Eric WATKINS, Petitioner-Appellant v. Michael W. GARRETT, Warden, Respondent-Appellee, 514 F. App'x 443

PER CURIAM: Proceeding pro se and in forma pauper-is, Eric Watkins, former federal prisoner # 55630-004, appeals the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, filed but not decided while he was incarcerated, challenging the validity of a prison disciplinary proceeding, which resulted in the loss, inter alia, of 21 days good-time credit. The petition was filed in 2009; Watkins was released from custody in 2010. The court dismissed Watkins’ petition as moot and, in the alternative, on grounds that his due-process claims lacked merit.

Watkins contends his release from prison did not render the petition moot because: (1) he remains “in custody” for purposes of § 2241(c)(3) because he continues to serve supervised release; and (2) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) (court may modify supervised release prior to its expiration) and United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000), the district court had jurisdiction to modify his supervised release if it found he was incarcerated beyond expiration of his prison term. Mootness is a question of law reviewed de novo. E.g., Bayou Liberty Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S.

Army Corps of Eng’rs, 217 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir.2000). Watkins is “in custody” for purposes of pursuing federal habeas relief because he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Complex in Beaumont, Texas, when he filed the instant § 2241 petition, and he is currently serving a four-year term of supervised release. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989); Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir.2006). The relevant inquiry, however, is whether Watkins satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement of

Article III,

section 2 of the Constitution. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Watkins did not seek reduction of supervised release under § 3583(

e) in district court; and, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider reduction because Watkins was sentenced in the Northern District of Florida, and no transfer of jurisdiction was effected. See 18 U.S.C. § 3605 (authorizing exercise of jurisdiction over person on supervised release if jurisdiction transferred by sentencing court). Further, he has not shown the disciplinary action will cause him to suffer adverse consequences. E.g., Bailey v.

Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278-79 (5th Cir.1987) (holding former federal prisoner’s appeal seeking expungement of disciplinary reports and restoration of good-time credit moot because court could not provide relief after release, and prisoner did not allege future adverse consequences). AFFIRMED. Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.