Anthony Quinn GIBSON, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Carey ESTES, Individually, Defendant-Appellant, 338 F. App'x 476

EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge: Anthony Quinn Gibson (“Gibson”) sued Mayor Carey Estes in his individual capacity under state law for malicious interference with employment after Gibson was fired. The jury awarded Gibson $60,000 in actual damages. After reviewing the briefs, hearing oral argument, and relying on pertinent portions of the record, we conclude that the issues raised on appeal do not present reversible error.

First, we reject Estes’s contention that Mississippi law requires an independent tort to be the basis for the “unlawful purpose” prong of the claim for malicious interference with at-will employment. See Levens v. Campbell, 733 So.2d 753, 760-61 (Miss.1999) (elements of claim include “3) that [intentional acts] were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant....”). No Mississippi case supports this

interpretation. Although the interplay of “bad faith,” unlawful purpose, and “without right or justifiable cause” are confusing at the margins of analysis, the discussion of Levens in Monism binds the federal courts and sufficiently resolves any conundrum for purposes of this case. See Morrison v. Miss. Enterp. for Tech., Inc., 798 So.2d 567, 575-76 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). Because we see no fatal inconsistency in state court decisions, there is therefore no benefit to the legal system in attempting to certify this case to the Mississippi Supreme Court.

Second, based on Levens and Monison, there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict that Mayor Estes exhibited bad faith by seeking Gibson’s termination in order to retaliate for Gibson’s law enforcement activities against Estes and his family and to prevent future investigations. There was also sufficient evidence that Mayor Estes’s actions caused the termination. AFFIRMED. Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.