Felicia N. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GREENWAY MERCEDES; Mercedes Benz of Houston Greenway, Defendants-Appellees, 534 F. App'x 244

PER CURIAM: Felicia N. Jones appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “The district court must dismiss [an] action if it finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir.2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)). A district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Id. Although this court liberally construes pro se briefs, “even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them.” Mapes v.

Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.1993) and Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)). Jones has failed to make a coherent argument challenging the district court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. When an appellant fails to identify any error in the district court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant had not appealed that issue. Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987).

Jones has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. Because Jones’s appeal presents no legal points arguable on their merits, the appeal IS DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2. We recently issued Jones a sanction warning in Jones v. Vouitton, No. 12-20562, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. May 28, 2013). Jones filed her notice of appeal and her brief in the instant case before we issued that warning.

We repeat our WARNING that any future frivolous pleadings filed by her in this court or in any court subject to the jurisdiction of this court will subject her to sanctions. Jones should review any pending matters to ensure that they are not frivolous. Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.