Jeremiah Dewayne ARNOLD, Petitioner-Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee, 598 F. App'x 298

PER CURIAM: Invoking 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Jeremiah Dewayne Arnold, federal prisoner # 45645-019, filed the instant suit to challenge his conviction for use of a firearm during a crime of violence and his 25-year sentence. The district court determined' that the suit was best classed as an unauthorized successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and dismissed it. In this appeal, Arnold argues that his claims are properly brought under § 2241 because they concern fundamental errors in the criminal process and because the claims have not previously been considered on the merits.

He also argues that the district court erred by not considering Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). When considering the denial of a § 2241 petition, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Christopher v. Miles, 342 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir.2003). Our analysis of Arnold’s arguments and pertinent authority shows no error in connection with the district court’s judgment. Because Arnold’s arguments relate to events that occurred prior to or at sentencing, his suit arises under § 2255. See Padilla v.

United States, 416 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir.2005). He has already filed the one § 2255 motion to which he is entitled, and he has not received authorization to file another. Consequently, the district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the motion. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h); United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir.2000). Insofar as Arnold contends that he should be permitted to file a § 2241 petition under the savings clause of § 2255 because Alleyne meets the parameters of the savings clause, he is mistaken. See Reyes-Requena v.

United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir.2001). This court has held that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. United States v. Olvera, 775 F.3d 726, 730 (5th Cir.2015). Moreover, Arnold’s reliance on Alleyne is misplaced. Alleyne extended the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), to hold that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the statutory minimum sentence must be alleged in an indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2160 & n. 1.

Here, Arnold’s sentence was enhanced based on a prior conviction, not because of some other fact. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(C)(i). Further, since the decision in Alleyne implicates the validity of a sentence, Alleyne does not establish that Arnold was convicted of a nonexistent offense. See Wesson v. U.S. Penitentiary Beaumont, TX, 305 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir.2002). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to 5th Cm. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.