Eugenio RAMIREZ-MENA, Petitioner v. Eric J. HOLDER, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent, 324 F. App'x 434

PER CURIAM: Eugenio Ramirez-Mena (Ramirez) petitions for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) summarily dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order finding him removable and granting voluntary departure. He also petitions for review of the BIA’s order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. However, Ramirez has abandoned any challenge to the BIA’s October 29, 2007,

summary dismissal of his appeal by failing to brief it. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987)). The BIA denied the motion to reopen on the ground that Ramirez had overstayed his period of voluntary departure and therefore was statutorily ineligible for the relief sought. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 388 (5th Cir.2006).

Ramirez contends that the BIA erred in denying his motion to toll the voluntary departure period, which he filed contemporaneously with his motion to reopen. The applicable statutory and regulatory provisions, however, make clear that the BIA was without authority to extend the voluntary departure period beyond the 60 days already granted. See Dada v. Mukasey, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2307, 2316, 171 L.Ed.2d 178 (2008); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f); see also Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391.

Ramirez did not seek to withdraw his request for voluntary departure prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period. See Dado, 128 S.Ct. at 2318-20. The BIA’s denial of the motion to stay or extend the voluntary departure period was not error. Ramirez became ineligible for the relief he sought, adjustment of status and cancellation of removal, because he failed to depart the United States within the 60-day voluntary departure period, which expired while his motion to reopen was pending. See § 1229e(d)(B). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.

See Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391; § 1229c(d)(B). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. Pursuant to 5th Cut. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.