PER CURIAM: This is the second of two separate civil actions involving the same parties and same dispute. Because we lack appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal. In the first suit, No. 3:16-cv-00319, Ben and Janie Dove (the “Doves”) brought suit against Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., Walter Investment Management Corporation, and other defendants (collectively “Green Tree”) in Mississippi state court (“Dove /”). Dove I was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, where it is currently stayed pending arbitration.
The district court administratively closed the case for statistical purposes, directing that any party may move to re-open the case and vacate the stay “following the completion of arbitration or if further judicial intervention is necessary.” Green Tree then filed this civil action, No. 3:16-cv-00312 (“Dove IF), to compel the Doves to arbitrate under
Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”). In Dove II, the district court compelled arbitration, and, “as nothing remain[ed] to be litigated in th[e] lawsuit,” it dismissed the case with prejudice. The Doves argue that, as a result of the district court’s ruling in Dove II, there is a final judgment rendering appellate jurisdiction appropriate. Conversely, Green Tree argues that because no final decision exists on the merits of the dispute, we lack appellate jurisdiction. We conduct an independent review of the basis of our jurisdiction.
This case presents a nearly identical jurisdictional question to that which we addressed in Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. Charles, which controls our decision in this case. In Charles, we considered whether a district court order compelling arbitration and dismissing a case with prejudice was final and appealable when an earlier order in a separate case involving the same parties stayed the underlying proceedings pending arbitration.
We noted there that under “section 16 of the FAA, ‘[a]n arbitration order entering a stay, as opposed to a dismissal, is not an appealable order.’ ” Considering both cases in tandem, consistent with the “strong federal interest” in favor of arbitration, we accordingly found that the order staying the underlying case precluded us from determining that the order of dismissal was final and appealable. As a result, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction. As in Charles, this Court, consistent with the “strong federal interest” in favor of arbitration, does not consider the orders in the two cases in isolation.
Regardless of the district court’s dismissal in the second civil case, the underlying substantive proceedings remain stayed. Therefore, this appeal does not stem from a final, appeal-able order, and we lack appellate jurisdiction. For the above reasons, we DISMISS the appeal. Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. . 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. . See Hill v. City of Seven Points, 230 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2000), . 872 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. 2017). . Id. at 639-40. .
See id. at 639 (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3)); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 87 n.2, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000); CitiFinancial Corp. v. Harrison, 453 F.3d 245, 251 (5th Cir. 2006); Apache Bohai Corp., LDC v. Texaco China, B.V., 330 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2003). . See Charles, 872 F.3d at 639. . See id.