ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES PER CURIAM: In Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir.2008), vacated by — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2340, 176 L.Ed.2d 559 (2010), we held, inter alia, that the alleged failure of Jesus Natividad Santos-Sanchez’s attorney to warn him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel warranting coram nobis relief. In Padilla v.
Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment mandates that “counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). Subsequently, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in Santos-Sanchez and remanded the case to us for further consideration. We find that Padilla has abrogated our holding in Santos-Sanchez. We therefore vacate the district court’s denial of Santos-Sanchez’s petition for a writ of coram no-bis and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with Padilla. VACATED and REMANDED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. . We note that Santos-Sanchez’s deportation neither deprives the district court of jurisdic-lion nor renders his petition moot. See Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir.2004) (holding, in the context of a writ of habeas corpus, that a bar on re-admission following removal or deportation is a legally cognizable collateral consequence, and thus deportation did not render the petition moot).