Heather CLARK; David Claxton; David M. Compton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAMSON COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee, 538 F. App'x 579

PER CURIAM: This action for unpaid wages involves a dispute over the implementation of the Fluctuating Workweek (“FWW”) method for calculating overtime pay. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.114. Named plaintiffs Heather Clark, David Claxton, David Compton, and 112 other paramedics (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued their employer, Williamson County (“the County”), alleging that it violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by failing to pay them at least one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for overtime hours. The district court entered

summary judgment for the County, adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation concluding that the County’s payment scheme complied with the FLSA under the FWW method. Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal and contend that the County’s compensation system was not a valid FWW system. We review de novo the district court’s grant of

summary judgment. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Rentech Steel LLC, 620 F.3d 558, 562 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Canal Indem. Co., 352 F.3d 254, 259-60 (5th Cir.2003)). Plaintiffs “bear[ ] the burden of proving that the [County] failed to properly administer the FWW method.” Samson v. Apollo Res., Inc., 242 F.3d 629, 636 (5th Cir.2001) (citing Cash v. Conn Appliances, Inc., 2 F.Supp.2d 884, 896 (E.D.Tex.1997)). The magistrate judge determined that Plaintiffs could not meet this burden.

The district court agreed with this decision, concluding that the magistrate judge’s “application of the law and legal analysis in support of his conclusions [was] sufficient and appropriate.” We agree. After reviewing the briefs and relevant law, examining pertinent portions of the record, and hearing oral argument, we conclude that the County is entitled to

summary judgment. AFFIRMED. Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.