rule of strict construction does not allow the parties to create an ambiguity where none exists and does not authorize courts to create new contractual obligations, where the language of the written document clearly expresses the intent of the parties.”' The Liljebergs and the district court also rely on the rule that “under Louisiana law doubts or ambiguities as to the meaning of a contract must, if not otherwise resolvable, be eliminated by interpreting the contract against the party who prepared it.” The Supreme Court of Louisiana has applied this rule in the context of “an adhesionary contract,” noting that “any contradiction or ambiguity should be construed against Titan, the party who drafted the policy,” but that “[t]his general rule of construction ... only applies when there are two equally reasonable

interpretations of the contractual provision in question.” The statutory provision, Louisiana Civil Code

article 2056, captioned “Standard-form contracts,” provides both that, “[i]n case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a provision in a contract must be interpreted against the party who furnished its text” and that “[a] contract executed in a standard form of one party must be interpreted, in case of doubt, in favor of the other party.” This language suggests it will primarily be applied to standard-form or adhesionary contracts or, as the Supreme Court of Louisiana has most often recently applied

article 2056, to insurance contracts. Neither this court nor the Supreme Court of Louisiana has, however, confined the provision to these types of contracts. At the same time, we have held that, “while the jurisprudence of Louisiana has established a rule of contractual

interpretation which construes ambiguity against the party drafting the document in question, neither party is deemed to be the scrivener when, as here, the initial draft is modified and remodified in a series of exchanges between the parties to produce an execution draft reflecting give and take between obligor and obligee.” We first must answer whether the judicial lien and foreclosure of the hospital were defaults under the collateral mortgage and lease and, if so, whether they were transactional defaults under the pharmacy agreement’s cross-default provision.

Section 5.1(

b) of the pharmacy agreement provides: This Agreement shall be effective as set forth above and shall continue in full force and effect, unless sooner terminated with the first to occur of the following: ... (

b) Either party shall remain in breach of this Agreement for a continuous, unabated 30-day period after receipt of written notice of such breach from the other party. Should OPERATOR [Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc.]; or any of LIFEMARK’s corporate affiliates, be in default of any other contractual agreement with LIFEMARK or any of LIFEMARK’s corporate affiliates, including, but not limited to, the lease relating to the Hospital, then OPERATOR [Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc.] shall be in breach of this Agreement.

Section 5.1(

b) placed the Liljebergs in breach of the pharmacy agreement by virtue of the default under the fourth covenant of the collateral mortgage through the sale of the hospital. That covenant provides that “[t]he Mortgagor [St.

Jude] hereby agrees that should the [hospital] be mortgaged, sold or transferred, either with or without the assumption of the aforesaid indebtedness, such sale, transfer or mortgage shall constitute a breach of this contract and the obligations herein set forth.” Lifemark argues that the judicial mortgage and lien placed on the hospital was also a transactional default under the fourth and fifth covenants of the collateral mortgage.

The fourth covenant provides in relevant part, in addition to the previously-quoted language, that “[t]he [hospital] is to remain mortgaged and hypothe-cated until the full and final payment of the aforesaid indebtedness ..., the Mortgagor [St.

Jude] hereby binding itself ... not to make a conveyance, mortgage, transfer or sale of the [hospital] until full and final payment of the aforesaid indebtedness ..., unless the Mortgagee [Life-mark Hospitals, Inc.] expressly consents to such conveyance or mortgage in writing.” The fifth covenant provides, in pertinent part, that “should there be created or suffered to be created any other lien or charges superior in rank to the lien and mortgage herein granted, ... then and in any of §uch events, the Note in principal and interest and all other indebtedness secured hereby shall, at the option of the Mortgagee [Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.] shall, at the option of the Mortgagee [Life-mark Hospitals, Inc.], immediately become due and payable.... ” Finally, Lifemark argues that the Travelers lien created a default of the lease between St.

Jude and Lifemark, which provides in

Article 11.1, entitled “Warranty of Peaceable Possession and Title,” that “[djuring the Lease Term, LESSOR [St. Jude] represents and covenants that it will not create nor allow to exist any liens, encumbrances or charges relating to obligations of the LESSOR [St.

Jude] affecting the Leased Premises except liens, such as paving, water and sewerage liens, resulting from a special assessment by a Governmental Authority and the Act of Collateral Mortgage ... and any other mortgage instruments now or hereafter executed to secure the [Life-mark Hospitals, Inc.] loan ... or otherwise agreed to in writing by [Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.].” It is important to note that the collateral mortgage was signed by St. Jude and Life-mark Hospitals, Inc., not Liljeberg Enterprises and Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., while the lease of the hospital was signed by St.

Jude and Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., not Liljeberg Enterprises and Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. As a result, Lifemark argues on appeal that the first reference to Life-mark in

section 5.1(

b) of the CPA is a typographical error, and that the provision should read “or any of OPERATOR’S corporate affiliates,” such that any default of St. Jude, which is an affiliate of the “Operator,” Liljeberg Enterprises, is a default under the pharmacy agreement. The difficulty for Lifemark is that it is required to seek reformation or, to avoid absurdity, reading of the word “OPERATOR’S” into

section 5.1(

b) for “LIFEMARK’S.” Lifemark has never whole-heartedly sought reformation and with good reason. Under Louisiana law, “[r]eformation is an equitable remedy that may be used when a contract between the parties fails to express their true intent, either because of mutual mistake or fraud.” Indeed, “[t]o establish the appropriateness of reformation, [Lifemark] had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the [pharmacy agreement], as written, contained a mutual mistake and did not comport with the parties original intent.” On this appeal, Lifemark stresses that the district court erred in rejecting its

interpretation of

section 5.1(b). The district court concluded that the language in

section 5.1(

b) could have been prepared for Liljeberg Enterprises’s benefit so that a default by Lifemark or a Lifemark affiliate would have allowed Liljeberg Enterprises to terminate the pharmacy agreement or seek damages. Lifemark replies that this suggested rational basis for the provision’s otherwise embarrassing phrasing is not so simple. Rather, this rescue requires a finding that the scriveners made four errors in the provision, instead of the one error that would exist under Lifemark’s

interpretation. Lifemark’s argument, while strong, is not clear and convincing evidence of mutual mistake or fraud in the formation of the pharmacy agreement. Lifemark also says that John Liljeberg testified that the Travelers lien could cause a default under the pharmacy agreement’s cross-default provision. As we read the testimony, Liljeberg did not admit any mutual mistake in the drafting of

section 5.1(

b) of the pharmacy agreement. Rather he indicated only that his attorney was concerned that the Travelers lien and foreclosure might sever the pharmacy agreement. At the same time, “Louisiana courts will not interpret a contract in a way that leads to unreasonable consequences or inequitable or absurd results even when the words used in the contract are fairly explicit.” Lifemark argues that the assertion that there was no typographical error in

section 5.1(

b) of the pharmacy agreement is untenable because it leads to the nonsensical result that, when read literally,

section 5.1(

b) provides that Liljeberg Enterprises would be in breach if a Lifemark affiliate defaulted under an agreement with another Lifemark affiliate. Lifemark points out that this reading of

section 5.1(

b) is contrary to its plain language. That provision sets forth a default on “the lease relating to the Hospital” as an example of the type of breach that will trigger the cross-default provision. They note that, under Lilje-berg Enterprises’s reading, such a breach of the lease could not trigger the cross-default provision because it is not an agreement between Liljeberg Enterprises and a Lifemark affiliate or an agreement between two Lifemark entities. This is a stronger argument for Lifemark’s

interpretation of

section 5.1(b). Particularly so in light of several controlling standards for contract

interpretation under Louisiana law:

(1) Every provision of the contract must be interpreted in light of the contract’s other provisions in order to give each provision the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole;

(2) Contract provisions susceptible to different meanings should be interpreted so as not to neutralize or ignore any provision, or treat any provision as mere surplusage and so as to preserve the validity of the contract; and (3) “ ‘A doubtful provision must be interpreted in light of the nature of the contract, equity, usages, the conduct of the parties before and after the formation of the contract, and of other contracts of a like nature between the same parties.’ ” Only if these rules do not resolve the issue of how to interpret the contractual provision at issue should the provision be interpreted against the party that drafted it, which default rule applies, in any event, “only ... when there are two equally reasonable

interpretations of the contractual provision in question.” We conclude that Lifemark’s

interpretation of

section 5.1(b), providing that “LIFEMARK’S” should be read as “OPERATOR’S” in the first reference in the provision, is the only construction of the provision which gives it the meaning suggested by the pharmacy agreement as a whole and which does not neutralize or ignore any provision or treat any provision as mere surplusage. In particular, this reading of

section 5.1(

b) makes sense of the example of the lease of the hospital between St. Jude and Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., which was signed only a month after Liljeberg Enterprises and Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. entered into the pharmacy agreement. In short, reading

section 5.1(

b) literally leads to absurd results, inter alia, that Lilje-berg Enterprises would be required to answer for a default by one of Lifemark’s corporate affiliates, whereas the

interpretation advanced by Lifemark represents the most reasonable

interpretation of the provision in question following the established rules of contract

interpretation under Louisiana law. We conclude that the district court erred in finding

section 5.1(

b) to be unenforeea-ble and therefore severable from the pharmacy agreement pursuant to

section 10 and in finding that “[t]he obligations contained in the [pharmacy agreement] are severable from St. Jude’s obligations to [Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.] under the mortgage and [Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc.] under the lease.” We further hold that the district court clearly erred in finding, largely implicitly, that the Travelers judicial mortgage and the judicial sale of the hospital were not defaults under the fourth covenant of the collateral mortgage.

The district court also clearly erred in finding that “[t]he mortgage when viewed in tandem with the lease was incapable of default since the obligations owed by [Lifemark] under the lease would satisfy all of the obligations due by St. Jude to [Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.] under the terms of the financing.” Under the express terms of the collateral mortgage, the hospital was not be mortgaged or sold. These events were breaches of the non-finaneial covenants of the collateral mortgage and the undisputed fact is that the hospital was both mortgaged and sold.

It is no answer that the mortgage and sale resulted from Life-mark’s actions and not Liljeberg Enterprises’s or St. Jude’s. The express language of the fourth covenant does not confine its prohibition of sales or mortgages of the hospital to events caused by St. Jude. We have already concluded that the district court clearly erred in finding the superior rank of the Travelers judicial mortgage and the resulting judicial sale of the hospital to have been the result of a breach of fiduciary duties, bad faith, or collusion on the part of Lifemark.

Moreover, the district court made no findings that Liljeberg Enterprises had cured or provided adequate assurance that it will promptly cure such a default, nor could the district court have done so on this record. The Liljebergs, however, attempt to escape the effect of the default under the collateral mortgage by attacking the validity of the cross-default provision of the pharmacy agreement. These efforts are unavailing.

The Travelers judgment which gave rise to the judicial mortgage and lien and subsequent judicial sale of the hospital did not occur solely because of Liljeberg Enterprises’s financial condition upon the filing of its

Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. To assert that it did ignores the Liljebergs’ bad faith conduct, as found by this court, in their dealings with Travelers. Contrary to the Liljebergs’ assertion, relegated to a footnote, that the pharmacy agreement’s cross-default provision is legally invalid because it impermissibly hinges on Liljeberg Enterprises’s financial condition and ability to pay under the other contracts, the cross-default provision does not run afoul of the exceptions to 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(l)’s requirements provided under sections 365(b)(2)(

A) or 365(e)(1)(A). There is non-binding authority from bankruptcy and district courts outside of this circuit, cited by the Lilje-bergs, for the propositions that cross-default provisions do not integrate otherwise separate transactions or leases and that

section 365 prohibits the enforcement of cross-default provisions where enforcement would restrict the debtor’s ability to assume an executory contract.

We agree with another bankruptcy court which recently synthesized these authorities, and concluded that, while “cross-default provisions are inherently suspect,” they are not per se invalid in the bankruptcy context, and “a court should carefully scrutinize the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular transaction to determine whether enforcement of the provision would contravene an overriding federal bankruptcy policy and thus impermissi-bly hamper the debtor’s reorganization.” Before finding that a cross-default provision involving a lease and non-lease agreements, including a note, similar to that here, was enforceable, the bankruptcy court concluded that “[f]ed-eral bankruptcy policy is offended where the non-debtor party seeks enforcement of a cross-default provision in an effort to extract priority payments under an unrelated agreement,” such that “[a] creditor cannot use the protections afforded it by

section 365(b) (which requires curing of defaults and adequate assurances of future payments as a precondition to assumption of an executory contract or unexpired lease) in order to maximize its returns by treating unrelated unsecured debt as a de facto priority obligation.” As such, “where the non-debtor party would have been willing, absent the existence of the cross-defaulted agreement, to enter into a contract that the debtor wishes to assume, the cross-default provision should not be enforced,” but “enforcement of a cross-default provision should not be' refused where to do so would thwart the non-debtor party’s bargain.” The court also noted that “[t]he fact that legally separate entities are parties .to the various contracts does not of itself preclude enforcement of the cross-default provision” and that, “[w]here documents are contemporaneously executed as necessary elements of the same transaction, such that there would have been no transaction without each of the other agreements, the fact that nominally distinct parties executed the agreements will not preclude enforcement of a cross-default provision in favor of a party whose economic interests are identical to those of the entity that is party to the document containing the cross-default provision.” Here, there is ample support for the conclusion that the lease and collateral mortgage of the hospital are interrelated with the pharmacy agreement and that there would have been no pharmacy agreement without the lease- of the hospital or the loan secured by the collateral mortgage.

Indeed, the parties agreed in the pre-trial order that St. Jude would not have entered into the lease of the hospital to Lifemark if Lifemark had refused to enter into the pharmacy agreement with Liljeberg Enterprises. It is true that the lease was signed a month after the pharmacy agreement was executed, but

section 5.1(

b) expressly contemplates “the lease relating to the Hospital” as an instrument covered by the cross-default provision. The parties also agreed that John Lilje-berg signed a letter of intent dated December 20,1982, with Lifemark concerning a proposal to develop St. Jude Hospital. The district court, in considering the effectiveness of an alleged default under pharmacy agreement

section 5.1(e), found that “although it is evident that the [pharmacy agreement] was a part of the overall transaction, it is not evident from the documents executed one month after the [pharmacy agreement] that the [pharmacy agreement] was not severable from the remainder of the transaction,” such that “a default under the [pharmacy agreement] would not collapse the loan or the Lease.” That observation adds nothing.

Non-enforcement of the cross-default provision, providing that a default under the collateral mortgage or lease would collapse the pharmacy agreement, would thwart Life-mark’s bargain in agreeing to enter into the pharmacy agreement, all a part of the overall transaction to finance the building of the hospital through a loan secured by a collateral mortgage. Any finding, express or implied, to the contrary by the district court is clearly erroneous on the record before us. C. In sum, the district court erred in allowing Liljeberg Enterprises to assume the pharmacy agreement pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365.

Liljeberg Enterprises’s assumption of the pharmacy agreement is barred pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(

A) by defaults under the fourth covenant of the collateral mortgage in the form of the judicial mortgage placed on and judicial sale of the hospital, which in turn resulted in an incurable default under

section 5.1(

b) of the pharmacy agreement. We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment in Cause No. 93-1794 granting Liljeberg Enterprises’s motion to assume the pharmacy agreement. VII.

Cause No. 93-4249 The district court in Cause No. 93-4249 ruled that Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., American Medical, and Tenet are liable to Liljeberg Enterprises for damages in the total amount of $12,432,905.92 for breach of payment due under the pharmacy agreement, specifically for the following: (1) $4,062,396 for Lifemark’s failure to reimburse Liljeberg Enterprises its actual acquisition costs for the period August 31, 1989 through June 1, 1993; (2) $700,000 as lost profits for Lifemark’s failure to purchase contrast media through the date of trial from Lilje-berg Enterprises as required under the pharmacy agreement; (3) $2,023,571 for Lifemark’s wrongful disallowance of requested payment to Liljeberg Enterprises due to pricing differences and other items not specifically addressed in the district court’s judgment through the date of trial; (4) $103,617 for Lifemark’s wrongfully deducting bad debt allowances from its payments on the cost reimbursement portion of Liljeberg Enterprises’s billing through the date of trial; (5) $150,275.60 for Life-mark’s failure to implement minimum fee increases due to Liljeberg Enterprises under the pharmacy agreement through the date of trial; (6) $54,055 for Lifem

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