UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James M. BOHANNON, Defendant-Appellee, 225 F.3d 615

SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KENNEDY, J., joined. BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 618-20), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. OPINION SILER, Circuit Judge. The United States of America, plaintiff, appeals an order granting a motion to suppress evidence seized from James Bo-hannon, defendant, during a warrantless search. For the reasons discussed below, we REVERSE. BACKGROUND In November 1997, law enforcement agents executed a search warrant for a trailer residence suspected of being used as a methamphetamine laboratory. Two of the agents, Mike Thompson and Sam Lee, left the residence.

It was late evening and dark outside at the time. Several agents were still inside completing the administrative portion of the search. As Lee and Thompson were walking to their car, another car drove up the driveway at a rapid rate of speed and stopped near the front porch of the residence. James Bohannon got out of the passenger’s side of the car and Johnny Bohannon got out of the driver’s side. They walked quickly toward the residence. Lee told them to stop, approached Johnny, and asked for some identification. He produced a state-issued identification card which was not a driver’s license.

James Bohannon was holding a beer in his left hand and had his right hand in his pocket when he got out of the car. Thompson asked him to set the beer down and take his hand out of his pocket and James complied. But James put his hand back in his pocket twice and acted very nervous. Finally, Thompson instructed James to raise his hands. When Thompson proceeded to frisk him, James dropped his hands. Thompson slapped James’s hands back and continued the frisk. He saw a bulge in James’s pocket and he pulled out two packs of cigarettes and some methamphetamine.

He asked James if he had any more drugs and James told him he had some more in his back pocket as well as a gun. Thompson found a loaded handgun and an extra clip in James’s waistband. After his arrest, James confessed to operating a methamphetamine laboratory. He consented to a search of his residence where agents found equipment, chemicals, and paraphernalia which could be used to manufacture methamphetamine. DISCUSSION Law enforcement officials have a limited authority to detain occupants of a premises while a proper search is being conducted. See Michigan v.

Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981). In Summers, the Court stated that: Most obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Less obvious, but sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. Finally, the orderly completion of the search may be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present. Id. at 702-703, 101 S.Ct. 2587. In the present case, James was not a resident of the premises being searched.

However, agents’ authority to detain citizens has been extended. In United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir.1993), this court held that detention of the defendant, who did not live at the residence that was being searched, was constitutional because two of the justifications for detaining residents still existed. The court stated that the search was necessary for the safety of the agents and “reasonable and proportional to law enforcement’s legitimate interests in preventing flight in the event incriminating evidence is found.” Id. at 663.

The court declared that those concerns are the same whether or not the person detained is a resident of the premises being searched. Id. Therefore, it is irrelevant that James was not a resident. The present case is also different from Summers in that James was not inside the residence. However, this fact does not make the search of James unconstitutional. As the Third Circuit concluded, “[a]l-though Summers itself only pertains to a resident of the house under search, it follows that the police may stop people coming to or going from the house if police need to ascertain whether they live there.” Baker v.

Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir.1995). The policy justifications of Summers and Fountain, especially to protect officers’ safety, are applicable in this case. “The possible danger presented by an individual approaching and entering a structure housing a drug operation is obvious. In fact, it would have been foolhardy for an objectively reasonable officer not to conduct a security frisk under the circumstances.” United States v. Patterson, 885 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir.1989).

Furthermore, because James showed every intention of walking into the house where armed officers were in the process of completing the search, his safety was also at risk. Preventing his unexpected entry into the trailer was for the safety of everyone involved. In United States v. Barrett, 890 F.2d 855, 857 (6th Cir.1989), an agent had just completed an authorized search of a residence when he noticed an automobile coming up the driveway. The agent knew couriers made deliveries of drugs to the residence.

This court held that the agent was justified in asking Barrett for identification and his purpose for being on the premises. Id. at 860. The present case is similar to Barrett. The residence searched was a suspected methamphetamine lab. Therefore, an officer could reasonably infer that a customer or distributor would arrive on the premises. The agents had reasonable suspicion that James was involved in criminal activity. Consequently, his detention was constitutional. If the detention of Bohannon was constitutional, the question becomes whether the frisk of James was authorized under the Fourth Amendment.

A law enforcement agent may conduct a pat-down search to find weapons “where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The “issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id. James was riding in a car that drove up to a residence during a nighttime search that was being conducted because the residence was suspected of being a laboratory for an illegal drug operation.

The rapid approach of the vehicle down the long driveway and James’s quick exit from the car and approach toward the front door of the trailer indicate an apparent familiarity with the residence. Given that the trailer was owned by a methamphetamine dealer, James’s apparent familiarity with the place might give the officers cause for concern that he was there to do business and may have been armed. Furthermore, the driver of the car did not provide the law enforcement agents with a driver’s license, but merely a state-issued identification card.

James acted very nervous and twice ignored the officer’s request that he keep his hands out of his pockets. A reasonable conclusion for an officer to make was that James may have been armed and dangerous. Therefore, it was reasonable and prudent for the agent “to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” Id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The policy justifications of Summers and Fountain, especially to protect officers’ safety, are applicable in this case.

Therefore, the agents had the constitutional authority to briefly detain and search James Bohannon. As a consequence, the fruits of the search and James’s inculpato-ry statement concerning his residence should not be suppressed. REVERSED.