OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; Mark P. Nye; Kenneth D. McFadden, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Keith BISSELL, Defendant-Appellant, 210 F.3d 595

SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. NELSON, J. (pp. 599-601), delivered a separate opinion concurring in both the opinion of the court and the judgment. KRUPANSKY, J. (pp. 601-12), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. OPINION SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendant, Keith Bissell, a former commissioner for the Tennessee Public Service Commission (“PSC”), was found to have violated the plaintiffs’, Mark P. Nye, Kenneth D. McFadden, and Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. (“OOIDA”), constitutional rights.

Bissell appealed and this court upheld the district court’s decision, but vacated its award of injunctive relief and remanded for clarification. In light of changing circumstances, the award of injunctive relief was found to be unnecessary, but the district court still held OOIDA to be a “prevailing party” and awarded OOIDA attorneys’ fees and costs. Bissell now challenges the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs to OOIDA. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND OOIDA brought an action against defendants PSC, Bissell, and two officers of PSC alleging that the defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting unreasonable searches of trucks traveling on public state and interstate highways in Tennessee. OOIDA also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of

Article I,

Section 8, Clause 5 of the Constitution. Thereafter,

summary judgment was granted by the district court in favor of all the defendants on the Fourth Amendment issue, as well as for the two PSC officers on the remaining issues. All claims against PSC were dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment which grants states immunity from suits in federal court. After a bench trial, the district court found that Bissell had violated OOIDA's constitutional rights and enjoined Bissell from continuing to violate the plaintiffs' rights. The district court also awarded OOIDA reasonable costs and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This court upheld the district court's grants of

summary judgment, but vacated the district court's award of injunctive relief finding that it was too vague. We remanded the case with instructions to the district court to determine if injunctive relief was still necessary since Bissell had resigned as a commissioner, and the PSC had been abolished by the Tennessee legislature. On remand, the district court found that, in light of the changed circumstances, no irreparable damage could be done, and, therefore, injunctive relief was not necessary.

The district court also found that OOIDA was still a "prevailing party" entitled to attorneys' fees and reasonable costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Citing Perket v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 905 F.2d 129, 132 (6th Cir.1990), the district court stated that, although OOIDA had not ultimately received any judicially awarded relief, it had demonstrated that the present "lawsuit acted as a `catalyst' in prompting defendants to take the desired action" and awarded OOIDA $515,700 for fees and $68,500 for costs.

STANDARD OF REVIEW This court reviews awards of attorneys' fees under an abuse of discretion standard. Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304, 308-09 (6th Cir.1988). "A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact ... or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard." Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 753 F.2d 1354, 1356 (6th Cir.1985) (citations omitted). Under this standard, this court must review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.

Perket, 905 F.2d at 132. DISCUSSION Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, district courts have the discretion to award attorneys' fees to a "prevailing party" in a civil rights lawsuit. A "prevaffing party" need not actually prevail on the merits of its claim so long as it "succeed[sJ on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978).

Any enforceable judgment, or comparable type of relief, or settlement, therefore, will generally make a plaintiff a "prevailing party" as long as "his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). A plaintiff is benefitted by "monetary damages, injunctive relief, or a voluntary change in a defendant's conduct." Woolridge v. Marlene Indus., 898 F.2d 1169, 1173 (6th Cir.1990).

If the plaintiff's relief stems from a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff must show that his or her lawsuit was the "catalyst" behind that change. Payne v. Board of Educ., Cleveland City Schools, 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir.1996). The district courts use a two-part test to determine whether a plaintiffs lawsuit is the "catalyst" to a defendant's changed behavior: First, in order to qualify as a "prevailing party," a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her lawsuit was causally related to securing the relief obtained. This determination is factual.

Secondly, plaintiff must establish some minimum basis in law for the relief secured. . . . "If it has been judicially determined that defendants' conduct, however beneficial it may be to plaintiffs' interests, is not required by law, then defendants must be held to have acted gratuitously and plaintiffs have not prevailed in a legal sense." Johnston v. Jago, 691 F.2d 283, 286 (6th Cir.1982), quoting Nadean v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir.1978). See Hewitt v.

Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987)("[I]f the defendant, under pressure of the lawsuit, alters his conduct . . . towards the plaintiff that was the basis for the suit, the plaintiff will have prevailed."). Although not conclusive, chronological evidence is a factor in determining whether a plaintiffs lawsuit is the catalyst for the defendant's changed conduct. Payne, 88 F.3d at 399. Bissell submits that the district court erred by applying the catalyst test because his resignation and the abolition of the PSC were not voluntary actions in response to the OOIDA's lawsuit.

According to Bissell, the district court failed to make any findings of facts when determining whether OOIDA was a "prevailing party." When deciding to award OOIDA attorneys' fees and costs, the district court stated: In the present case, the Court initially awarded injunctive relief to Plaintiff after concluding that Defendant Bissell's conduct violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights. The Court's opinion contained specific findings of discriminatory and unconstitutional policies and practices of the Defendants, as well as numerous illegal acts by employees of the PSC.

In vacating the injunction, the Sixth Circuit did not disturb any of the Court's substantive findings and conclusions regarding these matters, including Defendant Bissell's unconstitutional behavior. Rather, the appellant court merely vacated the injunction because of its uncertain demands and directed the Court to clarify the injunction's language, and to consider whether Defendant's conduct warrants such injunctive relief now that the PSC has been abolished and Defendant is no longer a commissioner.

The sole reason this Court did not reissue the injunction on remand was the state's interim decision to eliminate the PSC entirely, along with Defendant Bissell's resignation from his position as commissioner. These actions were largely in response to the Court's determination that widespread unconstitutional practices were taking place. The Court finds that, as in Village of Crestwood, Defendants' remedial actions were causally linked to Plaintiffs' institution of suit and initial victory in this Court. (Emphasis added.) The evidence is undisputed.

OOIDA received declaratory and injunctive relief from the district court on the merits of its case. Consequently, the district court found that OOIDA was the "prevailing party" entitled to attorneys' fees. This court upheld the district court's declaratory judgment and only vacated the award of injunctive relief so that the district court could clarify its ruling. It is also undisputed that Bissell's resignation and the abolition of the PSC occurred after OOIDA filed its lawsuit.

Although the record does lack specific findings of fact by the district court to support its conclusion that Bis-sell's actions and the abolition of the PSC were in response to the district court's early holding that widespread unconstitutional practices were taking place, the declaratory judgment issued by the district court is sufficient reason alone to deem OOIDA a “prevailing party” in this case. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding OOIDA attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs.

The eloquent dissent suggests that this opinion is contrary to our prior decision in Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n v. Bissell, No. 94-6178/6179, 1997 WL 525411 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 1997), but it is not intended to contradict our prior decision and does not in fact contradict it. Our prior decision did not set aside a declaratory judgment obtained by OOIDA, and the record shows that OOIDA likely would have obtained injunctive or other relief against Bissell had Bissell remained in office and had the PSC existed in its previous structure. AFFIRMED. . The dissent finds fault in this statement.

Although Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), states that nothing in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987), "suggested that the entry of [a declaratory] judgment in a party’s favor automatically renders that party prevailing under § 1988,” it clarifies that by holding that the judgment must affect the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff. Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 3, 109 S.Ct. 202. That has occurred here. The declaratory judgment operated as a catalyst to force Bissell’s resignation and a restructure of the PSC.

That was the conclusion of the district court which had no direct evidence on that issue but had ample circumstantial evidence upon which it could have drawn that inference.