PER CURIAM: Robert A. Tuft, Texas prisoner # 1062966, appeals the district court’s decision on remand to grant
summary judgment on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. In his § 1983 claim, Tuft challenges the participation of Kathren Gonzalez, a female corrections officer, in a cross-sex strip search of his person performed on February 26, 2005, after corrections officers detected the smell of cigarette smoke in the prison dormitory. According to Tuft, Gonzalez participated in this search for the purpose of coercing Tuft to disclose information regarding the contraband cigarettes. Tuft claims that the search violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. He raises several issues on appeal. Tuft contends that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Gonzalez based on qualified immunity. “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir.2011).
A right is clearly established if “the contours of [the] right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). To find a right clearly established, “we must be able to point to controlling authority — or a robust consensus of persuasive authority — that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity and that places the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Waganfeald v.
Gusman, 674 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Tuft has not shown that Gonzalez’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The rights that Tuft asserts in this action were not clearly established at the time of the search under either controlling authority or a consensus of persuasive authority. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting Gonzalez’s motion for
summary judgment, denying Tuft’s cross-motion for
summary judgment, and denying Tuft’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Tuft next argues that the district court erred in excluding Levi Peterson, a male corrections officer, as a defendant in his claim regarding the cross-sex strip search. Yet, Tuft did not name Peterson as a defendant or move to amend his complaint to add Peterson. Even if this court were to construe Tuft’s memorandum in opposition to
summary judgment as a motion to amend, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Peterson. Tuft’s proposed amendment would be futile in light of the qualified immunity analysis above. See Avatar Exploration, Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 321 (5th Cir.1991) (“We ... affirm denials of motions to amend when amendment would be futile.”). Tuft claims that the district court abused its discretion in striking his supplemental response to Gonzalez’s motion for
summary judgment, which contained the revised version of the prison policy governing cross-sex strip searches enacted in 2006. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider this document as untimely, filed without leave of court, and pertaining to a policy enacted after the 2005 search. Finally, Tuft moves to disqualify the district court judge. Because Tuft fails to raise any facts or circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality, see Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir.2003), his motion is denied. AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.